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Chapter 1
Introduction
Depending on the context, multi-agent systems [141, 144] are usually pre-
sented as a new paradigm for computation, programming, or design. Per-
hapsmost importantly, they can be seen a philosophicalmetaphor that pro-
vides a way of modeling the world, and makes one use speciﬁc vocabulary
when describing the phenomena we are interested in. Putting it in another
way,multi-agent systems formanewparadigm for thinking and talking about
the world, and assigning it a speciﬁc conceptual structure. Components
of such systems are assumed to be autonomous, perhaps intelligent, deﬁ-
nitely active or even pro-active... having some goals and beliefs... et cetera.
Thus, the metaphor builds on the intuition that humans are agents, and
that other entities we study can be just like us to some extent.
Logic-based methods for multi-agent systems have several advantages.
Logic provides a vocabulary for naming properties of systems, and the vo-
cabulary is given precisemeaning viamodels and semantic rules. Moreover,
logical models provide a conceptual apparatus for reasoning that can be as
well used outside mathematical logic. In this thesis, we focus onmodal log-
ics with their clear and intuitively appealing conceptual machinery of pos-
sible world semantics (aka Kripke semantics). The logics draw from the long
tradition of philosophical studies on human behavior and the behavior of
the world in general, that yielded epistemic logic, deontic logic, temporal
logic etc. In particular, we investigate a branch of modal logics that can be
described as strategic logics. That is, the generic modal structure is infused
with game-theoretical notions of player, coalition , choice, strategy, outcome,
rationality, etc. Since all these concepts seem highly relevant for interaction
between autonomous entities, it seems a perfect starting point formodeling
and reasoning about multi-agent systems.
It should be pointed out that modal logics for multi-agent systems (and
their models) can be used in at least two ways. First, we may strive to rep-
resent an objective observer’s view to a multi-agent system with the instru-
ments they provide. This is the viewpoint we usually adopt while talking
about “speciﬁcation”, “design”, “veriﬁcation” etc. The observer (e.g., the
designer or the administrator of the system) may collect all relevant aspects
of the system in a Kripkemodel, and then derive or verify certain properties
of thismodel. Or, the designer can specify some desirable properties of a sys-
tem, and then try to engineer a model in which those properties hold. On
8
9 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
the other hand, a model can be also used to capture the subjective view of an
agent to the reality he is acting in. In that case, the agent can ask about prop-
erties of the world via the properties of the model, or, more importantly,
look for a strategy that makes some desirable property true in themodel.
This thesis collects several papers that investigate multi-agent systems
fromdifferent angles, using logics that combine concepts from game theory
with well established modal treatment of time, knowledge and belief. Part I
of the thesis represents the linguistic angle: we look for a language that al-
lows to capture strategic abilities of agents under imperfect information in
the most intuitive (and general) way. Part II is focused on the modeling di-
mension: we incorporate economic rationality in our view of agents, and
study its impact on agents’ behavior within the framework of modal logic.
The perspective of Part III is computational: we study the complexity of veri-
ﬁcation for several speciﬁcation languages, andobserve some intriguing pat-
terns among them. Finally, Part IV presents an attempt at integration of two
fundamental approaches to reasoning about systems: we show how certain
aspects of qualitative (logical) reasoning can be incorporated into quantita-
tive analysis of MAS in the style of Markov decision processes.
1.1 Logics for Imperfect InformationGames
Modal logics of strategic ability [6, 8, 113, 114] provide a language that suc-
cessfully combines advantages of logic and game theory. The logics have
clear and intuitive semantics, are axiomatizable, and have some interest-
ing computational properties. Moreover, they are based on an intuitively
appealing set of concepts that originate from logics of time and computa-
tion [116, 38, 44] and classical game theory [139, 109, 111]. Alternating-
time temporal logic (ATL), proposed in [6] and further developed in [7, 8],
is probably the most important logic of strategic ability that emerged in re-
cent years. ATL is built around so called cooperation modalities 〈〈A〉〉, where
A is a coalition (i.e., a group of agents). Informally, 〈〈A〉〉ϕ says that group A
has a joint strategy to ensure that, nomatter what the other agents do,ϕwill
become true.
From the game-theoretical perspective, ATL can be seen as a framework
for reasoning about extensive form games of perfect information. The se-
mantics of ATL addresses abilities of agents in these games in a convincing
way,1 but several ingredients are still missing if the logic is to be a good lan-
guage for reasoning about behavior and interaction of agents. One such in-
gredient is uncertainty: real systems seldom include agents who always per-
fect information about the current state of the affairs. We study this issue in
depth in Part I.
A number of logics have been proposed to capture agents’ abilities in
imperfect information scenarios [133, 134, 66, 83, 121, 86, 135, 3, 63], yet
none of them seems the ultimate deﬁnitive solution. Most importantly, a
coalition’s ability to achieve property ϕ should imply that the agents have
enough control and knowledge to identify and execute a strategy that en-
forces ϕ – and this turns out to be more sophisticated than it seems. In
1Although a debate on this subject has also begun recently, cf. [2, 21, 27, 140].
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particular, in order to identify a successful strategy, the agents must con-
sider not only the possible courses of action starting from the current state
of the system, but also from states that the agents cannot distinguish from
the current one. There aremany subtle cases here, inwhich initial situations
should be represented with different sets of states. The aim of the work re-
ported in Chapter 2 is to come up with a logic that handles the subtleties in
a way which is both general and elegant.
To achieve this, we build our proposal around new epistemic operators
called constructive knowledge operators. The idea has been inspired by the
tradition of constructivism which argues that one must present (or “con-
struct”) amathematical object to prove that it exists [127]. In the same spirit,
agents A constructively know that group B can enforce property ϕ if A can
present a strategy for B that guarantees achieving ϕ. The logic which we
propose has a fairly non-standard semantics: formulae are interpreted in
sets of states rather than single states. Now, for a set of states Q, one can
write M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ to express the fact that A must have a strategy which
is successful for all states in Q. Constructive knowledge operators yield sets
of states for which a single evidence (i.e., a successful strategy) should be
produced (instead of checking if the required property holds in each of the
states separately, like standard epistemic operators do).
We call the resulting languageConstructive Strategic Logic (CSL) to empha-
size that, in order to prove M,Q |= ϕ true, one must produce “construc-
tive” evidence for all possible states in set Q, rather than “circumstantial”
evidence that deals with every case q ∈ Q separately.
In terms of technical results, we show in Chapter 2 that:
1. CSL is strictly more expressive thanmost existing solutions.
2. It retains the samemodel checking complexity, namely themodel check-
ing problem isΔP2 -complete with respect to the size of the model and
the length of the formula.
3. Constructive knowledge satisﬁes axioms KD45. Moreover, a simple
syntactical restriction is sufﬁcient to guarantee validity of axiom T.
4. Standard knowledge can be deﬁned as a special case of constructive
knowledge.
We also present a number of examples to back up our claim that CSL is re-
ally the right language for qualitative reasoning about imperfect informa-
tion scenarios in multi-agent systems.
Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between CSL and one of the more
interesting previous proposals, called Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic
(ETSL) [135]. Technically, this can be seen as a minor contribution that
expands the picture from Chapter 2. However, we also propose an intu-
itive reading of the central operator in ETSL: “if A play rationally to achieve
ϕ (meaning: they never play a dominated strategy), they will achieve ϕ”.
Thus, one may treat ETSL as a logic that captures properties of agents’ ratio-
nal play (albeit in a limited sense). Under this interpretation, we use CSL
and ETSL to prove that a rational player knows that he will succeed if, and
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only if, he knows how to play to succeed. Moreover, we show that the same
is not true for rational coalitions of players.
Among other things, the results in Chapter 3 touch upon the other im-
portant ingredient which is missing in the original ATL, namely constraints
on agents’ behavior that stem from their rationality. This connects nicely to
the subject of Part II, where we discuss how rationality can be modeled and
speciﬁed, and how one can reason about the outcome of rational play.
Part I of the thesis is based on the following papers:
1. Wojciech Jamroga and Thomas A˚gotnes (2007), Constructive Knowl-
edge: What Agents CanAchieve under Imperfect Information. Journal
of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 17(4), pp. 423–475.
2. Wojciech Jamroga (2006), On the Relationship between Playing Ratio-
nally and Knowing how to Play: A Logical Account. Proceedings of the
29th German Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence KI’06, pp. 403–417,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
1.2 Plausible Behavior andRational Play
Logics of knowledge and belief are often too static and inﬂexible to be used
on real-world problems. In particular, they usually offer no concept for ex-
pressing that some course of events ismore plausible than another. This, and
especially the notion of plausibility provided by game-theoretical solution
concepts, is the main focus of Part II. We propose how plausibility and ra-
tionality can be modeled, and how one can reason about the outcome of
plausible behavior and/or rational play on top of these models.
Chapter 4 addresses the general perspective. We extend modal logics
of time and knowledge with a notion of plausible behavior: the notion is
added to the language of CTLK [115], which is a straightforward combina-
tion of the branching-time temporal logic CTL [41, 38] and standard epis-
temic logic [57, 42]. In our approach, plausibility is modeled as a temporal
property of behaviors. That is, some behaviors of the system can be assumed
plausible and others implausible, with the underlying idea that the latter
should perhaps be ignored in practical reasoning about the future. Behav-
iors are formally modeled as computations (or paths) in the system. Since
we use branching-time logic as the starting point, the resulting language al-
lows for reasoning about what can (or must) plausibly happen.
Moreover, we propose a particular notion of beliefs (inspired by [126,
46]), deﬁned on top of knowledge and plausibility. The main intuition is
that beliefs are facts that an agent would know if he assumed that only plausi-
ble things could happen. An actual notion of plausibility can emerge in many
different ways. For example, it may result from observations and learning,
knowledge exchange, folk knowledge, or adopting a rationality criterion from
game theory.
We believe that humans use such a concept of plausibility and “practical
beliefs” quite often in their everyday reasoning. Restricting one’s reasoning
to plausible possibilities is essential to make the reasoning feasible, as the
space of all possibilities is exceedingly large in real life. Of course, this does
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not exclude a more extensive analysis in special cases, e.g. when our plau-
sibility assumptions do not seem accurate any more, or when the cost of
inaccurate assumptions can be too high (as in the case of high-budget busi-
ness decisions). But even in these cases, we usually do not get rid of plau-
sibility assumptions completely – we only revise them to make them more
cautious. That is, when planning to open an industrial plant in the UK, we
will probably consider the possibility of our main contractor taking her life,
butwewill still not take into account the possibilities of: an invasion ofUFO,
England being destroyed by a meteorite, Fidel Castro becoming the British
Prime Minister etc. Note that this is fundamentally different from using a
probabilistic model in which all these unlikely scenarios are assigned very
low probabilities: in that case, they also have a very small inﬂuence on our
ﬁnal decision, but we must process the whole space of physical possibilities
to evaluate the options.
We investigate some important properties of plausibility, knowledge, and
belief in this new framework. In particular, we show that:
1. Knowledge is an S5modality (as expected), and that beliefs satisfy ax-
iomsK45 in general, andKD45 for the class of plausibly serial models.
2. The relationship betweenknowledge andbelief for plausibly serialmod-
els is natural and reﬂects the initial intuition well.
3. Plausibility assumptions canbe speciﬁed in the object language through
a plausibility update operator, with natural properties.
4. Model checking formulae of CTLKwith plasibility is nomore complex
than model checking CTL and CTLK, i.e., it is P-complete in the size
of the model and the length of the formula.
Several modal notions of plausibility were already discussed in [46, 47,
126, 107, 93]. In these papers, like in ours, plausibility is used as a primitive
semantic concept that helps to deﬁne beliefs on top of agents’ knowledge.
However, our plausibility is deﬁned as a temporal property, i.e., it is a prop-
erty of temporal paths rather than states, andwe use branching (rather than
linear) timewith explicit quantiﬁcation over temporal paths. Moreover, our
framework is more computationally oriented since its semantics is based on
concepts and representations that were devised tomodel interaction of pro-
cesses in computational systems. Finally, our logic provides a mechanism
for specifying and updating sets of plausible paths in the object language.
Thus, plausibility sets can be speciﬁed in a succinct way, which is another
feature that makes our framework computation-friendly. The model check-
ing results are especially encouraging in this light.
All these differences are rather subtle. Chapter 5 departs more signiﬁ-
cantly from the existing modal approaches to plausible reasoning. Here,
the notion of plausibility is given a game-theoretical foundation. Game the-
ory identiﬁes a number of solution concepts (e.g., Nash equilibrium, undom-
inated strategies, Pareto optimality) that can be used to deﬁne rationality of
players. Then, one can assume that players play rationally in the sense of one
of the concepts, and we ask about the outcome of the game under this assump-
tion. Note that solution concepts do not only help to determine the right
decision for “our” agent. Perhaps even more importantly, they constrain
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the possible (predicted) responses of the opponents. For many games the
number of all possible outcomes is inﬁnite, although only some of them
“make sense”. Still, we need a notion of rationality (like subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium) to discard the “less sensible” ones, and determine what
should happen had the game been played by ideal players.
There are two possible points of focus in this context. Research within
game theory understandably favors work on characterization of various types
of rationality (and deﬁning most appropriate solution concepts). Applica-
tions of game theory, also understandably, tend toward using the solution
concepts in order to predict the outcome in a given game (in other words,
to “solve” the game). The ﬁrst issue has been studied in the framework of
logic, for example in [11, 19, 124, 125]; more recently, game-theoretical so-
lution concepts have been characterized in dynamic logic [62, 61], dynamic
epistemic logic [14, 128], and ATL [130, 85]. The second issue seems to have
been neglected in logic-based research: papers by Van Otterloo and his col-
leagues [137, 138, 136, 135] are the only exceptions we know of (and each
of them commits to a particular view of rationality). Here, we try to ﬁll in
this gap, and propose a general, modal logic-based framework for reason-
ing about behavior and abilities of rational agents. We also attempt to show
that, with temporal formulae, muchmore can be said about the outcome of
rational play than just the payoff values at the end of the game.
Chapter 5 includes the following results:
1. We extend ATL to a new logic ATLP (“ATL with Plausibility”) that al-
lows to reason about what agents can achieve under an arbitrary plau-
sibility assumption. E.g., one can assume that the agents can only play
Nash equilibria, or undominated strategies, and ask which outcomes
can be obtained by whom under this assumption.
2. We extend the results from [130, 85], and show that the classical solu-
tion concepts (Nash equilibrium, subgame perfectNash equilibrium, Pareto
optimality, and others) can be characterized in ATLP. In consequence,
ATLP can serve both as a language for reasoning about rational play,
and for specifying what rational play is.
3. We propose an alternative approach to deﬁning solution concepts for
inﬁnite games by specifying “winning conditions” with temporal for-
mulae. We also demonstrate how these “qualitative” solution con-
cepts (parameterized with temporal formulae) can be characterized in
ATLP.
4. We constructively show that several relevant logics can be embedded
into ATLP.
5. We show that, for different subclasses of the new logic, the complexity
of model checking ATLP ranges fromΔP3 -completeness to PSPACE-
completeness. We also argue that, when the number of plausible strat-
egy proﬁles is reasonably small, the model checking can be done in
polynomial time.
Part II of the thesis is based on the following papers:
1.3. VERIFICATION INMULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 14
1. Nils Bulling and Wojciech Jamroga (2007), Agents, Beliefs, and Plau-
sible Behavior in a Temporal Setting. Proceedings of the 6th Inter-
national Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
AAMAS’07, pp. 570–577.
2. Nils Bulling,Wojciech Jamroga, and Ju¨rgenDix (2008), Reasoning about
Rational Agents in ATLP. Annals of Mathematics and AI. To appear.
1.3 Veriﬁcation inMulti-Agent Systems
A study of computational complexity is nowadays almost obligatory in a pa-
per on logic in MAS. Authors usually study the complexity of model check-
ing and/or satisﬁability checking of their logic in order to back the useful-
ness of the proposal with a formal argument. Unfortunately, the results bear
often only a limited connection to the “practical” complexity which is en-
counteredwhen one tries to use the formalism in reality. Moreover, it is pos-
sible to manipulate the context so that different complexity results are ob-
tained for the same problem. In Part III, we study the model checking com-
plexity for some variants od ATL with perfect and imperfect information.
In particular, we show that veriﬁcation with ATL is not as cheap as it seems
according to the complexity results from [7, 8]. Moreover, we demonstrate
how the complexity class of the model checking problem changes when we
change the way we represent input and/or measure its size.
1. It is well known that ATLmodel checking can be done in time linear in
the size of themodel. InChapter 6, we point out that the size of anATL
model is usually exponential in the number of agents. Moreover, when
the size of models is deﬁned in terms of states and agents rather than
transitions, it turns out that the problem is ΔP3 -complete for concur-
rent game structures, andΔP2 -complete for another class of ATL mod-
els called alternating transition systems.
2. We show that for “Positive ATL” that allows for negation only on the
level of propositions, model checking is somewhat cheaper, namely it
is ΣP2 -complete for concurrent game structures, andNP-complete for
alternating transition systems.
3. We present a nondeterministic polynomial reduction from checking
arbitrary alternating transition systems to checking turn-based transi-
tion systems. We also discuss the determinism assumption in alternat-
ing transition systems, and show that it can be easily removed.
4. We study themodel checking complexity for a variant of ATLwith im-
perfect information (ATLir). We show that theproblem isΔP2 -complete
in the number of transitions and the length of the formula, therefore
closing a gap in previous work of Schobbens [121]. Furthermore, we
prove that model checking ATLir is ΔP3 -complete with respect to the
number of agents, states and actions in the concurrent game structure
(ΣP2 -complete for “Positive ATLir”). Thus, model checking of agents’
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abilities for imperfect information appears harder than for perfect in-
formation when a coarser measure of the input is used, but both prob-
lems fall into the same complexity class when a ﬁner-grained measure
is used.
5. Finally, in Chapter 7, we propose a new class of representations that
can be used for modeling (and model checking) temporal, strategic
and epistemic properties of agents and their teams. Our representa-
tions follow the main ideas from interpreted systems of Halpern, Fagin
et al. [58, 42]; however, they are also modular and compact in the way
concurrent programs [92] are. We conclude with a somewhat surpris-
ing result thatmodel checking ability under imperfect information for
the new class can be computationally cheaper than model checking
perfect information.
The resulting pattern of complexity is at least intriguing. Perfect infor-
mation makes model checking cheaper, comparable, or harder than imper-
fect information, depending on the abstraction level and the way we deﬁne
the size of the input. Does it mean that theoretical complexity results are
not worth anything in practice? Not necessarily – but certainly one needs to
take these results with a grain of salt. In most cases, only a more extensive
study (carried out from several different perspectives) can give us ameaning-
ful picture of the real computational difﬁculty behind the problem.
This part of the thesis is based on the following papers:
1. Wojciech Jamroga and Ju¨rgen Dix (2008), Model Checking Abilities of
Agents: A Closer Look. Theory of Computing Systems, 42(3), pp. 366–
410.
2. Wojciech Jamroga and Thomas A˚gotnes (2007), Modular Interpreted
Systems. Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Autono-
mous Agents andMultiagent Systems AAMAS’07, pp. 892–899.
1.4 StrategicReasoningforStochasticAgent
Systems
Models of multi-agent systems can be, roughly speaking, divided into two
classes. Qualitative models provide no numerical information about states of
the system and relationships between states. They are used as basic mod-
els of computation, in semantics of programming languages, and in speci-
ﬁcation and veriﬁcation of systems. They are also used in domains where
quantitative information cannot be reliably obtained nor assumed. Quanti-
tative models, on the other hand, assume that relationships are measurable,
and provide numerical information about the degrees of relations. For the
relations between states, the degrees are usually given as probabilities. For
the “qualities” of particular states, one often talks about rewards or utilities.
Quantitative representations are used in stochastic modeling, decision the-
ory, reinforcement learning, game theory etc.
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In the previous chapters, we were concerned with analysis of agent sys-
tems, based on qualitative models and descriptions. Part IV presents an at-
tempt to transfer some intuitions from qualitative approaches to the quan-
titative realm. That is, we explore analogies between transition systems and
Markovian models in order to provide a more expressive language for rea-
soning about, and speciﬁcation of agents in stochastic environments.
Quantitative analysis of processes is usually based on the notion of ex-
pected reward. Still, other features of Markov chains and Markov decision
processes canbe also interesting. InChapter 8,wepropose touse themethod-
ology of propositional modal logic in order to study quantitative properties
of systems and processes. We observe that – when truth values represent
utility of an agent – temporal operators “sometime” and “always” have a
very natural interpretation. “Sometime p” (p) can be rephrased as “p is
achievable in the future”. Thus, under the assumption that agents want to
obtain as much utility as possible, it is natural to view the operator as max-
imizing the utility value along a given temporal path. Similarly, “always p”
(p) can be rephrased as “p is guaranteed from now on”. In other words, p
asks for the minimal value of p on the path. On a more general level, every
universal quantiﬁer is essentially aminimizer of truth values, while existen-
tial quantiﬁers can be seen as maximizers. Thus, Eγ (“there is a path such
that γ”) maximizes the utility speciﬁed by γ across all paths that can occur;
likewise, Aγ (“for all paths γ”) minimizes the value of γ across paths. Also,
disjunction and conjunction can be seen as a maximizer and a minimizer:
ϕ ∨ ψ reads easily as “the utility that can be achieved through ϕ or ψ”, while
ϕ ∧ ψ reads as “utility guaranteed by both ϕ and ψ”.
Markov temporal logic (MTL), proposed in Chapter 8, makes use of the
above intuitions. We also brieﬂy consider an extension for Markov decision
processes where a single decision maker inﬂuences the behavior of the sys-
tem by choosing a stochastic policy. In terms of technical results, we show
that:
1. The simplest version of MTL (for Markov chains) strictly extends the
branching-time logic CTL*,
2. Typical ﬁxpoint properties for temporal operators do also hold for the
“state-based” subset of MTL.
Related work includes research onmulti-valuedmodal logics [50, 36, 90,
97] and probabilistic model checking [32, 65, 12]; our work comes espe-
cially close to [33], where the “Discounted CTL” was proposed. However,
we attempt at a more systematic exploration of linguistic features that are
offered by propositional modal logic. The beneﬁts of this approach can be
already seen in Chapter 9, where Markov temporal logic is extended to the
multi-agent case in a straightforward way. We show that the resulting logic
strictly extends ATLIr*, i.e., alternating-time temporal logic with memory-
less strategies. We also present ﬁxpoint characterizations for some natural
combinations of strategic, path, and temporal operators, that can be seen
as analogues of Bellman equation. The characterizations enable computing
the truth values of manyMTL formulae by solving sets of simple equations.
This part of the thesis is based on the following papers:
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1. Wojciech Jamroga (2008), A Temporal Logic for Markov Chains. Pro-
ceedings of the 7th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
andMultiagent Systems AAMAS’08, pp. 697–704.
2. Wojciech Jamroga (2008), A Temporal Logic for StochasticMulti-Agent
Systems. Proceedings of the 11th Paciﬁc Rim International Conference
on Multi-Agents PRIMA’08, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp.
239–250. To appear.
Part I
Logics for Imperfect
InformationGames
18
19
Chapter 2
Constructive Knowledge:
What Agents CanAchieve
Under Imperfect
Information (jointwork
with Thomas A˚gotnes)
Abstract. We propose a non-standard interpretation of
Alternating-time Temporal Logic with imperfect information, for
which no commonly accepted semantics has been proposed yet.
Rather than changing the semantic structures, we generalize the
usual interpretation of formulae in single states to sets of states. We
also propose a new epistemic operator for “practical” or “construc-
tive” knowledge, and we show that the new logic (which we call
Constructive Strategic Logic) is strictly more expressive than most
existing solutions, while it retains the same model checking com-
plexity. Finally, we study properties of constructive knowledge and
other operators in this non-standard semantics.
Keywords: Alternating-time Temporal Logic, strategic ability, im-
perfect information, epistemic logic.
2.1 Introduction
Modal logics of strategic ability [6, 8, 113, 114] form one of the ﬁelds where
logic and game theory can successfully meet. The logics have clear possible
worlds semantics, are axiomatizable, and have some interesting computa-
tional properties. Moreover, they are underpinned by a clear and intuitively
appealing conceptualmachinery formodeling and reasoning about systems
that involve multiple autonomous agents. The basic notions, used here,
originate from temporal logic (i.e., the logic of time and computation) [116,
38, 44], and classical game theory [139, 109, 111] which emerged in an at-
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tempt to give precisemeaning to common-sense notions like choices, strate-
gies, or rationality – and to provide formal models of interaction between
autonomous entities. Modal logics that embody basic game theory notions
– and at the same time build upon branching-time temporal logics, well
known and studied in the context of computational systems – seem a good
starting point for investigatingmulti-agent systems.
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL), proposed in [6] and further de-
veloped in [7, 8], is probably the most important logic of strategic ability
that has emerged in recent years. The key elements of ATL are so called coop-
eration modalities 〈〈A〉〉, one for each possible set of agents A. Informally, the
meaning of 〈〈A〉〉ϕ is that the group A has a joint strategy to ensure that, no
matter what the other agents do, ϕwill become true. However, ATL consid-
ers only agents that possess perfect information about the current state of
the world, and such agents seldom exist in reality. On the other hand, im-
perfect information and knowledge are addressed in epistemic logic in a nat-
ural way [57]. A combination of ATL and epistemic logic, called Alternating-
time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL), was introduced in [133, 134] to enable
reasoning about agents actingunder imperfect information. Still, it has been
pointed out in several places [66, 83, 86, 1] that themeaning of ATEL formu-
lae can be counterintuitive. Most importantly, an agent’s ability to achieve
property ϕ should imply that the agent has enough control and knowledge
to identify and execute a strategy that enforces ϕ.
Example 1 Let us consider a variant of the example from [121]. There is a
banker b (who knows the code that opens the safe), and a robber r who does not
know the code. The banker can also change the code, and he does so from time
to time. If a person is in the vault, and types the code correctly, the safe opens. If
incorrect code is typed, the vault door closes, jailing the person inside.
Intuitively, there is no feasible plan for r to quickly open the safe whenever he
wants to (unless he threatens or corrupts the banker to reveal the code). Reason:
whatever the current code is, the vault looks the same to r, and a sensible plan
should specify the same choices in indistinguishable situations (otherwise the plan
cannot be executed). On the other hand, there is a behavior speciﬁcation (formally:
a function from states to actions) that allows r to rob the bank, and it reads as
follows: “if you are outside then enter the vault; if you are inside and the code is
00000 then type 00000; if the code is 00001 then type 00001 etc.”. Clearly, not ev-
ery speciﬁcation like this makes up a strategy that can be executed by the player.
Those that do are sometimes called uniform strategies, and are required to pre-
scribe the same choices in indistinguishable states.1 Unfortunately, ATEL accepts
all functions from states to actions as a strategies, which does not blend well with
the assumption that agents’ knowledge is limited.
It should be noted that it is not always enough to restrict strategies to uniform
ones. Consider a situation when b has set the code to 23087 and gone for lunch (so
he will not change it again for a while), and r is now standing in front of the safe.
Obviously, there is a uniform strategy for r that leads to opening the safe, namely:
“type 23087, regardless of anything”. The robber even knows that such a successful
strategy exists. On the other hand, he does not know which strategy it is (because
1This very much in agreement with game-theoretical treatment of games with imperfect
information. A strategy in such games is a function from information sets (i.e., sets of indistin-
guishable states) to actions.
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he does not know what the current state is), and thus he does not have the ability
to open the safe for sure.
Reasoning about the collective abilities of teams requires even more so-
phisticated concepts.
Example 2 Suppose that, instead of a single robber r, a gang of robbers r1, ..., rn
is operating. If they can discuss their plans before acting, they can share their indi-
vidual information about the current state of affairs in order to determine the best
strategy (which seems to somehow be related to the notion of distributed knowl-
edge from epistemic logic). If they have to coordinate on the ﬂy, without commu-
nicating, then it is desirable that they all can separately identify the same winning
strategy, and they all know that the others can identify this strategy, and they all
know that they all know etc. (which looks very much like common knowledge).
Thus, there seems to be no single notion of collective knowledge that sufﬁces for all
possible scenarios involving collective strategic ability.
Example 3 Let us also consider an industrial company that wants to start pro-
duction, and looks for a good strategy when and how it should do it. Such a strategy
is feasible if it can be carried out by the company (i.e., by its management and em-
ployees). However, it does not have to be prepared by members of the company
themselves. In many cases, a consulting ﬁrm is hired to work out the best plan.
Then, it is enough that members of the consulting ﬁrm can work out a good strat-
egy which can be executed by the management and employees of the industrial
company.
A number of logics were proposed to capture these, and similar, proper-
ties [66, 83, 121, 86, 135, 63], yet none of them seems the ultimate deﬁnitive
solution. Most of the solutions agree that only uniform strategies should be
taken into account (cf. Example 1). However, in order to identify a success-
ful strategy, the agentsmust consider not only the possible courses of action
starting from the current (actual) state of the system, but also from states
that the agents cannot distinguish from the current one. There are many
variants here, especially when group epistemics is concerned, as Examples 2
and 3 demonstrate. The agents may have common, mutual, or distributed
knowledge2 about a strategy being successful, or they may be hinted the
right strategy by a distinguished member (the “boss”), a subgroup (“head-
quarters committee”) or even another group of agents (“consulting com-
pany”) etc. In other words, there aremany subtle cases inwhich the (subjec-
tively possible) initial situations should be represented with different sets of
states. Some existing solutions treat only some of the cases (albeit often in
an elegant way), while the others offer a very general treatment of the prob-
lem at the expense of an overblown logical language (which is by no means
elegant). Our aim is to come up with a logic of ability under imperfect informa-
tion, which is both general and elegant. By “general”, wemean that it allows to
characterize as many meaningful levels of strategic ability as possible (and
at least asmany as ATOL [83]). In particular, it should enable the distinction
between various readings of knowing a strategy “de re” and “de dicto” for
individual as well as collective players. By “elegant”, we mean that it allows
2See Section 2.2.2 for precise deﬁnitions.
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us to express various levels of ability by composition of epistemic operators
with strategic operators, instead of assigning a specializedmodality to every
conceivable combination.
To achieve this, we build our proposal around new epistemic operators
for what we call “practical” or “constructive” knowledge. The idea has been
inspired by the tradition of constructivism which argues that one must ﬁnd
(or “construct”) a mathematical object to prove that it exists [127]. In the
same spirit, agentsA constructively know that 〈〈B〉〉ϕ if they canpresent a strat-
egy for B that guarantees achieving ϕ. The logic which we propose in this
paper has a fairly non-standard semantic interpretation. We use the same
semantic structures that were used before for ATEL, ATOL, ATLir etc.; how-
ever, in our semantics formulae are interpreted over sets of states rather than
single states. This reﬂects the intuition that the “constructive” ability to en-
force ϕmeans that the agents in question have a single strategy that brings
about ϕ for all subjectively possible initial situations – and not merely that
a successful strategy exists for each initial situation (because those could be
different strategies for different situations). To do it in a ﬂexible and general
way, the type of satisfaction relation in our proposal forces one to specify
the set of initial states explicitly. In consequence, we writeM,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ to
express the fact that Amust have a strategy which is successful for all states
in a set of statesQ.
Semantically, the constructive knowledge operators yield sets of states
for which a single evidence (i.e., a successful strategy) should be presented
(instead of checking if the required property holds in each of the states sep-
arately, like standard epistemic operators do). For example,M, q |= Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ
holds iff 〈〈a〉〉ϕ is satisﬁed byM,Q, where Q is the set of states which agent
a cannot distinguish from q. We point out that the new operators capture
the notion of knowing “de re”, while the standard epistemic operators refer
to knowing “de dicto”. We call the resulting logic Constructive Strategic Logic
(CSL) to emphasize that, in order to proveM,Q |= ϕ true, onemust produce
“constructive” evidence for all possible cases inQ, rather than “circumstan-
tial” evidence that deals with every case q ∈ Q separately.
We begin with a short presentation of Alternating-time Temporal Logic
and the attempts that have been made to extend ATL to scenarios with im-
perfect information (Section 2.2). In Section 2.3we present themain contri-
bution of this paper: a new, non-standard semantics for the logic of strate-
gic ability, imperfect information and knowledge. We show that it is strictly
more expressive than the existing solutions, with the possible exception of
ETSL (Section 2.4), while it retains the same model checking complexity
(Section 2.5). Then, in Section 2.6, we study the properties of construc-
tive knowledge itself. It turns out that, when “standard” knowledge is as-
sumed to be S5, constructive knowledge is KD45. Moreover, a simple syn-
tactical restriction is sufﬁcient to guarantee validity of axiomT for construc-
tive knowledge. In Section 2.7 we show that standard knowledge is deﬁn-
able from constructive knowledge. We also observe that, when we allow a
formula to be interpreted in a set of states, several deﬁnitions of negation
(corresponding to different ways of quantifying over the set) are possible.
We introduce and discuss such alternative negations and related operators.
Finally, in Section 2.8 we investigate the relative expressiveness of some of
these operators in detail, and we deﬁne a normal form for formulae of our
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language.
Some preliminary results of this research have been reported in [73, 75].
2.2 What Agents CanAchieve
Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL [6, 7, 8] was introduced by Alur, Hen-
zinger and Kupferman in order to capture properties of open computational
systems (such as computer networks), where different components can act
autonomously. Computations in such systems are effected by the compo-
nents’ combined actions. Alternatively, ATL can be seen as a logic for sys-
tems involvingmultiple agents, that allows one to reason aboutwhat agents
can achieve in game-like scenarios. As ATL does not include imperfect infor-
mation in its scope, it can be seen as a logic for reasoning about agents who
always have complete knowledge about the current state of affairs.
2.2.1 ATL: Ability in Perfect InformationGames
ATL can be understood as a generalization of the branching time temporal
logic CTL [29, 38], in which path quantiﬁers are replaced with so called co-
operation modalities. The formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, where A is a coalition of agents,
expresses that A have a collective strategy to enforce ϕ. ATL formulae in-
clude temporal operators: “ ” (“in the next state”),  (“always from now
on”) and U (“until”). Operator (“now or sometime in the future”) can be
deﬁned asϕ ≡ U ϕ. Similarly to CTL, every occurrence of a temporal op-
erator is immediately preceded by exactly one cooperation modality.3 The
broader language of ATL∗, in which no such restriction is imposed, is not
discussed in this paper.
Formally, the recursive deﬁnition of ATL formulae is:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ
whereA is a set of agents.
Example ATL properties are: 〈〈jamesbond〉〉win (James Bondhas an infal-
lible plan to eventuallywin), and 〈〈jamesbond, bondsgirl〉〉funU shot− at (Bond
and his current girlfriend have a collective way of having fun until someone
shoots at them).
A number of semantics have been deﬁned for ATL, most of them equiv-
alent [51, 52]. In this paper, we use a variant of concurrent game structures
(CGS s) as models. A CGS is a tuple M = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o〉 which
includes a nonempty ﬁnite set of all agents Agt = {1, ..., k}, a nonempty
set of states St, a set of atomic propositions Π, a valuation of propositions
π : St → 2Π, and a set of (atomic) actions Act. Function d : Agt × St →
(2Act \ ∅) deﬁnes nonempty sets of actions available to agents at each state,
and o is a (deterministic) transition function that assigns the outcome state
q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to state q and a tuple of actions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉, αi ∈ d(i, q),
that can be executed byAgt in q. A strategy sa of agent a is a conditional plan
that speciﬁes what a is going to do for every possible situation: sa : St→ Act
3The logic to which such a syntactic restriction applies is sometimes called “vanilla” ATL
(resp. “vanilla” CTL etc.).
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such that sa(q) ∈ d(a, q). A collective strategy SA for a group of agents A is a
tuple of strategies, one per agent fromA.
Remark 1 This is a deviation from the original semantics of ATL [6, 7, 8], where
strategies assign agents’ choices to sequences of states, which suggests that agents
can by deﬁnition recall the whole history of each game. Both types of strategies
yield equivalent semantics for “vanilla” ATL, but the choice of one or the other no-
tion of strategy does affect the semantics of the full ATL* andmost ATL variants for
games with imperfect information [121]. The main reason why we use “memory-
less” strategies here is that model checking strategic abilities of agents with perfect
recall and imperfect information is believed to be undecidable (cf. Section 2.2.10).
A path λ in modelM is an inﬁnite sequence of states that can be effected
by subsequent transitions, and refers to a possible course of action (or a pos-
sible computation) that may occur in the system; by λ[i], we denote the ith
position on path λ. Function out(q, SA) returns the set of all paths that may
result from agentsA executing strategy SA from state q onward:
out(q, SA) = {λ = q0q1q2... | q0 = q and for every i = 1, 2, ... there exists
a tuple of agents’ decisions 〈α1, ..., αk〉 such that αa = SA(a)(qi−1) for
each a ∈ A, and αa ∈ d(a, qi−1) for each a /∈ A, and o(qi−1, α1, ..., αk) =
qi}.
Informally speaking, M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there is a collective strategy SA
such that ϕ holds for every λ ∈ out(q, SA). Formally, the semantics of ATL
formulae can be given via the following clauses:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ π(q) (for p ∈ Π);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q |= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ iff there is a collective strategy SA such that, for every
λ ∈ out(q, SA), we haveM,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ out(q, SA), we
haveM,λ[i] for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there existsSA such that for everyλ ∈ out(q, SA) there
is an i ≥ 0, for whichM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
Example 4 Consider a simple formalization of the scenario from Example 1,
presented in Figure 2.2.1A. First, the banker sets the code to either 0 or 1, and
walks away. Then, the robber tries to open the safe by typing a number. If the
number is correct, the safe opens; otherwise the robber is jailed in the vault. Nodes
in the graph represent global states of the system. Transitions are labeled by com-
binations of actions from b, r, and nop stands for “no operation” or “do nothing”
(formally, nop is just another action).
ATL addresses agentswith perfect information, so the following naturally holds:
M1, q0 |= 〈〈r〉〉open. The right strategy for the robber is to wait ﬁrst to see which
code is set, and then to type the appropriate number: sr(q0) = nop, sr(q1) = type0,
and sr(q2) = type1.
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q0
q3 q4
open
q1 q2
nop,nop
set0,nop
nop,type0
nop,type1
nop,type1
nop,type0
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set1,nop
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(A) q0
open
a
nop,nop
set0,nop
nop,type0
nop,type1
jail
set1,nop
nop,nop
(B)
q3 q4
q1 q2
nop,type1
nop,type0
Figure 2.1: The banker and the robber: (A) concurrent game structureM1 for
the perfect information case; (B) concurrent epistemic game structure M2
for the imperfect information case
Remark 2 Concurrent game structures model actions as abstract atomic enti-
ties, with no underlying structure. This is not necessarily satisfying for everyone’s
purposes. One may, e.g., want to deﬁne actions as state transformations that can
occur in the system, like in models of dynamic logic [60]; STIT models assign ac-
tions/choices with even more complicated conceptual structure [17]. We choose,
after [8, 121, 83, 3], to avoid the discussion on the nature of actions, and make
the simplifying assumption that actions are identiﬁed by unique names. Note that
this approach follows closely the tradition of game theory, and the deﬁnition of an
extensive game form in particular [111].
One of the most appreciated features of ATL is its model checking com-
plexity – linear in the number of transitions in the model and the length of
the formula. Themodel checking problem is, given a formulaϕ and amodel
M with a state q, to decide whetherM, q |= ϕ or not.
Proposition 1 ([8]) The ATLmodel checking problem is PTIME-complete, and
can be done in timeO(ml), wherem is the number of transitions in the model and
l is the length of the formula.
Note that the complexity is measured, as usual, as a function of the size
of the input. Thus, while inﬁnite concurrent game structures make perfect
sense in general, they cannot be subjects of model checking unless repre-
sented in a ﬁnite way.
Remark 3 The result in Proposition 1 does not seem so unambiguously opti-
mistic after a closer inspection, i.e., when we measure the size of models in the
number of states, actions and agents [78, 95, 82], or when we represent systems
with so called concurrent programs [131]. This remark is only meant as a note of
warning; such a detailed complexity analysis for the logics of ability under imper-
fect information (that are the main topic here) is beyond the scope of this paper.
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2.2.2 ATLwith Epistemic Logic
ATL is unrealistic in a sense: real-life agents seldom possess complete infor-
mation about the current state of the world. On the other hand, imperfect
information and knowledge are handled in epistemic logic in a natural way.
A combination of ATL and epistemic logic, called Alternating-time Tempo-
ral Epistemic Logic (ATEL), was introduced by van der Hoek and Wooldridge
in [133, 134] to enable reasoning about agents acting under imperfect infor-
mation.
ATEL enriches the picture with an epistemic component, adding to ATL
operators for representing agents’ knowledge: Kaϕ reads as “agent a knows
thatϕ”. Additional operatorsEAϕ,CAϕ, andDAϕ, whereA is a set of agents,
refer tomutual knowledge (“everybody knows”), common knowledge, and dis-
tributed knowledge among the agents from A. Thus, EAϕ means that every
agent in A knows that ϕ holds, while CAϕ means not only that the agents
from A know that ϕ, but they also know that they know it, and that they
know that they know that they know it, etc. The distributed knowledge
modality DAϕ expresses that if the agents could share their individual in-
formation they would be able to recognize that ϕ.
Models for ATEL extend concurrent game structures with epistemic ac-
cessibility relations ∼1, ...,∼k⊆ Q × Q (one per agent) for modeling agents’
uncertainty.4 We will call such models concurrent epistemic game structures
(CEGS) in the rest of the paper. Agent a’s epistemic relation is meant to en-
code a’s inability to distinguish between the (global) system states: q ∼a q′
means that, while the system is in state q, agent a cannot determinewhether
it is in q or q′. Then, the semantics ofKa is deﬁned as:
M, q |= Kaϕ iffM, q′ |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
Example 5 Consider modelM2 from Figure 2.2.1B, with the epistemic link be-
tween states q1 and q2 (we omit the reﬂexive indistinguishability links from q0 to
q0, q1 to q1 etc. to make the ﬁgure easier to read). This time, the scenario is more
realistic: the robber does not know the correct code. Thus, one cannot expect him to
be able to open the safe. Still, in ATEL,we have thatM2, q0 |= 〈〈r〉〉open; the same
(non-uniform) strategy as in Example 4 can be used to demonstrate this. Moreover,
we have even that M2, q0 |= Kr〈〈r〉〉open: using knowledge operators does not
help, because cooperation modalities are still underpinned by a notion of strategy
that does not agree with imperfect information of agents. This is a fundamental
problem with ATEL, which we discuss brieﬂy in Section 2.2.3.
Relations ∼EA, ∼CA and ∼DA , used to model group epistemics, are derived
from the individual relations of agents fromA. First,∼EA is the union of rela-
tions ∼a, a ∈ A. Next, ∼CA is deﬁned as the transitive closure of ∼EA. Finally,
∼DA is the intersection of all the ∼a, a ∈ A. The semantics of group knowl-
edge can be deﬁned as below (forK = C,E,D):
M, q |= KAϕ iffM, q′ |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼KA q′.
Note thatKa ≡ C{a} ≡ E{a} ≡ D{a}, so individual knowledge operators
Ka are actually redundant.
4The relations are assumed to be equivalences.
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Figure 2.2: Gambling Robots game. Nodes represent global states of the sys-
tem; arrows denote transitions, labeled with combinations of actions from
all the agents. Dashed lines indicate states that are indistinguishable for re-
spective agents. Actions of the environment agent are omitted from the pic-
ture to make it easier to read. As epistemic relations are by deﬁnition reﬂex-
ive, we omit reﬂexive epistemic links too
In order to explore the subtleties of collective play, we extend the model
from Figure 2.2.1B slightly: the pattern is the same, butmore complex prop-
erties can be demonstrated.
Example 6 (Gambling robots) Two robots (a and b) play a simple card game.
The deck consists of Ace, King and Queen (A,K,Q). Normally, it is assumed that
A is the best card, K the second best, and Q the worst; so, A beats K and Q, K
beats Q, and Q beats no card. At the beginning of the game, the “environment”
agent deals a random card to both robots (actions dealAK , dealAQ, . . . , dealQK),
so that each player can see his own card, but he does not know the card of the other
player. Then robot a can choose to exchange his card for the one remaining in the
deck (action exch), or he can keep the current one (keep). At the same time, robot
b can change the priorities of the cards to a Rochambeau-like game (that is, A still
beatsK andK beatsQ, butQ becomes better thanA), or he can do nothing (nop),
i.e. leave the priorities unchanged. If a has a better card than b after that, then a
win is scored, otherwise the game ends in a “losing” state.
A CEGS for the game is shown in Figure 2.2.2; we will refer to the model as
M3 throughout the rest of the paper. State q0 represents the situation before, and
states qAK , . . . , qQK after the cards have been dealt (each qc1c2 stands for the sit-
uation when a has got card c1, and b has got card c2). Actions of the environment
are omitted from the ﬁgure for the sake of readability. Similarly to the previous
example,M3, q0 |= 〈〈a, b〉〉win (and evenM3, q0 |= C{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉win), but there
is no uniform strategy to achieve this: in order to win, a must exchange his card
in state qQK , so he must exchange his card in qQA too (if we require uniformity),
and playing exch in qQA leads to the losing state. So, again, we have 〈〈a, b〉〉win,
although intuitively {a, b} have no feasible way of ensuring a win.
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2.2.3 Problemswith ATEL
It has been pointed out in several places that themeaning of ATEL formulae
can be counterintuitive [66, 83, 86]. Most importantly, one would expect
that an agent’s ability to achieve property ϕ should imply that the agent
has enough control and knowledge to identify and execute a strategy that en-
forces ϕ (cf. also [121]). ATEL adds to ATL the vocabulary of epistemic logic;
still, in ATEL the strategic and epistemic layers are combined as if they were
independent. They should be – if we do not ask whether the agents in ques-
tion are able to identify and execute their strategies. They should not if we
want to interpret strategies as executable plans, about which the agents know
that they guarantee achieving the goal.
First of all, executable plans should not specify different actions in indis-
tinguishable states. Most (if not all) current approaches to strategic ability
under imperfect information [83, 121, 86, 135, 63], agree with the postulate
from [66] that only uniform strategies should be considered in the semantics
of 〈〈A〉〉. Formally, strategy sa is uniform iff q ∼a q′ implies that sa(q) = sa(q′);
a collective strategy SA is uniform iff it consists of only uniform individual
strategies. In other words, agents make choices with respect to their local
(epistemic) states rather thanglobal states of the system. Agents are assumed
to know their available actions (i.e., the choices open to them), so theymust
have the same choices in indistinguishable states. That is, from now on we
consider only models in which q ∼a q′ implies d(a, q) = d(a, q′).
Second, it was suggested in [83] that, when reasoning about what an
agent can enforce, it seemsmore appropriate to require the agent to know his
winning strategy rather than to knowonly that such a strategy exists. This prob-
lem is closely related to the distinction between knowledge de re and knowl-
edge de dicto, well known in the philosophy of language [117], as well as re-
search on the interaction between knowledge and action [105, 106, 143].
One can naturally distinguish at least four different levels of strategic ability
(cf. [83]):
1. Agent a has a strategy “de re” to enforce ϕ, i.e., he has an executable
winning strategy and knows the strategy (he “knows how to play”);
2. Agent a has a strategy “de dicto” to enforce ϕ (i.e., he knows only that
some executable winning strategy is available);
3. Agent a has an executable strategy to enforce ϕ (but not necessarily
even knows about it);
4. Agent amay happen to behave in such a way that ϕ is enforced. How-
ever, the behavior canhaveno executable speciﬁcation (i.e., theremight
be no uniform strategy that describes it).
Obviously, (1)⇒ (2)⇒ (3)⇒ (4), but not the other way around. We do
think that all of these concepts can be useful for reasoning about strategic
ability under imperfect information. However, we believe that (1) is partic-
ularly important and natural. Unfortunately, ATEL enables to express only
ability of type (4), as Example 5 showed. Several variations on “ATLwith im-
perfect information” have been proposed as alternatives, yet none of them
seems the ultimate deﬁnitive solution. We summarize the most important
proposals in the following sections.
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2.2.4 First Try: ATELwith Uniform Strategies
The ﬁrst attempt to cope with these problems was presented in [66], where
it was proposed that only uniform strategies should be used in the seman-
tics of cooperationmodalities. “Uniform ATEL” (U-ATEL) captures ability of
type (2) and (3): 〈〈a〉〉ϕ says that a has a uniform strategy to achieve ϕ, and
Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ denotes having a strategy “de dicto”. However, knowing how to play
still cannot be expressed.
Example 7 Consider model M2 from Figure 2.2.1B, and assume that q1 is the
current state. The robber does have a uniform strategy to open the safe in one step
(play type0 at q1 and q2, and nop elsewhere), and indeedM2, q1 |= 〈〈r〉〉 open. He
also knows that such a strategy is available, and we haveM2, q1 |= Kr〈〈r〉〉 open
(in every state q such that q1 ∼r q,M, q |= 〈〈r〉〉 open). Still, the robber does not
know how to play in q1 to achieve open, and this property has no U-ATEL coun-
terpart. Note also thatM2, q0 |= ¬〈〈r〉〉open ∧ 〈〈∅〉〉 〈〈r〉〉open, andM2, q0 |=
¬Kr〈〈r〉〉open ∧ Kr〈〈∅〉〉 Kr〈〈r〉〉open (the robber has no strategy to open the
safe in q0, but he can simply wait a moment, and he will magically get one), which
suggests that one should be careful when talking about abilities of type (2) and (3).
Likewise, for the gambling robots we have M3, q0 |= ¬〈〈a〉〉win, and even
M3, q0 |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉win (see Section 2.2.2). On the other hand, M3, qAK |=
〈〈a〉〉win ∧Ka〈〈a〉〉win.
2.2.5 Aggregating Initial States: “Feasible Atel”
“Feasible ATEL” [86], which we will sometimes call F-ATEL, is an update of
ATEL, in which the “perfect information” cooperation modalities are kept,
but the language is extendedwithnewmodalities: 〈〈A〉〉f , 〈〈A〉〉fE , 〈〈A〉〉fC , 〈〈A〉〉fKa
and 〈〈A〉〉fMa , that represent agents’ ability to ﬁnd a suitable uniform strategy,
with the semantics summarized below:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉f ϕ iff there is a uniform collective strategy SA such that,
for every λ ∈ out(q, SA), we haveM,λ[1] |= ϕ.
For 〈〈A〉〉fϕ and 〈〈A〉〉fϕU ψ: analogously;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉fE ϕ iff there is a uniform collective strategy SA such that,
for every q′ such that q ∼EA q′, and for every λ ∈ out(q′, SA), we have
M,λ[1] |= ϕ.
For 〈〈A〉〉fEϕ and 〈〈A〉〉fEϕU ψ: analogously;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉fC ϕ iff there is a uniform collective strategy SA such that,
for every q′ such that q ∼CA q′, and for every λ ∈ out(q′, SA), we have
M,λ[1] |= ϕ.
For 〈〈A〉〉fCϕ and 〈〈A〉〉fCϕU ψ: analogously;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉fKa ϕ iff there is a uniform collective strategy SA such that,
for every q′ such that q ∼a q′, and everyλ ∈ out(q′, SA), wehaveM,λ[1] |=
ϕ.
For 〈〈A〉〉fKaϕ and 〈〈A〉〉
f
Ka
ϕU ψ: analogously;
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M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉fMa ϕ iff there is a uniform collective strategy SA and state q′
with q ∼a q′, such that, for every λ ∈ out(q′, SA), we haveM,λ[1] |= ϕ.
For 〈〈A〉〉fMaϕ and 〈〈A〉〉
f
Ma
ϕU ψ: analogously.
The idea of cooperation modalities with subscripts that indicate the epis-
temic “mode”, in which coalitionA can identify their winning strategy, was
further developed in the logic of ATOL, which we present in Section 2.2.6.
We note that “Uniform ATEL” can be seen as a subset of “Feasible ATEL”,
as the meaning of 〈〈A〉〉ϕ proposed in [66] is, for agents playing memoryless
strategies, equivalent to 〈〈A〉〉fϕ from [86].
2.2.6 Going for Expressive Power: ATOL
Alternating-time Temporal Observational Logic (ATOL), proposed in [83],
follows the same perspective, but it offers a richer language of strategic op-
erators to express subtle differences between various kinds of collective abil-
ities of teams. In this paper, we use the notation proposed in [84]. The infor-
mal meaning of 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕ is: “groupA has a (memoryless uniform) strategy
to enforce ϕ, and agents Γ can identify the strategy as successful forA in the
epistemic sense K”. For instance,M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉D(Γ)ϕ iff there is SA such that,
for every q′ with q ∼DΓ q′, and every λ ∈ out(q′, SA), we have that ϕ is true for
λ.
Formally, let K = E,C,D. The semantics of the enhanced cooperation
modalities can be deﬁned as follows:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ) ϕ iff there is a collective memoryless uniform strategy
SA such that, for every q′ with q ∼KΓ q′, and every λ ∈ out(q′, SA), we
have thatM,λ[1] |= ϕ.
For 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕ and 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕU ψ: analogously.
Example 8 Coming back to our gambling robots, it is easy to see thatM3, q0 |=
¬〈〈a〉〉K(a)win, because, for every a’s (uniform) strategy, if it guarantees a win in
e.g. state qAK then it fails in qAQ (and similarly for other pairs of indistinguishable
states). Let us also observe that M3, q0 |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉E({a,b})win: in order to win,
a must exchange his card in state qQK , so he must exchange his card in qQA too
(by uniformity), and playing exch in qQA leads to the losing state. On the other
hand,M3, qAQ |= 〈〈a, b〉〉E({a,b}) win (a winning strategy: sa(qAK) = sa(qAQ) =
sa(qKQ) = keep, sb(qAQ) = sb(qKQ) = sb(qAK) = nop; qAK , qAQ, qQK are the
states thatmust be considered by a and b in qAQ). Still,M3, qAK |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉E({a,b})
win.
ATOL allows us to express other ways of identifying a winning strategy too:
we have that M3, qAK |= 〈〈a, b〉〉D({a,b}) win ∧ 〈〈a, b〉〉K(a) win (the robots can
identify the strategy if they share their views of the world; also, a can be the “boss”
who points out the strategy), andM3, qAQ |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉C({a,b}) win (despite both
a, b knowing the winning strategy, they do not have common knowledge about it).
ATOL is quite expressive. However, it does not allow for combination of
strategic ability and arbitrary epistemic modes – the operators 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ) are
ﬁxed by taking K ∈ {C,E,D}. For example, 〈〈A〉〉EAEAϕ is not a well formed
ATOL formula – although it is easy to give an interpretation of such a for-
mula in a similar manner to the other ATOL operators. Furthermore, the
trebly parameterized cooperationmodalities are rather baroque.
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2.2.7 Elegance and Simplicity: ATLir
Schobbens [121] approached the problem of combining strategies with un-
certainty on a more abstract level. He suggested that it makes sense to talk
about agents with perfect as well as imperfect information on one hand, and
perfect vs. imperfect recall on the other – and that these two fundamental
semantic choices are orthogonal. This gives rise to four different logics of
strategic ability: ATLIR (for perfect Information and perfect Recall, i.e. the
original ATL), ATLiR (for imperfect information and perfect Recall), etc. As
we focus on imperfect information andmemoryless strategies in this paper,
the logic of ATLir is most interesting for us.
Informally, 〈〈A〉〉irϕ holds inM, q iff there is a uniform collective strategy
SA such that, for every agent a ∈ A, state q′ with q ∼a q′, and path λ ∈
out(q′, SA), we have that ϕ is true for λ. In other words, there is a strategy
such that everybody in A knows that executing this strategy will bring about
ϕ. Formally:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ir ϕ iff there is a uniform collective strategy SA such that, for
every a ∈ A, q′ such that q ∼EA q′, and path λ ∈ out(SA, q′), we have
M,λ[1] |= ϕ.
For 〈〈A〉〉irϕ and 〈〈A〉〉irϕU ψ: analogously.
Example 9 For our gambling robots, we get e.g. that: M3, q0 |= ¬〈〈a〉〉irwin,
M3, q0 |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉irwin, M3, qAQ |= 〈〈a, b〉〉ir win, and M3, qAK |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉ir
win.
Note that 〈〈A〉〉irΦ is equivalent to the “Feasible ATEL” formula 〈〈A〉〉fEΦ,
and the ATOL formula 〈〈A〉〉E(A)Φ. Moreover, it is not possible to express in
ATLir thatA have common knowledge about the successful strategy, or that
they are able to identify it if they share their information etc. On the other
hand, ATLir stands out among the existing proposals for its simplicity and
conceptual clarity, and can be treated as the “core”, minimal ATL-based lan-
guage for ability under imperfect information.
The following proposition sums up some of the results presented in [121,
81, 83]:
Proposition 2 Model checking “Feasible ATEL”, ATLir andATOL isΔP2 -complete
in the number of transitions (and epistemic links) in the model, and the length of
the formula.
In Section 2.3, we will propose Constructive Strategic Logic (CSL) which
strictly subsumesATOL,while sharing (in our opinion) the elegance ofATLir,
and model checking complexity of all of the approaches discussed above.
The main idea behind CSL is that we would like to express various levels
of ability with combinations of some kind of epistemic operators with some
kind of cooperation modalities. Before we present our proposal, we want to
mention two logics that, to a limited extent, have achieved a similar trait.
The logics are brieﬂy presented in Sections 2.2.8 and 2.2.9.
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2.2.8 Abilities of Rational Players: ETSL
Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic [135] digs deeper in the repository of
game theory, and focuses on the concept of undominated strategies. Its vari-
ant of the cooperation modalities has a different ﬂavor than the ones from
ATL, ATEL, ATOL etc. In a way, 〈〈A〉〉ϕ in ETSL can be summarized as: “if A
play rationally to achieveϕ (meaning: they never play a dominated strategy),
they will achieve ϕ”.
ETSL is underpinned by several interesting concepts. Unfortunately, its
original semantics from [135] comes with a plethora of auxiliary functions
and deﬁnitions (and a couple of omissions), which make it rather hard to
read. Moreover, the semantics is deﬁned only for ﬁnite turn-based acyclic
game models, and the satisfaction relation refers not only to models and
states (respectively paths), but also to a ﬁxed strategy SAgt (assumed to rep-
resent the current strategies of all agents). It has been shown in [68], that
the semantics can be extended to concurrent epistemic game structures, and
given in amore compact way. Moreover, for “vanilla” ETSL formulae,5 it can
be given via standard semantic clauses for state formulae.
Let M be a CEGS. First, we deﬁne the notion of domination as fol-
lows. Let Φ ≡ ψ, ψ, or ψ1 U ψ2, where ψ,ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla” ETSL for-
mulae. Moreover, let |Φ| denote the set of paths for which Φ holds; for-
mally, | ψ| = {λ |M,λ[1] |= ψ}, |ψ| = {λ | ∀iM,λ[i] |= ψ}, and |ψ1 U ψ2| =
{λ | ∃i(M,λ[i] |= ψ2 ∧ ∀0≤j<iM,λ[j] |= ψ1}. Then, strategy SA dominates strat-
egy TA wrt.M, q, and Φ iff both of the following conditions hold:
1. for every q′ with q ∼EA q′: if out(q′, TA) ⊆ |Φ| then also out(q′, SA) ⊆ |Φ|;
2. there is q′ such that q ∼EA q′, and out(q′, SA) ⊆ |Φ|, and out(q′, TA) ⊆ |Φ|.
StrategySA is undominatedwrt.M, q,Φ iff there is no strategy that dominates
SA wrtM, q,Φ.
Now the semantics of 〈〈A〉〉 in ETSL can be expressed entirely in terms of
models and their states:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ iff for every strategy SA, undominated wrtM, q, ϕ, and
every λ ∈ out(q, SA), we have thatM,λ[1] |= ϕ.
For 〈〈A〉〉ϕ and 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ: analogously.
The relationship between ETSL andConstructive Strategic Logic is brieﬂy
discussed in Section 2.4.4. We conjecture that neither of them subsumes
the other, but there are several interesting associations. Themost interesting
feature of ETSL is perhaps the fact that, by combining standard epistemic op-
erators and its non-standard cooperationmodalities, we can capture “know-
ing how to play” for individual agents (although this does not extend to col-
lective agents), see [68] or Section 2.4.4 for more details.
2.2.9 Explicit Actions: ATEL-A
In AT(E)L, it is not possible to refer directly to particular actions in the logi-
cal language. For example, it is not possible to express the fact that “if agent
5I.e, formulae in which every temporal operator is preceded by exactly one cooperation
modality.
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i chooses action α, then formula ϕ will necessarily be true in the next mo-
ment”. ATEL-A [3] allows such expressions by introducing names of actions,
in addition to names of agents, inside cooperationmodalities. For instance,
the above expression can be written as 〈〈αi〉〉 ϕ. This makes it possible to
capture the levels of ability, discussed in Section 2.2.3, in the limited case of
properties that can be achieved in one step:
(4), (3) 〈〈i〉〉 ϕ: agent imay behave in such a way that ϕ is enforced next.
Note that there is no difference between (4) and (3) when we only talk
about the next state – then uniformity does not play any role;
(2) Ki〈〈i〉〉 ϕ: agent i has a strategy “de dicto” to enforce ϕ next;
(1)
∨
α∈Act Ki〈〈αi〉〉 ϕ: agent i has a strategy “de re” to enforce ϕ next.
Because of explicit actions, ATEL-A is not directly comparable to the log-
ics considered in this paper, and we will not discuss ATEL-A further.
2.2.10 Other Possibilities
In the original formulation of ATL, agents were assumed to have perfect re-
call of the game, in the sense that they could base their decisions on se-
quences of states rather than on single states. Variants of ATL for perfect re-
call and imperfect information have also been considered, cf. ATLiR [121]
and ATEL-R* [83]. However, as agents seldom have unlimited memory, and
logics of strategic ability with imperfect information and perfect recall are
believed to have undecidablemodel checking [8, 121], we do not investigate
this variant of ability here.
Yet another, very recent, proposal [63] approaches the problem of strate-
gic abilities under imperfect information within the framework of STIT (the
logic of seeing to it that). STIT sharesmany similarities with ATL, but it comes
from a different tradition, and its technical formulation is markedly differ-
ent from that of ATL. Thus, in order to analyze STIT-based proposals in our
new framework, one must ﬁrst establish the precise relationship between
both frameworks, i.e., compare models, semantics, expressive power, prag-
matics (e.g., veriﬁcation issues) etc. Several important results in this respect
have already been reported [142, 22], but there is still much to be done.
2.3 Constructive Strategic Logic: A New Se-
mantics for Ability andKnowledge
ATOL covers more cases than ATLir and “Feasible ATEL”, and it is not com-
mitted to any notion of rationality (unlike ETSL). One major drawback of
ATOL is that it vastly increases the number of modal operators necessary
to express properties of agents. For team A, a whole family of cooperation
modalities 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ) is used (instead of a singlemodality 〈〈A〉〉 in ATL) to spec-
ify who should identify the right strategy forA, in what way etc. It would be
muchmore elegant tomodify the semantics of “simple” cooperationmodal-
ities 〈〈A〉〉 and/or epistemic operators, so that they can be composed into
sufﬁciently expressive formulae. The problem with strategic ability under
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uncertainty is that, when analyzing consequences of their strategies, agents
must consider also the outcome paths starting from states other than the
current state – namely, from all states that look the same as the current state.
Thus, a property of a strategy being successfulwith respect to goalϕ is not lo-
cal to the current state; the same strategymust be successful in all “opening”
states being considered. In order to capture this feature of strategic ability
under imperfect information, we change the type of the satisfaction rela-
tion |=, and deﬁne what it means for a formula ϕ to be satisﬁed in a set of
states Q ⊆ St of model M . To our best knowledge, nobody has used this
kind of semantics yet.
Moreover, we extend the language ofATELwithunary “constructive knowl-
edge” operators Ka, one for each agent a, that yield the set of states, in-
distinguishable from the current state from a’s perspective. Constructive
common, mutual, and distributed knowledge are formalized via operators
CA,EA, and DA.
2.3.1 Language and Semantics
The language of Constructive Strategic Logic (CSL) includes atomic propo-
sitions, Boolean connectives, strategic formulae, standard epistemic oper-
ators, and constructive knowledge operators for groups of agents (individual
knowledge can be deﬁned as a special case of collective knowledge – see be-
low):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ | CAϕ | EAϕ | DAϕ |
CAϕ | EAϕ | DAϕ.
whereA is a set of agents.
Remark 4 As we will show in Section 2.7.2, standard knowledge can be deﬁned
as a special kind of constructive knowledge, and therefore the standard knowledge
operators do not have to be included in the language. However, rather than im-
mediately deriving CA, EA, DA from CA,EA,DA, we choose to give the semantic
clauses for all of them, and only later prove the relationship formally.
Models are concurrent epistemic game structures again; that is, we inter-
pret the formulae of CSL over exactly the same class of models which was
used for ATEL, ATLir, ATOL etc. To recapitulate, a CEGS can be deﬁned as a
tuple
M = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o,∼1, ...,∼k〉,
where:
• Agt = {1, ..., k} is a ﬁnite nonempty set of all agents,
• St is a nonempty set of states,
• Π is a set of atomic propositions,
• π : St→ 2Π is a valuation of propositions,
• Act is a nonempty set of (atomic) actions;
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• function d : Agt × St → 2Act deﬁnes actions available to an agent in a
state; d(a, q) = ∅ for all a ∈ Agt, q ∈ St,
• o is a (deterministic) transition function that assigns an outcome state
to each combination of a state and a vector of actions (one action per
agent). That is, o(q, α1, . . . , αk) ∈ St for every q ∈ St and 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈
d(1, q)× · · · × d(k, q);
• ∼1, ...,∼k⊆ St × St are epistemic accessibility relations, one per agent.
It is assumed that each ∼a is an equivalence relation, and that q ∼a q′
implies d(a, q) = d(a, q′).
Again, a (memoryless) strategy sa of agent a is a conditional plan repre-
sented by function sa : St → Act such that sa(q) ∈ d(a, q) for every q. A
collective strategy SA is a tuple of strategies, one per agent from A. Strat-
egy sa is uniform iff q ∼a q′ implies sa(q) = sa(q′); a collective strategy is
uniform iff it consists of only uniform individual strategies. A path λ is an
inﬁnite sequence of states that can be effected by subsequent transitions; by
λ[i], we denote the ith position on path λ. Function out(q, SA) returns the set
of all paths that may result from agents A executing strategy SA from state
q onward (see Section 2.2.1 for the precise deﬁnition). Collective epistemic
relations are deﬁned as: ∼DA=
⋂
a∈A ∼a, ∼EA=
⋃
a∈A ∼a; ∼CA is deﬁned as the
transitive closure of∼EA.
Nowwedeﬁne the notion of a formulaϕ being satisﬁed by a (non-empty)
set of states Q in a modelM , writtenM,Q |= ϕ. We will also writeM, q |= ϕ
as a shorthand forM, {q} |= ϕ. Note that it is the latter notion of satisfaction
(in single states) that we will ultimately be interested in – but that notion
is deﬁned in terms of the (more general) satisfaction in sets of states. Let
img(q,R) be the image of state q with respect to binary relation R, i.e., the
set of all states q′ such that qRq′. Moreover, we use out(Q,SA) as a shorthand
for
⋃
q∈Q out(q, SA), and img(Q,R) as a shorthand for
⋃
q∈Q img(q,R). The
new semantics is given through the following clauses. In the semantics of
cooperationmodalities, onlymemoryless uniform strategies are considered.
M,Q |= p iff p ∈ π(q) for every q ∈ Q;
M,Q |= ¬ϕ iffM,Q |= ϕ;
M,Q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM,Q |= ϕ andM,Q |= ψ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ out(Q,SA), we
have thatM, {λ[1]} |= ϕ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ out(Q,SA) and
i ≥ 0, we haveM, {λ[i]} |= ϕ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ out(Q,SA),
there is an i ≥ 0 for whichM, {λ[i]} |= ψ andM, {λ[j]} |= ϕ for every
0 ≤ j < i.
M,Q |= KAϕ iffM, q |= ϕ for every q ∈ img(Q,∼KA) (whereK = C,E,D).
M,Q |= KˆAϕ iffM, img(Q,∼KA) |= ϕ (where Kˆ = C,E,D and K = C,E,D,
respectively).
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The satisfaction relation |= gives us both the traditional notion of sat-
isfaction in a state, and the more general notion of satisfaction in a set of
states. As mentioned above, we are usually interested in the former, but in
order to interpret, e.g., an expression such asCA〈〈A〉〉 p in a single state, we
must interpret the subexpression 〈〈A〉〉 p in a set of states.
Formally, the language includes only operators for representing knowl-
edge of teams. However, individual knowledge operators can be deﬁned in
the usual manner as:
Kaϕ ≡ C{a}ϕ, and
Kaϕ ≡ C{a}ϕ.
As a brief example, take the formula ϕ = Ka〈〈a〉〉 ψ where a is an agent.
We have that M, q |= ϕ iff there is a strategy Sa for a such that for every
λ ∈ out(img(q,∼a), Sa), M,λ[1] |= ψ; in other words iff there is an (exe-
cutable) strategy for a which is successfull (achieves ψ in the next state) in
all the states that a considers to be possible. Or, in the terminology of Sec-
tion 2.2.3, a knows a winning strategy – a has a strategy de re (for achieving
ψ). We will discuss how the logic captures many subtly different properties
of ability under imperfect information inmore detail in Section 2.4, after we
have clariﬁed a few additional fundamental issues.
We employ the usual deﬁnition of the “sometime” operator:
ϕ ≡ U ϕ
Wewill also use derivedpropositional connectives. However, the exactmean-
ing of these in the non-standard semantics must be carefully studied, and
we will do that in Section 2.3.2. The CSL concept of validity is discussed in
Section 2.3.3.
A note on notation: as above, we will henceforth use KA to denote an
arbitrary standard knowledge operator for agentsA (i.e., CA,EA orDA), and
we use KˆA to denote the constructive knowledge operator corresponding to
KA, i.e., CˆA = CA, EˆA = EA and DˆA = DA. We use K,K′,K1,K2 etc. to de-
note arbitrary standard knowledge operators for arbitrary sets of agents, and,
again, Kˆ, Kˆ′, Kˆ1, Kˆ2 etc. to denote the corresponding constructive modali-
ties.
2.3.2 Additional Operators
In addition to the derived operators introduced in Section 2.3.1, we use a
slightly unusual deﬁnition of the Boolean “false” and “true” constants:
⊥ ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉(p ∧ ¬p)U (p ∧ ¬p), where p is an arbitrary primitive proposition,
 ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉(¬⊥)U (¬⊥)
2.3. CONSTRUCTIVE STRATEGIC LOGIC 38
and the usual deﬁnition of Boolean connectives6:
ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2),
ϕ1 → ϕ2 ≡ ¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, and
ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 ≡ (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2 → ϕ2).
The above Boolean operators have the following semantic characteriza-
tions:
Proposition 3
1. M,Q |= ⊥ for allQ ⊆ St,Q = ∅.
2. M,Q |=  for allQ ⊆ St,Q = ∅.
3. M,Q |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iffM,Q |= ϕ1 orM,Q |= ϕ2.
4. M,Q |= ϕ1 → ϕ2 iffM,Q |= ϕ1 impliesM,Q |= ϕ2.
5. M,Q |= ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 iff we have thatM,Q |= ϕ1 iffM,Q |= ϕ2.
Proof
1) Suppose thatM,Q |= ⊥ for someQ = ∅. ThenM,Q |= 〈〈∅〉〉(p∧¬p)U (p∧
¬p), so for all paths λ starting from the states in Q we haveM,λ[0] |=
p ∧ ¬p. That is, for all q ∈ Q: M, q |= p ∧ ¬p. As Q is nonempty, there is
at least one such q. But that means that p ∈ π(q) and p /∈ π(q), which
cannot be the case.
2) Analogous.
3) M,Q |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff M,Q |= ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2) iff M,Q |= ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 iff
M,Q |= ¬ϕ1 orM,Q |= ¬ϕ2 iffM,Q |= ϕ1 orM,Q |= ϕ2.
4), 5) Straightforward from the above.

To conclude the analysis of standard connectives in this (rather non-
standard) setting, we observe that the ¬ operator behaves like classical nega-
tion: it obeys the law of double negation, the law of excluded middle, and
the consistency requirement in every possible context:
Proposition 4 We have the following for everyM andQ ⊆ St:
1. M,Q |= ¬¬ϕ↔ ϕ,
2. M,Q |= ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ,
3. M,Q |= ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ).
6The reasonwhywe use the above deﬁnitions of and⊥ instead of themore commonones:
⊥ ≡ p ∧ ¬p,  ≡ ¬⊥ is that in the restricted language CSL−, discussed in Section 2.6.3,
certain formulae are disallowed, namely the ones in which negation (or a sequence of conjunc-
tions, followed by negation) follows a constructive knowledge operator. Deﬁning the Boolean
constants the way we do, we make sure that no unraveling of  or ⊥ will ever lead to such a
formula.
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Proof Straightforward from Proposition 3 and the semantic deﬁnition of ¬.

It should be noted that there are other possibilities for deﬁning negation,
disjunction and implication, corresponding to the different ways of quanti-
fying over the setQ. We discuss the issue inmore detail in Section 2.7.
2.3.3 Validity
We say that a formula is weakly valid (or simply valid) if it is satisﬁed indi-
vidually by each state in every model, i.e., ifM, q |= ϕ for all modelsM and
states q in M . It is strongly valid if it is satisﬁed by all non-empty sets in all
models; i.e., if for eachM and every non-empty set of states Q it is the case
thatM,Q |= ϕ. We are ultimately interested in the former (see Remark 5 be-
low). The importance of strong validity, on the other hand, lies in the fact
that strong validity of ϕ↔ ψmakes ϕ and ψ completely interchangeable (cf.
Proposition 6.2). It is not difﬁcult to see that the same is not true for weak
validity.
Proposition 5 1. Strong validity implies validity.
2. Validity does not imply strong validity.
Proof (1) Straightforward. (2) We here take the liberty to refer forward
to some simple results we haven’t proven yet, because it is instructive to
point out the distinction between weak and strong validity at this point. By
Propositions 3.5 and 18, we have that for anyM and set of states Q,M,Q |=
〈〈∅〉〉ϕU ϕ ↔ ϕ iff (∀q∈QM, q |= ϕ iffM,Q |= ϕ). It follows immediately that
〈〈∅〉〉ϕU ϕ ↔ ϕ is (weakly) valid, for any ϕ. It follows from Lemma 1.1 that
there is a M and a set of states Q and a formula ϕ such that M,Q |= ϕ but
∀q∈QM, q |= ϕ; thus 〈〈∅〉〉ϕU ϕ↔ ϕ is not strongly valid. 
Remark 5 The term the logic is sometimes understood as the set of all valid
formulae in the logic. In this sense, we deﬁne the logic of CSL as the set of all
weakly valid formulae of CSL. In a similar way, we say that a formula ϕ is CSL-
satisﬁable if it is weakly satisﬁable in CSL, i.e., there is a modelM and a state q
such thatM, q |= ϕ.
Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 from Section 2.3.2 have two important conse-
quences. First, the rule of Modus Ponens is correct with respect to this se-
mantics. Second, if ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 is strongly valid, then formulae ϕ1 and ϕ1 are
completely interchangeable under strong (and hence also weak) validity.
Proposition 6
1. If ϕ1 → ϕ2 is strongly (resp. weakly) valid, and ϕ1 is strongly (resp. weakly)
valid, then ϕ2 is strongly (resp. weakly) valid.
2. If ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 is strongly valid, and ψ′ is obtained from ψ through replacing an
occurrence of ϕ1 by ϕ2, thenM,Q |= ψ iffM,Q |= ψ′.
Proof Straightforward. 
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2.4 Expressing Agents’ Strategic Abilities
In the language of Constructive Strategic Logic, strategic properties of coali-
tions can be expressed in a ﬂexible and elegant way. To support this claim,
we ﬁrst show that the philosophical discourse on various levels of knowl-
edge and ability, mentioned in Section 2.2.3, has its formal counterpart in
CSL formulae. Then, we present a translation of ATLir, ATOL and “Feasible
ATEL” to CSL, and thus prove that the latter embeds the former ones. We
also discuss the relationship between ETSL and CSL. To avoid confusion, we
will use the satisfaction sign with subscripts (|=ATOL , |=CSL , |=ETSL etc.), indicat-
ing which semantics is currently referred to.
2.4.1 Capturing Levels of Strategic Power
The reason why we need to interpret formulae over sets of states is that we
need non-standard epistemic operators: M, q |= Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ expresses the fact
that a has a single strategy that enforces ϕ from all states indiscernible from
q, instead of stating that ϕ can be achieved from every such state separately.
Note that the latter property is verymuch in the spirit of standard epistemic
logic, and indeed canbe capturedwith the standard knowledge operator (via
Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ). Speaking inmore abstract terms:
1. Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ refers to agent a having a strategy “de re” to enforce ϕ (i.e. hav-
ing a successful strategy and knowing the strategy);
2. Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ refers to agent a having a strategy “de dicto” to enforce ϕ (i.e.
knowing only that some successful strategy is available);
3. 〈〈a〉〉ϕ expresses that agent a has a strategy to enforce ϕ from the current
state (but not necessarily even knows about it).
Above, each of the three formulae are informally interpreted in an assumed
(single) state q of a model M , i.e., we discuss the meaning of, e.g., M, q |=
Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ. Themeaning of this formula in this single state is again deﬁned by
interpreting a subformula in a certain set of states. By strategieshere, we only
mean executable (i.e., uniform) strategies. Capturing different ability levels
of coalitions is analogous, with various “epistemic modes” of collective rec-
ognizing the right strategy.
Example 10 Robot a has no winning strategy in the starting state of the game:
M3, q0 |= ¬〈〈a〉〉win, which implies that it has neither a strategy “de re” nor “de
dicto”: M3, q0 |= ¬Ka〈〈a〉〉win ∧ ¬Ka〈〈a〉〉win. On the other hand, he has a
successful strategy in qAK (just play keep) and it knows it has one (because another
action, exch, is bound to win in qAQ); still, the knowledge is not constructive, since
a does not knowwhich strategy is the right one in the current situation:M3, qAK |=
〈〈a〉〉 win ∧Ka〈〈a〉〉 win ∧ ¬Ka〈〈a〉〉 win.
Other properties of the gambling robots, that we discussed in Examples 9 and 8,
can be easily expressed in the new logic by combining constructive knowledge with
cooperation modalities: M3, q0 |= ¬E{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉win, M3, qAK |= D{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉
win ∧ Ka〈〈a, b〉〉 win ∧ ¬E{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉 win,M3, qAQ |= E{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉 win ∧
¬C{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉 win etc. In fact, it turns out that the new logic is expressive enough
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Figure 2.3: Simple market example: modelM4
to embed most approaches we have discussed. We present an appropriate transla-
tion in the next section.
Example 11 Consider a market model, depicted in Figure 2.4.1, which formal-
izes in a very simple way the scenario from Example 3. The economy is assumed to
run in simple cycles: after the moment of bad economy (bad−market), there is al-
ways a good time for small and medium enterprises (s&m), after which the market
tightens and an oligopoly emerges. At the end, the market gets stale, and we have
stagnation and bad economy again.
The company c is the only agent whose actions are represented in the model.
The company can wait (action wait) or decide to start production: either on its
own (own-production), or as a subcontractor of a major company (subproduction).
Both decisions can lead to either loss or success, depending on the current market
conditions. However, the company management cannot recognize the market con-
ditions: bad market, time for small and medium enterprises, and oligopoly market
look the same to them, as the epistemic links for c indicate.
The company can call the services of two marketing experts. Expert 1 is a spe-
cialist on oligopoly, and can recognize oligopoly conditions (although she cannot
distinguish between bad economy and s&m market). Expert 2 can recognize bad
economy, but he cannot distinguish between other types of market. The experts’
actions have no inﬂuence on the actual transitions of the model, and are omitted
from the graph in Figure 2.4.1. It is easy to see that the company cannot identify
a successful strategy on its own: for instance, for the small and medium enter-
prises period, we have that M4, q1 |= ¬Kc〈〈c〉〉success. It is not even enough to
call the help of a single expert: M4, q1 |= ¬K1〈〈c〉〉success ∧ ¬K2〈〈c〉〉success,
or to ask the experts to independently work out a common strategy: M4, q1 |=
¬E{1,2}〈〈c〉〉success. Still, the experts can propose the right strategy if they join
forces and cooperate to ﬁnd the solution:M4, q1 |= D{1,2}〈〈c〉〉success.
Note that this is not true any more for bad market. That is,
M4, q0 |= ¬D{1,2}〈〈c〉〉success, because c is a memoryless agent, and it has no
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uniform strategy to enforce success from q0 at all. However, the experts can suggest
a more complex scheme that involves consulting them once again in the future:
M4, q0 |= D{1,2}〈〈c〉〉 D{1,2}〈〈c〉〉success.
For strategic abilities, standard knowledge corresponds to knowing “de
dicto”, while constructive knowledge captures “knowing how to play”. We
observe that both kinds of epistemic operators can be combined in a mean-
ingful way. For example,KaKb〈〈b〉〉win says that agent a knows that player b
knowshow towin. Note that this is substantially different fromKaKb〈〈b〉〉win,
which says that agent a can identify a strategy which b knows to be win-
ning. Also, when interleaving epistemic operators with strategic operators,
we can, e.g., describe an ability to acquire, distribute ormaintain ability. For
instance,Ka〈〈a〉〉Kb〈〈b〉〉winmeans that a knows how tomaintain b’s (con-
structive) ability to win, while Ka〈〈a〉〉Kb〈〈b〉〉win says only that a knows
that this is in principle possible, and Ka〈〈a〉〉Kb〈〈b〉〉win says that a knows
how to keep b aware that a winning strategy exists.
2.4.2 Expressivity of CSL
Let L be the logic of ATLir, ATOL or F-ATEL, and let ϕ,ψ be formulae of L.
Also, let K = C,E,D and Kˆ = C,E,D, respectively. Then, let the translation
function tr be deﬁned as follows:
tr(p) = p tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr(ψ) tr( ϕ) = tr(ϕ)
tr(ϕ) = tr(ϕ) tr(ϕU ψ) = tr(ϕ)U tr(ψ)
tr(〈〈A〉〉irϕ) = EA〈〈A〉〉tr(ϕ) tr(〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕ) = KˆΓ〈〈A〉〉tr(ϕ)
tr(〈〈A〉〉fϕ) = 〈〈A〉〉tr(ϕ) tr(〈〈A〉〉fKϕ) = KˆA〈〈A〉〉tr(ϕ)
tr(〈〈A〉〉fKbϕ) = Kb〈〈A〉〉tr(ϕ) tr(〈〈A〉〉
f
Mb
ϕ) = ¬Kb¬〈〈A〉〉tr(ϕ)
tr(KAϕ) = KAtr(ϕ)
The following result justiﬁes the translation.
Theorem 1 M, q |=L ϕ iffM, q |=CSL tr(ϕ).
Proof in the Appendix.
Corollary 1 The translation yields a reduction of ATLir, ATOL and “Feasible
ATEL”model checking problems toCSLmodel checking. The time needed for the re-
duction, and the resulting formula, are linear in the length of the original formula.
We summarize the model checking complexity results for CSL in Section 2.5.
Proposition 7 Constructive Strategic Logic is strictly more expressive than
ATLir, ATOL etc.
Proof It is sufﬁcient to prove that there is a CSL formula ϕ that has no
ATOL equivalent (i.e., there is no ATOL formula which holds in exactly the
same models and states as ϕ). Consider the formula ϕ ≡ EAEA〈〈A〉〉ψ. For
most models (M3 from Figure 2.2.2 being an example) we have ∼DA  ∼EA
 ∼EA ◦ ∼EA  ∼CA, so ϕ is equivalent to neither 〈〈A〉〉D(A)ψ, 〈〈A〉〉E(A)ψ, nor
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〈〈A〉〉C(A)ψ. This is of course possible, because EA (similarly to EA) is not a
KD45modality (see Theorem 5 in Section 2.6.4). 
Note that the semantics ofCSL is based on exactly the same class ofmodels
as ATEL, ATOL, ATLir etc. (i.e., on CEGS s). Thus, the above translation can
also be used for reduction of validity (resp. satisﬁability) problems for ATLir,
ATOL and “Feasible ATEL” to weak validity (resp. satisﬁability) of CSL. By
Theorem 1, we have the following.
Corollary 2 ATLir, ATOL and “Feasible ATEL” can be embedded in CSL.
2.4.3 Constructive Strategic Logic vs. ATEL
As we already pointed out in Section 2.2.3, ATEL only enables expressing
ability of type (4): the ATEL formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ says that agentsAmay happen to
behave in such a way that ϕ is enforced (but there might be no executable
strategy to enforce it). Thus, ATEL is about a kind of ability different from
the “constructive” one we study in this paper. Formally, ATEL differs from
CSL in two main ways. First, it does not require uniform strategies. Second,
it does not have the constructive knowledge operators.
First, consider non-uniformity. Note that uniform strategies is not a new
idea of CSL (see Section 2.2), and that the differences between the ATEL op-
erators and the uniform variants used by CSL are also shared by all the pre-
viously studied logics using uniform strategies. We nevertheless comment
brieﬂy on the difference here. First, the “nexttime” fragment of ATEL can be
embedded in CSL, as the following proposition shows. It should be remem-
bered that the CEGS s used in ATEL are slightly more general than the ones
used in CSL (and the other approaches we have discussed): they do not re-
quire that the same actions are available in indistinguishable states. Below
we refer to such CEGS s as uniform CEGS s.
Proposition 8 Let ϕ be an ATEL formula that does not include operators , U
andM be a uniform CEGS. Then,M, q |=ATEL ϕ iffM, q |=CSL ϕ.
Proof It is sufﬁcient to note thatM, q |=ATEL 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ iffM, q |=CSL 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ.
Thus, we have that the “nexttime” formulae have the same semantics in
both logics when interpreted at single states, and ATEL formulae include no
“constructive” operators for aggregating sets of states. 
Remark 6 It is well known that cooperation modalities for strategies of perfect
information (e.g., the ones in ATL and ATEL) have the following ﬁxpoint charac-
terizations:
〈〈A〉〉ϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, (2.1)
〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ ↔ ψ ∨ ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ. (2.2)
For uniform information strategies, the above formulae are not valid any more
(see below). Still, it would be possible to embed the whole ATEL in CSL if we in-
cluded ﬁxpoint operators in the latter. In that case, the following translation could
be used to translate ATL/ATEL modalities to equivalent CSL counterparts:
tr(〈〈A〉〉ϕ) = νZ.ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 Z,
tr(〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ) = μZ.ψ ∨ ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 Z.
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Figure 2.4: A model with one agent. From each of the states q1, q2, q3, q4, the
same outcomes can be achieved in one step, albeit through different actions
We note that due to the uniformity of CSL strategies, the set of ATEL va-
lidities is not contained in CSL validities. A counter-example is the formula
〈〈r〉〉¬jail ↔ ¬jail ∧ 〈〈r〉〉 〈〈r〉〉¬jail. It is valid in ATEL (it is an instance of
the valid scheme that gives a characterization of “always” in terms of “next”
in ATL andATEL). Still, the formula is false inmodelM2 and state q0 fromEx-
ample 5: the left hand side of the biconditional is false, but the right hand
side is true inM2, q0.
More importantly, we can show that CSL is more powerful than ATEL
whenwewant to characterize sets of situations in actual systems. First, given
aﬁnitemodel, everyATEL formulahas aCSL counterpart (i.e., a CSL formula
whichholds in exactly the same states). Second, CSL allows for ﬁner-grained
speciﬁcations than ATEL (in the sense that there are CSL formulae for which
there are no ATEL formulae with the same extension). The result is formal-
ized in Propositions 9 and 10.
Proposition 9 Given a uniform CEGS, every ATEL formula has a CSL counter-
part with the same extension (i.e., one which is satisﬁed in exactly the same states
of the model).
Proof sketch For ﬁnite models: let M be a model with |M | states, and ϕ be
an ATEL formula. All subformulae 〈〈A〉〉ψ can be equivalently rewritten as
(ψ∧〈〈A〉〉 )|M |ψ, where |M | is the number of states inM . This follows by the
property (2.1) above, and the fact that, after |M | steps, the system is bound
to come back to one of the previously visited states, for which a successful
action has already been found. Similarly, subformulae 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2 can be
equivalently rewritten as (ψ2 ∨ ψ1 ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 )|M |ψ2. This way, we get an ATEL
formula ϕ′ without , U which holds in exactly the same states as ϕ. By
Proposition 8, ϕ′ has the same extension in ATEL and CSL. 
Proposition 10 Given a uniform CEGS, there can be CSL formulae that have
no ATEL counterpart with the same extension (i.e., one which is satisﬁed in exactly
the same states of the model).
Proof ConsidermodelM5 fromFigure 2.4.3. The formulaKa〈〈a〉〉 winholds
in q3 and q4, but not in q1 nor q2. There is no ATEL formula which is true
exactly in q3, q4: it is easy to see that an ATEL formula is true in q1 iff it is true
in q2 iff it is true in q3 iff it is true in q4. 
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2.4.4 Constructive Strategic Logic vs. ETSL
CSL and ETSL are underpinned by different notions of ability. ETSL can be
treated as a logic that describes the outcome of rational play under imperfect
information,7 in the same way as CSL can be seen as a logic that captures
agents’ strategic abilities (regardless of whether the agents play rationally
or not). Thus, the focus of CSL and ETSL is different, and we suspect that
neither logic formally subsumes the other. However, several interesting as-
sociations have been already proposed in [68].
Let us consider only models with ﬁnite state spaces,8 and formulae Φ ≡
ψ,ψ, or ψ1 U ψ2 where ψ,ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla” ETSL formulae.
Proposition 11 ([68]) An agent has a strategy “de re” to enforceΦ if, and only
if, he knows that his rational play will bring about Φ. Formally:
M, q |=ETSL Ka〈〈a〉〉Φ iff M, q |=CSL Ka〈〈a〉〉Φ.
Proposition 12 ([68]) If a coalition has common knowledge about how to play,
then it has common knowledge that rational play will be successful:
if M, q |=CSL CA〈〈A〉〉Φ then M, q |=ETSL CA〈〈A〉〉Φ.
The same holds for neither mutual nor distributed knowledge.
Proposition 13 ([68]) If A have distributed knowledge that rational play will
bring aboutΦ, then they have distributed knowledge how to play to bring aboutΦ.
Formally:
if M, q |=ETSL DA〈〈A〉〉Φ then M, q |=CSL DA〈〈A〉〉Φ.
The same holds for neither mutual nor common knowledge.
Amore deﬁnitive study of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
2.5 VeriﬁcationofStrategicAbilities through
Model Checking
Themodel checking problem asks whether a given formula ϕ holds in a given
model M and state q. We deﬁne the general model checking problem as the
problem that asks whether formula ϕ holds in modelM and set of states Q.
Letmctl(ϕ,M) be aCTLmodel checker that returns the set of all stateswhich
satisfy ϕ inM . Below, we sketch an algorithmmcheck(ϕ,M,Q) that returns
true if M,Q |=CSL ϕ and false otherwise, running in time ΔP2 , i.e., in deter-
ministic polynomial time with adaptive queries to anNP oracle.
Case ϕ ≡ p: return(true) if p ∈ π(q) for all q ∈ Q, else return(false);
Case ϕ ≡ ¬ψ: return(true) ifmcheck(ψ,M,Q) = false, else return(false);
7We emphasize that this is a speciﬁc notion of rationality (i.e., agents are assumed to play
only undominated strategies). Game theory proposes several other rationality criteria as well,
based e.g. on Nash equilibrium, dominant strategies, or Pareto efﬁciency. In fact, it is easy to
imagine ETSL-like logics based on these notions instead.
8More generally, we can consider modelsM such that there exists at least one undominated
strategy wrtM, q,Φ.
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Case ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2: return(true) ifmcheck(ψ1,M,Q) = true and
mcheck(ψ2,M,Q) = true, else return(false);
Case ϕ ≡ KAψ: ComputeQ′ := img(Q,∼KA), and then return(true) if
mcheck(ψ,M, q) = true for all q ∈ Q′, else return(false);
Case ϕ ≡ KˆAψ: return(mcheck(ψ,M, img(Q,∼KA)));
Case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 ψ: Runmcheck(ψ,M, q) for every q ∈ St, and label the states
in which the answer was true with an additional proposition yes (not
used elsewhere). Then, guess the strategy ofA, and “trim”modelM by
removing all the transitions inconsistent with the strategy (yielding a
sparser model M ′). Finally, return(true) if Q ⊆ mctl(A yes,M ′), else
return(false).
NOTE: subformula ψ is checked in the original model M , and not in
M ′!
Case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ: Runmcheck(ψ,M, q) for every q ∈ St, and label the states
in which the answer was true with an additional proposition yes (not
used elsewhere). Then, guess the strategy ofA, and “trim”modelM by
removing all the transitions inconsistent with the strategy (yielding a
sparser model M ′). Finally, return(true) if Q ⊆ mctl(Ayes,M ′), else
return(false). Again, note that ψ is checked in the original modelM .
Case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2: analogous.
Asmodel checkingCTL canbedone indeterministic polynomial time [30],
we get the following.
Proposition 14 General model checking for Constructive Strategic Logic is in
ΔP2 when the input size is measured with the number of transitions (and epistemic
links) in the model, and the length of the formula.
For the lower bound, we observe that CSL subsumes ATLir, and model
checking ATLir isΔP2 -complete [121, 81]. Thus, we pay no price in terms of
complexity for using themore expressive language of CSL:
Theorem 2 Generalmodel checking for Constructive Strategic Logic isΔP2 -complete
in the number of transitions (and epistemic links) in the model, and the length of
the formula.
2.6 Constructive Knowledge
Philosophically, constructive knowledge draws inspiration frommathemat-
ical constructivism: in order to “constructively know” that ϕ, agentsAmust
be able to ﬁnd (or “construct”) a mathematical object that supports ϕ. This
is relevant when ϕ ≡ 〈〈B〉〉ψ – in that case, the mathematical object in ques-
tion is a strategy for B which guarantees achieving ψ. The semantic role of
constructive knowledge operators is to produce sets of states that will appear on
the left hand side of the satisfaction relation. In a way, thesemodalities “ag-
gregate” states into sets, and sets into bigger sets. On the other hand,most of
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the other operators “split” (or “destroy”) sets in the sense that, for evaluating
M,Q |= ϕ, they require evaluation of subformulae of ϕ in single states rather
than sets of states. Standard epistemic operators (CA, EA, DA) are the most
straightforward examples (e.g., evaluating CAψ inM,Q “splits” into evalu-
ating ψ in each state from img(Q,∼CA) separately). Cooperation modalities
(combined with temporal operators) are “splitting” in a similar way. Besides
the “aggregating” and “splitting” operators, there are also “neutral” ones
that do not change the set of reference: namely, conjunction (∧) and nega-
tion (¬). In what follows, we study important properties of these operators
in CSL.
2.6.1 Properties of Constructive Knowledge
In the following proposition we list some properties of constructive knowl-
edge (keep inmind that strong validity implies validity).
Proposition 15 The following are strongly valid for any Kˆ ∈ {C,D,E}:
1. KˆA(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ↔ (KˆAϕ1 ∨ KˆAϕ2)
2. KˆA¬ϕ↔ ¬KˆAϕ
3. KˆA(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ↔ (KˆAϕ1 ∧ KˆAϕ2)
4. KˆA(ϕ1 → ϕ2) ↔ (KˆAϕ1 → KˆAϕ2)
Proof
1. M,Q |= KˆA(ϕ1∨ϕ2) iffM, img(Q,∼KˆA) |= ϕ1∨ϕ2 iffM, img(Q,∼KˆA) |= ϕ1
orM, img(Q,∼KˆA) |= ϕ2 iffM,Q |= KˆAϕ1 orM,Q |= KˆAϕ2 iffM,Q |=
KˆAϕ1 ∨ KˆAϕ2.
2. M,Q |= KˆA¬ϕ iffM, img(Q,∼KˆA) |= ¬ϕ iffM, img(Q,∼KˆA) |= ϕ iffM,Q |=
KˆAϕ iffM,Q |= ¬KˆAϕ.
3. M,Q |= KˆA(ϕ1∧ϕ2) iffM, img(Q,∼KˆA) |= ϕ1∧ϕ2 iffM, img(Q,∼KˆA) |= ϕ1
andM, img(Q,∼KˆA) |= ϕ2 iffM,Q |= KˆAϕ1 andM,Q |= KˆAϕ2 iffM,Q |=
KˆAϕ1 ∧ KˆAϕ2.
4. M,Q |= KˆA(¬ϕ1∨ϕ2) iffM,Q |= (KˆA¬ϕ1)∨KˆAϕ2 iffM,Q |= (¬KˆAϕ1)∨
KˆAϕ2 iffM,Q |= KˆAϕ1 → KˆAϕ2.

2.6.2 IsKa an Epistemic Operator?
We believe that operators CA, EA, DA and Ka do capture a special kind of
knowledge of agents. An interesting question is: do this notion of knowl-
edge have the properties usually associated with knowledge? In particular,
do postulates K,D,T,4,5 of epistemic logic hold for constructive knowl-
edge? In general, the answer is no; particularly, the truth axiom does not
hold.
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Figure 2.5: ModelM6 with two agents a, b, and two states q, q′ such that q ∼a
q′
Theorem 3 Below, we list the constructive knowledge versions of some of the S5
properties for individual agents. “Yes” means that the schema is strongly valid;
“No” means that it is not even weakly valid (incidentally, none of the properties
turns out to be weakly but not strongly valid).
K Ka(ϕ→ ψ) → (Kaϕ→ Kaψ) Yes
D ¬Ka⊥ Yes
T Kaϕ→ ϕ No
4 Kaϕ→ KaKaϕ Yes
4+ Kaϕ↔ KaKaϕ Yes
5 ¬Kaϕ→ Ka¬Kaϕ Yes
5+ ¬Kaϕ↔ Ka¬Kaϕ Yes
B ϕ→ Ka¬Ka¬ϕ No
Before proving Theorem 3, we take a closer look at the relationship be-
tween satisfaction by a set of states (M,Q |= ϕ), and satisfaction in each of
the states (∀q∈QM, q |= ϕ). The following Lemma shows that the former does
not necessarily imply the latter, and that the latter does not necessarily im-
ply the former.
Lemma 1
1. There is amodelM , state q, agent a and formulaϕ such thatM, img(q,∼a) |=
ϕ and for every q ∈ img(q,∼a),M, q |= ϕ.
2. There areM, q, a, ϕ such thatM, img(q,∼a) |= ϕ andM, q |= ϕ.
Proof Consider modelM6 from Figure 2.6.2.
1) Let ϕ = 〈〈a〉〉 p. NowM6, q |= ϕ (a can choose action α1), andM6, q′ |=
ϕ (a can choose action α2). However, M6, img(q,∼a) |= ϕ, because no
uniform strategy for a leads to q (in one step) from both q, q′.
2) Letϕ = ¬p. Now p ∈ π(q)∩π(q′), soM6, {q, q′} |= p, andM6, img(q,∼a) |=
ϕ. But p ∈ π(q), soM6, q |= p, andM6, q |= ϕ.
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
Proof of Theorem 3
K: Immediate by Proposition 15.
D: Suppose thatM,Q |= Ka⊥ for any Q = ∅. ThenM, img(Q,∼a)) |= ⊥. By
reﬂexivity of∼a, set img(Q,∼a) is nonempty, which contradicts Propo-
sition 3.1.
T: LetM, q, a, ϕ be as in Lemma 1.2. M, q |= Kaϕ, butM, q |= ϕ, so T is not
weakly (and hence not strongly) valid.
4+/4: M,Q |= KaKaϕ iffM, img(Q,∼a) |= Kaϕ iffM, img(img(Q,∼a),∼a) |=
ϕ iff M, img(Q,∼a) |= ϕ (since img(img(Q,∼a),∼a) = img(Q,∼a)) iff
M,Q |= Kaϕ.
5+/5: M,Q |= ¬Kaϕ iffM,Q |= Kaϕ iff, by 4+,M,Q |= KaKaϕ iff, by Propo-
sition 15,M,Q |= Ka¬Kaϕ.
B: Let M, q, a, ϕ be as in Lemma 1.1. M, img(q,∼a) |= ϕ, so M, q |= Ka¬ϕ.
By 4+, M, q |= KaKa¬ϕ, so M, q |= ¬KaKa¬ϕ, and by Proposition 15
M, q |= Ka¬Ka¬ϕ. ButM, q |= ϕ. Thus, B is not weakly (nor strongly)
valid.

2.6.3 In Quest for the Truth Axiom
We have just showed that, out of the S5 properties, axioms K,D,4,5 (but
not T!) hold. However, it also turns out that if we slightly restrict the lan-
guage, then the correspondingT axiombecomes strongly valid. LetCSL− be
the subset ofCSL inwhich, between every occurrence of constructive knowl-
edge (CA,EA,DA) and negation, there is always at least one operator other
than conjunction.9 Formally, CSL− formulae are deﬁned by the following
grammar (whereK = C,E,D and Kˆ = C,E,D):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ | KAϕ | KˆAψ,
ψ ::= p | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ | KAϕ | ψ ∧ ψ | KˆAψ.
Theorem 4 Every CSL− instance ofT (i.e.,Kaψ → ψ) is strongly valid.
Proof in the Appendix.
Thus, the T axiom holds for CSL−. Note that, by Proposition 15, the
meaning of negation or conjunction in the immediate scope of a construc-
tive knowledge operator is the same as if the operator were immediately out-
side the constructive knowledge operator.10 In consequence, every formula
of the full CSL is equivalent to one in CSL−. Thus, we can restrict our logical
language to CSL− without losing expressive power, and we automatically
9In particular, the requirement is met when operators CA,EA,DA are never immediately
followed by either ¬ or ∧.
10Which is very much unlike the semantics of negation following a standard knowledge op-
erator!
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“get” axiom T. We also observe that, from a more philosophical perspec-
tive, it is hard to pinpoint the intuitive meaning of negation immediately
following constructive knowledge. Note that, e.g., Ka¬〈〈a〉〉ϕ should be read
as “a has constructive knowledge about being unable to achieve ϕ”.11 It seems
thus, ﬁrst, that the weaker version of the truth axiom in Theorem 4 might
be more appropriate for constructive knowledge, and second, that it might
be a good idea to consider the logical language of constructive knowledge to
be limited to CSL−. In this case, constructive knowledge has theT property,
we do not lose any expressive power, and we leave out only formulae with
philosophically unclear reading.
Is then the constructive knowledge in CSL− S5? First, it must be noted
that – even though CSL and CSL− are expressively equivalent – the exten-
sion of the schema T is different in CSL− (for example, Ka¬p → ¬p is a
CSL instance of T, but even though it is equivalent to the CSL− formula
¬Kap → ¬p, the latter is not a CSL− instance of T). More importantly, in
CSL− the axiom schemataK and 5, at least written as in Theorem 3, are not
valid, but they are not invalid either – they are simply not formulae at all. It
does not seem correct to say that an operator has the S5 properties when it
cannot even express theK principle or negative introspection. Furthermore,
CSL− lacks the S5 principle of uniform substitution.
2.6.4 PropertiesofCollectiveConstructiveKnowledge
We brieﬂy consider the properties of collective knowledge operators. Theo-
rem5 should come as no surprise: note that, analogously to standard knowl-
edge, constructive common and distributed knowledge have the same prop-
erties as individual knowledge,whilemutual knowledge (“everybodyknows”)
differs in that it does not satisfy the introspection axioms 4 and 5.
Theorem 5 Below, we list some of the S5 properties for collective constructive
knowledge operators. We don’t state the properties explicitly, but refer to Theorem
3 – axiom K for CA becomes CA(ϕ → ψ) → (CAϕ → CAψ), and so on. “Yes”
means that the schema is strongly valid; “No” means that it is not even weakly
valid (the proof is left for the reader).
CA EA DA
K Yes Yes Yes
D Yes Yes Yes
T No No No
4 Yes No Yes
4+ Yes No Yes
5 Yes No Yes
5+ Yes No Yes
B No No No
Note that the proof of Theorem 4 required only that the epistemic re-
lation in question was reﬂexive. Thus, it can be easily extended to handle
collective constructive knowledge.
11Ka〈〈a〉〉¬ϕ, on the other hand, makes perfect sense: it refers to a’s constructive ability to
prevent ϕ.
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Corollary 3 Every CSL− instance of schemaT for collective constructive knowl-
edge operators CA,EA,DA is strongly valid.
2.7 Negation, Localization, andDeﬁnability
of Knowledge
The semantics of negation presented in Section 2.3.1 (we call it weak nega-
tion from now on) yields a very strong notion of disjunction, as Proposi-
tion 3 states. Such a strong notion of disjunction makes sense when we talk
about agents’ abilities, i.e., when used inside a Ka operator. For example:
M, q |= Ka(〈〈a〉〉ϕ ∨ 〈〈a〉〉ψ)means in fact that a in q can either identify a plan
to achieve ϕ or to achieve ψ. On the other hand, for a disjunction of simpler
formulae, e.g., primitive propositions p and r, a weaker notion seems more
intuitive: the disjunction p ∨ r should hold inM,Q iff, for any state q ∈ Q,
at least one of the disjuncts p and r holds in q (but different disjuncts may
hold in different states ofQ). This intuition can be captured with a different
negation operator ∼, which we call “strong” negation. The idea of strong
negation can be summarized as: M,Q |=∼ ϕ iff M, q |= ϕ for every q ∈ Q.
However, we will deﬁne it in terms of another, more primitive operator that
we call localization.
As it turns out, the signiﬁcance of localization goes beyond our discus-
sion on various kinds of negation. Most importantly, localization can be
used to deﬁne standard knowledge operators from constructive knowledge
operators. On theother hand, localization itself proves deﬁnable fromstrate-
gic and temporal operators. In consequence, standard knowledge can be de-
ﬁned in CSL without standard knowledge operators.
2.7.1 Local Evaluation of Formulae
In the semantics of CSL, formulae are interpreted in sets of states; in order
for ϕ to hold in M,Q, the formula must be “globally” satisﬁed in all states
from Q at once (i.e., with single evidence). Another option is to evaluate
ϕ locally in particular states from Q. To this end, we introduce a modality
that speciﬁes explicitly that the formulamust be evaluated for every relevant
state separately:
M,Q |= loc ϕ iffM, q |= ϕ for every q ∈ Q.
Proposition 16 Below, we investigate some typical axioms with respect to the
localization modality. “Yes” means that the scheme is strongly valid, “No” means
that the scheme is not strongly valid. Note that all the schemes below are weakly
valid, becauseM, q |= loc ϕ↔ ϕ for every individual state q.
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K loc (ϕ→ ψ) → (loc ϕ→ loc ψ) Yes
D ¬loc⊥ Yes
T loc ϕ→ ϕ No
4 loc ϕ→ loc loc ϕ Yes
4+ loc ϕ↔ loc loc ϕ Yes
5 ¬loc ϕ→ loc ¬loc ϕ No
5+ ¬loc ϕ↔ loc ¬loc ϕ No
B ϕ→ loc ¬loc ¬ϕ Yes
Proof in the Appendix.
Thus, localization is weak, but not strong, S5. In particular, S5 proper-
ties T and 5 do not necessarily hold in some contexts, for example in the
immediate scope of a constructive knowledge operator.
Proposition 17 Some other localization properties are the following, all strongly
valid (proof is left for the reader).
loc p↔ p, p ∈ Π loc (ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ (loc ϕ ∧ loc ψ)
〈〈A〉〉 ϕ↔ 〈〈A〉〉 loc ϕ 〈〈A〉〉ϕ↔ 〈〈A〉〉loc ϕ
〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ ↔ 〈〈A〉〉loc ϕU ψ ↔ 〈〈A〉〉ϕU loc ψ
locKAϕ↔ KAϕ KAϕ↔ KAloc ϕ,K ∈ {C,E,D}
Wewill show in the following sections how the loc operator can be used
todeﬁne standard knowledge and alternativenegationoperators. Thismakes
the following result very important: it says that localization is deﬁnable in
the CSL language, from the 〈〈∅〉〉 and U operators.
Proposition 18 The following formula is strongly valid:
loc ϕ↔ 〈〈∅〉〉ϕU ϕ
Proof M,Q |= 〈〈∅〉〉ϕU ϕ iff ∀λ∈out(Q,∅) there is an i ≥ 0 such thatM,λ[i] |= ϕ
and for any j such that 0 ≤ j < i,M,λ[j] |= ϕ. Since for each q ∈ Q there is a
λ ∈ out(Q, ∅)with λ[0] = q, this implies that ∀q∈QM, q |= ϕwhich is the same
asM,Q |= loc ϕ. To see that the other direction holds as well, assume that
M,Q |= locϕ and let λ ∈ out(Q, ∅). Wemust provide awitness for i; take i = 0.
Now,M,λ[i] |= ϕ and there is no j such that 0 ≤ j < i, soM,Q |= 〈〈∅〉〉ϕU ϕ.

2.7.2 DeﬁningStandardKnowledge fromConstructive
Knowledge
Standard knowledge operators are deﬁnable from constructive knowledge
and localization:
Proposition 19 KAϕ ↔ KˆAloc ϕ is strongly valid for any K ∈ {C,E,D}, Cˆ =
C, Eˆ = E, Dˆ = D.
Proof M,Q |= KˆAloc ϕ iffM, img(Q,∼KA) |= loc ϕ iff ∀q∈img(Q,∼KA)M, q |= ϕ iff
M,Q |= KAϕ. 
In particular, knowledge of a formula is the same as constructive knowl-
edge of the localization of the formula, i.e. Kaϕ ↔ Kaloc ϕ. An important
corollary of Propositions 19 and 18 is the following.
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Theorem 6 The following is strongly valid:
KAϕ↔ KˆA〈〈∅〉〉ϕU ϕ.
Theorem 6 shows that standard knowledge can be seen as a special case of con-
structive knowledge. It follows that the standard knowledge operators are strictly
speaking redundant in the CSL language.
2.7.3 Non-StandardDeﬁnitions of Negation
Negation, as deﬁned in Section 2.3.1, is “weak” in the sense that it is sufﬁ-
cient for the negation of, e.g., an atomic formula p to hold in a set of states
Q that p is false in at least one state from Q. Several other interpretations
of negation in a set of states are possible, corresponding to different ways of
quantifying over the set. We deﬁne strong negation as:
∼ϕ ≡ loc ¬ϕ
Note that, by Proposition 18, strong negation is deﬁnable from weak nega-
tion: ∼ϕ can be equivalently deﬁned as 〈〈∅〉〉(¬ϕ)U (¬ϕ).
Proposition 20 M,Q |=∼ϕ iff, for every q ∈ Q, we have thatM, q |= ϕ.
Proof M,Q |=∼ϕ iffM,Q |= loc¬ϕ iff for every q ∈ Qwehave thatM, q |= ϕ.

Strong negation does not behave as classical negation: it does not obey
the law of double negation, the law of excluded middle, or the consistency
requirement under strong validity. Nevertheless, it preserves these laws un-
der weak validity.
Proposition 21
1. ∼∼ϕ→ ϕ is weakly valid, but not strongly valid.
2. ϕ→∼∼ϕ is weakly valid, but not strongly valid.
3. ϕ∨ ∼ϕ is weakly valid, but not strongly valid.
4. ¬(ϕ∧ ∼ϕ) is weakly valid, but not strongly valid.
Proof
1), 2) Weak validity is immediate. M,Q |=∼∼ ϕ iff M,Q |= loc ¬ ∼ ϕ iff
M,Q |= loc ¬loc ¬ϕ iff for every q ∈ Qwe have thatM, q |= ϕ. Counter-
examples for the two implications are found in the two parts of Lemma
1, respectively, by takingQ = img(q,∼a).
3) Weak validity is immediate. As a counter-example to strong validity,
takeM and ϕ from Lemma 1.1, and letQ = img(q,∼a). M,Q |= ϕ, and
it is not the case thatM, q′ |= ϕ for every q′ ∈ Q.
4) Weak validity: immediate. Strong validity: takeM = M6 fromLemma1,
and letQ = {q, q′}, ϕ ≡ ¬〈〈a〉〉 p.
2.7. NEGATION, LOCALIZATION, DEFINABILITY OF KNOWLEDGE 54

Remark 7 Alternatively, strong negation can be taken as a primary notion: lo-
calization is deﬁnable from strong negation, and standard knowledge is thus de-
ﬁnable from constructive knowledge and strong negation. Formally, the following
are strongly valid:
1. loc ϕ↔∼∼ϕ
2. KAϕ↔ KˆA ∼∼ϕ.
BooleanOperators Based on Strong Negation
Recall that connectives like ∨ and→ are deﬁned in terms of weak negation
(¬). Similar connectives can be deﬁned for strong negation:
• ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2 ≡∼(∼ϕ1∧ ∼ϕ2),
• ϕ1  ϕ2 ≡∼ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2, and
• ϕ1  ϕ2 ≡ (ϕ1  ϕ2) ∧ ϕ2  ϕ1.
These versions of disjunction, material implication, and material bicon-
ditional have the following semantic characterizations:
Proposition 22
1. M,Q |= ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2 iff, for every q ∈ Q, we haveM, q |= ϕ1 orM, q |= ϕ2;
2. M,Q |= ϕ1  ϕ2 iff, for every q ∈ Q, we have that M, q |= ϕ1 implies
M, q |= ϕ2;
3. M,Q |= ϕ1  ϕ2 iff, for every q ∈ Q, we have thatM, q |= ϕ1 iffM, q |=
ϕ2.
Proof
1. M,Q |=∼ (∼ϕ1∧ ∼ϕ2) iff ∀q∈QM, q |=∼ϕ1∧ ∼ϕ2 iff ∀q∈QM, q |=∼ϕ1
orM, q |=∼ϕ2 iff ∀q∈QM, q |= ϕ1 orM, q |= ϕ2.
2. M,Q |= ϕ1  ϕ2 iffM,Q |=∼ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2 iff ∀q∈Q(M, q |=∼ϕ1 orM, q |= ϕ2)
iff ∀q∈Q(M, q |= ϕ1 orM, q |= ϕ2) iff ∀q∈QM, q |= ϕ1 → ϕ2.
3. Straightforward.

We can also deﬁne the strong negation-based versions of Boolean con-
stants “true” and “false”, but they coincide with the ones already proposed
in Section 2.3.2.
Proposition 23 Let −− ≡ p∧ ∼p, and −− ≡∼−− . Then:
1. M,Q |= −− for allQ ⊆ St,Q = ∅.
2. M,Q |= −− for allQ ⊆ St,Q = ∅.
Proof Straightforward. 
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Some Connections between theWeak and the Strong
It is immediate from Proposition 22 that, just as strong negation is the local-
ization of weak negation, the operators ‖, and deﬁned by strong nega-
tion, are the localizations of their counterparts ∨, →, ↔ deﬁned by weak
negation:
Proposition 24 The following are strongly valid:
(ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2) ↔ loc (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)
(ϕ1  ϕ2) ↔ loc (ϕ1 → ϕ2)
(ϕ1  ϕ2) ↔ loc (ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2)
Moreover, for validity (not strong validity), the two negations, the two
disjunctions and the two implications coincide:
Proposition 25 The following formulae are valid (but not strongly valid):
1. ¬ϕ↔∼ϕ
2. (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ↔ (ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2)
3. (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ↔ (ϕ1  ϕ2)
Proof Immediate from Proposition 24, sinceM, q |= ψ iffM, q |= loc ψ, for
any (single) state q. 
The following proposition shows that the notions of strong andweak va-
lidity can be seen as dual with respect to the strong andweak versions of the
connectives.
Proposition 26 1. ∼ϕ is strongly valid iff ¬ϕ is weakly valid.
2. ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2 is strongly valid iff ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 is weakly valid.
3. ϕ1  ϕ2 is strongly valid iff ϕ1 → ϕ2 is weakly valid.
4. ϕ1  ϕ2 is strongly valid iff ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 is weakly valid.
The laws of negation were stated in Proposition 21 using connectives ∨,
etc., deﬁned fromweak negation. We can now show, however, that the laws
of negation do in fact hold for strong negation if we state these laws using
the operators deﬁned from strong negation.
Proposition 27 1. ∼∼ϕ ϕ is strongly valid.
2. ϕ ‖∼ϕ is strongly valid.
3. ∼(ϕ∧ ∼ϕ) is strongly valid.
Proof Immediate from Propositions 21 and 26. 
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Properties of Constructive Knowledgewith “Strong” Negation
In Section 2.6.2, we discussed the S5 properties of constructive knowledge.
These properties can also be stated using strong negation, and derived con-
nectives, instead of weak negation.
Theorem 7 Below, we list constructive knowledge versions of some S5 properties
using strong negation. “Yes” means that the schema is strongly valid; “No” means
that it is not even weakly valid (again, none of the properties turn out to be weakly
but not strongly valid).
∂K Ka(ϕ ψ) (Kaϕ Kaψ)No
∂D ∼Ka−− Yes
∂T Kaϕ ϕ No
∂4 Kaϕ KaKaϕ Yes
∂4+ Kaϕ KaKaϕ Yes
∂5 ∼Kaϕ Ka∼Kaϕ Yes
∂5+ ∼Kaϕ Ka∼Kaϕ Yes
∂B ϕ Ka∼Ka∼ϕ Yes
Proof in the Appendix.
Finally, we point out that if we restrict the language to CSL−, as discussed
in Section 2.6.3, we get the truth axiom ∂T, i.e., the following variant of
Theorem 4.
Theorem 8 Every CSL− instance of schema ∂T (Kaϕ ϕ) is strongly valid.
Proof Note that ∀q∈QM, q |= Kaϕ → ϕ (by T), which implies thatM,Q |=
Kaϕ ϕ (by Proposition 22). 
Other Negations
We have considered two operators for negation so far. Yet another alterna-
tive is: ∠ϕ ≡ ¬loc ϕ. The meaning of ∠ is characterized with the following
proposition.
Proposition 28 M,Q |= ∠ϕ iff there exists q ∈ Q such thatM, q |= ϕ.
Proof M,Q |= ∠ϕ iffM,Q |= ¬loc ϕ iffM,Q |= loc ϕ iff there is a q ∈ Q such
thatM, q |= ϕ. 
2.8 Normal Forms and Expressiveness
In this section, we investigate expressiveness further, with particular focus
on the relationship between localization, weak negation and strong nega-
tion. In order to study expressiveness, we will study variants of the language
deﬁned in Section 2.3.1 with other (primary) operators. We have discussed
the interpretation of the following operators in sets of states:
¬ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉T CA EA DA CA EA DA loc ∼
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where T is an ATL temporal connective and A is a set of agents. We use
the expression L(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T,KA, KˆA, loc , ∼) to denote the language with all
thementioned operators,L(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T,KA, KˆA, loc ) to denote the language
with all operators except strong negation, and so on. The CSL language in-
troduced in Section 2.3.1 is L = L(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T,KA, KˆA). For simplicity, we
sometimes useL∗ for themost extensive languageL(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T,KA, KˆA, loc ,
∼).
We say that two formulae ϕ and ψ are equivalent, if ϕ ↔ ψ is valid, and
that they are strongly equivalent if ϕ ↔ ψ is strongly valid. We say that a
languageL2 is at least as expressive as a languageL1, if for every ϕ1 ∈ L1 there
exist an equivalent ϕ2 ∈ L2. We say thatL2 andL1 are expressively equivalent,
if L2 is at least as expressive as L1 and L1 is at least as expressive as L2.
We will make use of the following deﬁnition:
Atoms = Θ ∪ {〈〈A〉〉Tγ : γ ∈ L∗} ∪ {∼γ : γ ∈ L∗}.
We begin with deﬁning a normal form of our formulae.
2.8.1 Constructive Normal Form
A formula, possibly containing strongnegation, is of constructive normal form
if every subformula starting with a KˆA operator is of the form Kˆ1 · · · Kˆkψ
where ψ is either a primitive proposition, starts with a cooperation modal-
ity, or starts with strong negation. We now show that every L∗ formula is
equivalent to one of constructive normal form, and also to a formula of con-
structive normal formwithout strong negation.
Deﬁnition 1 (Constructive normal form (CSNF)) The set of L∗ formu-
lae of constructive normal form (CSNF) is deﬁned inductively as follows.
• p is of CSNF when p ∈ Θ,
• Kˆγ is of CSNF iff γ is of CSNF and either γ ∈ Atoms or γ = Kˆ′χ,
• 〈〈G〉〉Tγ is of CSNF iff γ is of CSNF,
• ¬γ is of CSNF iff γ is of CSNF,
• γ1 ∧ γ2 is of CSNF iff both γ1 and γ2 are of CSNF,
• ∼γ is of CSNF iff γ is of CSNF.
Theorem 9 Every formula in L∗ is strongly equivalent to a formula of construc-
tive normal form.
Proof in the Appendix.
Thus, any formula of the most general kind we have considered is equiv-
alent to a formula of CSNF. Note that a CSNF formula might contain strong
negation. However, we can also get rid of strong negation, as the following
result states.
Corollary 4 Every formula inL∗ is strongly equivalent to a formula of construc-
tive normal form without strong negation.
Proof in the Appendix.
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2.8.2 Expressiveness of Strong Negation
We have shown in Section 2.7 that standard knowledge, localization and
strong negation can be deﬁned with use of weak negation (together with
conjunction, constructive knowledge and ATL operators). Thus, L(¬,∧,
〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ) is already as expressive as the full L∗. Now we will investigate the
other direction: does weak negation add expressiveness if we already have
strong negation? We show in the following theorem that, in the language L
extended with strong negation, every formula is actually equivalent to one
without weak negation.
Theorem 10 Every formula in L(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ, ∼) is equivalent to a formula
of L(∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ, ∼).
Proof in the Appendix.
Thus, in particular, the following four languages are expressively equiva-
lent:
L(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ) L(∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ, ∼) L L∗
In consequence, both L(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ) and L(∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ, ∼) are expres-
sively complete with respect to the other operators we have considered. An
important difference between L(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ) and L(∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ, ∼) is that
strong negation is deﬁnable fromweak negation andATL operators by a sim-
ple schema (〈〈∅〉〉¬ϕU ¬ϕ), while this is not the casewhenwe reverse the roles
of the negations.
2.9 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a non-standard semantics for the modal logic of
strategic ability under imperfect information, in which formulae are inter-
preted over sets of states rather than in single states.12 Moreover, we intro-
duce new epistemic operators for “constructive” knowledge. It turns out
that, in this new semantics, simple cooperationmodalities 〈〈A〉〉 can be com-
bined with “constructive” epistemic operators into sufﬁciently expressive
formulae. Indeed, the new logic is strictly more expressive than most existing
ATL versions for imperfect information, while it retains the samemodel check-
ing complexity as the least costly of them. The philosophical dimension
of constructive knowledge is also natural: the constructive knowledge op-
erators capture the notion of knowing “de re”, while the standard epistemic
operators refer to knowing “de dicto”. Moreover, it turns out that standard
(traditional) knowledge is a special case of constructive knowledge. Also,
the language of CSL is expressive enough to enable expressing several other
interesting operators in a simple way.
Most of the usual S5 properties (with the notable exception of the truth
axiom T) hold for constructive knowledge. Furthermore, if we slightly re-
strict the syntax of CSL, we do not lose expressive power and the schema T
becomes a validity.
12We emphasize again that we do not propose newmodels: concurrent epistemic game struc-
tures have already been used for several years in ATEL-like logics. What we propose is a new
interpretation of formulae.
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CSL has novel, meaningful epistemic operators that can be used to cap-
ture important properties of the interaction between knowledge, action and
ability. In futurework, we plan to investigate further the expressivity of CSL,
and its relationshipwith logics like ETSL, ATLiR, ATEL-R*, ATEL-A, and “Uni-
form STIT”. A good case study (together with amore detailed analysis of ver-
iﬁcation complexity) is essential to determine the applicability of the logic.
Also, the (relative) expressive power of various operators in our semantics
seems to be worth further study.
We thank anonymous reviewers of JANCL and AAMAS-06 for their help-
ful remarks. Thomas A˚gotnes’ work has been supported by the Research
Council of Norway under grant 166525/V30. Wojtek Jamroga would also
like to thank Jan Broersen, John-Jules Meyer andWiebe van der Hoek.
2.10 Appendix: Some Proofs
Theorem 1
Proof (structural induction with respect to the structure of ϕ)
• M, q |=CSL tr(p) iffM, q |=CSL p iff p ∈ π(q) iffM, q |=L p.
• M, q |=CSL tr(¬ϕ) iff M, q |=CSL tr(ϕ) iff (by induction) M, q |=L ϕ iff
M, q |=L ¬ϕ.
• M, q |=CSL tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) iffM, q |=CSL tr(ϕ) andM, q |=CSL tr(ψ) iff (by induc-
tion)M, q |=L ϕ andM, q |=L ψ iffM, q |=L ϕ ∧ ψ.
• M, q |=CSL tr(〈〈A〉〉K(Γ) ϕ) iffM, q |=CSL KˆΓ〈〈A〉〉 tr(ϕ) iffM, img(q,∼KΓ ) |=CSL
〈〈A〉〉 tr(ϕ) iff ∃SA∀λ∈out(img(q,∼KΓ ),SA)M,λ[1] |=CSL tr(ϕ) iff (by induc-
tion) ∃SA∀λ∈out(img(q,∼KΓ ),SA)M,λ[1] |=ATOL ϕ iffM, q |=ATOL 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ) ϕ.
• For 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕ and 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)(ϕU ψ): analogously. The same for 〈〈A〉〉irϕ,
〈〈A〉〉fKϕ, and 〈〈A〉〉fKbϕ.
• M, q |=CSL tr(〈〈A〉〉f ϕ) iff M, q |=CSL 〈〈A〉〉 tr(ϕ) iff ∃SA∀λ∈out(q,SA)
M,λ[1] |=CSL tr(ϕ) iff (by induction) ∃SA∀λ∈out(q,SA) M,λ[1] |=F-ATEL ϕ iff
M, q |=F-ATEL 〈〈A〉〉f ϕ.
• M, q |=CSL tr(〈〈A〉〉fMb ϕ) iffM, q |=CSL ¬Kb¬〈〈A〉〉 tr(ϕ) iff¬∀q′∈img(q,∼b)¬M, q′ |=CSL 〈〈A〉〉 tr(ϕ) iff ∃q′∈img(q,∼b)∃SA∀λ∈out(q′,SA)M,λ[1] |=CSL tr(ϕ)
iff (by induction) ∃SA∃q′∈img(q,∼b)∀λ∈out(q′,SA)M,λ[1] |=F-ATEL ϕ iff
M, q |=F-ATEL 〈〈A〉〉fMb ϕ.
• For 〈〈A〉〉fMbϕ and 〈〈A〉〉
f
Mb
(ϕU ψ): analogously.
• M, q |=CSL tr(KAϕ) iffM, q |=CSL KAtr(ϕ) iff ∀q′∈img(q,∼KA)M, q′ |=CSL tr(ϕ)
iff (by induction) ∀q′∈img(q,∼KA)M, q′ |=L ϕ iffM, q |=L KAϕ.

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Theorem 4
Proof (structural induction on the structure ofϕ) In each case, wewill prove that
M,Q |= Kaϕ impliesM,Q |= ϕ for an arbitrary Q. By Proposition 3, we can
then conclude thatM,Q |= Kaϕ→ ϕ.
To simplify the proof, we assume that each ϕ has been transformed so
that no constructive knowledge operator is followedby conjunction (byPropo-
sition 15.3, each subformula KˆA(ψ1∧ψ2) can be equivalently transformed to
KˆAϕ1∧KˆAϕ2, andwe can apply this transformation recursively). Thus, every
Kˆ in ϕ is now followed either by some other Kˆ′, or by 〈〈A〉〉, or by a standard
knowledge operatorK′′, or by an atomic proposition p.
Additionally, given Q, we deﬁne Q′ = img(Q,∼a). Note that Q ⊆ Q′ by
reﬂexivity of∼a. Also, out(Q,SA) ⊆ out(Q′, SA) bymonotonicity of function
outwrtQ, and img(Q,∼KA) ⊆ img(Q′,∼KA) by reﬂexivity of all∼KA.
Case ϕ ≡ p: Let M,Q |= Kap. Then M,Q′ |= p, i.e. ∀q∈Q′M, q |= p. So,
∀q∈QM, q |= p, andM,Q |= p.
Case ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2: Let M,Q |= Ka(ψ1 ∧ ψ2). Then M,Q′ |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2, i.e.
M,Q′ |= ψ1 and M,Q′ |= ψ2. So, M,Q |= Kaψ1 and M,Q |= Kaψ2.
By the induction hypothesis, M,Q |= ψ1 and M,Q |= ψ2, and hence
M,Q |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
Case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 ψ: Let M,Q |= Ka〈〈A〉〉 ψ. Then M,Q′ |= 〈〈A〉〉 ψ, and
so ∃SA∀λ∈out(Q′,SA)M,λ[1] |= ψ. Thus, ∃SA∀λ∈out(Q,SA)M,λ[1] |= ψ, and
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ψ.
Cases ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ and ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2: analogous.
Case ϕ ≡ KAψ: LetM,Q |= KaKAψ. ThenM,Q′ |= KAψ, and ∀q∈img(Q′,∼KA)
M, q |= ψ. But then also ∀q∈img(Q,∼KA)M, q |= ψ, andM,Q |= KAψ.
Before we consider the remaining cases, we deﬁne a couple of additional
symbols. Let Qi = img(Qi−1,∼KiAi), with the initial set Q0 = Q. That is,
Qi = img(...(img(Q,∼K1A1), ...),∼K
i
Ai
). Also, let Q′′ = img(Qn,∼a). Note that
Qn ⊆ Q′′, and out(Qn, SB) ⊆ out(Q′′, SB) for any SB.
Case ϕ ≡ KˆnAn ...Kˆ1A1p: (i.e., ϕ is a sequence of n possibly different Kˆ opera-
tors for possibly different coalitions). LetM,Q |= KaKˆnAn ...Kˆ1A1p. Then
M,Q′′ |= p, andhence ∀q∈Q′′M, q |= p. Thus, ∀q∈QnM, q |= p, soM,Qn |=
p, andM,Q |= KˆnAn ...Kˆ1A1p.
Case ϕ ≡ KˆnAn ...Kˆ1A1KBψ: analogous.
Case ϕ ≡ KˆnAn ...Kˆ1A1〈〈B〉〉 ψ: LetM,Q |= KaKˆnAn ...Kˆ1A1〈〈B〉〉 ψ.
ThenM,Q′′ |= 〈〈B〉〉 ψ, and hence ∃SB∀λ∈out(Q′′,SB)M,λ[1] |= ψ.
Thus, ∃SB∀λ∈out(Qn,SB)M,λ[1] |= ψ, soM,Qn |= 〈〈B〉〉 ψ, andM,Q |=
KˆnAn ...Kˆ1A1〈〈B〉〉 ψ.
Cases ϕ ≡ KˆnAn ...Kˆ1A1〈〈B〉〉ψ and ϕ ≡ KˆnAn ...Kˆ1A1〈〈B〉〉ψ1 U ψ2: analogous.

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Proposition 16
Proof
K Immediate.
D Suppose that M,Q |= loc ⊥ for some Q = ∅. Then, there is some q for
whichM, q |= ⊥, but this contradicts Proposition 3.1.
T To see that T is not strongly valid, let ϕ andM be as in Lemma 1.1, and
takeQ = img(q,∼a).M,Q |= loc ϕ, butM,Q |= ϕ.
4/4+ M,Q |= loc ϕ iff for every q ∈ Q we have that M, q |= ϕ iff for every
q ∈ Qwe have thatM, q |= loc ϕ iffM,Q |= loc loc ϕ.
5/5+ To see that 5 is not strongly valid, let M be as in Figure 2.6.2, ϕ = p
and let Q = {q, q′}. M,Q |= ¬loc ϕ because M, q′ |= ¬ϕ. However, if
it were the case thatM,Q |= loc ¬loc ϕ, thenM, q |= ¬loc ϕ and thus,
M, q |= ¬ϕ, which is not the case.
B M,Q |= ϕ iff for all q ∈ Q we have thatM, q |= ϕ iff for all q ∈ Q we have
thatM, q |= ¬loc ¬ϕ iffM,Q |= loc ¬loc ¬ϕ.

Theorem 7
Proof
∂K: We construct a counterexample. Let M be a model with states q1, q2
and agent a, such that q1 ∼a q2, π(q1) = {r} and π(q2) = {p}. Let
ϕ = ¬p and ψ = r. p ∈ π(q1) ∩ π(q2), soM, img(q1,∼a) |= ϕ andM, q1 |=
Kaϕ. r ∈ π(q1) ∩ π(q2), soM, img(q1,∼a) |= ψ andM, q1 |= Kaψ. Thus,
M, q1 |= Kaϕ → Kaψ and by Proposition 25: M, q1 |= Kaϕ  Kaψ
(*). Since both M, q1 |= ϕ → ψ and M, q2 |= ϕ → ψ, by Proposition
22, M, img(q1,∼a) |= ϕ  ψ and thusM, q1 |= Ka(ϕ  ψ). Together
with (*), we get that M, q1 |= Ka(ϕ  ψ) → (Kaϕ  Kaψ) and, by
Proposition 25,M, q1 |= Ka(ϕ  ψ)  (Kaϕ  Kaψ). Thus, ∂K is not
weakly (and hence not strongly) valid.
∂T: LetM, q, a, ϕ be as in Lemma 1.2. M, q |= Kaϕ andM, q |= ϕ, soM, q |=
Kaϕ  ϕ by Proposition 25. Thus, ∂T is not weakly (and hence not
strongly) valid.
∂4+/∂4: M,Q |= Kaϕ KaKaϕ iff, by Proposition 22, ∀q∈Q(M, q |= Kaϕ⇔
M, q |= KaKaϕ) iff, by 4+, ∀q∈Q(M, q |= Kaϕ⇔M, q |= Kaϕ).
∂5+/∂5: M,Q |=∼Kaϕ Ka ∼Kaϕ iff, by Proposition 22, ∀q∈Q(M, q |=∼
Kaϕ ⇔ M, q |= Ka ∼Kaϕ) iff ∀q∈Q(M, img(q,∼a) |= ϕ ⇔ M, img(q,∼a)
|=∼ Kaϕ) iff ∀q∈Q(M, img(q,∼a) |= ϕ ⇔ ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)M, img(q′,∼a) |=
ϕ)which is true, since img(q′,∼a) = img(q,∼a) for any q′ ∈ img(q,∼a).
∂D: M,Q |=∼Ka−− iff ∀q∈QM, q |= Ka−− iff ∀q∈QM, img(q,∼a) |= −− , which
is true by Proposition 23.1.
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∂B: M,Q |= ϕ Ka∼Ka∼ϕ iff ∀q∈Q(M, q |= ϕ⇒
M, img(q,∼a) |=∼ Ka ∼ ϕ) iff ∀q∈Q(M, q |= ϕ ⇒ ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)M, q′ |=
Ka ∼ ϕ) iff ∀q∈Q(M, q |= ϕ ⇒ ∀q′∈img(q,∼a) M, img(q′,∼a) |=∼ ϕ) iff
∀q∈Q(M, q |= ϕ ⇒ ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)∃q′′∈img(q′,∼a)M, q′′ |= ϕ) iff ∀q∈Q(M, q |=
ϕ⇒ ∃q′∈img(q,∼a)M, q′ |= ϕ). This always holds, by taking q′ = q.

Theorem9andCorollary4 (ConstructiveNormalForm)
and Theorem 10 (Expressiveness of Strong Negation)
In the followingwewill very oftenwork in the languageL(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, KˆA, ∼),
and we will henceforth use the shorthand notation Lˆ to denote this lan-
guage, for simplicity.
We use Subf (ϕ) to denote the set of all subformulae of ϕ (including ϕ it-
self). For simplicity, we assume that each subformula of a formula is unique,
i.e. that there is a unique member of Subf (ϕ) for each occurrence of a sub-
formula in ϕ13.
We ﬁrst present intermediate deﬁnitions and results leading up to the
main result in Theorem 9. Note that Lemma 3 below gives an alternative
(equivalent) deﬁnition of constructive normal form.
Deﬁnition 2 We deﬁne the depth dϕ(ψ) of a subformula ψ ∈ Subf (ϕ) of a
formula ϕ ∈ Lˆ in the usual way:
• dϕ(ϕ) = 0
• dϕ(Kˆγ) = d⇒ dϕ(γ) = d + 1
• dϕ(〈〈G〉〉Tγ) = d ⇒ dϕ(γ) = d + 1
• dϕ(γ1 ∧ γ2) = d ⇒ dϕ(γ1) = dϕ(γ2) = d + 1
• dϕ(¬γ) = d ⇒ dϕ(γ) = d + 1
• dϕ(∼γ) = d ⇒ dϕ(γ) = d + 1
Lemma 2 A formula ψ ∈ Lˆ is of CSNF iff every γ ∈ Subf (ψ) is of CSNF.
Proof The implication to the left is trivial; we prove the one to the right.
Assume that ψ is of CSNF. That each γ ∈ Subf (ψ) is of CSNF follows immedi-
ately by induction on the depth of γ:
• dψ(γ) = 0: γ = ψ is of CSNF
• dψ(γ) = d + 1 (d ≥ 0). We reason by the possible cases:
– dψ(Kˆγ) = d: by the induction hypothesis Kˆγ is of CSNF, and thus
γ is of CSNF.
13This can be achieved by, e.g., adorning the subformulae with unique identiﬁers, or by tak-
ing Subf (ϕ) to be a multiset instead of a set. The only reason for this assumption is to make
proofs simpler.
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– dψ(〈〈G〉〉Tγ) = d: 〈〈G〉〉Tγ is of CSNF; γ is of CSNF.
– dψ(γ ∧ γ′) = d: γ ∧ γ′ is of CSNF; γ is of CSNF. Similarly when
dψ(γ′ ∧ γ) = d.
– dψ(¬γ) = d: ¬γ is of CSNF; γ is of CSNF.
– dψ(∼γ) = d: ∼γ is of CSNF; γ is of CSNF.

Lemma 3 A formula ψ ∈ Lˆ is of CSNF iff every Kˆγ ∈ Subf (ψ) is of the form
KˆKˆ0 · · · Kˆkα where α ∈ Atoms, for some k ≥ 0.
Proof For the direction to the right, assume that there is a Kˆγ ∈ Subf (ψ)
which is not of the form. There are two possibilities: γ = Kˆ0 · · · Kˆm¬β or
γ = Kˆ0 · · · Kˆmβ1 ∧ β2 for somem ≥ 0. In either case, it follows immediately
that Kˆγ is not of CSNF. By Lemma 2, ψ is not of CSNF.
For the direction to the left, assume that every Kˆγ ∈ Subf (ψ) is of the
form. We show that every χ ∈ Subf (ψ) is of CSNF by structural induction:
• χ = p ∈ Θ: χ is of CSNF.
• χ = Kˆγ: by the induction hypothesis, γ is of CSNF. By assumption,
γ = Kˆ0 · · · Kˆkα for some α ∈ Atoms and some k ≥ 0. Thus, χ is of CSNF.
• χ = 〈〈A〉〉Tγ: by the induction hypothesis, γ is of CSNF, and thus χ is of
CSNF.
• χ = γ1 ∧ γ2: by the induction hypothesis, γ1 and γ2 are of CSNF, and
thus χ is of CSNF.
• χ =∼ γ: by the induction hypothesis, γ is of CSNF and thus χ is of
CSNF.
• χ = ¬γ: by the induction hypothesis, γ is of CSNF and thus χ is of
CSNF.

Now that we have established some properties of formulae of CSNF, we
go on to deﬁne themapping of a formula to one of CSNF.
Deﬁnition 3 The value f(Kˆψ) of the function f : {Kˆψ : ψ ∈ Lˆ} → Lˆ is deﬁned
by structural induction over ψ:
f(Kˆψ) = Kˆψ when ψ ∈ Atoms
f(KˆKˆ′γ) = KˆKˆ′γ
f(Kˆ¬γ) = ¬f(Kˆγ)
f(Kˆ(γ1 ∧ γ2)) = f(Kˆγ1) ∧ f(Kˆγ2)
Lemma 4 Let β ∈ Lˆ be a formula. β is of CSNF iff f(Kˆβ) is of CSNF for any
arbitrary Kˆ ∈ {CA,DA,EA : A ⊆ Σ}.
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Proof Let Kˆ ∈ {CA,DA,EA : A ⊆ Σ}. The proof is by structural induction
over β:
• β = p ∈ Θ: β is of CSNF iff f(Kˆβ) = Kˆp is of CSNF.
• β = Kˆ′γ: β is of CSNF iff f(Kˆβ) = KˆKˆ′γ is of CSNF.
• β = 〈〈A〉〉Tγ: β is of CSNF iff f(Kˆβ) = Kˆ〈〈A〉〉Tγ is of CSNF.
• β = γ1 ∧ γ2: β is of CSNF iff both γ1 and γ2 are of CSNF iff, by the
induction hypothesis, both f(Kˆγ1) and f(Kˆγ2) are of CSNF iff f(Kˆβ) is
of CSNF.
• β =∼γ: β is of CSNF iff f(Kˆβ) = Kˆβ is of CSNF.
• β = ¬γ: β is of CSNF iff γ is of CSNF iff, by the induction hypothesis,
f(Kˆγ) is of CSNF iff ¬f(Kˆγ) is of CSNF iff f(Kˆ¬γ) is of CSNF.

Lemma 5 For any ψ ∈ Lˆ,
Kˆψ ↔ f(Kˆψ)
is strongly valid for any Kˆ ∈ {CA,DA,EA : A ⊆ Σ}.
Proof The proof is by structural induction over ψ. When ψ ∈ Atoms or
ψ = Kˆ′γ, f(Kˆψ) = Kˆψ, and we are done. When ψ = ¬γ,M,Q |= Kˆψ iff, by
Proposition 15,M,Q |= ¬Kˆγ iffM,Q |= Kˆγ iff, by the induction hypothesis,
M,Q |= f(Kˆγ) iff M,Q |= ¬f(Kˆγ) iff M,Q |= f(Kˆψ). When ψ = γ1 ∧ γ2,
M,Q |= Kˆψ iff, by Proposition 15,M,Q |= Kˆγ1 andM,Q |= Kˆγ2 iff, by the
induction hypothesis,M,Q |= f(Kˆγ1) andM,Q |= f(Kˆγ2) iffM,Q |= f(Kˆψ).

Deﬁnition 4 (ϕi,Xi, αi) Let ϕ ∈ Lˆ be a formula. Deﬁne ϕi, i ≥ 0:
• i = 0: ϕ0 = ϕ
• i = j+1 (j ≥ 0): LetXi = {Kˆψ : Kˆψ ∈ Subf (ϕj), Kˆψ is not of CSNF}. IfXi
is empty, let ϕj+1 = ϕj . Otherwise, select an αi ∈ Xi such that β ∈ Xi im-
plies that dϕj (β) ≤ dϕj (αi) (several suchαimay exist; select one arbitrarily),
and let ϕj+1 be ϕj with the subformula αi replaced by f(αi).
Lemma 6 Let ϕ ∈ Lˆ, and let αi be deﬁned in Def. 4. For each i ≥ 1, f(αi) is of
CSNF.
Proof Let αi = Kˆψ. We show that for every γ ∈ Subf (ψ), f(Kˆγ) is of CSNF by
structural induction over γ:
• γ = p ∈ Θ: f(Kˆγ) = Kˆp is of CSNF.
• γ = Kˆ′β: f(Kˆγ) = KˆKˆ′β is of CSNF iff Kˆ′β is of CSNF. Assume that
Kˆ′β is not of CSNF, then γ ∈ Xi. Then dϕi−1(γ) > dϕi−1(αi), but this is
a contradiction since there are no γ ∈ Xi with greater depth than αi.
Thus, f(Kˆγ) is of CSNF.
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• γ = 〈〈G〉〉Tβ: By the induction hypothesis, f(Kˆβ) is of CSNF; by Lemma
4 β is of CSNF; 〈〈G〉〉Tβ is of CSNF; Kˆ〈〈G〉〉Tβ = f(Kˆγ) is of CSNF.
• γ = γ1 ∧ γ2: By the induction hypothesis, f(Kˆγ1) and f(Kˆγ2) are of
CSNF; f(Kˆγ1) ∧ f(Kˆγ2) is of CSNF; f(Kˆγ) is of CSNF.
• γ = ¬β: By the induction hypothesis, f(Kˆβ) is of CSNF; ¬f(Kˆβ) is of
CSNF; f(Kˆγ) is of CSNF.
• γ =∼β: By the induction hypothesis, f(Kˆβ) is of CSNF; by Lemma 4 β
is of CSNF; γ is of CSNF; Kˆγ = f(Kˆγ) is of CSNF.

Lemma 7 Let ϕ ∈ Lˆ, and let ϕi be deﬁned in Def. 4. There is a p ≥ 1 such that
ϕp = ϕp−1 andXp = ∅. We write ϕˆ = ϕp for an arbitrary such p.
Proof X1 is ﬁnite. We show that Xi+1 ⊂ Xi (proper inclusion) whenever
ϕi = ϕi−1, for any i ≥ 1. The Lemma follows.
Let ϕi = ϕi−1. Assume that there is an α ∈ Xi+1, α ∈ Xi. α is not of
CSNF, and since α ∈ Subf (ϕi) and α ∈ Subf (ϕi−1) the only possibility is
that α ∈ Subf (f(αi)). But by Lemma 6, f(αi) is of CSNF, and by Lemma 2 α
must be of CSNF which is a contradiction. Thus,Xi+1 ⊆ Xi. To see that the
inclusion is proper, observe that αi ∈ Xi but αi ∈ Xi+1. 
Proof of Theorem 9 Let ϕ′′ ∈ L∗, and let ϕ′ be the result of replacing every
occurrence of K in ϕ′′ with the combination Kˆ ∼∼, for every K. Let ϕ be
the result of replacing every occurrence of loc in ϕ′ with the combination
∼∼. ϕ′′ and ϕ are strongly equivalent by Remark 7. Observe that ϕ ∈ Lˆ. Let
ϕˆ = ϕp be deﬁned from ϕ as in Lemma 7.
First, we argue that ϕˆ is of CSNF. If not, there is a Kˆγ ∈ Subf (ϕˆ) where γ
is not of the form Kˆ0 · · · Kˆkα for α ∈ Atoms (Lemma 3). Then, Kˆγ is not of
CSNF, which contradicts the fact thatXp = ∅. Second, we show that ϕˆ ↔ ϕ
is strongly valid. Let i ≥ 1. By Lemma 5, M,Q |= αi iff M,Q |= f(αi) for
any M,Q. It follows immediately that M,Q |= ϕi iff M,Q |= ϕi+1. Thus,
M,Q |= ϕ = ϕ0 iffM,Q |= ϕˆ = ϕp. Thus, ϕˆ is of CSNF, and it is equivalent to
ϕ. 
Proof of Corollary 4 Let ϕ ∈ L∗. By the theorem, ϕ is strongly equivalent to a
formula ϕˆwhich is of CSNF.Now,we recursively replace all subformulae of ϕˆ
of the form ∼ψwith 〈〈∅〉〉(¬ψ)U (¬ψ), yielding (by Proposition 18) a strongly
equivalent formula ϕ′ without strong negation. We observe that subformu-
lae of CSNF are replaced with subformulae of CSNF, so ϕ′ is of CSNF too. 
Wenow go on to present our proof of Theorem 10. Somemore notation:
when ϕ ∈ Lˆ, we use ∂ϕ to denote the result of replacing each occurrence
of ¬ in ϕ with ∼. Formally, ∂p = p; ∂Kaψ = Ka∂ψ; ∂〈〈G〉〉Tψ = 〈〈G〉〉T∂ψ;
∂ψ1 ∧ ψ2 = ∂ψ1 ∧ ∂ψ2; ∂¬ψ =∼∂ψ; ∂∼ψ =∼∂ψ.
We begin with deﬁning the notion of constructive depth of a subformula –
not to be confused with the notion of depth in the proof of Theorem 9.
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Deﬁnition 5 (Constructive depth) Let ϕ ∈ Lˆ. The constructive depth,
or just c-depth,Dϕ(ψ) in ϕ of a subformula ψ ∈ Subf (ϕ) is deﬁned inductively as
follows:
• Dϕ(ϕ) = 0
• Dϕ(Kˆγ) = D ⇒ Dϕ(γ) = D + 1
• Dϕ(〈〈G〉〉Tγ) = D ⇒ Dϕ(γ) = 0
• Dϕ(γ1 ∧ γ2) = D ⇒ Dϕ(γ1) = Dϕ(γ2) = D
• Dϕ(¬γ) = D ⇒ Dϕ(γ) = D
• Dϕ(∼γ) = D ⇒ Dϕ(γ) = 0
If ϕ has no occurrence of ¬ on c-depth D, i.e., if ¬ψ ∈ Subf(ϕ) implies
thatDϕ(¬ψ) = D, we say that ϕ is free of ¬ on depthD.
Lemma 8 If a formula ϕ ∈ L(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ, ∼) is free of ¬ on all depths > 0,
then
ϕ↔ ∂ϕ
is valid.
Proof We show that
ψ ↔ ∂ψ is
{
valid ifDϕ(ψ) = 0
strongly valid ifDϕ(ψ) > 0
for all ψ ∈ Subf (ϕ) by structural induction.
ψ = p: immediate (∂ψ = ψ).
ψ = KˆAγ: Dϕ(γ) > 0. M,Q |= ψ iffM, img(Q,∼KA) |= γ iff, by the induction
hypothesis,M, img(Q,∼KA) |= ∂γ iffM,Q |= KA∂γ iffM,Q |= ∂ψ.
ψ = 〈〈G〉〉γ: M,Q |= ψ iff ∃SG∀λ∈out(Q,SG)∀j≥0M,λ[j] |= γ iff, by the induc-
tion hypothesis (for γ, whereDϕ(γ) = 0), ∃SG∀λ∈out(Q,SG)∀j≥0M,λ[j] |=
∂γ iffM,Q |= 〈〈G〉〉∂γ. Similar for the other ATL connectives.
ψ = γ1 ∧ γ2: First, consider the case thatDϕ(ψ) = 0, in which caseDϕ(γ1) =
Dϕ(γ2) = 0. Wemust show that ψ ↔ ∂ψ is valid.M, q |= ψ iffM, q |= γ1
andM, q |= γ2 iff, by the induction hypothesis,M, q |= ∂γ1 andM, q |=
∂γ2 iffM, q |= ∂γ1 ∧ ∂γ2. Second, consider the case thatDϕ(ψ) > 0, in
which case Dϕ(γ1) > 0 and Dϕ(γ2) > 0. We must show that ψ ↔ ∂ψ
is strongly valid. M,Q |= ψ iff M,Q |= γ1 and M,Q |= γ2 iff, by the
inductionhypothesis,M,Q |= ∂γ1 andM,Q |= ∂γ2 iffM,Q |= ∂γ1∧∂γ2.
ψ = ¬γ: By the assumption in the lemma,Dϕ(ψ) = 0. Then alsoDϕ(γ) = 0.
M, q |= ψ iffM, q |= γ iff, by the induction hypothesis, M, q |= ∂γ iff
M, q |=∼∂γ.
ψ =∼γ: M,Q |= ψ iff ∀q∈QM, q |= γ iff, by the induction hypothesis (for γ,
whereDϕ(γ) = 0), ∀q∈QM, q |= ∂γ iffM,Q |=∼∂γ.
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
Proof of Theorem 10 Let ϕ ∈ L(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ, ∼) be a formula, and let ϕˆ be
a formula of CSNF equivalent to ϕ. Note that ϕˆ ∈ L(¬,∧, 〈〈A〉〉T, Kˆ, ∼). We
show that
Dϕˆ(ψ) > 0 ⇒ ψ ∈ Atoms or ψ = Kˆγ (2.3)
for every ψ ∈ Subf (ϕˆ) by induction over the depth (not the constructive
depth) of ψ, for arbitrary γ and Kˆ. For the base case, let ψ = ϕˆ and (2.3) is
vacuously true. In the inductive case assume that (2.3) holds for the parent
ofψ. There are three circumstances inwhichDϕˆ(ψ) > 0. First, Kˆψ ∈ Subf (ϕˆ).
Then, ψ ∈ Atoms or ψ is of the form Kbγ, since ϕˆ is of CSNF. Second, ¬ψ ∈
Subf (ϕˆ)withDϕˆ(ψ) = Dϕˆ(¬ψ). By the induction hypothesis, it must be the
case that Dϕˆ(¬ψ) = 0, so (2.3) is vacuously true. Third, ψ ∧ ψ′ ∈ Subf (ϕˆ)
with Dϕˆ(ψ) = Dϕˆ(ψ′) = Dϕˆ(ψ ∧ ψ′). By the induction hypothesis, it must
be the case that Dϕˆ(ψ ∧ ψ′) = 0, so (2.3) is vacuously true. Similarly for the
case ψ′ ∧ ψ. This shows that ϕˆ is free for ¬ on all depths > 0, and thus ϕ
is equivalent to ϕˆ which is equivalent to ∂ϕˆ by Lemma 8 which is without
weak negation. 
Chapter 3
On the Relationship
between Playing
Rationally andKnowing
how to Play: A Logical
Account
Abstract. Modal logics of strategic ability usually focus on captur-
ing what it means for an agent to have a feasible strategy that brings
about some property. While there is a general agreement on abilities
in scenarioswhere agents have perfect information, the right seman-
tics for ability under incomplete information is still debated upon.
Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic, an offspring of this debate, can
be treated as a logic that captures properties of agents’ rational play.
In this paper, we provide a semantics of ETSL that is more compact
and comprehensible than the one presented in the original paper by
vanOtterloo and Jonker. Second, we use ETSL to show that a rational
player knows that he will succeed if, and only if, he knows how to
play to succeed – while the same is not true for rational coalitions of
players.
Keywords: multi-agent systems, theories of agency, game-
theoretical foundations, modal logic.
3.1 Introduction
Modal logics of strategic ability usually focus on capturingwhat itmeans for
an agent to have a feasible strategy that brings about some property. While
there is a general agreement on abilities in scenarios where agents have per-
fect information, the right semantics for ability under incomplete informa-
tion is still debated upon. Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic, proposed by
van Otterloo and Jonker [135], is an offspring of this debate, but one that
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leads in an orthogonal direction to the mainstream solutions. The central
operator of ETSL can be read as: “if A play rationally to achieve ϕ (mean-
ing: they never play a dominated strategy), they will achieve ϕ”. Thus, one
may treat ETSL as a logic that captures properties of agents’ rational play in
a sense.
This paper contains two main messages. First, we provide a semantics
of ETSL that is more compact and comprehensible than the one presented
in [135]. ETSL is underpinned by several exciting concepts. Unfortunately,
its semantics is also quite hard to read due to a couple non-standard solu-
tions and a plethora of auxiliary functions, which is probably why the logic
never received the attention it deserves. Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, we use ETSL to show that a rational player knows that he will succeed
if, and only if, he knows how to play to succeed – while the same is not true
for rational coalitions of players.
3.2 Reasoning about Abilities of Agents
Modal logics of strategic ability [6, 8] form one of the ﬁelds where logic and
game theory can successfully meet. The logics have clear possible worlds se-
mantics, are axiomatizable, and have some interesting computational prop-
erties. Moreover, they are underpinned by intuitively appealing conceptual
machinery formodeling and reasoning about systems that involvemultiple
autonomous agents.
3.2.1 ATL: Ability in Perfect InformationGames
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [6, 8] can be seen as a logic for sys-
tems involvingmultiple agents, that allows one to reason aboutwhat agents
can achieve in game-like scenarios. Since ATL does not include incomplete
information in its scope, it can be seen as a logic for reasoning about agents
who always have perfect information about the current state of affairs. For-
mula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, where A is a coalition of agents, expresses that A have a collec-
tive strategy to enforce ϕ. ATL formulae include temporal operators: “ ”
(“in the next state”),  (“always from now on”) and U (“until”). Operator
 (“now or sometime in the future”) can be deﬁned as ϕ ≡ U ϕ. Like
in CTL, every occurrence of a temporal operator is preceded by exactly one
cooperation modality 〈〈A〉〉.1 Formally, the recursive deﬁnition of ATL for-
mulae is:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ
A number of semantics have been deﬁned for ATL, most of them equiva-
lent [52]. In this paper, we use a variant of concurrent game structures,
M = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o〉,
which includes anonemptyﬁnite set of all agentsAgt = {1, ..., k}, a nonempty
set of states St, a set of atomic propositions Π, a valuation of propositions
1The logic to which such a syntactic restriction applies is sometimes called “vanilla” ATL
(resp. “vanilla” CTL etc.).
3.2. REASONING ABOUT ABILITIES OF AGENTS 70
π : Π → 2St, and a nonempty set of (atomic) actions Act. Function d : Agt×
St→ 2Act deﬁnes actions available to an agent in a state, and o is a determin-
istic transition function that assigns an outcome state q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to
state q, and a tuple of actions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 that can be executed byAgt in q. A
strategy of agent a is a conditional plan that speciﬁes what a is going to do for
every possible situation (sa : St → Act such that sa(q) ∈ d(a, q)). A collective
strategy (called also a strategy proﬁle) SA for a group of agents A is a tuple of
strategies Sa, one per agent a ∈ A. A path λ inM is an inﬁnite sequence of
states that can be effected by subsequent transitions, and refers to a possible
course of action (or a possible computation) that may occur in the system;
by λ[i], we denote the ith position on path λ. Function out(q, SA) returns
the set of all paths that may result from agentsA executing strategy SA from
state q onward:
out(q, SA) = {λ = q0q1q2... | q0 = q and for every i = 1, 2, ... there exists a
tuple of actions 〈αi−11 , ..., αi−1k 〉 such that αi−1a = Sa(qi−1) for each a ∈
A, αi−1a ∈ d(a, qi−1) for each a /∈ A, and o(qi−1, αi−11 , ..., αi−1k ) = qi}.
Now, the semantics of ATL formulae can be given via the following clauses:
M, q |= p iff q ∈ π(p) (where p ∈ Π);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q |= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ iff there is a collective strategy SA such that, for every
λ ∈ out(q, SA), we haveM,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ out(q, SA), we
haveM,λ[i] for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there is SA st. for every λ ∈ out(q, SA) there is i ≥ 0, for
whichM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
3.2.2 Strategic Ability and Incomplete Information
ATL is unrealistic in a sense: real-life agents seldom possess complete infor-
mation about the current state of the world. Alternating-time Temporal Epis-
temic Logic (ATEL) [133] enriches the picture with an epistemic component,
adding to ATL operators for representing agents’ knowledge: Kaϕ reads as
“agent a knows that ϕ”. Additional operators EAϕ, CAϕ, and DAϕ refer to
mutual knowledge (“everybody knows”), common knowledge, and distributed
knowledge among the agents from A. Models for ATEL extend concurrent
game structures with epistemic accessibility relations∼1, ...,∼k⊆ Q×Q (one
per agent) for modeling agents’ uncertainty; the relations are assumed to be
equivalences. We will call such models concurrent epistemic game structures
(CEGS) in the rest of the paper. Agent a’s epistemic relation is meant to en-
code a’s inability to distinguish between the (global) system states: q ∼a q′
means that, while the system is in state q, agent a cannot determinewhether
it is not in q′. Then:
M, q |= Kaϕ iff ϕ holds for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
Relations ∼EA, ∼CA and ∼DA , used to model group epistemics, are derived
from the individual relations of agents fromA. First,∼EA is the union of rela-
tions ∼a, a ∈ A. Next, ∼CA is deﬁned as the transitive closure of ∼EA. Finally,
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Figure 3.1: Gambling Robots game. Arrows represent possible transitions
of the system (labeled with tuples of agents’ actions); dashed lines connect
states that are indiscernible for particular agents.
∼DA is the intersection of all the ∼a, a ∈ A. The semantics of group knowl-
edge can be deﬁned as below (forK = C,E,D):
M, q |= KAϕ iff ϕ holds for every q′ such that q ∼KA q′.
Example 12 (Gambling Robots) Two robots (a and b) play a simple
card game. The deck consists of Ace, King and Queen (A,K,Q); it is assumed that
A beatsK,K beats Q, but Q beats A. First, the “environment” agent env deals a
random card to both robots (face down), so that each player can see his own hand,
but he does not know the card of the other player. Then robot a can exchange his
card for the one remaining in the deck (action exch), or he can keep the current one
(keep). At the same time, robot b can change the priorities of the cards, so that A
becomes better than Q (action chg) or he can do nothing (nop). If a has a better
card than b after that, then a win is scored, otherwise the game ends in a “los-
ing” state. A CEGS for the game is shown in Figure 3.1; we will refer to the model
as M0 throughout the rest of the paper. Note that M0, q0 |= 〈〈a〉〉win (and even
M0, q0 |= Ka〈〈a〉〉win), although, intuitively, a has no feasible way of ensuring a
win. This is a fundamental problem with ATEL, which we discuss brieﬂy below.
It was pointed out in several places that the meaning of ATEL formulae
is somewhat counterintuitive [66, 83, 86]. Most importantly, one would ex-
pect that an agent’s ability to achieve propertyϕ should imply that the agent
has enough control and knowledge to identify and execute a strategy that en-
forces ϕ (cf. also [121]). This problem is closely related to the well known
distinction between knowledge de re and knowledge de dicto.
A number of frameworks were proposed to overcome this problem [66,
83, 121, 86, 135, 63], yet none of them seems the ultimate deﬁnitive solu-
tion. Most of the solutions agree that only uniform strategies (i.e., strate-
gies that specify the same choices in indistinguishable states) are really exe-
cutable. However, in order to identify a successful strategy, the agents must
consider not only the courses of action, starting from the current state of the
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system, but also from states that are indistinguishable from the current one.
There are many cases here, especially when group epistemics is concerned:
the agents may have common, ordinary or distributed knowledge about a
strategy being successful, or they may be hinted the right strategy by a dis-
tinguishedmember (the “boss”), a subgroup (“headquarters committee”) or
even another group of agents (“consulting company”). Most existing solu-
tions [121, 135, 63] treat only some of the cases (albeit rather in an elegant
way), while others [83, 86] offer a more general treatment of the problem
at the expense of an overblown logical language (which is by no means ele-
gant).
Recently, a new, non-standard semantics for ability under incomplete in-
formation has been proposed in [73, 75], which we believe to be both intu-
itive, general and elegant. We summarize the proposal in the next section,
as we will use it further to capture strategic abilities of agents.
3.2.3 An Intuitive Semantics for Ability and Knowl-
edge
In [73, 75], a non-standard semantics for the logic of strategic ability and
incomplete information has been proposed, which we believe to be ﬁnally
satisfying. In the semantics, formulae are interpreted over sets of states rather
than single states. Moreover, we introduce “constructive knowledge” oper-
ators Ka, one for each agent a, that yield the set of states, indistinguishable
from the current state from a’s perspective. Constructive common, mutual,
and distributed knowledge is formalized via operators CA,EA, and DA. The
language, which we tentatively call Constructive Strategic Logic (CSL) here,
is deﬁned as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ∼ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ | CAϕ | EAϕ | DAϕ |
CAϕ | EAϕ | DAϕ.
Individual knowledge operators can be derived as: Kaϕ ≡ E{a}ϕ andKaϕ ≡
E{a}ϕ. Moreover, we deﬁneϕ1∨ϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1∧¬ϕ2), andϕ1 → ϕ2 ≡ ¬ϕ1∨ϕ2.
Themodels are concurrent epistemic game structures again, andwe con-
sider onlymemoryless uniform strategies. Let img(q,R) be the image of state
q with respect to relationR, i.e. the set of all states q′ such that qRq′. More-
over, we use out(Q,SA) as a shorthand for ∪q∈Qout(q, SA), and img(Q,R) as a
shorthand for ∪q∈Qimg(q,R). The notion of a formula ϕ being satisﬁed by a
set of statesQ ⊆ St in a modelM is given through the following clauses.
M,Q |= p iff q ∈ π(p) for every q ∈ Q;
M,Q |= ¬ϕ iffM,Q |= ϕ;
M,Q |=∼ϕ iffM, q |= ϕ for every q ∈ Q;
M,Q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM,Q |= ϕ andM,Q |= ψ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ out(Q,SA), we
have thatM, {λ[1]} |= ϕ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ out(Q,SA) and
i ≥ 0, we haveM, {λ[i]} |= ϕ;
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M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ out(Q,SA),
there is i ≥ 0 for whichM, {λ[i]} |= ψ andM, {λ[j]} |= ϕ
for every 0 ≤ j < i;
M,Q |= KAϕ iff M, q |= ϕ for every q ∈ img(Q,∼KA) (where K =
C,E,D);
M,Q |= KˆAϕ iff M, img(Q,∼KA) |= ϕ (where Kˆ = C,E,D and K =
C,E,D, respectively).
We will also writeM, q |= ϕ as a shorthand forM, {q} |= ϕ, and this is the
notion of satisfaction (in single states) that we are ultimately interested in –
but that notion is deﬁned in terms of the satisfaction in sets of states.
Now, Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ expresses the fact that a has a single strategy that enforces
ϕ from all states indiscernible from the current state, instead of stating that
ϕ can be achieved from every such state separately (whatKa〈〈a〉〉ϕ says, which
is very much in the spirit of standard epistemic logic). More generally, the
ﬁrst kind of formulae refer to having a strategy “de re” (i.e. having a successful
strategy and knowing the strategy), while the latter refer to having a strat-
egy “de dicto” (i.e. only knowing that some successful strategy is available;
cf. [83]). Note also that the property of having a winning strategy in the
current state (but not necessarily even knowing about it) is simply expressed
with 〈〈a〉〉ϕ. Capturing different ability levels of coalitions is analogous, with
various “epistemic modes” of collective recognizing the right strategy.
Example 13 Robot a has no winning strategy in the starting state of the game:
M0, q0 |= ¬〈〈a〉〉win, which implies that it has neither a strategy “de re” nor “de
dicto” (M0, q0 |= ¬Ka〈〈a〉〉win ∧ ¬Ka〈〈a〉〉win). On the other hand, he has a
successful strategy in qAK (just play keep) and he knows he has one (because an-
other action, exch, is bound to win in qAQ); still, the knowledge is not construc-
tive, since a does not know which strategy is the right one in the current situation:
M0, qAK |= 〈〈a〉〉 win ∧Ka〈〈a〉〉 win ∧ ¬Ka〈〈a〉〉 win. Also, b’s playing chg en-
forces a transition to qw for both qAQ, qKQ, so M0, qAQ |= Kb〈〈b〉〉 win (robot b
has a strategy “de re” to enforce a win from qAQ).
Finally, qQK |= 〈〈a, b〉〉win ∧ E{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉win ∧ C{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉win
∧¬E{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉win∧D{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉win: in qQK , the robots have a collective strat-
egy to enforce awin, and they all know it (they even have common knowledge about
it); on the other hand, they cannot identify the right strategy as a team – they can
only see one if they share knowledge at the beginning (i.e., in qQK).
3.3 Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic
A very interesting variation on the theme of combining strategic, epistemic
and temporal aspects of a multi-agent system was proposed in [135]. Epis-
temic Temporal Strategic Logic (ETSL) digs deeper in the repository of game
theory, and focuses on the concept of undominated strategies. Thus, its vari-
ant of cooperationmodalities has a different ﬂavor than the ones from ATL,
ATEL, CSL etc. In a way, formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ in ETSL can be summarized as:
“IfA play rationally to achieve ϕ (meaning: they never play a dominated
strategy), they will achieve ϕ”.
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ETSL can be treated as a logic that describes the outcome of rational play un-
der incomplete information,2 in the same way as CSL can be seen as a logic
that captures agents’ strategic abilities (regardless of whether the agents play
rationally or not). The main claim we propose in this paper is that a ratio-
nal player knows that he will succeed if, and only if, he has a strategy “de
re” to succeed – while the same is not true for rational coalitions of players.
However, beforewe present and discuss the claim formally in Section 3.4, we
must re-write the semantics of ETSL in several respects.
First, the original semantics of ETSL is deﬁned only for ﬁnite turn-based
acyclic game models with epistemic accessibility relations, and we will gen-
eralize the semantics to concurrent epistemic game structures. Next, the se-
mantics comes with a plethora of auxiliary functions and deﬁnitions (and
a couple of omissions), which makes it rather hard to read. In fact, this is
probably the reason why the logic never received the attention it deserves,
and it is deﬁnitely worth trying to make the semantics more compact. Fi-
nally, the authors of [135] propose that amodel should include also a “grand
strategy proﬁle” SAgt, deﬁning the actual strategies of all agents (or at least
constraining them in some way, since non-deterministic strategies are al-
lowed in ETSL). While the idea seems interesting in itself (a similar idea was
later exploited e.g. in [85] to allow for explicit analysis of strategies and rea-
soning about strategy revision), we will show that it does not introduce a
ﬁner-grained analysis of “vanilla” ETSL formulas: if a formula holds inM, q
for one strategy proﬁle, it holds in M, q for all the other strategy proﬁles,
too. Moreover, it can be proved that the semantics of cooperation modal-
ities 〈〈A〉〉 is the same regardless of whether we consider non-deterministic
strategies or not. In consequence, we will be able to show a “vanilla” ETSL
semantics expressed entirely in terms of concurrent epistemic game struc-
tures and their states.
3.3.1 The SemanticsMade Easier to Read
Formulae of ETSL come with no restriction wrt grouping of temporal opera-
tors:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | ϕ | ϕ | ϕU ψ | Kaϕ.
After some re-writing (and having it generalized to general game struc-
tures, not only turn-based trees), the semantics canbe given as follows. Strate-
gies are allowed to be non-deterministic, i.e. Sa : St → 2Act.3 We require
strategies to be uniform, although [135] does not do it explicitly (we take it
as a simple omission, because otherwise many claims in that paper seem to
be false). A collective strategy (strategy proﬁle) SA is a tuple of strategies, one
per agent from A. S0a is the “neutral strategy” with no restriction on a’s ac-
tions (S0a(q) = Act for each q ∈ St), and strategy proﬁle S0A assigns neutral
strategies to agents from A. Moreover, we generalize function out(q, SA) to
handle nondeterministic strategies too; in out′(q, SA), “αi−1a = Sa(qi−1)” is
replaced with αi−1a ∈ Sa(qi−1).
2We emphasize that this is a speciﬁc notion of rationality (i.e., agents are assumed to play
only undominated strategies). Game theory proposes several other rationality criteria as well,
based e.g. on Nash equilibrium, dominant strategies, or Pareto efﬁciency. In fact, it is easy to
imagine ETSL-like logics based on these notions instead.
3To preserve seriality (“time ﬂows forever”), we assume that Sa(q) = ∅ for all q ∈ St.
75 CHAPTER 3. PLAYING RATIONALLY VS. KNOWINGHOWTO PLAY
Now, the semantics can be given through the following clauses (the seman-
tics for p, ¬ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ is analogous to the one presented in Section 3.2.1):
M,SAgt, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff for all strategies TA, undominated wrt q, ϕ, we have
M, (TA, S0Agt\A), q |= ϕ;
M,SAgt, q |= ϕ iff for every λ ∈ out′(q, SAgt)we haveM,SAgt, λ[1] |= ϕ;
M,SAgt, q |= ϕ iff for every λ ∈ out′(q, SAgt) and i ≥ 0 we have
M,SAgt, λ[i] |= ϕ;
M,SAgt, q |= ϕU ψ iff for every λ ∈ out′(q, SAgt) there is i ≥ 0 such that
M,SAgt, λ[i] |= ψ and for all j such that 0 ≤ j < i we
haveM,SAgt, λ[j] |= ϕ;
M,SAgt, q |= Kaϕ iff for all q ∼a q′ we haveM, (SAgt(a), S0Agt\{a}), q′ |= ϕ.
Deﬁnition 6 Strategy SA dominates TA with respect to formula ϕ, model M ,
and state q, if SA achieves ϕ better then TA, i.e. iff:
1. for every q′ such that q ∼A q′: ifM, (TA, S0Agt\A), q′ |= ϕ then also
M, (SA, S0Agt\A), q
′ |= ϕ, and
2. there exists q′ such that q ∼A q′, andM, (SA, S0Agt\A), q′ |= ϕ, and
M, (TA, S0Agt\A), q  ϕ.
Remark 8 Deﬁnition 6 uses epistemic relation ∼A. However, epistemic acces-
sibility relations are deﬁned only for individual agents in [135], which is perhaps
another omission. In this study, we take the liberty to ﬁx∼A as∼EA.
We also point out that ETSL can be extendedwith collective epistemic operators
EA, CA, DA in a straightforward manner.
Example 14 Consider the gambling robots again. Robot a has two undominated
strategies wrt win,M, qAK : namely, to play exch in both qAK , qAQ, or to play
keep in both (other choices do not matter). Since playing exch fails in qAK , so:
M0, qAK |= 〈〈a〉〉 win. Furthermore, playing keep is the only undominated strat-
egy in qKQ and qKA (and it succeeds only in qKQ). Thus,M0, qKQ |= 〈〈a〉〉 win,
andM0, qKA |= 〈〈a〉〉 win. Hence,M0, qKQ |= Ka〈〈a〉〉 win.
3.3.2 A FewProperties
In this section, wepresent several properties of ETSL formulae thatwill allow
us to give an even simpler semantic deﬁnition of “vanilla” ETSL.
Proposition 29 For every “vanilla” ETSL formulaϕ, concurrent epistemic game
structureM , and state q inM : M,SAgt, q |= ϕ iffM,S′Agt, q |= ϕ for any pair of
“grand” strategy proﬁles SAgt, S′Agt.
Proof By induction on the structure of ϕ. Note that it is sufﬁcient to prove
the implication one way, as the choice of SAgt, S′Agt is completely arbitrary.
Case ϕ ≡ p: M,SAgt, q |= p, so q ∈ π(q), soM,S′Agt, q |= p.
Case ϕ ≡ ¬ψ: M,SAgt, q |= ¬ψ, soM,SAgt, q |= ψ, so (by induction hypothe-
sis)M,S′
Agt, q |= ψ, soM,S′Agt, q |= ¬ψ. (As the choice of SAgt, S′Agt was
completely arbitrary, the implication holds the other way too.)
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Case ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2: analogous.
Case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 ψ: M,SAgt, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ψ iffM, (TA, S0Agt\A), λ[1] |= ϕ for all
undominated TA and λ ∈ out′(q, (TA, S0Agt\A)). Note that the latter con-
dition does not refer to SAgt, soM,S′Agt, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ψ too.
Cases ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ and ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2: analogous.
Case ϕ ≡ Kaψ: M,SAgt, q |= Kaψ, so M, (SAgt(a), S0Agt\{a}), q′ |= ψ for all
q ∼a q′. By induction hypothesis, also M, (S′Agt(a), S0Agt\{a}), q′ |= ψ
for all q ∼a q′, soM,S′Agt, q |= Kaψ.

Remark 9 We point out that restricting the scope of Proposition 29 to “vanilla”
ETSL formulae is important. In particular, the epistemic opertor Ka has a non-
standard interpretation when the full language of ETSL is considered.
Proposition 30 Let Φ ≡ ψ,ψ, or ψ1 U ψ2 where ψ,ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla”
ETSL formulae. Moreover, let |Φ| denote the set of paths for which Φ holds; for-
mally, | ψ| = {λ |M,λ[1] |= ψ}, |ψ| = {λ | ∀iM,λ[i] |= ψ}, and |ψ1 U ψ2| =
{λ | ∃i(M,λ[i] |= ψ2 ∧ ∀0≤j<iM,λ[j] |= ψ1}.
Then, SA dominates TA wrt Φ,M , and q iff:
1. for every q′, q ∼EA q′: if out(q′, TA) ⊆ |Φ| then also out(q′, SA) ⊆ |Φ|, and
2. there exists q′, q ∼EA q′, such that out(q′, SA) ⊆ |Φ| and out(q′, TA) ⊆ |Φ|.
Proof Straightforward from the deﬁnition. 
Remark 10 Note that dominance can be characterized in an evenmore compact
way. Let succq,Φ(SA) = {q ∈ img(q,∼EA) | out(q, SA) ⊆ |Φ|} be the set of states
from img(q,∼EA), for which sa succeeds to enforce Φ. Now, SA dominates TA wrt
Φ,M, q iff succq,Φ(TA)  succq,Φ(SA).
Proposition 31 Let Φ ≡ ψ,ψ, or ψ1 U ψ2 where ψ,ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla”
ETSL formulae. Strategy TA is dominated wrt Φ,M, q by a strategy SA iff it is
dominated wrt Φ,M, q by a deterministic strategy S′A.
Proof ⇒: Let TA be dominated by SA (wrt ϕ,M, q). We construct the de-
terministic strategy S′A by ﬁxing arbitrary (uniform) choices out of SA. For-
mally, for every agent a ∈ A and abstraction class img(q′,∼a) ⊆ St such that
Sa(q′) = {α, α′, ...}, we ﬁx S′a(q′′) = α for all q′′ ∈ img(q′,∼a). (By uniformity
of SA, we have α ∈ Sa(q′′) for all q′′ ∈ img(q′,∼a), so S′A is a valid strategy.)
First, this enforces uniformity of S′A. Second, out(q¯, S
′
A) ⊆ out(q¯, SA) for all
q¯ ∈ St (by deﬁnition of out). Thus, we can use Proposition 30 to show that
S′A dominates TA, which concludes the proof.
⇐: Straightforward. 
77 CHAPTER 3. PLAYING RATIONALLY VS. KNOWINGHOWTO PLAY
Proposition 32 Let Φ be as above. Then,M,SAgt, q |= 〈〈A〉〉Φ iff for all deter-
ministic strategies TA, undominated wrt Φ, we haveM, (TA, S0Agt\A), q |= Φ.
Proof ⇒: Straightforward.
⇐: Assume that M, (TA, S0Agt\A), q |= Φ for all deterministic strategies TA,
undominated wrt Φ, and suppose that there is a nondeterministic undomi-
nated SA such thatM, (SA, S0Agt\A), q |= Φ. Let us ﬁx a deterministic uniform
strategy S′A out of SA in a similar way as in Proposition 31. Now, out(q¯, S
′
A) ⊆
out(q¯, SA) for all q¯ ∈ St, so out(q′, SA) ⊆ |Φ| implies out(q′, S′A) ⊆ |Φ| (S′A is
never worse than SA wrt Φ). Moreover, out(q, S′A) ⊆ |Φ| and out(q, SA) ⊆ |Φ|.
By Proposition 30, S′A dominates SA, so SA is dominated – a contradiction.

3.3.3 ETSL in Terms of Concurrent Epistemic Game
Structures
Wehave shown that, for “vanilla” ETSL, strategies do not have to be referred
explicitly in the interpretation of formulae (Propositions 29 and 30). More-
over, we can restrict the set of considered strategies to deterministic strate-
gies (Propositions 31 and 32). In consequence, we can express the semantics
of “vanilla” ETSL equivalently in ATL-like fashion:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ iff for every strategy SA, undominated wrt q, ϕ, and
every λ ∈ out(q, SA), we have thatM,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff for every strategy SA, undominated wrt q,ϕ, and ev-
ery λ ∈ out(q, SA) and i ≥ 0we haveM,λ[i] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff for every strategy SA, undominated wrt q, ϕU ψ, and
every λ ∈ out(q, SA), there is i ≥ 0 such thatM,λ[i] |= ψ
and for all j such that 0 ≤ j < iwe haveM,λ[j] |= ϕ.
Only uniform deterministic strategies are taken into account. The se-
mantics of p, ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ, and the epistemic operators is the same as for ATL
and ATEL.
3.4 Playing Rationally vs. Knowing how to
Play
We can ﬁnally present the main result of this paper, namely, that a rational
player knows that he will succeed if, and only if, he has a strategy “de re” to
succeed. The result holds under the assumption that the model is ﬁnite,4 or
more generally, that it includes at least one undominated strategy.
Moreover, we show that having common knowledge how to succeed is,
in general, a stronger property than knowing that one will succeed for ratio-
nal coalitions of players. That is, if rational agents have common knowledge
about a winning strategy, then they have common knowledge that theywill
succeed – but the converse is not true any more. Surprisingly enough, it
turns out that the relationship is strictly reverse for distributed knowledge:
4We use the term “ﬁnite model” to denote a CEGS with a ﬁnite set of states St.
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if a rational coalition has distributed knowledge that it will succeed, then
it has distributed knowledge about a winning strategy – but not necessarily
the other way around. For mutual knowledge, the relationship holds nei-
ther way.
In what follows, we use |=ETSL and |=CSL to denote the ETSL and CSL satis-
faction relation, respectively.
3.4.1 Rational Play of Individual Agents
We begin with two important lemmas.
Lemma 9 Given a ﬁnite modelM , state q inM , formula Φ and agent a, there is
a strategy sa which is undominated wrtM, q,Φ.
Proof First, we consider the simpler case when the set of actions Act is ﬁ-
nite. In such a case, the set of strategies is also ﬁnite, and the dominance
relation is transitive and antireﬂexive. Suppose that every strategy is domi-
nated; then, there must be a strategy which is dominated by itself – a con-
tradiction.
We sketch the proof for inﬁnite Act as follows. We partition the inﬁ-
nite set of strategies into equivalence classes, such that strategies in the same
class have the sameoutcomepaths for every state q (i.e., sa ≈ ta iff ∀qout(q, sa)
= out(q, ta)). Obviously, if sa dominates ta, then all strategies s′a ≈ sa dom-
inate ta too. Now, at every state q (and therefore at every point on a path
from out(q′, sa)) there is a ﬁnite number of possible sets of successor states
(the actual set being determined by the choice sa(q)). Moreover, the same
choice must be taken at every further occurrence of the same state q on a
path, since sa is amemoryless strategy. In consequence, there is only a ﬁnite
number of different sets of outcome paths, and hence a ﬁnite number of the
equivalence classes. Again, dominance is transitive and antireﬂexive, so an
undominated strategymust exist. 
Remark 11 Note that the result in Lemma 9 does not extend to CEGS with inﬁ-
nite state spaces. Consider the game of “Fuzzy Blackjack” (called so all the more
because our robots play it usually after having consumed too much machine oil).
Only a single player is necessary, and we use positive real numbers as states and
actions (i.e., St = Act = R+). When the player chooses a number in state q, the
number is added to the state: o(q, α) = q + α. The values below 1 are the winning
ones, i.e. π(win) = (0, 1) (it should be 21, but this would make the game too com-
plicated for a drunken robot). Moreover, the robot cannot distinguish between the
states below 1: q ∼a q′ for all q, q′ ∈ (0, 1). Now, there is no undominated strategy
wrt 0.5, win.
To prove this, suppose that a strategy sa is undominated. The strategy is uni-
form, so sa(q) = α for some α ∈ R+ and all q ∈ (0, 1). Obviously, α ∈ (0, 1),
because else sa never succeeds. Now, the set of states in which sa is successful is:
succ
0.5,

win
(sa) = (0, 1 − α). Let ta(q) = q + α/2. Now, succ0.5, win(ta) =
(0, 1− α/2)  succ0.5,Φ(sa) – a contradiction. Note also that:
• If we replace R+ with the set of positive rational numbers, the result is the
same. So, there may be no undominated strategies even when we restrict St
andAct to countable sets.
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• In order to show the same for countable St and ﬁnite Act, it is sufﬁcient to
modify the example so that Act = {0, 1, call}, and the initial state and ev-
ery subsequent action α = 0, 1 are simply stored in the resulting state. Now
o(q, call) takes the initial state q0 and the string of 0s and 1s α1, ..., αn stored
in q, and returns q′ = q0 + (0.α1...αn1)2. For such a game, there is no un-
dominated strategy wrt 0.5,win.
Lemma 10 Given M, q,Φ, a, if there is an undominated strategy wrt M, q,Φ,
then there is also an undominated strategy wrtM, q′,Φ for every q′ ∈ img(q,∼a).
Proof Take any sa undominated wrtM, q,Φ (*). Suppose now that sa is dom-
inated by some strategy ta wrt another state q′ ∈ img(q,∼a) (**).
1. By (*) and Prop. 30: ∀q′′∈img(q,∼a) (out(q′′, ta) ⊆ |Φ| ⇒ out(q′′, sa) ⊆ |Φ|).
2. By (**) and Prop. 30: ∃q′′∈img(q′,∼a) (out(q′′, ta) ⊆ |Φ| ∧ out(q′′, sa) ⊆ |Φ|).
Moreover, img(q,∼a) = img(q′,∼a) because is∼a is an equivalence relation –
which gives a contradiction between (1) and (2). 
Remark 12 We note that Lemma 10 may hold even for indistinguishability re-
lations that are not equivalences. In fact, it is sufﬁcient to require that ∼a is tran-
sitive. In that case, q′ ∈ img(q,∼a) and q′′ ∈ img(q′,∼a) implies that q′′ ∈
img(q,∼a), and we also get the contradiction.
We are ready to prove themain claim of this paper now.
Theorem 11 Let us consider only ﬁnite models, and formulae Φ ≡ ψ,ψ, or
ψ1 U ψ2 where ψ,ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla” ETSL formulae. An agent has a strategy “de
re” to enforce Φ if, and only if, he knows that his rational play will bring about Φ.
Formally, for every ﬁniteM and state q inM :
M, q |=ETSL Ka〈〈a〉〉Φ iff M, q |=CSL Ka〈〈a〉〉Φ.
Proof Induction on the structure of Φ. We prove the theorem for the case
Φ ≡ ψ. Other cases are analogous.
⇒: Let M, q |=ETSL Ka〈〈a〉〉ψ. Then, ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)M, q′ |=ETSL 〈〈a〉〉ψ, and
henceM, q |=ETSL 〈〈a〉〉ψ in particular. By Lemmas 9 and 10, there is a strat-
egy sa, undominated wrtM, q′,ψ for every q′ ∈ img(q,∼a).
Then: ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)∀λ∈out(q′,sa)∀iM,λ[i] |=ETSL ψ. By the induction hypoth-
esis, also ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)∀λ∈out(q′,sa)∀iM,λ[i] |=CSL ψ. Thus, ∀λ∈out(img(q,∼a),sa)∀i
M,λ[i] |=CSL ψ and soM, img(q,∼a) |=CSL 〈〈a〉〉ψ, and ﬁnallyM, q |=CSL Ka〈〈a〉〉
ψ.
⇐: LetM, q |=CSL Ka〈〈a〉〉ψ, i.e. M, img(q,∼a) |=CSL 〈〈a〉〉ψ. Consider q′ ∈
img(q,∼a). By transitivity of ∼a, we have img(q′,∼a) ⊆ img(q,∼a), so also
∀q′∈img(q,∼a)M, img(q′,∼a) |=CSL 〈〈a〉〉ψ. Then, for every q′ ∈ img(q,∼a), there
must be sa such that ∀q′′∈img(q′,∼a)∀λ∈out(q′′,sa)∀iM,λ[i] |=CSL ψ, and hence
(by induction) ∀q′′∈img(q′,∼a)∀λ∈out(q′′,sa)∀iM,λ[i] |=ETSL ψ. So, succq′,ψ(sa) =
img(q′,∼a), and therefore succq′,ψ(ta) = img(q′,∼a) for every other undom-
inated strategy ta (otherwise ta would be dominated by sa). Thus,M, q′ |=ETSL
〈〈a〉〉ψ for every q′ ∈ img(q,∼a), and ﬁnallyM, q |=ETSL Ka〈〈a〉〉ψ. 
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Theorem 12 More generally, for every Φ as above, and M, q such that there
exists an undominated strategy wrt M, q,Φ: M, q |=ETSL Ka〈〈a〉〉Φ iff M, q |=CSL
Ka〈〈a〉〉Φ.
3.4.2 Rational Coalitions Are at Disadvantage
Beside some philosophical insight into the nature of knowledge and ratio-
nal play, Theorems 11 and 12 provide us with an alternative way of decom-
posing strategic abilities under incomplete information into a strategic and
epistemic part. The deﬁnition of the strategic dimension is more sophisti-
cated and less straightforward than usually; on the other hand, we do not
pay the price of a non-standard satisfaction relation. Unfortunately, such
decomposition is not valid any more when abilities of collective agents are
concerned. Now, the relationship is much more limited: if a coalition has
common knowledge how to play, then it has also common knowledge that
rational play will be successful; the same does not hold for other types of
collective knowledge. Moreover, the converse relationship is guaranteed for
distributed knowledge, but not for common nor mutual knowledge.
Theorem 13 Let Φ ≡ ψ,ψ, or ψ1 U ψ2 where ψ,ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla” ETSL
formulae. Then, if a coalition has common knowledge how to play, then it has
common knowledge that rational play will be successful:
if M, q |=CSL CA〈〈A〉〉Φ then M, q |=ETSL CA〈〈A〉〉Φ.
The same holds for neither mutual nor distributed knowledge.
Proof Common knowledge: LetM, q |=CSL KA〈〈A〉〉ψ, i.e. M, img(q,∼CA)
|=CSL 〈〈A〉〉ψ. Consider q′ ∈ img(q,∼CA). We have img(q′,∼EA) ⊆ img(q′,∼CA) ⊆
img(q,∼CA), so also ∀q′∈img(q,∼CA)M, img(q′,∼EA) |=CSL 〈〈A〉〉ψ. Then, for every
q′ ∈ img(q,∼CA), theremust beSA such that ∀q′′∈img(q′,∼EA)∀λ∈out(q′′,SA)∀iM,λ[i]|=CSL ψ, and hence (by induction) ∀q′′∈img(q′,∼EA)∀λ∈out(q′′,SA)∀iM,λ[i] |=ETSL ψ.
So, succq′,ψ(SA) = img(q′,∼EA), and therefore succq′,ψ(TA) = img(q′,∼EA)
for every other undominated strategy TA (otherwise TAwould be dominated
by SA). Thus, M, q′ |=ETSL 〈〈A〉〉ψ for every q′ ∈ img(q,∼CA), and ﬁnally
M, q |=ETSL CA〈〈A〉〉ψ.
Mutual knowledge: for a counterexample, consider amodiﬁcation of the
game from Figure 3.1, in which a third robot c is introduced. The robot can
only executenop, and its epistemic relation∼c= {(q, q) | q ∈ St}∪{(qKQ, qKA),
(qKA, qKQ)}, i.e. c can distinguish all states except qKQ, qKA. Moreover, the
transition function is slightly changed: now, o(qKA, keep, nop) = qw. For the
resulting systemM1, we have thatM1, qAQ |=CSL E{b,c}〈〈b, c〉〉 win, but at the
same timeM1, qAQ |=ETSL E{a,c}〈〈a, c〉〉 winbecauseM1, qKQ |=ETSL 〈〈a, c〉〉 win.
Distributedknowledge: analogously,M1, qKQ |=CSL D{b,c}〈〈b, c〉〉 win, yet
M1, qKQ |=ETSL D{a,c}〈〈a, c〉〉 win becauseM1, qKQ |=ETSL 〈〈a, c〉〉 win. 
Theorem 14 Let Φ ≡ ψ,ψ, or ψ1 U ψ2 where ψ,ψ1, ψ2 are “vanilla” ETSL
formulae, and letM be a ﬁnite CEGS.5 Then, ifA have distributed knowledge that
5Alternatively, we can request that A have at least one undominated strategy for every rele-
vant state.
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Figure 3.2: (A) Model M2: four agents a, b, c, d, epistemic relations shown
with the dashed lines, Act = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Transitions: o(qi, j, j, j, j) = qw for
j = i, otherwise the system proceeds to the “losing” state ql; (B) Model
M3: two agents a, b, two actions 1, 2. The tuples of actions that are absent in
the graph lead to ql.
rational play will bring aboutΦ, then they have distributed knowledge how to play
to bring about Φ. Formally:
if M, q |=ETSL DA〈〈A〉〉Φ then M, q |=CSL DA〈〈A〉〉Φ.
The same holds for neither mutual nor common knowledge.
Proof sketch Distributedknowledge: the proof is analogous to the proofs
of Lemma 10 and Theorem 11 (part⇒), as we can exploit the fact that∼DA is
transitive, and img(q,∼DA ) ⊆ img(q,∼EA).
Mutual knowledge: for a counterexample, consider modelM2 from Fig-
ure 3.2A. Let q denote the state “opposite” to q, i.e. q1 = q3, q2 = q4 etc.
Furthermore, let Si
Agt denote the strategy of playing 〈i, i, i, i〉 in all states.
Now, Si
Agt is the only undominated strategy wrt qi,
win for i = 1, ..., 4,
and S1
Agt, ..., S
4
Agt are exactly the strategies undominated wrt q0,
win. So,
M2, qi |=ETSL 〈〈Agt〉〉 win for every i = 0, 1, ..., 4, and therefore M2, q0 |=ETSL
EAgt〈〈Agt〉〉 win. On the other hand, there is no single strategy that suc-
ceeds for all q0, q1, ..., q4.
Common knowledge: consider modelM3 from Figure 3.2B. Let S{a,b} be
the strategy “play 〈1, 1〉 everywhere”, and T{a,b} be “play 〈2, 2〉 everywhere”.
Note that S{a,b} is the only undominated strategy wrt q, win for q = q0, q1,
and T{a,b} is the only undominated strategy wrt q, win for q = q2, q3. Thus,
for every q = q0, ..., q3: M3, q |=ETSL 〈〈a, b〉〉 win, and hence M3, q1 |=ETSL
C{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉 win. On the other hand,M3, q1 |=CSL C{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉 win. 
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, the relationship between rational play and knowing how to
play is investigated in a formal way. To this end, we dust off Epistemic Tem-
poral Strategic Logic by vanOtterloo and Jonker [135], andpropose a simpler
semantics expressed entirely in terms of concurrent epistemic game struc-
tures and their states; we prove that the new semantics is equivalent to the
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original one for “vanilla” ETSL formulae. ETSL serves as a device for talking
about the outcome of rational play (in the sense that agents are assumed to
play only undominated strategies). To capture properties of the other kind
(“knowing how to play”), we use the recent proposal of Constructive Strate-
gic Logic [73, 75].
Themain result of this paper states that, for ﬁnitemodels, a rational player
knows that he will succeed if, and only if, he knows how to succeed. We also show
that the relationship is much more limited for rational coalitions. That is,
if rational agents have common knowledge about a winning strategy, then
they have common knowledge that they will succeed – but the converse
is not guaranteed any more. Moreover, it turns out that the relationship
is strictly reverse for distributed knowledge: if a rational coalition has dis-
tributed knowledge that it will succeed, then it has distributed knowledge
about awinning strategy – but not necessarily the otherway around. Finally,
for mutual knowledge, the relationship does not hold either way in general.
This is a curious result, and one that may lead to interesting philosophical
conclusions.
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Part II
Plausible Behavior and
Rational Play
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Chapter 4
Agents, Beliefs, and
Plausible Behavior in a
Temporal Setting (joint
workwith Nils Bulling)
Abstract. Logics of knowledge and belief are often too static and
inﬂexible to be used on real-world problems. In particular, they usu-
ally offer no concept for expressing that some course of events is
more likely to happen than another. We address this problem and ex-
tend CTLK (computation tree logic with knowledge) with a notion
of plausibility, which allows for practical and counterfactual reason-
ing. The new logic CTLKP (CTLK with plausibility) includes also a
particular notion of belief. A plausibility update operator is added to
this logic in order to change plausibility assumptions dynamically.
Furthermore, we examine some important properties of these con-
cepts. In particular, we show that, for a natural class ofmodels, belief
is aKD45modality. We also show that model checking CTLKP isP-
complete and can be done in time linear with respect to the size of
models and formulae.
Keywords:multi-agent systems, temporal logic, plausibility, beliefs
4.1 Introduction
Notions like time, knowledge, and beliefs are very important for analyzing the
behavior of agents andmulti-agent systems. In this paper, we extendmodal
logics of time and knowledge with a concept of plausible behavior: this no-
tion is added to the language of CTLK [115], which is a straightforward com-
bination of the branching-time temporal logic CTL [41, 38] and standard
epistemic logic [57, 42].
In our approach, plausibility can be seen as a temporal property of be-
haviors. That is, some behaviors of the system can be assumed plausible
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and others implausible, with the underlying idea that the latter should per-
haps be ignored in practical reasoning about possible future courses of ac-
tion. Moreover, behaviors can be formally understood as temporal paths in
the Kripke structure modeling a multi-agent system. As a consequence, we
obtain a language to reason about what can (or must) plausibly happen.
We propose a particular notion of beliefs (inspired by [126, 46]), deﬁned in
terms of epistemic relations and plausibility. The main intuition is that be-
liefs are facts that an agent would know if he assumed that only plausible things
could happen.
We believe that humans use such a concept of plausibility and “practical
beliefs” quite often in their everyday reasoning. Restricting one’s reason-
ing to plausible possibilities is essential to make the reasoning feasible, as
the space of all possibilities is exceedingly large in real life. We investigate
some important properties of plausibility, knowledge, and belief in this new
framework. In particular, we show that knowledge is an S5 modality, and
that beliefs satisfy axioms K45 in general, and KD45 for the class of plausi-
bly serial models. Finally, we show that the relationship between knowledge
and belief for plausibly serial models is natural and reﬂects the initial intu-
ition well. We also show how plausibility assumptions can be speciﬁed in
the object language via a plausibility update operator, andwe study properties
of such updates. Finally, we show that model checking of the new logic is
nomore complex thanmodel checking CTL and CTLK.
Our ultimate goal is to come up with a logic that allows the study of
strategies, time, knowledge, and plausible/rational behavior under both per-
fect and imperfect information. As combining all these dimensions is highly
nontrivial (cf. [83, 73]) it seems reasonable to split this task. While this pa-
per deals with knowledge, plausibility, and belief, the companion paper [76]
proposes a general framework formulti-agent systems that regard game-the-
oretical rationality criteria likeNash equilibrium, Pareto optimality, etc. The
latter approach is based on themore powerful logic ATL [8].
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we brieﬂy present branching-
time logic with knowledge, CTLK. In Section 3 we present our approach to
plausibility and formally deﬁne CTLK with plausibility. We also show how
temporal formulae can be used to describe plausible paths, and we compare
our logic with existing related work. In Section 4.4, properties of knowl-
edge, belief, and plausibility are explored. Finally, we present veriﬁcation
complexity results for CTLKP in Section 4.5.
4.2 Branching Time andKnowledge
In this paperwe develop a framework for agents’ beliefs about how theworld
can (or must) evolve. Thus, we need a notion of time and change, plus a
notion of what the agents are supposed to know in particular situations.
CTLK [115] is a straightforward combination of the computation tree logic
CTL [41, 38] and standard epistemic logic [57, 42].
CTL includes operators for temporal properties of systems: i.e., pathquan-
tiﬁer E (“there is a path”), togetherwith temporal operators: (“in the next
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state”),  (“always from now on”) and U (“until”).1 Every occurrence of a
temporal operator is preceded by exactly one path quantiﬁer in CTL (this
variant of the language is sometimes called “vanilla” CTL). Epistemic logic
uses operators for representing agents’ knowledge: Kaϕ is read as “agent a
knows that ϕ”.
Let Π be a set of atomic propositions with a typical element p, and Agt =
{1, ..., k} be a set of agents with a typical element a. The language of CTLK
consists of formulae ϕ, given as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Eγ | Kaϕ
γ ::= ϕ | ϕ | ϕU ϕ.
We will sometimes refer to formulae ϕ as (“vanilla”) state formulae and to
formulae γ as (“vanilla”) path formulae.
The semantics ofCTLK is basedonKripkemodelsM = 〈St,R,∼1, ...,∼k, π〉,
which include a nonempty set of states St, a state transition relation R ⊆
St×St, epistemic indistinguishability relations∼a⊆ St×St (one per agent),
and a valuation of propositions π : Π → 2(St). We assume that relation R is
serial and that all∼a are equivalence relations. A path λ inM refers to a pos-
sible behavior (or computation) of systemM, and can be represented as an
inﬁnite sequence of states that follow relationR, that is, a sequence q0q1q2...
such that qiRqi+1 for every i = 0, 1, 2, ...We denote the ith state in λ by λ[i].
The set of all paths inM is denoted by ΛM (if the model is clear from con-
text,Mwill be omitted). A q-path is a path that starts from q, i.e., λ[0] = q. A
q-subpath is a sequence of states, starting from q, which is a subpath of some
path in the model, i.e. a sequence q[0]q[1]... such that q = q[0] and there are
q0, ..., qi such that q0...qiq[0]q[1]... ∈ ΛM.2 The semantics of CTLK is deﬁned
as follows:
M, q |= p iff q ∈ π(p);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q |= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ;
M, q |= E ϕ iff there is a q-path λ such thatM, λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= Eϕ iff there is a q-path λ such thatM, λ[i] |= ϕ for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |= EϕU ψ iff there is a q-path λ and i ≥ 0 such thatM, λ[i] |= ψ, and
M, λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i;
M, q |= Kaϕ iffM, q |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
4.3 ExtendingTimeandKnowledgewithPlau-
sibility and Beliefs
In this section we discuss the central concept of this paper, i.e. the concept
of plausibility. First, we outline the idea informally. Then, we extend CTLK
1Additional operators A (“for every path”) and  (“sometime in the future”) are deﬁned in
the usual way.
2For CTLK models, λ is a q-subpath iff it is a q-path. It will not always be so when plausible
paths are introduced.
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with the notion of plausibility by adding plausible path operators Pl a and
physical path operator Ph to the logic. FormulaPl aϕ has the intendedmean-
ing: according to agent a, it is plausible that ϕ holds; formula Phϕ reads as: ϕ
holds in all “physically” possible scenarios (i.e., even in implausible ones). The
plausible path operator restricts statements only to those paths which are
deﬁned to be “sensible”, whereas the physical path operator generates state-
ments about all paths that may theoretically occur. Furthermore, we deﬁne
beliefs on top of plausibility and knowledge, as the facts that an agent would
know if he assumed that only plausible things could happen. Finally, we discuss
related work [46, 47, 126, 107, 93], and compare it with our approach.
4.3.1 The Concept of Plausibility
It is well known how knowledge (or beliefs) can be modeled with Kripke
structures. However, it is not so obvious howwe can capture knowledge and
beliefs in a sensible way in one framework. Clearly, there should be a con-
nection between these two notions. Our approach is to use the notion of
plausibility for this purpose. Plausibility can serve as a primitive concept
that helps to deﬁne the semantics of beliefs, in a similar way as indistin-
guishability of states (represented by relation ∼a) is the semantic concept
that underlies knowledge. In this sense, our work follows [46, 126]: essen-
tially, beliefs arewhat an agentwould know if he took only plausible options
into account. In our approach, however, plausibility is explicitly seen as a
temporal property. That is, we do not consider states (or possible worlds) to be
more plausible than others but rather deﬁne some behaviors to be plausible,
and others implausible. Moreover, behaviors can be formally understood as
temporal paths in the Kripke structure modeling a multi-agent system.
Anactual notionof plausibility (that is, a particular set of plausible paths)
can emerge in many different ways. It may result from observations and
learning; an agent can learn from its observations and see speciﬁc patterns
of events as plausible (“a lot of people wear black shoes if they wear a suit”).
Knowledge exchange is another possibility (e.g., an agent a can tell agent b
that “player c always bluffs when he is smiling”). Game theory, with its ra-
tionality criteria (undominated strategies, maxmin, Nash equilibrium etc.)
is another viable source of plausibility assumptions. Last but not least, folk
knowledge can be used to establish plausibility-related classiﬁcations of be-
havior (“players normally want to win a game”, “people want to live”).
In any case, restricting the reasoning to plausible possibilities can be es-
sential if we want to make the reasoning feasible, as the space of all possi-
bilities (we call them “physical” possibilities in the rest of the paper) is ex-
ceedingly large in real life. Of course, this does not exclude amore extensive
analysis in special cases, e.g. when our plausibility assumptions do not seem
accurate any more, or when the cost of inaccurate assumptions can be too
high (as in the case of high-budget business decisions). But even in these
cases, we usually do not get rid of plausibility assumptions completely – we
only revise them tomake themmore cautious.3
3That is, when planning to open an industrial plant in the UK, we will probably consider
the possibility of our main contractor taking her life, but we will still not take into account
the possibilities of: an invasion of UFO, England being destroyed by a meteorite, Fidel Castro
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To formalize this idea, we extend models of CTLK with sets of plausible
paths and add plausibility operators Pl a, physical paths operator Ph , and
belief operatorsBa to the language ofCTLK.Now, it is possible tomake state-
ments that refer to plausible paths only, as well as statements that regard all
paths that may occur in the system.
4.3.2 CTLKwith Plausibility
In this section, we extend the logic of CTLK with plausibility; we call the
resulting logic CTLKP. Formally, the language of CTLKP is deﬁned as:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Eγ | Pl aϕ | Phϕ | Kaϕ | Baϕ
γ ::= ϕ | ϕ | ϕU ϕ.
For instance, we may claim it is plausible to assume that a shop is closed
after the openinghours, though themanagermaybephysically able to open
it at any time: Pl aA(late → ¬open) ∧PhE(late ∧ open).
The semantics of CTLKP extends that of CTLK as follows. Firstly, we aug-
ment themodels with sets of plausible paths. Amodel with plausibility is given
as
M = 〈St,R,∼1, ...,∼k,Υ1, ...,Υk, π〉,
where 〈St,R,∼1, ...,∼k, π〉 is a CTLKmodel, andΥa ⊆ ΛM is the set of paths
inM that are plausible according to agent a. If we want tomake it clear that
Υa is taken from modelM, we will write ΥMa . It seems worth emphasizing
that this notion of plausibility is subjective and holistic. It is subjective be-
causeΥa represents agent a’s subjective view on what is plausible – and indeed,
different agents may have different ideas on plausibility (i.e., Υa may differ
from Υb). It is holistic because Υa represents agent a’s idea of the plausible
behavior of the whole system (including the behavior of other agents).
Remark 13 In our models, plausibility is also global, i.e., plausibility sets do
not depend on the state of the system. Investigating systems, in which plausibility
is relativized with respect to states (like in [46]), might be an interesting avenue of
future work. However, such an approach – while obviously more ﬂexible – allows
for potentially counterintuitive system descriptions. For example, it might be the
case that path λ is plausible in q = λ[0], but the set of plausible paths in q′ = λ[1] is
empty. That is, by following plausible path λwe are bound to get to an implausible
situation. But then, does it make sense to consider λ as plausible?
Secondly, we use a non-standard satisfaction relation |=P , which we call
plausible satisfaction. LetM be a CTLKP model and P ⊆ ΛM be an arbitrary
subset of paths inM (not necessarily anyΥMa ). |=P restricts the evaluationof
temporal formulae to the paths given in P only. The “absolute” satisfaction
relation |= is deﬁned as |=ΛM .
Let ∂(P ) be the set of all states that lie on at least one path in P , i.e.
∂(P ) = {q ∈ St | ∃λ ∈ P∃i (λ[i] = q)}. Now, the semantics of CTLKP can be
given through the following clauses:
becoming the British PrimeMinister etc. Note that this is fundamentally different fromusing a
probabilistic model in which all these unlikely scenarios are assigned very low probabilities: in
that case, they also have a very small inﬂuence on our ﬁnal decision, but we must process the
whole space of physical possibilities to evaluate the options.
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M, q |=P p iff q ∈ π(p);
M, q |=P ¬ϕ iffM, q |=P ϕ;
M, q |=P ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |=P ϕ andM, q |=P ψ;
M, q |=P E ϕ iff there is a q-subpath λ ∈ P such thatM, λ[1] |=P ϕ;
M, q |=P Eϕ iff there is a q-subpath λ ∈ P such thatM, λ[i] |=P ϕ for every
i ≥ 0;
M, q |=P EϕU ψ iff there is a q-subpath λ ∈ P and i ≥ 0 such thatM, λ[i] |=P
ψ, andM, λ[j] |=P ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i;
M, q |=P Pl aϕ iffM, q |=Υa ϕ;
M, q |=P Phϕ iffM, q |= ϕ;
M, q |=P Kaϕ iffM, q |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′;
M, q |=P Baϕ iff for all q′ ∈ ∂(Υa)with q ∼a q′, we have thatM, q′ |=Υa ϕ.
One of the main reasons for using the concept of plausibility is that we
want to deﬁne agents’ beliefs out of more primitive concepts – in our case,
these are plausibility and indistinguishability – in a way analogous to [126,
46]. If an agent knows that ϕ, he must be “sure” about it. However, beliefs
of an agent are not necessarily about reliable facts. Still, they should make
sense to the agent; if he believes thatϕ, then the formula should at least hold
in all futures that he envisages as plausible. Thus, beliefs of an agent may be
seen as things known to him if he disregards all non-plausible possibilities.
We say that ϕ isM-true (M |= ϕ) ifM, q |= ϕ for all q ∈ StM. ϕ is valid
(|= ϕ) ifM |= ϕ for all modelsM. ϕ isM-strongly true (M|≡ϕ) ifM, q |=P ϕ
for all q ∈ StM and all P ⊆ ΛM. ϕ is strongly valid ( |≡ϕ) ifM|≡ϕ for all
modelsM.
Proposition 33 Strong truth and strong validity imply truth and validity, re-
spectively. The reverse does not hold.
Ultimately, we are going to be interested in normal (not strong) validity,
as parameterizing the satisfaction relation with a set P is just a technical de-
vice for propagating sets of plausible paths Υa into the semantics of nested
formulae. The importance of strong validity, however, lies in the fact that
|≡ϕ ↔ ψ makes ϕ and ψ completely interchangeable, while the same is not
true for normal validity.
Proposition 34 Let Φ[ϕ/ψ] denote formula Φ in which every occurrence of ψ
was replaced by ϕ. Also, let |≡ϕ ↔ ψ. Then for all M, q, P : M, q |=P Φ iff
M, q |=P Φ[ϕ/ψ] (in particular,M, q |= Φ iffM, q |= Φ[ϕ/ψ]).
Note that |= ϕ↔ ψ does not even imply thatM, q |= Φ iffM, q |= Φ[ϕ/ψ].
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Figure 4.1: Guessing Robots game
Example 15 (Guessing Robots) Consider a simple game with two agents a
and b, shown in Figure 4.1. First, a chooses a real number r ∈ [0, 1] (without
revealing the number to b); then, b chooses a real number r′ ∈ [0, 1]. The agents
win the game (and collect EUR 1, 000, 000) if both chose 1, otherwise they lose.
Formally, we model the game with a CTLKP modelM, in which the set of states
St includes q[s] for the initial situation, states q[r], r ∈ [0, 1], for the situations after
a has chosen number r, and “ﬁnal” states q[w], q[l] for the winning and the losing
situation, respectively. The transition relation is as follows: q[s]Rq[r] and q[r]Rq[l]
for all r ∈ [0, 1]; q[1]Rq[w], q[w]Rq[w], and q[l]Rq[l]. Moreover, π(one) = {q[1]}
and π(win) = {q[w]}. Player a has perfect information in the game (i.e., q ∼a q′ iff
q = q′), but player b does not distinguish between states q[r] (i.e., q[r] ∼b q[r′] for
all r, r′ ∈ [0, 1]). Obviously, the only sensible thing to do for both agents is to choose
1 (using game-theoretical vocabulary, these strategies are strongly dominant for
the respective players). Thus, there is only one plausible course of events if we
assume that our players are rational, and henceΥa = Υb = {q[s]q[1]q[w]q[w] . . .}.
Note that, in principle, the outcome of the game is uncertain:M, q[s] |= ¬Awin∧
¬A¬win. However, assuming rationality of the players makes it only plausible
that the game must end up with a win: M, q[s] |= Pla Awin ∧ Plb Awin, and
the agents believe that this will be the case: M, q[s] |= BaAwin ∧ BbAwin.
Note also that, in any of the states q[r], agent b believes that a (being rational) has
played 1:M, q[r] |= Bbone for all r ∈ [0, 1].
4.3.3 Deﬁning Plausible Pathswith Formulae
So far, we have assumed that sets of plausible paths are somehow given in
models. In this section we present a dynamic approach where an actual no-
tion of plausibility can be speciﬁed in the object language. Note that we
want to specify (usually inﬁnite) sets of inﬁnite paths, and we need a ﬁnite
representation of these structures. One logical solution is given by using
path formulae γ. These formulae describe properties of paths; therefore,
a speciﬁc formula can be used to characterize a set of paths. For instance,
think about a country in Africa where it has never snowed. Then, plausible
paths might be deﬁned as ones in which it never snows, i.e., all paths that
satisfy ¬snows. Formally, let γ be a CTLK path formula. We deﬁne |γ|M to
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be the set of paths that satisfy γ in modelM:
| ϕ|M = {λ | M, λ[1] |= ϕ}
|ϕ|M = {λ | ∀i (M, λ[i] |= ϕ)}
|ϕ1 U ϕ2|M = {λ | ∃i
(M, λ[i] |= ϕ2 ∧
∀j(0 ≤ j < i⇒M, λ[j] |= ϕ1)
)}.
Moreover, we deﬁne the plausible paths model update as follows. LetM =
〈St,R,∼1, ...,∼k,Υ1, ...,Υk, π〉 be a CTLKP model, and let P ⊆ ΛM be a set
of paths. ThenMa,P = 〈St,R,∼1, ...,∼k,Υ1, ...,Υa−1, P,Υa+1, ...,Υk, π〉 de-
notes modelMwith a’s set of plausible paths reset to P .
Now we can extend the language of CTLKP with formulae (set-pla γ)ϕ
with the intuitive reading: “suppose that γ exactly characterizes the set of
plausible paths, then ϕ holds”, and formal semantics given below:
M, q |=P (set-pla γ)ϕ iffMa,|γ|M , q |=P ϕ.
Weobserve that this update scheme is similar to the oneproposed in [85].
4.3.4 Comparison to RelatedWork
Several modal notions of plausibility were already discussed in the existing
literature [46, 47, 126, 107, 93]. In these papers, like in ours, plausibility is
used as a primitive semantic concept that helps to deﬁne beliefs on top of
agents’ knowledge. A similar idea was introduced by Moses and Shoham
in [107]. Their work preceded both [46, 47] and [126] – and althoughMoses
and Shoham do not explicitly mention the term “plausibility”, it seems ap-
propriate to summarize their idea ﬁrst.
Moses and Shoham: Beliefs as Conditional Knowledge
In [107], beliefs are relativized with respect to a formula α (which can be
seen as a plausibility assumption expressed in the object language). More
precisely, worlds that satisfy α can be considered as plausible. This concept
is expressed via symbols Bαi ϕ; the index i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is used to distinguish
between three different implementations of beliefs. The ﬁrst version is given
by Bα1 ϕ ≡ K(α → ϕ).4 A drawback of this version is that if α is false, then
everything will be believedwith respect to α. The second version overcomes
this problem: Bα2 ϕ ≡ K(α → ϕ) ∧ (K¬α → Kϕ); now ϕ is only believed
if it is known that ϕ follows from assumption α, and ϕ must be known if
assumption α is known to be false. Finally,Bα3 ϕ ≡ K(α → ϕ) ∧ ¬K¬α: if the
assumption α is known to be false, nothing should be believed with respect
to α. The strength of these different notions is given as follows: Bα3 ϕ implies
Bα2 ϕ, and Bα2 ϕ implies Bα1 ϕ. In this approach, belief is strongly connected
to knowledge in the sense that belief is knowledge with respect to a given
assumption.
4Unlike in most approaches,K is interpreted over allworlds and not only over the indistin-
guishable worlds.
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Friedman andHalpern: Plausibility Spaces
The work of Friedman and Halpern [46] extends the concepts of knowledge
and belief with an explicit notion of plausibility; i.e., some worlds are more
plausible for an agent than others. To implement this idea, Kripke mod-
els are extended with function P which assigns a plausibility space P (q, a) =
(Ω(q,a),(q,a)) to every state, or more generally every possible world q, and
agent a. Theplausibility space is just a partially ordered subset of states/worlds;
that is, Ω(q, a) ⊆ St, and (q,a)⊆ St × St is a reﬂexive and transitive rela-
tion. Let S, T ⊆ Ω(q,a) be ﬁnite subsets of states; now, T is deﬁned to be
plausible given S with respect to P (q, a), denoted by S →P (q,a) T , iff all mini-
mal points/states in S (with respect to (q,a)) are also in T .5 Friedman and
Halpern’s view to modal plausibility is closely related to probability and,
more generally, plausibility measures. Logics of plausibility can be seen as
a qualitative description of agents preferences/knowledge; logics of proba-
bility [43, 91], on the other hand, offer a quantitative description.
The logic from [46] is deﬁned by the following grammar: ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∧
ϕ | ¬ϕ | Kaϕ | ϕ →a ϕ, where the semantics of all operators except →a is
given as usual, and formulae ϕ →a ψ have the meaning that ψ is true in the
most plausible worlds in which ϕ holds. Formally, the semantics for→a is
given as: M, q |= ϕ →a ψ iff SϕP (q,a) →P(q,a) SψP (q,a), where Sϕ(q,a) = {q′ ∈
Ω(q,a) | M, q′ |= ϕ} are the states in Ω(q,a) that satisfy ϕ. The idea of deﬁning
beliefs is given by the assumption that an agent believes in something if he
knows that it is true in the most plausible worlds of Ω(q,a); formally, this can be
stated asBaϕ ≡ Ka( →a ϕ).
Friedman and Halpern have shown that the KD45 axioms are valid for
operator Ba if plausibility spaces satisfy consistency (for all states q ∈ St it
holds that Ω(q,a) ⊆ { q′ ∈ St | q ∼a q′ }) and normality (for all states q ∈ St
it holds that Ω(q,a) = ∅).6 A temporal extension of the language (mentioned
brieﬂy in [46], and discussed in more detail in [47]) uses the interpreted sys-
tems approach [58, 42]. A systemR is given by runs, where a run r : N → St
is a function from timemoments (modeled byN) to global states, and a time
point (r, i) is given by a time point i ∈ N and a run r. A global state is a com-
bination of local states, one per agent. An interpreted systemM = (R, π) is
given by a system R and a valuation of propositions π. Epistemic relations
are deﬁned over time points, i.e., (r′,m′) ∼a (r,m) iff agent a’s local states
r′a(m
′) and ra(m)of (r′,m′) and (r,m) are equal. Formulae are interpreted in a
straightforward waywith respect to interpreted systems, e.g.M, r,m |= Kaϕ
iffM, r′,m′ |= ϕ for all (r′,m′) ∼a (r,m). Now, these are time points that
play the role of possible worlds; consequently, plausibility spacesP(r,m,a) are
assigned to each point (r,m) and agent a.
Su et al.: KBC Logic
Su et al. [126] have developed a multi-modal, computationally grounded
logic with modalities K,B, and C (knowledge, belief, and certainty). The
5When there are inﬁnite chains . . . 
 q3 
 q2 
a q1, the deﬁnition is much more sophisti-
cated. An interested reader is referred to [46] for more details.
6Note that this “normality” is essentially seriality of states wrt plausibility spaces.
95 CHAPTER 4. AGENTS, BELIEFS, AND PLAUSIBLE BEHAVIOR
computational model consists of (global) states q = (qvis, qinv, qper, Stpls)
where the environment is divided into a visible (qvis) and an invisible part
(qinv), and qper captures the agent’s perception of the visible part of the en-
vironment. External sourcesmay provide the agent with information about
the invisible part of a state, which results in a set of states Stpls that are plau-
sible for the agent.
Given a global state q, we additionally deﬁne V is(q) = qvis, Inv(q) = qinv,
Per(q) = qper, and Pls(q) = Stpls. The semantics is given by an extension of
interpreted systems [58, 42], here, it is called interpreted KBC systems. KBC
formulae are deﬁned as ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kϕ | Bϕ | Cϕ. The epistemic
relation∼vis is captured in the followingway: (r, i) ∼vis (r′, i′) iff V is(r(i)) =
V is(r′(i′)). The semantic clauses for belief and certainty are given below.
M, r, i |= Bϕ iffM, r′, i′ |= ϕ for all (r′, i′) with V is(r′(i′)) = Per(r(i)) and
Inv(r′(i′)) ∈ Pls(r(i))
M, r, i |= Cϕ iffM, r′, i′ |= ϕ for all (r′(i′))with V is(r′(i′)) = Per(r(i))
Thus, an agent believes ϕ if, and only if, ϕ is true in all states which look like
what he sees now and seem plausible in the current state. Certainty is stronger: if
an agent is certain about ϕ, the formulamust hold in all states with a visible
part equal to the current perception, regardless of whether the invisible part
is plausible or not.
The logic does not include temporal formulae, although it might be ex-
tended with temporal operators, as time is already present in KBCmodels.
What Are the Differences to Our Logic?
In our approach, plausibility is explicitly seen as a temporal property, i.e.,
it is a property of temporal paths rather than states. In the object language,
this is reﬂectedby the fact that plausibility assumptions are speciﬁed through
path formulae. In contrast, the approachof [107] and [126] is static: not only
the logics do not include operators for talking about time and/or change,
but these are states that are assumed plausible or not in their semantics.
Thedifferences to [46, 47] aremore subtle. Firstly, the frameworkof Fried-
man andHalpern is static in the sense that plausibility is taken as a property
of (abstract) possible worlds. This formulation is ﬂexible enough to allow
for incorporating time; still, in our approach, time is inherent to plausibility
rather than incidental.
Secondly, our framework is more computationally oriented. The imple-
mentation of temporal plausibility in [46, 47] is based on the interpreted
systems approach with time points (r,m) being subject to plausibility. As
runs are included in time points, they can also be deﬁned plausible or im-
plausible.7 However, it also means that time points serve the role of pos-
sible worlds in the basic formulation, which yields Kripke structures with
uncountable possible world spaces in all but the most trivial cases.
Thirdly, [46, 47] build on linear time: a run (more precisely, a time mo-
ment (r,m)) is ﬁxedwhena formula is interpreted. In contrast, weuse branch-
7Friedman and Halpern even brieﬂy mention how plausibility of runs can be embedded in
their framework.
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ing time with explicit quantiﬁcation over temporal paths.8 We believe that
branching time ismore suitable for non-deterministic domains (cf. e.g. [41]),
of which multi-agent systems are a prime example. Note that branching
timemakes ournotionof belief different fromFriedmanandHalpern’s. Most
notably, property Kϕ → Bϕ is valid in their approach, but not in ours: an
agentmay know that some course of events is in principle possible, without
believing that it can really become the case (see Section 4.4.2). As Proposi-
tion 42 suggests, such a subtle distinction between knowledge and beliefs is
possible in our approach because branching time logics allow for existential
quantiﬁcation over runs.
Fourthly, while Friedman and Halpern’s models are very ﬂexible, they
also enable system descriptions that may seem counterintuitive. Suppose
that (r,m) is plausible in itself (formally: (r,m) is minimal wrt (r,m,a)), but
(r,m+1) is not plausible in (r,m+1). Thismeans that following the plausible
pathmakes it implausible (cf. Remark 13), which is even stranger in the case
of linear time. Combining the argument with computational aspects, we
suggest that our approach canbemorenatural and straightforward formany
applications.
Last but not least, our logic provides a mechanism for specifying (and
updating) sets of plausible paths in the object language. Thus, plausibility
sets can be speciﬁed in a succinct way, which is another feature that makes
our framework computation-friendly. Themodel checking results from Sec-
tion 4.5 are especially encouraging in this light.
4.4 Plausibility, Knowledge, and Beliefs
in CTLKP
In this section we study some relevant properties of plausibility, knowledge,
and beliefs; in particular, axioms KDT45 are examined. But ﬁrst, we iden-
tify two important subclasses of models with plausibility.
A CTLKP model is plausibly serial (or p-serial) for agent a if every state of
the system is part of a plausible path according to a, i.e. ∂(Υa) = St. As
we will see further, a weaker requirement is sometimes sufﬁcient. We call a
modelweakly p-serial if every state has at least one indistinguishable counter-
part which lies on a plausible path, i.e. for each q ∈ St there is a q′ ∈ St such
that q ∼a q′ and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa). Obviously, p-seriality implies weak p-seriality.
We get the following characterization of bothmodel classes.
Proposition 35 M is plausibly serial for agent a iff formula Pl aE  is valid
inM .M is weakly p-serial for agent a iff ¬KaPl aA ⊥ is valid inM .
4.4.1 Axiomatic Properties
Theorem 15 Axioms K, D, 4, and 5 for knowledge are strongly valid, and ax-
iom T is valid. That is, modalities Ka form system S5 in the sense of normal
8To be more precise, time in [46] does implicitly branch at epistemic states. This is because
(r,m) ∼a (r′,m′) iff a’s local state corresponding to both time points is the same (ra(m) =
r′a(m′)). In consequence, the semantics ofKaϕ can be read as “for every run, and everymoment
on this run that yields the same local state as now, ϕ holds”.
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validity, andKD45 in the sense of strong validity.
We do not include proofs here due to lack of space. The interested reader
is referred to [24], where detailed proofs are given.
Proposition 36 Axioms K, 4, and 5 for beliefs are strongly valid. That is, we
have:
|≡ (Baϕ ∧Ba(ϕ→ ψ)) → Baψ, |≡ (Baϕ→ BaBaϕ), and |≡ (¬Baϕ→ Ba¬Baϕ).
Thenext proposition concerns the “consistency” axiomD:Baϕ→ ¬Ba¬ϕ.
It is easy to see that the axiom is not valid in general: as we have no restric-
tions on plausibility sets Υa, it may be as well that Υa = ∅. In that case we
haveBaϕ∧Ba¬ϕ for all formulaeϕ, because the set of states to be considered
becomes empty. However, it turns out thatD is valid for a very natural class
of models.
Proposition 37 AxiomD for beliefs is not valid in the class of all CTLKPmod-
els. However, it is strongly valid in the class of weak p-serial models (and therefore
also in the class of p-serial models).
Moreover, as onemay expect, beliefs do not have to be always true.
Proposition 38 AxiomT for beliefs is not valid; i.e., |= (Baϕ→ ϕ). The axiom
is not even valid in the class of p-serial models.
Theorem 16 Belief modalities Ba form system K45 in the class of all models,
andKD45 in the class of weakly plausibly serial models (in the sense of both nor-
mal and strong validity). Axiom T is not even valid for p-serial models.
4.4.2 Plausibility, Knowledge, and Beliefs
First, we investigate the relationship between knowledge and plausibility/
physicality operators. Then, we look at the interaction between knowledge
and beliefs.
Proposition 39 Let ϕ be a CTLKP formula, andM be a CTLKP model. We
have the following strong validities:
1. |≡Pl aKaϕ↔ Kaϕ
2. |≡PhKaϕ↔ KaPhϕ and |≡KaPhϕ↔ Kaϕ
We now want to examine the relationship between knowledge and be-
lief. For instance, if agent a believes in something, he knows that he believes
it. Or, if he knows a fact, he also believes that he knows it. On the other
hand, for instance, an agent does not necessarily believe in all the things he
knows. For example, we may know that an invasion from another galaxy is
in principle possible (KaE invasion), but if we do not take this possibility as
plausible (¬Pl aEinvasion), then we reject the corresponding belief in con-
sequence (¬BaEinvasion). Note that this property reﬂects the strong con-
nection between belief and plausibility in our framework.
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Proposition 40 The following formulae are strongly valid:
(i)Baϕ→ KaBaϕ, (ii)KaBaϕ→ Baϕ,
(iii)Kaϕ→ BaKaϕ.
The following formulae are not valid:
(iv)Baϕ→ BaKaϕ, (v)Kaϕ→ Baϕ
The last invalidity is especially important: it is not the case that knowing
something implies believing in it. This emphasizes that we study a speciﬁc
concept of beliefs here. Note that its speciﬁc is not due to the plausibility-
based deﬁnition of beliefs. The reason lies rather in the fact that we investi-
gate knowledge, beliefs and plausibility in a temporal framework, as Propo-
sition 41 shows.
Proposition 41 Let ϕ be a CTLKP formula that does not include any temporal
operators. ThenKaϕ → Baϕ is strongly valid, and in the class of p-serial models
we have even that |≡Kaϕ↔ Baϕ.
Moreover, it is important that we use branching timewith explicit quan-
tiﬁcation over paths; this observation is formalized in Proposition 42.
Deﬁnition 7 We deﬁne the universal sublanguage of CTLK in a way similar
to [132]:
ϕu ::= p | ¬p | ϕu ∧ ϕu | ϕu ∨ ϕu | Aγu | Kaϕu,
γu ::= ϕu | ϕu | ϕu U ϕu.
We call such ϕu universal formulae, and γu universal path formulae.
Proposition 42 Let ϕu be a universal CTLK formula. Then |≡Kaϕu → Baϕu.
The following two theorems characterize the relationship betweenknowl-
edge and beliefs: ﬁrst for the class of p-serialmodels, and then, ﬁnally, for all
models.
Theorem 17 The following formulae are strongly valid in the class of plausibly
serial CTLKP models:
(i)Baϕ↔ KaPl aϕ, (ii)Kaϕ↔ BaPhϕ.
Theorem 18 FormulaBaϕ↔ KaPl a(E  → ϕ) is strongly valid.
Note that this characterization has a strong commonsense reading: be-
lieving in ϕ is knowing that ϕ plausibly holds in all plausibly imaginable situa-
tions.
4.4.3 Properties of the Update
The ﬁrst notable property of plausibility update is that it inﬂuences only for-
mulae in which plausibility plays a role, i.e. ones in which belief or plausi-
bility modalities occur.
Proposition 43 Let ϕ be a CTLKP formula that does not include operatorsPl a
andBa, and γ be a CTLKP path formula. Then, we have |≡ϕ↔ (set-pla γ)ϕ.
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What can be said about the result of an update? At ﬁrst sight, formula
(set-pla γ)Pl aAγ seems a natural characterization; however, it is not valid.
This is because, by leaving the other (implausible) paths out of scope, we
may leave out of |γ| some paths that were needed to satisfy γ (see the exam-
ple in Section 4.4.2). We propose two alternative ways out: the ﬁrst one re-
stricts the language of the update similarly to [132]; the other refers to phys-
ical possibilities, in a way analogous to [85].
Proposition 44 The CTLKP formula (set-pla γ)Pl aAγ is not valid. However,
we have the following validities:
1. |≡ (set-pla γu)Pl aAγu, where γu is a universal CTLK path formula from
Deﬁnition 7.
2. If ϕ,ϕ1, ϕ2 are arbitrary CTLK formulae, then:
|≡ (set-pla ϕ)Pl aA (Phϕ),
|≡ (set-pla ϕ)Pl aA(Phϕ), and
|≡ (set-pla ϕ1 U ϕ2)Pl aA(Phϕ1)U (Phϕ2).
4.5 VeriﬁcationofPlausibility, TimeandBe-
liefs
In this section we report preliminary results on model checking CTLKP for-
mulae. Clearly, verifyingCTLKPproperties directly againstmodelswithplau-
sibility does not make much sense, since these models are inherently inﬁ-
nite; what we need is a ﬁnite representation of plausibility sets. One such
representation has been discussed in Section 4.3.3: plausibility sets can be
deﬁned by path formulae and the update operator (set-pla γ).
We follow this idea here, studying the complexity of model checking
CTLKP formulae against CTLK models (which can be seen as a compact rep-
resentation of CTLKPmodels in which all the paths are assumed plausible),
with the underlying idea that plausibility sets, when needed, must be de-
ﬁned explicitly in the object language. Below we sketch an algorithm that
model-checks CTLKP formulae in time linear wrt the size of the model and
the length of the formula. This means that we have extended CTLK to a
more expressive language with no computational price to pay.
First of all, we get rid of the belief operators (due to Theorem 18), re-
placing every occurrence of Baϕ with KaPl a(E  → ϕ). Now, let −→γ =
〈γ1, ..., γk〉 be a vector of “vanilla” path formulae (one per agent), with the
initial vector −→γ0 = 〈, ...,〉, and −→γ [γ′/a] denoting vector −→γ , in which −→γ [a]
is replaced with γ′. Additionally, we deﬁne −→γ [0] = . We translate the re-
sulting CTLKP formulae to ones without plausibility via function tr(ϕ) =
tr−→γ0,0(ϕ), deﬁned as follows:
tr−→γ ,i(p) = p,
tr−→γ ,i(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = tr−→γ ,i(ϕ1) ∧ tr−→γ ,i(ϕ2),
tr−→γ ,i(¬ϕ) = ¬tr−→γ ,i(ϕ),
tr−→γ ,i(Kaϕ) = Ka tr−→γ ,0(ϕ),
tr−→γ ,i(Pla ϕ) = tr−→γ ,a(ϕ),
tr−→γ ,i((set-pla γ
′)ϕ) = tr−→γ [γ′/a],i(ϕ),
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tr−→γ ,i(Phϕ) = tr−→γ ,0(ϕ),
tr−→γ ,i( ϕ) = tr−→γ ,i(ϕ),
tr−→γ ,i(ϕ) = tr−→γ ,i(ϕ),
tr−→γ ,i(ϕ1 U ϕ2) = tr−→γ ,i(ϕ1)U tr−→γ ,i(ϕ2),
tr−→γ ,i(Eγ′) = E(
−→γ [i] ∧ tr−→γ ,i(γ′)).
Note that the resulting sentences belong to the logic of CTLK+, that is
CTL+ (where each path quantiﬁer can be followed by a Boolean combina-
tion of “vanilla” path formulae)9 with epistemic modalities. The following
proposition justiﬁes the translation.
Proposition 45 For any CTLKP formula ϕ without Ba, we have that
M, q |=CTLKP ϕ iffM, q |=CTLK+ tr(ϕ).
In general,model checkingCTL+ (and alsoCTLK+) isΔP2 -complete. How-
ever, in our case, the Boolean combinations of path subformulae are always
conjunctions of at most two non-negated elements, which allows us to pro-
pose the following model checking algorithm. First, subformulae are evalu-
ated recursively: for every subformula ψ of ϕ, the set of states inM that sat-
isfy ψ is computed and labeled with a new proposition pψ. Now, it is enough
to deﬁne checkingM, q |= ϕ forϕ in which all (state) subformulae are propo-
sitions, with the following cases:
CaseM, q |= E(p ∧ γ): If M, q |= p, then return no. Otherwise, remove
fromM all the states that donot satisfy p (yielding a sparsermodelM ′),
and check the CTL formula Eγ inM ′, q with any CTLmodel-checker.
CaseM, q |= E( p ∧ γ): CreateM ′ by adding a copy q′ of state q, in which
only the transitions to states satisfying p are kept (i.e., M, q′ |= r iff
M, q |= r; and q′Rq′′ iff qRq′′ andM, q′′ |= p). Then, check Eγ inM ′, q′.
CaseM, q |= E(p1 U p2 ∧ p3 U p4): Note that this is equivalent to checking
E(p1 ∧ p3)U (p2 ∧ Ep3 U p4) ∨ E(p1 ∧ p3)U (p4 ∧ Ep1 U p2), which is a CTL
formula.
Other cases: The above cases cover all possible formulas that begin with a
path quantiﬁer. For other cases, standard CTLK model checking can
be used.
Theorem 19 Model checking CTLKP against CTLKmodels is PTIME-complete,
and can be done in timeO(ml), wherem is the number of transitions in the model,
and l is the length of the formula to be checked. That is, the complexity is no worse
than for CTLK itself.
4.6 Conclusions
In this paper a notion of plausible behavior is considered, with the under-
lying idea that implausible options should be usually ignored in practical
reasoning about possible future courses of action. We add the new notion
9For the semantics of CTL+, and discussion of model checking complexity, cf. [96].
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of plausibility to the logic of CTLK [115], and obtain a language which en-
ables reasoning about what can (or must) plausibly happen. As a technical
device to deﬁne the semantics of the resulting logic, we use a non-standard
satisfaction relation |=P that allows to propagate the “current” set of plau-
sible paths into subformulae. Furthermore, we propose a non-standard no-
tion of beliefs, deﬁned in terms of indistinguishability and plausibility. We
also propose howplausibility assumptions can be speciﬁed in the object lan-
guage via a plausibility update operator (in a way similar to [85]).
We use this new framework to investigate some important properties of
plausibility, knowledge, beliefs, and updates. In particular, we show that
knowledge is an S5modality, and that beliefs satisfy axiomsK45 in general,
andKD45 for the class of plausibly serial models. We also prove that believing
in ϕ is knowing that ϕ plausibly holds in all plausibly possible situations. That is,
the relationship between knowledge and beliefs is very natural and reﬂects
the initial intuition precisely. Moreover, the model checking results from
Section 4.5 show that veriﬁcation for CTLKP is no more complex than for
CTL and CTLK.
We would like to stress that we do not see this contribution as a mere
technical exercise in formal logic. Human agents use a similar concept of
plausibility and “practical” beliefs in their everyday reasoning in order to
reduce the search space andmake the reasoning feasible. As a consequence,
we suggest that the framework we proposemay prove suitable for modeling,
design, and analysis resource-bounded agents in general.
We would like to thank Juergen Dix for fruitful discussions, useful com-
ments and improvements.
Chapter 5
Reasoning about
Temporal Properties of
Rational Play (jointwork
with Nils Bulling and
Ju¨rgenDix)
Abstract. This article is about deﬁning a suitable logic for ex-
pressing classical game theoretical notions. We deﬁne an exten-
sion of alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) that enables us to ex-
press various rationality assumptions of intelligent agents. Our pro-
posal, the logic ATLP (ATL with plausibility) allows us to specify sets
of rational strategy proﬁles in the object language, and reason about
agents’ play if only these strategy proﬁles were allowed. For exam-
ple, we may assume the agents to play only Nash equilibria, Pareto-
optimal proﬁles or undominated strategies, and ask about the re-
sulting behaviour (and outcomes) under such an assumption. The
logic also gives rise to generalized versions of classical solution con-
cepts through characterizing patterns of payoffs by suitably param-
eterized formulae of ATLP. We investigate the complexity of model
checking ATLP for several classes of formulae: It ranges fromΔP3 to
PSPACE in the general case and from ΔP3 to ΔP4 for the most in-
teresting subclasses, and roughly corresponds to solving extensive
games with imperfect information.
Keywords: game theory, modal and temporal logic, reasoning
about agents, rationality.
5.1 Introduction
Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [6, 8] is a temporal logic that incorpo-
rates some basic game theoretical notions. In ATL we can express that a
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group of agents is able to bring aboutψ, i.e., they are able to ensure a situation
where ψ holds whatever the other agents might do. However, such a state-
ment is weaker than it seems. Often, we know that agents behave according
to some rationality assumptions, they are not completely dumb. Therefore
we do not have to check all possible plays – only those that are plausible in
some reasonable sense. This has striking similarities to nonmonotonic rea-
soning, where one considers default rules that describe the most plausible
behaviour and allow to draw conclusions when knowledge is incomplete.
In general, plausibility can be seen as a broader notion than rationality:
One may obtain plausibility speciﬁcations e.g. from learning or folk knowl-
edge. In this article, however, we mostly focus on plausibility as rationality
in a game-theoretical sense.
Our idea has been inspired by the way in which games are analyzed in
game theory. Firstly, game theory identiﬁes a number of solution concepts
(e.g., Nash equilibrium, undominated strategies, Pareto optimality) that can
be used to deﬁne rational behaviour of players. Secondly, we usually assume
that players play rationally in the sense of one of the above concepts, and we
ask about the outcome of the game under this assumption.
Solution concepts do not only help to determine the right decision for
an agent. Perhaps more importantly, they constrain the possible (predicted)
responses of the opponents to a proper subset of all the possibilities. For
many games the number of all possible outcomes is inﬁnite, although only
some of them, often ﬁnitelymany,make sense. Weneed a notion of rational-
ity (like subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium) to discard the less sensible ones,
and to determine what should happen had the game been played by ideal
players.
5.1.1 Idea andMain Results
While ATL is already a logic that incorporates some game theoretical con-
cepts, we claim that extendingATL by other useful constructs not only helps
us to better understand the classical solution concepts in game theory, but
it also paves the way for deﬁning new solution concepts (which we call gen-
eral). We extend ATL by the notion of plausibility, and call the resulting logic
ATLP. We claim that this logic is suitable to model and to reason about the
rational behaviour of agents.
In this article we discuss the following:
1. We recall from [14, 85] thatmodels of ATL, called concurrent game struc-
tures (CGS), embed extensive form games with perfect information in a nat-
ural way. This can be done, e.g., by adding auxiliary propositions to
the CGS, that describe the payoffs of agents. With this perspective,
concurrent game structures can be seen as a strict generalisation of ex-
tensive games.
2. We discuss informally how these more general games can be “solved”,
given an appropriate solution concept that deﬁnes which plays can be
plausibly expected.
3. We extend ATL to a new logic ATLP that allows to reason about what
agents can achieve under an arbitrary plausibility assumption. Analy-
5.1. INTRODUCTION 104
sis of this kind typically startswith assuming that agents are rational in
the sense that they only play strategies consistent with a selected solu-
tion concept (e.g., they can only playNash equilibria, or undominated
strategies etc.). Then, we can ask which outcomes can be obtained by
whom under this assumption.
4. We extend the results from [130, 85], and show that the classical solu-
tion concepts (Nash equilibrium, subgame perfectNash equilibrium, Pareto
optimality, and others) can be also characterized in the object language
of ATLP. That is, we propose expressions of ATLP that, given an exten-
sive game, denote exactly the set of Nash equilibria (subgame perfect
NE’s, Pareto optimal proﬁles, etc.) in that game. In consequence, ATLP
can serve both as a language for reasoning about rational play, and for
specifying what rational play is. We point out that these characteriza-
tions extend traditional solution concepts to the more general class of
multi-stagemulti-player games deﬁnedby concurrent game structures.
5. We also propose an alternative approach to deﬁning solution concepts
for games that involve inﬁnite ﬂow of time. In the new approach, path
formulae of ATL are used to specify the “winning conditions” of each
player. This implicitly leads to a normal form game with binary pay-
offs, where the traditional solution concepts are well deﬁned. We also
demonstrate how these “qualitative” solution concepts (parametrized
by ATL path formulae) can be characterized in ATLP.
6. We constructively show that several logics canbe embedded intoATLP.
That is, we demonstrate howmodels and formulae of those logics can
be (independently) transformed to their ATLP counterparts in a way
that preserves their truth values.
7. Last but not least, we investigate themodel checking problem in ATLP.
We show that, for different subclasses of the new logic, the complexity
ofmodel checking ranges fromΔP3 -completeness toPSPACE-comple-
teness. We also argue that, when the number of plausible strategy pro-
ﬁles is reasonably small, the model checking can be done in polyno-
mial time.
5.1.2 RelatedWork
In our approach, some strategies (or rather strategy proﬁles) can be assumed
plausible, and one can reason what can be plausibly achieved by agents un-
der such an assumption. There are two possible points of focus in this con-
text. Researchwithin game theory understandably favors work on character-
ization of various types of rationality (and deﬁning most appropriate solu-
tion concepts). Applications of game theory, also understandably, tend to-
ward using the solution concepts in order to predict the outcome in a given
game (in other words, to “solve” the game).
The ﬁrst issue has been studied in the framework of logic, for example
in [11, 19, 124, 125]; more recently, game-theoretical solution concepts have
been characterized in dynamic logic [62, 61], dynamic epistemic logic [14,
128], and ATL [130, 85].
105 CHAPTER 5. TEMPORAL PROPERTIES OF RATIONAL PLAY
The second thread seems to have been neglected in logic-based research:
papers by Van Otterloo and his colleagues [137, 138, 136, 135] are the only
exceptions we know of. Moreover, every proposal from [137, 138, 136, 135]
commits to a particular view of rationality (Nash equilibria, undominated
strategies etc.). In this paper, we try to generalize this kind of reasoning in
a way that allows to “plug in” any solution concept of choice. We also try
to ﬁll in the gap between the two threads by showing how sets of rational
strategy proﬁles can be speciﬁed in the object language, and building upon
the existing work onmodal logic characterizations of solution concepts [62,
61, 14, 128, 130, 85].
5.1.3 Structure of the Article
Webeginby introducing somebasic notions fromgame theory and the alter-
nating-time temporal logic (Section 5.2). In Section 5.3, we pave the way for
Sections 5.4 and 5.5: We relate ATL and its semantical models to extensive
games. Then we do the same for an extension of ATL, called ATLI, which
has been introduced in [85] to characterize solution concepts in extensive
games.
Section 5.4 introduces our logic ATLP: We extend ATL with a plausibil-
ity operator. This constitutes the base language LbaseATLP . The main syntac-
tic novelty are plausibility terms that refer to rational strategies. Then, we
extend the base language by allowing to specify sets of rational strategy pro-
ﬁles in the object language. To do this, we need to deﬁne a language with
a much richer structure of terms as in LbaseATLP . We achieve this by describ-
ing strategy proﬁles with ATLI formulae, and extending LbaseATLP so that the
concepts presented in Section 5.3.4 can be reused. Finally, we propose the
full language LATLP where ATLP characterizations of solution concepts are
“plugged” into ATLP formulae that describe the consequences of adopting
this or that notion of rationality. Thus, we create a single language for both
characterizing rational behaviour and reasoning about its outcome. We de-
ﬁne LATLP through a hierarchy of sublanguages LkATLP , each allowing for
more levels of plausibility updates than the previous one.
Section 5.5 lists our main conceptual results. We show how to embed
several logics in ATLP and how to express several classical solution concepts
(such as Nash equilibria and others) already in L1ATLP . Our third result is
the generalization of Nash equilibria, Pareto optimality, undominatedness
and subgame perfect Nash equilibria as certain parameterized formulae in
the language of ATLP.
Section 5.6 contains the results of our study on the complexity of model
checking in variants of ATLP. Finally, we conclude with Section 5.7.
Some results reported in this article have been already presented in a pre-
liminary form in several conference and workshop papers. A rough idea of
“ATL with plausibility” was proposed in [23, 76]. In [77], we studied a more
complex language of terms that would allow to specify sets of rational strat-
egy proﬁles in the object language; still, the language was not expressive
enough for our purposes. Some initial complexity results were also reported
in that paper. Finally, [26] put forward the idea that rationality speciﬁca-
tions can bewritten in ATLP itself, and nested in ATLP formulae. The idea of
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1\ 2 a12 a22
a11
a21
〈μ1(a11, a12),μ2(a11, a12)〉
〈μ1(a21, a22),μ2(a21, a22)〉
〈μ1(a11, a12),μ2(a11, a22)〉
〈μ1(a21, a12),μ2(a21, a22)〉
Figure 5.1: Payoff matrix for 2 players and 2× 2 strategies
“qualitative” solution concept was also introduced in [26].
5.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some concepts that are important for the rest of
this article. After recapitulating some machinery of game theory, together
with two running examples, we introduce ATL, which is the basis for our
new logic ATLP.
5.2.1 Concepts FromGameTheory
We start with the deﬁnition of a normal form game, also called strategic game,
and use the terminology of [111].
Deﬁnition 8 (Normal Form (NF) Game) A (perfect information) normal
form game Γ, is a tuple of the form Γ = 〈P,A1, . . . ,Ak, μ〉, where
• P is a ﬁnite set of players (or agents), with |P| = k,
• Ai are nonempty sets of actions (or strategies) for player i,
• μ : P → (∏ki=1Ai → R) is the payoff function (which we also write
〈μ1, . . . , μk〉).
A combinations of actions (resp. strategies, payoffs), one per player, will be called
an action proﬁle (resp. strategy proﬁle, payoff proﬁle) throughout the paper.
Such games are usually depicted with a payoff matrix. For example, a
game with 2 players having 2 strategies each is represented by the matrix in
Figure 5.1.
Example 16 (Classical NF Games) Some classical NF games with 2 players
and 2 strategies are shown in Figure 5.2. In theMatching Pennies game, player
1 wins when both pennies show the same side. Otherwise player 2 wins. In the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, two prisoners can either cooperate or defect with the police.
Finally, the Hawk-Dove game is similar, but the payoffs are different. The higher
the payoff the better it is for the respective player.
Deﬁnition 9 (Solution Concepts in Games) There are severalwell-known
solution concepts such as:
Nash Equilibrium (NE): A strategy proﬁle such that no agent can unilaterally
deviate from her strategy and get a better payoff;
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1\ 2 Head Tail
Head
Tail
(1, -1)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 1)
(1, -1)
1\ 2 C D
C
D
(3, 3)
(5, 0)
(0, 5)
(1, 1)
1\ 2 Dove Hawk
Dove
Hawk
(3, 3)
(4, 1)
(1, 4)
(0, 0)
Figure 5.2: Payoff matrices for Matching Pennies, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and
Hawk-Dove. Nash equilibria are set in bold font.
Pareto Optimality (PO): There is no other strategy proﬁle that leads to a pay-
off proﬁle which is at least as good for each agent, and strictly better for at
least one agent;
Weakly Undominated Strategies (UNDOM): These are strategies that are
not dominated by any other strategy, i.e., such that there is no strategy at
least as good for all the responses of the opponent, and strictly better for at
least one response.
We do not repeat the formal deﬁnitions here and refer to the literature [111]. We
point out, however, that some solution concepts yield sets of individual strategies
(UNDOM), while others produce rather sets of strategy proﬁles (NE, PO).
In the examples from Figure 5.2, there is no Nash equilibrium for the
Matching Pennies game, exactly one Nash equilibrium for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (namely, the strategy proﬁle 〈D,D〉), and two Nash equilibria for
the Hawk-Dove game (〈Hawk,Dove〉 and 〈Dove,Hawk〉).
In NF games, agents do their moves simultaneously: They do not see the
move of the opponent and therefore cannot act accordingly. On the other
hand, there are many games where the move of one player should depend
on the preceding move of the opponent, or even on the whole history. This
idea is captured in games of extensive form.
Deﬁnition 10 (Extensive Form (EF) Game) A (perfect information) exten-
sive form game Γ is a tuple of the form Γ = 〈P,A, H, ow, u〉, where:
• P is a ﬁnite set of players,
• A a ﬁnite set of actions (moves),
• H is a set of ﬁnite action sequences (game histories), such that (1) ∅ ∈ H, (2)
if h ∈ H, then every initial segment of h is also in H. We use the notation
A(h) = {m | h ◦m ∈ H} to denote themoves available at h, and Term =
{h | A(h) = ∅}, the set of terminal positions,
• ow : H → P deﬁnes which player “owns” history h, i.e., has the next move
given h,
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Figure 5.3: The bargaining game.
• u : P × Term → U assigns agents’ utilities to every terminal position of the
game.
We will usually assume that the set of utilities U is ﬁnite.
Such games can be easily represented as trees of all possible plays.
Example 17 (Bargaining) Consider bargaining with discount [111, 120].
Two players, 1 and 2, bargain about how to split goods worth initiallyw0 = 1 EUR.
After each round without agreement, the subjective worth of the goods reduces by
discount rates δ1 (for player a1) and δ2 (for player a2). So, after t rounds, the goods
areworth 〈δt1, δt2〉, respectively. Subsequently, a1 (if t is even) or a2 (if t is odd)makes
an offer to split the goods in proportions 〈x, 1− x〉, and the other player accepts or
rejects it. If the offer is accepted, then a1 takes xδt1, and a2 gets (1−x)δt2; otherwise
the game continues. The (inﬁnite) extensive form game is shown in Figure 5.3.
Note that the tree has inﬁnite depth as well as an iniﬁte branching factor.
In order to obtain a ﬁnite set of payoffs, it is enough to assume that the goods
are split with ﬁnite precision represented by a rounding function r : R → R. So,
after t rounds, the goods are in fact worth 〈r(δt1), r(δt2)〉, respectively, and if the offer
is accepted, then a1 takes r(xδt1), and a2 gets r((1− x)δt2).
A strategy for player i ∈ P in extensive game Γ is a function that assigns a
legalmove to each history owned by i. Note that a strategy proﬁle (i.e., a com-
bination of strategies, one per player) determines a unique path from the
game root (∅) to one of the terminal nodes (and hence also a single proﬁle
of payoffs). In consequence, one can construct the corresponding normal
from game NF (Γ) by enumerating strategy proﬁles and ﬁlling the payoff
matrix with resulting payoffs.
Example 18 (Sharing Game) Consider the Sharing Game in Figure 5.4A.
Its corresponding normal form game is presented in Figure 5.4B. Firstly, player 1
can suggest how to share, say, two 1 EUR coins. E.g. (2, 0) means that 1 gets two
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(A)
1
2
(0, 0) (2, 0)
2
(0, 0) (1, 1)
2
(0, 0) (0, 2)
(2, 0
) (1,1)
(0, 2)
no
yes no
yes no
yes
(B)
1\ 2 nnn nny nyn nyy ynn yny yyn yyy
(2, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 0) (2, 0) (2, 0) (2, 0)
(1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1)
(0, 2) (0, 0) (0, 2) (0, 0) (0, 2) (0, 0) (0, 2) (0, 0) (0, 2)
Figure 5.4: The Sharing game: (A) Extensive form; (B) Normal form. Nash
equilibria are set in bold font. A strategy abc (a, b, c ∈ {y, n}) of player 2 de-
notes the strategy in which 2 plays a (resp. b, c) if player 1 has played (2, 0)
(resp. (1, 1), (0, 2)) where n refers to “no” and y to “yes”.
euro and 2 gets nothing. Subsequently, player 2 can accept the offer or reject it; in
the latter case both players get nothing.
The game includes 3 strategies for player 1 (which can be denoted by the action
that they prescribe at the beginning of the game), and 8 strategies for player 2 (gen-
erated by the combination of actions prescribed for the second move), which gives
24 strategy proﬁles in total. However, not all of them seem plausible. Constraining
the possible plays to Nash equilibria only, we obtain 9 “rational” strategy proﬁles
(cf. Figure 5.4B), although it is still disputable if all of them really “make sense”.
A subgame of an extensive game Γ is deﬁned by a subtree of the game tree
of Γ.
Deﬁnition 11 (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPN)) This solu-
tion concept is an extension of NE: A strategy is a SPN in Γ if it is a NE in Γ and, in
addition, a NE in all subgames of Γ.
Example 19 (Sharing Game ctd.) Consider again the game fromExample 18.
While the game has 9 Nash equilibria, only two of them are subgame perfect:
〈(2, 0), yyy〉 and 〈(1, 1), nyn〉.
Example 20 (Bargaining ctd.) Consider the bargaining game from Exam-
ple 22. The game has an immense number of possible outcomes. Still worse, every
strategy proﬁle
sx :
{
a1 always offers 〈x, 1− x〉, and agrees to 〈y, 1− y〉 for y ≥ x
a2 always offers 〈x, 1− x〉, and agrees to 〈y, 1− y〉 iff 1− y ≥ 1− x
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is a Nash equilibrium (NE): an agreement is reached in the ﬁrst round.
Thus, every split 〈x, 1− x〉 can be achieved through a Nash equilibrium; it seems
that a stronger solution concept is needed. Indeed, the game has a unique sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium. Because of the ﬁnite precision, there is a mini-
mal round T with r(δT+1i ) = 0 for i = 1 or i = 2. For simplicity, assume that i = 2
and agent a1 is the offerer in T (i.e., T is even). Then, the only subgame perfect NE
is given by the strategy proﬁle sκ with κ = (1− δ2) 1−(δ1δ2)
T
2
1−δ1δ2 +(δ1δ2)
T
2 . The goods
are split 〈κ, 1− κ〉; the agreement is reached in the ﬁrst round.1
5.2.2 ATL
Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [6, 8] enables reasoning about temporal
properties and strategic abilities of agents. Formally, the language of ATL is
given as follows.
Deﬁnition 12 (LATL) Let Agt = {a1, . . . , ak} be a nonempty ﬁnite set of all
agents, and Π be a set of propositions (with typical element p). We use the symbol
a to denote a typical agent, andA to denote a typical group of agents fromAgt. The
logic LATL(Agt,Π) is deﬁned by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ.
Informally, 〈〈A〉〉ϕ says that agents A have a collective strategy to enforce
ϕ. ATL formulae include the usual temporal operators: (in the next state),
 (always from now on) and U (strict until). Additionally, (now or sometime
in the future) can be deﬁned as ϕ ≡ U ϕ. Like in CTL [29], every occur-
rence of a temporal operator is immediately preceded by exactly one coop-
eration modality (this variant of the language is sometimes called “vanilla”
ATL). The broader language of ATL	, where no such restriction is imposed, is
not discussed in this article. It should be noted that theCTL path quantiﬁers
A,E can be expressed in ATL with 〈〈∅〉〉, 〈〈Agt〉〉 respectively. The semantics of
ATL is deﬁned over concurrent game structures.
Deﬁnition 13 (CGS) A concurrent game structure (CGS) is a tuple: M =
〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o〉, consisting of: a set Agt = {a1, . . . , ak} of agents; a
set St of states; a set Π of atomic propositions; a valuation of propositions
π : St → 2Π; a set Act of actions. Function d : Agt × St → 2Act indicates the
actions available to agent a ∈ Agt in state q ∈ St. Wewill oftenwrite da(q) instead
of d(a, q), and use d(q) to denote the set d1(q) × · · · × dk(q) of action proﬁles
available in state q. Finally, o is a transition function which maps each state
q ∈ St and action proﬁle−→α = 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ d(q) to another state q′ = o(q,−→α ).
Remark 14 In the literature on ATL, the same symbols for agents (and groups of
agents) are used in the semantics and in the object language; we follow this tradi-
tion here.
A computation or path λ = q0q1 · · · ∈ Stω is an inﬁnite sequence of states
such that there is a transition between each qi, qi+1.We deﬁne λ[i] = qi to
1For the standard version of bargaining with discount (with the continuous set of pay-
offs [0, 1]), cf. [111, 120]. Restricting the payoffs to a ﬁnite set requires to alter the solution
slightly [123, 101], see also Appendix 5.8.
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denote the i-th state of λ. ΛM denotes all paths in M . The set of all paths
starting in q is given by ΛM (q).
Deﬁnition 14 (Strategy, outcome) A (memoryless) strategy of agent a is
a function sa : St → Act such that sa(q) ∈ da(q). We denote the set of such
functions byΣa. A collective strategy sA for teamA ⊆ Agt speciﬁes an individual
strategy for each agent a ∈ A; the set of A’s collective strategies is given by ΣA =∏
a∈A Σa. The set of all strategy proﬁles is given by Σ = ΣAgt.
The outcome of strategy sA in state q is deﬁned as the set of all paths that
may result from executing sA from state q on: out(q, sA) = {λ ∈ ΛM (q) | ∀i ∈
N0 ∃−→α = 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ d(λ[i]) ∀a ∈ A (αa = saA(λ[i]) ∧ o(λ[i],−→α ) = λ[i + 1])},
where saA denotes agent a’s part of the collective strategy sA.
The semantics of ATL can be given by the following clauses:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ π(q)
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q |= ϕ
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such thatM,λ[1] |= ϕ for allλ ∈ out(q, sA)
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such thatM,λ[i] |= ϕ for all λ ∈ out(q, sA)
and i ∈ N0
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such that, for all λ ∈ out(q, sA), there is
i ∈ N0 withM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i.
Remark 15 We somewhat deviate from the original semantics of ATL [6, 8],
where strategies assign agents’ choices to sequences of states (which suggests that
agents can recall the whole history of each game). While the choice between the
two types of strategies affects the semantics of most ATL extensions, both yield
equivalent semantics for pure ATL [121].
5.3 Relating Games andATL-Like Logics
In this sectionwe present some important ideas that form the starting point
for later sections. (1)We discuss informally how the notion of strategic abil-
ity in ATL can be reﬁned so that it takes into account only “sensible” be-
haviour of agents. (2) We look back on the logic of GLP [138] which im-
plements the idea formally, albeit in a very limited way. (3) We summarize
a correspondence between extensive games and the models of ATL. (4) We
recall an extension of ATL, called ATLI (“ATL with Intentions”), which will
later serve as an intermediate logical framework and as a motivation for our
logic ATLP.We also demonstrate how several game-theoretical solution con-
cepts can be expressed in ATLI. (5) Finally we present our idea of qualitative
solution concepts, where ATL path formulae are used to deﬁne the winning
conditions.
We illustrate the ideaswith two examples from theprevious section:Match-
ing Pennies and Bargaining with Discounts.
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Figure 5.5: Asymmetric matching pennies: (A)Concurrent game structureM1.
In q0 the agents can choose to show head or tail. Both agents can only exe-
cute action nop (no operation) in states q1, q2, q3. (B) The corresponding NF
game. We use sh (resp. st ) to denote the strategy in which the player always
shows head (resp. tail) in q0 and nop in q1, q2, and q3.
5.3.1 ATL andRational Play
Example 21 (Asymmetricmatching pennies) Consider a variant of the
matching pennies game, presented in Figure 5.5A. Formally, the model is given as
follows:
M1 = 〈{1, 2}, {q0, q1, q2, q3}, {start,money1,money2}, π, {head , tail ,nop}, d, o〉
where π is given as in the picture (π(q0) = {start} etc.), d(a, q0) = {head , tail}
for a = 1, 2, and d(a, q) = {nop} for a = 1, 2 and q = q1, q2, q3. The transition
function o can also be read off from the picture. We use nop (no operation) as a
“default” action in states q1, q2, and q3 that brings the system back to the initial
state. The intuition is that the game is played ad inﬁnitum. Alternatively, one
might add loops to states q1, q2 and q3 to model a game that is played only once.
If both players show heads in q0, both win a prize in the next step; if they both
show tails, only player 2 wins. If they show different sides, nobody wins. Note
that, e.g., M1, q0 |= 〈〈2〉〉¬money1, because agent 2 can play tail all the time,
preventing 1 fromwinning the prize. On the other hand,M1, q0 |= ¬〈〈2〉〉money2:
Agent 2 has no strategy to guarantee that she will win.
The concurrent game structure in Figure 5.5A determines the set of available
strategy proﬁles. However, it does not say anything about players’ preferences. Sup-
pose now that the players are only interested in getting somemoney sometime in the
future (but it does not matter when and/or howmuch). The corresponding normal
form game under this assumption is depicted in Figure 5.5B.
Such an analysis of the game is of course correct, yet it appears to be quite
coarse. It seems natural to assume that players prefer winning money over
losing it. If we additionally assume that the players are rational thinkers, it
seems plausible that player 1 should always play head, as it keeps the possi-
bility of gettingmoney open (while playing tail guarantees loss). Under this
assumption, player 2 has complete control over the outcome of the game:
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She can play head too, granting herself and the other agent with the prize,
or respond with tail, in which case both players lose. Note that this kind
of analysis corresponds to the game-theoretical notion of weakly dominant
strategy: For agent 1, playing head is dominant in the corresponding normal
form game in Figure 5.5B, while both strategies of player 2 are undominated,
so they can be in principle considered for playing.
It is still possible to reﬁne our analysis of the game. Note that 2, knowing
that 1 ought to play head and preferring to win money too, should decide
to play head herself. This kind of reasoning corresponds to the notion of
iterated undominated strategies. If we assume that both players do reason this
way, then 〈sh, sh〉 is the only rational strategy proﬁle, and the game should
end with both agents winning the prize.
5.3.2 Game Logicwith Preferences
Game Logic with Preferences [138] is, to our knowledge, the only logic de-
signed to address the outcome of rational play in games with perfect infor-
mation. Here, we summarize the idea very brieﬂy.
The central idea of GLP is facilitated by the preference operator [a : ϕ]. In-
terpretation of [a : ϕ]ψ in modelM proceeds as follows: if the truth of ϕ can
be enforced by a, then we remove from the model all the actions of a that
do not lead to enforcing it, and evaluate ψ in the resulting model. Thus, the
evaluation of GLP formulae is underpinned by the assumption that rational
agents satisfy their preferences whenever they can. The requirement applies to
all the subtrees of the game tree, and it is called “subgame perfectness” by
the authors.
The scope ofGLP, however, is limited in several respects. Firstly, themod-
els of GLP are restricted to ﬁnite game trees. Secondly, agents’ preferences
must be speciﬁed with propositional (non-modal) formulae, and they are
evaluated only at the terminal states of the game. The temporal part of the
language is limited, too. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the seman-
tics of GLP is based on a very speciﬁc notion of rationality (see above). One
can easily imagine variants of the semantics, in which other rationality cri-
teria are used (NE, PO, UNDOM) to eliminate “irrational” strategies. Indeed,
a preliminary version of GLP was based on the notion of Nash equilibrium
rather than “subgame perfectness” [137]. In this article, we want to allow as
much ﬂexibility as possible with respect to the choice of a suitable solution
concept.
5.3.3 Models of ATL vs. Extensive Games
In this section, we recall the correspondence between extensive form games
and the semantical models of ATL, proposed in [85] and inspired by [14,
130].
We only consider game trees inwhich the set of payoffs is ﬁnite. LetU de-
note the set of all possible utility values in a game; U will be ﬁnite and ﬁxed
for any given game. For each value v ∈ U and agent a ∈ Agt, we introduce
a proposition pva into our set Π, and ﬁx pva ∈ π(q) iff a gets payoff of at least v
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Figure 5.6: CGSM2 for the bargaining game
in q.2 States in the model represent ﬁnite histories in the game. In particu-
lar, we us ∅ to denote the root of the game. The correspondence between an
extensive game Γ and a CGSM can be captured as follows.
Deﬁnition 15 (FromExtensive Games to CGS)
A CGSM = {Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o} corresponds to an extensive game Γ =
〈P,A, H, ow, u〉 if, and only if, the following holds:
• Agt = P,
• St = H,
• Π and π include propositions pva to emulate utilities for terminal states in the
way described above,
• Act = A ∪ {nop},
• da(q) = A(q) if a = ow(q) and da(q) = {nop} otherwise,
• o(q, nop, . . . ,m, . . . , nop) = q ·m, and
• o(q, nop, nop, . . . , nop) = q for q ∈ Term.
We useM(Γ) to refer to the CGS which corresponds to Γ.
Example 22 (Bargaining in a CGS) We consider the bargaining game from
Example 17, but this time as a model of ATL. The CGS corresponding to the game
shown in Figure 5.6. Nodes represent various states of the negotiation process, and
arcs show how agents’ moves change the state of the game. A node label refers to
2Note that a state labeled by pva is also labeled by pv
′
a for all v′ ∈ U where v′ < v.
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the history of the game for better readability. For instance,
⎡⎣ 0, 11, 0
acc
⎤⎦ has the meaning
that in the ﬁrst round 1 offered 〈0, 1〉which was rejected by 2. In the next round 2’s
offer 〈1, 0〉 has been accepted by 1 and the game has ended.
Note that, for every extensive game Γ, there is a corresponding CGS, but
the reverse is not true: Concurrent game structures can include cycles and
simultaneous moves of players, which are absent in game trees. Note also
that, for those CGS’s that correspond to some EF game, we get an implicit
correspondence to a normal form game. We will extend this notion of cor-
respondence to all CGS’s in Section 5.3.5.
5.3.4 ATLI and Solution Concepts
The correspondence between extensive games and (some) concurrent game
structures gives us a way of performing game-theoretical analysis on the lat-
ter. In particular, game-theoretical solution concepts become meaningful
for these CGS’s. This section illustrates how several important notions of ra-
tionality from game theory, e.g. Nash equilibria (NE), subgame perfect NE,
Pareto optimality etc. can be characterized in a suitable logical language.
We use the analysis from [85] where an extension of ATL, called ATLI, was
employed for this purpose. We will later show how these characterizations
can be “plugged” into our new logic ATLP so that one can reason about the
outcome of rational play in a precisely deﬁned sense.
We also point out after [85] that these characterizations give rise to gen-
eralized versions of solution concepts which can be applied to allCGS’s, and
not only to those that correspond to some extensive form game.
Alternating-time temporal logic with intentions (ATLI) extends ATLwith for-
mulae (stra σa)ϕ with the intuitive reading: Suppose that player a intends to
play according to strategy σa, then ϕ holds. Thus, it allows to refer to agents’
strategies explicitly via terms σa. Let Str =
⋃
a∈Agt Stra be a ﬁnite set of
strategic terms. Stra are used to denote individual strategies of agent a ∈ Agt;
we assume that allStra are disjoint.
Deﬁnition 16 (LATLI) Let p ∈ Π, a ∈ Agt, A ⊆ Agt, and σa ∈ Stra. The
language LATLI(Agt,Π,Str) is deﬁned as:
θ ::= p | ¬θ | θ ∧ θ | 〈〈A〉〉 θ | 〈〈A〉〉θ | 〈〈A〉〉θ U θ | (stra σa)θ.
ATLIModelsM = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o, I,Str, [·]〉 extend concurrent game
structureswith intention relations I ⊆ St×Agt×Act (where qIaαmeans that a
possibly intends to do action αwhen in q). Moreover, strategic terms are in-
terpreted as strategies according to function [·] : Str → ⋃a∈Agt Σa such that
[σa] ∈ Σa for σa ∈ Stra (remember that Σa denotes the set of a’s strategies).
The set of paths consistent with all agents’ intentions is deﬁned as
ΛI = {λ ∈ ΛM | ∀i ∃α ∈ d(λ[i]) (o(λ[i], α) = λ[i + 1] ∧ ∀a ∈ Agt λ[i]Iaαa)}
We impose on I the natural requirement that qIaα implies that α ∈ da(q) for
a ∈ Agt; that is, agents only intend to do actions if they are actually able to
perform them.
We say that strategy sA is consistent with A’s intentions if qIasaA(q) for all
q ∈ St, a ∈ A. The intention-consistent outcome set is deﬁned as: outI(q, sA) =
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out(q, sA) ∩ ΛI . The semantics of strategic operators in ATLI extends and
replaces the semantic rules of ATL as follows:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 θ iff there is a collective strategy sA consistent with A’s in-
tentions, such that for every λ ∈ outI(q, sA), we have thatM,λ[1] |= θ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉θ andM, q |= 〈〈A〉〉θ U θ′: analogous;
M, q |= (stra σ)θ iff revise(M,a, [σ]), q |= θ.
The function revise(M,a, sa) updates modelM by setting a’s intention rela-
tion to
I ′a = {〈q, sa(q)〉 | q ∈ St},
so that sa and Ia represent the same mapping in the resulting model. Note
that a pure CGSM can be seen as a CGS with the full intention relation
I0 = {〈q, a, α〉 | q ∈ St, a ∈ Agt, α ∈ da(q)}.
Additionally, for A = {ai1 , . . . , air} and σA = 〈σai1 , . . . , σair 〉, we deﬁne:
(strA σA)ϕ ≡ (strai1 σai1 ) . . . (strair σair )ϕ. Furthermore, forB = {b1, . . . , bl} ⊆
Awe use σA[B] to refer toB’s substrategy, i.e. to 〈σb1 , . . . , σbl〉
Example 23 (Asymmetricmatching pennies ctd.) Coming back to our
matching pennies example from Figure 5.5, we have for instance that M1, q0 |=
(str1 σ)〈〈2〉〉money2 if the denotation of σ is set to sh .
With temporal logic, it is natural to deﬁne outcomes of strategies via
properties of resulting paths rather than single states. Thenotionof temporal
T -Nash equilibrium, parameterized with a unary operator T = ,,, U ψ,
ψ U , was proposed in [85]. Let σ = 〈σ1, . . . , σk〉 be a proﬁle of strategic terms,
and letT stand for anyof the following operators: ,,, U ψ,ψ U and let
a be an agent. Then we consider the following LATLI formulae:
BRTa (σ) ≡ (strAgt\{a} σ[Agt \ {a}])
∧
v∈U
(
(〈〈a〉〉Tpva) → ((stra σ[a])〈〈∅〉〉Tpva)
)
NET (σ) ≡
∧
a∈Agt
BRTa (σ)
SPNT (σ) ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉NET (σ).
BRTa (σ) refers to σ[a] being a T -best strategy for a against σ[Agt \ {a}];
NET (σ) expresses that strategy proﬁle σ is a T-Nash equilibrium; ﬁnally,
SPNT (σ) deﬁnes σ as subgame perfect T-NE. Thus, we have a family of equi-
libria: -Nash equilibrium, -Nash equilibrium etc., each corresponding
to a different temporal pattern of utilities. For example, we may assume that
agent a gets v if a utility of at least v is guaranteed for every time moment
(pva), is eventually achieved (pva), and so on.
The correspondence between solution concepts and their temporal coun-
terparts for extensive games is captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 46 Let Γ be an extensive game. Then the following holds:
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1. M(Γ), ∅ |= NE(σ) iff [σ]M(Γ) is a NE in Γ [85].3
2. M(Γ), ∅ |= SPN(σ) iff [σ]M(Γ) is a SPN in Γ.
Proof sketch
1. Since M(Γ) corresponds to an EF game, the “payoff” propositions pva
can only become true at the end of each path inM(Γ). Thus, BRa (σ)
in M(Γ), ∅ holds iff, whenever a can achieve the payoff of at least v
against σ[Agt \ {a}] (by any strategy), it can also achieve that by using
σ[a]. That is, a cannot obtain a better payoff by unilaterally changing
her strategy.
2. M(Γ), ∅ |= SPN(σ) iffM(Γ), q |= NE(σ) for every q reachable from
the root ∅ (*). However, Γ is a tree, so every node is reachable from ∅ in
M(Γ). So, by the ﬁrst part, (*) iff σ denotes a Nash equilibrium in every
subtree of Γ.

We can use the above ATLI formulae to express game-theoretical proper-
ties of strategies in a straightforward way.
Example 24 (Bargaining ctd.) We extend the CGS in Figure 5.6 to a CGS
with intentions; then, we haveM2, q0 |= NE(σ), with σ interpreted inM2 as sx
(for any x ∈ [0, 1]). Still,M2, q0 |= SPN(σ) if, and only if, [σ]M2 = sκ.
We also propose a tentative ATLI characterization of Pareto optimality
(based on the characterization from [130] for normal form games):
POT (σ) ≡
∧
v1
· · ·
∧
vk
(
(〈〈Agt〉〉T
∧
i
pvii ) → (strAgt σ)
(
(〈〈∅〉〉T
∧
i
pvii ) ∨
(
∨
i
∨
v′ s.t.
v′ > vi
〈〈∅〉〉Tpv′i )
))
.
That is, the strategy proﬁle denoted by σ is Pareto optimal iff, for every
achievable pattern of payoff proﬁles, either it can be achieved by σ, or σ ob-
tains a strictly better payoff pattern for at least one player. Note that the
above formula has exponential length with respect to the number of pay-
offs in U . Moreover, it is not obvious that this characterization is the right
one, as it refers in fact to the evolution of payoff proﬁles (i.e., combinations
of payoffs achieved by agents at the same time), and not temporal patterns
of payoff evolution for each agent separately. So, for example, PO(σ)may
hold even if there is a strategy proﬁle σ′ thatmakes each agent achieve even-
tually a better payoff, as long as not all of themwill achieve these better pay-
offs at the samemoment. Still, the following holds.
Proposition 47 Let Γ be an extensive game. Then:
M(Γ), ∅ |= PO(σ) iff [σ]M(Γ) is Pareto optimal in Γ.
3The empty history ∅ denotes the root of the game tree.
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Proof Let M(Γ), ∅ |= PO(σ). Then, for every payoff proﬁle 〈v1, . . . , vk〉
reachable in Γ, we have that either [σ] obtains at least as good a proﬁle,4 or
it obtains an incomparable payoff proﬁle. Thus, [σ] is Pareto optimal. The
proof for the other direction is analogous. 
Example 25 (Asymmetricmatching pennies ctd.) LetM ′1 be ourmatch-
ing pennies modelM1 with additional propositions p1i ≡ moneyi (so, we assign to
moneyi a utility of 1 for i). Then, we have M ′1, q0 |= PO(σ) iff σ denotes the
strategy proﬁle 〈sh , sh〉.
5.3.5 General Solution Concepts
In this part we present an abstract formulation of our notion of general so-
lution concept. We will elaborate on it later in Section 5.5.3, using our logic
ATLP.
We have seen in Section 5.3.3 that some (but not all!) concurrent game
structures can be seen as extensive form games, which in turn deﬁnes their
correspondence to NF games. These CGS’s must be turn-based (i.e., players
play by taking turns) and have a tree-like structure; moreover, they must in-
clude special propositions that emulate payoffs and can be used to deﬁne
agents’ preferences. Now, we want to extend the correspondence to arbi-
trary CGS’s. Our idea is to determine the outcome of a game by the truth of cer-
tain path formulae (e.g., in the case of binary payoffs, we can see the formulae
as winning conditions). So, we give up the idea of assigning payoffs to leaves
in a tree. Instead, we see a concurrent game structure as a game, paths in the
structure as plays in the game, and satisfaction of some pre-speciﬁed formu-
lae as the mechanism that deﬁnes agents’ outcome for a given play.
Which formulae can be used in this respect?
Deﬁnition 17 (ATL Path Formulae) ByATLpath formulae, we denote ar-
bitrary ATL formulae that are preceded by a temporal operator ,, U .
Given a CGSM and a path λ inM , satisfaction of path formulae is deﬁned as
follows:
M,λ |= ϕ iffM,λ[1] |= ϕ
M,λ |= ϕ iffM,λ[i] |= ϕ for all i ∈ N0
M,λ |= ϕU ψ iff there is i ∈ N0 with M,λ[i] |= ψ, and M,λ[j] |= ϕ for all
0 ≤ j < i.
We propose that player i’s preferences can be speciﬁed by a ﬁnite list of
path formulae ηi = 〈η1i , . . . , ηnii 〉 (where ni ∈ N) with the underlying assump-
tion that agent i prefers η1i most, η
2
i comes second best etc., and the worst
outcome occurs when no η1i , . . . , η
ni
i holds for the actual play. Thus, ηi im-
poses a total order on paths in a CGS.
For k players, we need a k-vector of such preference lists−→η = 〈η1, . . . , ηk〉.
Then, every concurrent game structure gives rise to the strategic game de-
ﬁned as below.
4We recall that
∧
i p
vi
i means that each player i gets at least vi.
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Deﬁnition 18 (FromCGS ToNFGame) LetM be a CGS, q ∈ StM a state,
and−→η = 〈η1, . . . , ηk〉 a vector of lists of ATL path formulae, where k = |Agt|.
Then we deﬁne S(M,−→η , q), the NF game associated withM , −→η , and q, as
the strategic game 〈Agt,A1, . . . ,Ak, μ〉, where the setAi of i’s strategies is given by
Σi for each i ∈ Agt, and the payoff function is deﬁned as follows:
μi(a1, . . . , ak) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
ni − j + 1 if ηji is the ﬁrst formula from ηi such that
M,λ |= ηji for all λ ∈ out(q, 〈a1, . . . , ak〉),
0 no ηji is satisﬁed
where ηi = 〈η1i , . . . , ηnii 〉, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni and we write μi for μ(i).
Below, we present the generalized version of temporal Nash equilibrium
and temporal subgame perfect NE.
BR
−→η
a (σ) ≡ (strAgt\{a} σ[Agt \ {a}])
∧
j
(
(〈〈a〉〉ηja) → ((stra σ[a])
∨
r≤j
〈〈∅〉〉ηra)
)
NE
−→η (σ) ≡
∧
a∈Agt
BR
−→η
a (σ)
SPN
−→η (σ) ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉NE−→η (σ).
The case with a single “winning condition” per agent is particularly in-
teresting. Clearly, it gives rise to a normal form game with binary payoffs
(cf., for instance, our informal discussion of the “matching pennies” vari-
ant in Example 21). We will stick to such binary games throughout the rest
of the paper (especially in Section 5.5.3 where general solution concepts are
studied in more detail), but one can easily imagine how the binary case ex-
tends to the case withmultiple levels of preference.
5.4 The Logic ATLP
Agents have limited ability to predict the future. However, some lines of
action seem often more sensible or realistic than others. If a rationality cri-
terion is available, we obtain means to focus on a proper subset of possible
plays. In game theoretic terms,we solve the game, i.e., we determine themost
plausible plays, and compute their outcome. In game theory, the outcome
consists of the payoffs (or utilities) assigned toplayers at the endof the game.
In temporal logics, the outcome of a play can be seen in terms of temporal
patterns that can occur — which allows for much subtler descriptions. In
Section 5.3.4 we explained how rationality can be characterized with for-
mulae of modal logic (ATLI in this case). Now we show how the outcome of
rational play can be describedwith a similar (but richer) logic, and that both
aspects can be seamlessly combined.
Our logic ATLP (“ATLwith Plausibility”) comes in several steps, based on
different underlying languages:
LbaseATLP : Sets of plausible/rational strategy proﬁles can be only referred to via
atomic plausibility terms (constants) whose interpretation is “hard-
wired” in the model. A typical LbaseATLP statement is (set-pl ω)Plϕ:
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Suppose that the set of rational strategy proﬁles is deﬁned by ω – then, it is
plausible to expect that ϕ holds. For instance, one can reason about what
should happen if only Nash equilibria were played, or about the abili-
ties of players who play only Pareto optimal proﬁles, had terms for NE
and PO been included in themodel.
L0ATLP : A mild extension of LbaseATLP . We allow some combinations of the
constants of LbaseATLP to formmore complex terms.
LATLPATLI : An intermediate language, where rational strategy proﬁles are
characterized by ATLI formulae.
LkATLP : Here we have nestings of plausibility updates up to level k. It turns
out that LATLPATLI is already embedded in L1ATLP .
LATLP : Unbounded nestings of formulae are allowed.
The language LbaseATLP is presented in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. Then, in
Section 5.4.3, we consider an intermediate step, namely plausibility terms
written in ATLI. They serve as amotivation to extend LbaseATLP to L1ATLP , and,
more generally, to a hierarchyLATLP = limk→∞ LkATLP whichwe investigate
in Section 5.4.4.
5.4.1 The Language LbaseATLP
We extend the language of ATL with operators PlA , (set-pl ω), and
(refn-pl ω). The ﬁrst assumes plausible behaviour of agents in A; the latter
are used to ﬁx the actual meaning of plausibility by plausibility terms ω. As
yet, the terms are simply constants with no internal structure. Their mean-
ing will be given later by a denotation function linking plausibility terms to
sets of strategy proﬁles.
Deﬁnition 19 (LbaseATLP ) The base language LbaseATLP (Agt,Π,Ω) is deﬁned over
nonempty sets: Π of propositions , Agt of agents, and Ω of plausibility terms. We
use p, a, ω to refer to typical elements of Π,Agt,Ω respectively, and A to refer to a
group of agents. LATLP (Agt,Π,Ω) consists of all formulae deﬁned by the follow-
ing grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ |
PlA ϕ | (set-pl ω)ϕ | (refn-pl ω)ϕ,
Additionally, we deﬁne ϕ as U ϕ, Pl as PlAgt , and Ph as Pl∅ . We will often
use LbaseATLP to refer to the language if the sets are clear from the context.
PlA assumes that agents in A play rationally; this means that the agents
can only use strategy proﬁles that are plausible in the given model. In par-
ticular,Pl (≡ PlAgt ) imposes rational behaviour on all agents in the system.
Similarly,Ph disregards plausibility assumptions, and refers to all physically
available scenarios. The model update operator (set-pl ω) allows to deﬁne
(or redeﬁne) the set of plausible strategy proﬁles (referred to by Υ in the
model) to the ones described by plausibility term ω (in this sense, it imple-
ments revision of plausibility). Operator (refn-pl σ) enables reﬁning the set
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of plausible strategy proﬁles, i.e. selecting a subset of the previously plausi-
ble proﬁles.
With ATLP, we can for example say that Pl 〈〈∅〉〉(closed ∧ Ph 〈〈guard〉〉 
¬closed): It is plausible to expect that the emergency doorwill always remain closed,
but the guard retains the physical ability to open it; or (set-pl ωNE)Pl 〈〈2〉〉money2:
Suppose that only playing Nash equilibria is rational; then, agent a can plausibly
reach a state where she gets some money.
We note that, in contrast to [46, 126, 24], the concept of plausibility pre-
sented in this article is objective, i.e. it does not vary from agent to agent.
This is very much in the spirit of game theory, where rationality criteria are
used in an analogous way. Moreover, it is global, because plausibility sets do
not depend on the state of the system. Note, however, that the denotation
of plausibility terms depends on the actual state.
5.4.2 Semantics of LbaseATLP
To deﬁne the semantics of ATLP, we extend CGS’s to concurrent game struc-
tures with plausibility. Apart froman actual set of plausible strategiesΥ, a con-
current game structure with plausibility (CGSP) must specify the denotation of
plausibility terms ω ∈ Ω. It is deﬁned via a plausibility mapping
[[·]] : St→ (Ω → 2Σ)
Instead of [[q]](ω)we will often write [[ω]]q to turn the focus to the plausibility
terms. Each term is mapped to a set of strategy proﬁles. Note also, that the
denotation of a term depends on the state. In a way, the current state of the
systemdeﬁnes the “initial position in the game”, and this heavily inﬂuences
the set of rational strategy proﬁles for most rationality criteria. For example,
a strategy proﬁle can be a Nash equilibrium (NE) in q0, and yet it may not be
a NE in some of its successors.
Wewill propose amore concrete (andmore practical) implementation of
plausibility terms in Section 5.4.4.
Deﬁnition 20 (CGSP) A concurrent game structure with plausibility
(CGSP) is given by a tuple
M = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o,Υ,Ω, [[·]]〉
where 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o〉 is a CGS,Υ ⊆ Σ is a set of plausible strategy proﬁles
(called plausibility set); Ω is a set of of plausibility terms, and [[·]] is a plausibility
mapping over St and Ω.
By CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω) we denote the set of all CGSP’s over Agt, Π and Ω. Fur-
thermore, for a given CGSPM we useXM to refer to elementX ofM , e.g., StM to
refer to the set St of states ofM .
Deﬁnition 21 (Compatiblemodel) Given a formula ϕ ∈ LATLP (Agt,Π,
Ω) a CGSPM is called compatiblewithϕ if, and only if,M ∈ CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω).
That is, the model interprets all symbols occurring in ϕ. A modelM is called com-
patible with a set L of ATLP formulae if, and only if, M is compatible with each
formula in L.
We will assume by default that, given a formula or a set of formulae, the model
we consider is compatible with it.
5.4. THE LOGIC ATLP 122
The formula Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ implies that A can only play plausible strategies.
Thus,A’s part of the strategy proﬁles inΥ is of particular interest whichmo-
tivates the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 22 (Substrategy) Let A,B ⊆ Agt be groups of agents such that
A ⊆ B and let sB ∈ ΣB be a collective strategy for agentsB. We use sB |A to denote
A’s substrategy tA contained in sB , i.e., strategy tA ∈ ΣA such that taA = saB for
every a ∈ A.5 For a singleton coalition {a}, we also write sB |a instead of sB |{a}.
For a given set PB ⊆ ΣB of collective strategies of agents B, PB |A denotes the
set ofA’s substrategies in PB, i.e.:
PB |A = {sA ∈ ΣA | ∃s′B ∈ PB (s′B |A = sA)}.
Often, we impose restrictions only on a subset B ⊆ Agt of agents, with-
out assuming rational play of all agents. This can be desirable due to several
reasons. It might, for example, be the case that only information about the
proponents’ play is available; hence, assuming plausible behavior of the op-
ponents is neither sensible nor justiﬁed. Or, even simpler, a group of (simple
minded) agents might be known to not behave rationally.
Consider formula PlB 〈〈A〉〉γ: The team A looks for a strategy that brings
about γ, but the members of the team who are also in B can only choose
plausible strategies. The same applies toA’s opponents that are contained in
B. Strategies which comply with B’s part of some plausible strategy proﬁle
are calledB-plausible.
Deﬁnition 23 (B-plausibility of strategies) Let A,B ⊆ Agt and sA ∈
ΣA. We say that sA is B-plausible inM if, and only if, B’s substrategy in sA is
part of some plausible strategy proﬁle inM , i.e., if sA|A∩B ∈ ΥM |A∩B.
By ΥM (B) we denote the set of all B-plausible strategy proﬁles inM . That is,
ΥM (B) = {s ∈ Σ | s|B ∈ ΥM |B}. Note that sA isB-plausible iff sA ∈ ΥM (B)|A.
Weobserve that sA is triviallyB-plausiblewheneverA andB are disjoint.
As mentioned above, if some opponents belong to the set of agents who
are assumed to play plausibly then they must also comply with the actual
plausibility speciﬁcations when choosing their actions; this is taken into ac-
count by the following notion of plausible outcome.
Deﬁnition 24 (B-plausible outcome) The B-plausible outcome,
outM (q, sA, B), with respect to strategy sA and state q is deﬁned as the set of paths
which can occur when only B-plausible strategy proﬁles can be played and agents
inA follow sA:
outM (q, sA, B) = {λ ∈ ΛM (q) | there exists aB-plausible t ∈ Σ such that
t|A = sA and outM (q, t) = {λ}}.
Note that the outcome outM (q, sA, B) is empty whenever the (A ∩ B)’s
part of sA is not part of any plausible strategy proﬁle in ΥM . For example,
assume that all agents in B play only parts of Nash equilibria. Then for a
given sA there are two possibilities for theB-consistent outcome. Either it is
empty because (A∩B)’s part of sA does not belong to anyNash equilibrium,
5We recall that saB (resp. t
a
A) denotes a’s part of sB (resp. tA).
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or it consists of all paths which can occur when (1) A stick to sA, (2) B (in-
cluding A ∩ B) play according to some Nash equilibrium, and (3) the other
agents behave arbitrarily.
The truth of ATLP formulae is given with respect to a model, a state, and
a set B of agents. The intuitive reading ofM, q |=B ϕ is: “ϕ is true in model
M and state q if it is assumed that players in B play rationally”, i.e., by us-
ing only plausible combinations of strategies. No constraints are imposed
on the behaviour of agents outside B, but the plausibility operator PlA can
be used to change the set of agents (viz A) whose play is restricted. The up-
date/reﬁnement modalities (set-pl ω)/(refn-pl ω) are used to change the
plausibility setΥM in the model.
Deﬁnition 25 (Semantics of LbaseATLP ) Let M ∈ CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω) and
A,B ⊆ Agt. The semantics of ATLP formulae is given as follows:
M, q |=B p iff p ∈ π(q) and p ∈ Π
M, q |=B ¬ϕ iffM, q |=B ϕ
M, q |=B ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |=B ϕ andM, q |=B ψ
M, q |=B 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ iff there is a B-plausible sA s.t. M,λ[1] |=B ϕ for all λ ∈
outM (q, sA, B)
M, q |=B 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there is a B-plausible sA s.t. M,λ[i] |=B ϕ for all λ ∈
outM (q, sA, B) and all i ∈ N0
M, q |=B 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there is aB-plausible sA such that, for allλ ∈ outM (q, sA, B),
there is i ∈ N0 withM,λ[i] |=B ψ, andM,λ[j] |=B ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i
M, q |=B PlA ϕ iffM, q |=A ϕ
M, q |=B (set-pl ω)ϕ iffM ′, q |=B ϕ where the new modelM ′ is equal toM but
the new setΥM ′ of plausible strategy proﬁles ofM
′ is set to [[ω]]qM .
M, q |=B (refn-pl ω)ϕ iff M ′, q |=B ϕ where M ′ is equal to M but ΥM ′ set to
ΥM ∩ [[ω]]qM .
The “absolute” satisfaction relation |= is given by |=∅.
Deﬁnition 26 (Validity) Let ϕ ∈ LATLP (Agt,Π,Ω) and M ⊆ CGSP (Agt,
Π,Ω). Formula ϕ is valid with respect to M if, and only if, M, q |= ϕ for every
M ∈ M and state q ∈ StM .
Note that an ordinary concurrent game structure (without plausibility)
can be interpreted as aCGSPwith all strategy proﬁles assumedplausible, i.e.,
withΥ = Σ, and empty set of plausibility terms Ω.
Let us clarify the semantics behind PlB〈〈A〉〉γ once more. The propo-
nents (A) look for a strategy that enforces γ; some of them (A ∩ B) are as-
sumed to play a part of a plausible strategy proﬁle while the others (A \ B)
can choose an arbitrary collective strategy. Analogously, some opponents
(B \A) are supposed to play plausibly (that complies to setΥM together with
the strategy already chosen by A ∩ B), while the rest (Agt \ (A ∪ B)) have
unrestricted choice. In particular, whenB = A, only the choices of the pro-
ponents are restricted; for B = Agt \ A plausibility restrictions apply to the
opponents only.
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Remark 16 We observe that our framework is semantically similar to the ap-
proach of social laws [122, 108, 132]. However, we refer to strategy proﬁles as
rational or not, while social laws deﬁne constraints on agents’ individual actions.
Also, our motivation is different: In our framework, agents are expected to behave
in a speciﬁed way because it is rational in some sense; social laws prescribe be-
haviour sanctioned by social norms and legal regulations.
Example 26 (Asymmetricmatching pennies ctd.) Suppose that it is
plausible to expect that both agents are rational in the sense that they only play
undominated strategies.6 Then, Υ = {(sh , sh), (sh , st)}. Under this assumption,
agent 2 is free to grant itself with the prize or to refuse it: Pl (〈〈2〉〉 money2 ∧
〈〈2〉〉¬money2). Still, it cannot choose to win without making the other player win
too: Pl¬〈〈2〉〉(money2 ∧ ¬money1). Likewise, if rationality is deﬁned via iterated
undominated strategies, then we have Υ = {(sh , sh)}, and therefore the outcome
of the game is completely determined: Pl 〈〈∅〉〉(¬start → money1 ∧money2).
Note that, in order to include both notions of rationality in the model, we can
encode them as denotations of two different plausibility terms – say, ωundom and
ωiter, with [[ωundom]]q0 = {(sh , sh), (sh , st)}, and [[ωiter]]q0 = {(sh , sh)}. LetM ′1
be modelM1 with plausibility terms and their denotation deﬁned as above. Then,
we have that M ′1, q0 |= (set-pl ωundom)Pl (〈〈2〉〉money2 ∧ 〈〈2〉〉¬money2) ∧
(set-pl ωiter)Pl 〈〈∅〉〉(¬start → money1 ∧money2).
Out of many solution concepts, Nash equilibrium is the most widely ac-
cepted, especially for non-cooperative games. We brieﬂy extend our work-
ing example with game analysis based on Nash equilibrium. Note that, in
this case, it is not possible to deﬁne rationalitywith independent constraints
on agents’ individual strategies (like in normative systems). These are full
strategy proﬁles being rational or not, since rationality of a strategy depends
on the actual response of the other players.
Example 27 (Asymmetricmatching pennies ctd.) Suppose that ratio-
nality is deﬁned through Nash equilibria. Then, Υ = {(sh , sh), (st , st)}. Under
this assumption, agent 2 is sure to get the prize: Pl 〈〈∅〉〉(¬start → money2).
Moreover, by choosing the right strategy, 2 can control the outcome of the other
agent: Pl (〈〈2〉〉(¬start → money1) ∧ 〈〈2〉〉¬money1). Note that agent 1 can con-
trol her own outcome too, if we assume that the players are obliged to play ratio-
nally: Pl (〈〈1〉〉(¬start → money1) ∧ 〈〈1〉〉¬money1). This may seem strange,
but a Nash equilibrium assumes implicitly that the agents coordinate their actions
somehow. Then, assuming a particular choice of one agent in advance constrains
the other agent responses considerably, which puts the ﬁrst agent at advantage.
Example 28 (Bargaining ctd.) Let ωNE denote the set of Nash equilibria
(every payoff can be reached by a Nash equilibrium), and ωSPN the set of subgame
perfect Nash equilibria in the game. Then, the following holds for every x ∈ [0, 1]:
M ′2, q0 |=
(set-pl ωNE)〈〈1, 2〉〉(px1 ∧ p1−x2 ) ∧ (set-pl ωSPN )〈〈∅〉〉(p
1−δ2
1−δ1δ2
1 ∧ p
δ2(1−δ1)
1−δ1δ2
2 ).
6We recall from Section 5.2.1 that a strategy sa ∈ Σa is called undominated if, and only if,
there is no strategy s′a ∈ Σa such that the achieved utility of s′a is at least as good as for sa for
all counterstrategies s−a ∈ ΣAgt\{a} and strictly better for at least one counterstrategy s−a ∈
ΣAgt\{a}.
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where M ′2 is given by M2 extended by plausibility terms and their denotation as
introduced above.
Finally, we observe that the “plausibility reﬁnement” operator can be
used to combine several solution concepts, e.g., (set-pl ωNE)(refn-pl ωPO)
restricts plausible play to Pareto optimal Nash equilibria. We can also use
(refn-pl ·) to compare different notions of rationality. For example,
(set-pl ωNE)(refn-pl ωPO)〈〈Agt〉〉  can be used to check if Pareto opti-
mal NE’s exist in themodel at all.
The base language LbaseATLP allows to restrict the analysis to a subset of
available strategy proﬁles. One drawback of LbaseATLP is that we cannot spec-
ify sets of plausible/rational strategy proﬁles in the object language, simply
because our terms do not have any internal structure — they are just con-
stants. Ideally, one would like to have a ﬂexible language of terms that al-
lows to specify any sensible rationality assumption, and then impose it on the
system.
Our ﬁrst step is to employ formulae of ATLI and make use of the results
in Section 5.3.4. The second step is to deﬁne a proper extension of LbaseATLP
where these concepts can be expressed, thus enabling both speciﬁcation
of plausibility and reasoning about plausible behaviour to be conducted in
ATLP. The idea is to use ATLP formulae θ to specify sets of plausible strategy
proﬁles, with the intended meaning that Υ collects exactly the proﬁles for
which θ holds. Then, we can embed such an ATLP-based plausibility speciﬁ-
cation in another formula of ATLP.
5.4.3 Plausibility Terms based onATLI
Deﬁnition 27 (LATLPATLI ) Let Ω∗ = {(σ.θ) | θ ∈ LATLI(Agt,Π, {σ[1], . . . ,
σ[k]})}. That is, Ω∗ collects terms of the form (σ.θ), where θ is an ATLI formula
including only references to individual agents’ parts of the strategy proﬁle σ.7 The
language ofATLPATLI is deﬁned as LbaseATLP (Agt,Π,Ω∗).
The idea behind terms of this form is simple. We have an ATLI formula θ,
parameterized with a variable σ that ranges over the set of strategy proﬁles
Σ. Now, we want (σ.θ) to denote exactly the set of proﬁles fromΣ, for which
formula θ holds. However – as σ denotes a strategy proﬁle, and ATLI allows
only to refer to strategies of individual agents – we need a way of addressing
substrategies of σ in θ. This can be done by using ATLI terms σ[i], which are
interpreted as i’s substrategy in σ.
For example, we may assume that a rational agent does not grant the
other agents with too much control over its life: (σ .
∧
a∈Agt((stra σ[a])
¬〈〈Agt \ {a}〉〉deada)). Note that games deﬁned byCGS’s are, in general, not
determined, so the above speciﬁcationdoes not guarantee that each rational
agent can efﬁciently protect her life. It only requires that she should behave
cautiously so that her opponents do not have complete power to kill her.
Deﬁnition 28 (Denotation of ATLI-based plausibility terms) LetM
be a CGS of the formM = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o〉 and Ω∗ be as in Deﬁnition 27.
7σ is the only variable in θ and refers to a strategy proﬁle.
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For each s ∈ Σwe deﬁneMs to be the following CGS with intentions:
Ms = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o, I0,Str, [·]〉
withStra = {σ[a]}, and [σ[a]] = s[a]. We recall from Section 5.3.4 that I0 repre-
sents the full intention relation.
The plausibility mapping for terms from Ω∗ is deﬁned as:
[[σ.θ]]q = {s ∈ Σ |Ms, q |= θ}.
It is now possible to plug in arbitrary ATLI speciﬁcations of rationality,
and reason about their consequences.
Example 29 (Asymmetricmatching pennies ctd.) It seems that explicit
quantiﬁcation over the opponents’ responses (not available in ATLI) is essential to
express undominatedness of strategies (cf. [130] and Section 5.5.3). Still, we can
at least assume that a rational player should avoid playing strategies that guaran-
tee failure if a potentially successful strategy is available. Under this assumption,
player 1 should never play tail, and in consequence player 2 controls the outcome
of the game:
M ′′1 , q0 |= (set-pl σ.
∧
a∈Agt(〈〈Agt〉〉moneya → (stra σ[a])〈〈Agt〉〉moneya))
Pl
(〈〈2〉〉(money1 ∧money2) ∧ 〈〈2〉〉¬(money1 ∧money2)).
where M ′′1 is the CGS M1 extended with propositions p
1
i ≡ moneyi, ATLI-based
plausibility terms, and their denotation according to Deﬁnition 28.
Moreover, if only Pareto optimal strategy proﬁles can be played, then both play-
ers are bound to keep winning money:
M ′′1 , q0 |= (set-pl σ.PO(σ)) Pl 〈〈∅〉〉(¬start → money1 ∧money2).
Finally, restricting plausible strategy proﬁles to Nash equilibria guarantees that
player 2 should plausibly get money, but the outcome of player 1 is not determined:
M ′′1 , q0 |= (set-pl σ.NE(σ)) Pl
(〈〈∅〉〉(¬start → money2)
∧¬〈〈∅〉〉money1 ∧ ¬〈〈∅〉〉¬money1
)
.
Example 30 (Bargaining ctd.) For the bargaining agents and κ = (1 −
δ2)
1−(δ1δ2)
T
2
1−δ1δ2 + (δ1δ2)
T
2 , we have accordingly:
1. M ′2, q0 |= (set-pl σ.NE(σ))Pl 〈〈∅〉〉 (px1 ∧ p1−x2 ) for every x;
2. M ′2, q0 |= (set-pl σ.SPN(σ))Pl 〈〈∅〉〉 (pκ1 ∧ p1−κ2 );
3. M ′2, q0 |= (set-pl σ.SPN(σ))Pl 〈〈∅〉〉(¬px11 ∧ ¬px22 ) for every x1 = κ and
x2 = 1− κ
whereM ′2 is the CGSP obtained from CGSM2 by adding ATLI-based plausibility
terms and their denotation.
Thus, we can encode a game as a CGSM , specify rationality assumptions
with an ATLI formula θ, and ask if a desired property ϕ of the system holds
under these assumptions by model checking (set-pl σ.θ)ϕ inM . Note that
the denotation of plausibility terms in Ω∗ is ﬁxed. We report our results on
the complexity of solving such games in Section 5.6.
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5.4.4 Language LkATLP and L∞ATLP
As we have already explained, our main idea is to use ATLP for both speciﬁ-
cation of rationality assumptions and describtion of the outcome of rational
play. Thus, we need a possibility to embed an ATLP formula ϕ (that deﬁnes
the rationality condition) in a “higher-level” formula of ATLP, as a part of
plausibility term (set-pl σ.ϕ). The reading of (set-pl σ.ϕ)ψ is, again: “Let
the plausibility set consist of proﬁles σ that satisfy ϕ; then, ψ holds”. Apart
from the possibility of nesting formulae via plausibility updates, we also pro-
pose to add quantiﬁer-like structures to the language of terms. Consider, for
example, the term σ1.(∃σ2)ϕ. We would like to collect all strategies s1 such
that there is a strategy s2 for which ϕ holds (we use σi to refer to si). Thus,
σ1.(∃σ2)ϕ is supposed to act in a similar way as the ﬁrst order logic-based set
speciﬁcation {x | ∃y : ϕ(x, y)}. It is easy to see that e.g. the set of all undom-
inated strategies can now be speciﬁed in a straightforward way.
As before, the new version of ATLP is given over a set Agt = {a1, . . . , ak}
of agents, a set Π of propositions, and a set Ω of primitive plausibility terms
(cf. Section 5.3.4). In addition to these sets, we also include a set Var of
strategic variables. Variables in Var range over strategy proﬁles; we need them
to characterize speciﬁc rationality criteria, in away similar to ﬁrst order logic
speciﬁcations.
The deﬁnition of LATLP is given recursively. In each step the structure
of plausibility terms becomes more sophisticated. At ﬁrst, we only consider
terms out ofΩ; their interpretation is given in themodel. On the next level,
we also allow plausibility terms to be quantiﬁed ATLP formulae which con-
tain strategic variables and elements from Ω. Plausibility terms of subse-
quent levels can again be based on terms from the previous levels, and so
forth. In consequence, the core 0-level language of our new ATLP is almost
the same as the base language LbaseATLP deﬁned in Section 5.4.1: It extends it
with simple combinations of terms.
In general, all the levels of the language can be seen as containing ordi-
nary formulae of the original ATLP, the only thing that changes as wemove
to higher levels is the complexity of plausibility terms. We begin with deﬁn-
ing simple combinations of plausibility terms, and then present the hierar-
chy of languages LkATLP , with the underlying idea that LkATLP allows for at
most k (k ∈ N0) nested plausibility updates. The full language LATLP allows
for any arbitrary ﬁnite number of nestings.
Deﬁnition 29 (Strategic combination) LetAgt denote a set of agents and
X be a non-empty set of symbols. We say that y is a strategic combination of x
if it is generated by the following grammar:
y ::= x | 〈y, . . . , y〉 | y[A]
where x ∈ X, 〈y, . . . , y〉 is a vector of length |Agt|, and A ⊆ Agt. The set of
strategic combinations over X is deﬁned by T(X). It is easy to see that operator
T is idempotent (T(X) = T(T(X))).
The intuition is that elements of x ∈ X are symbols in the object lan-
guage that refer to sets of strategy proﬁles, and the elements of T(X) allow to
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combine these sets to new sets.8 Let x refer to a set of strategy proﬁles χ ⊆ Σ.
Then, x[A] refers to all the proﬁles in Σ in whichA’s substrategy agrees with
some proﬁle from χ. Similarly, if x1, . . . , xk denote sets of strategy proﬁles
χ1, . . . , χk, then 〈x1, . . . , xk〉 refers to all the proﬁles that agree on ai’s strat-
egy with at least one proﬁle from χi for each i = 1, . . . , k.
Deﬁnition 30 (LkATLP ) Let Agt be a set of agents,Π a set of propositions, Ω be
a set of primitive plausibility terms, and Var a set of strategic variables (with typ-
ical element σ). The logics LkATLP (Agt,Π,Var,Ω), k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , are recursively
deﬁned as follows:
• L0ATLP (Agt,Π,Var,Ω) = LbaseATLP (Agt,Π,Ω0), where Ω0 = T(Ω);
• LkATLP (Agt,Π,Var,Ω) = LbaseATLP (Agt,Π,Ωk), where:
Ωk = T(Ωk−1 ∪ Ωk),
Ωk = {σ1.(Q2σ2) . . . (Qnσn)ϕ | n ∈ N,∀i (1 ≤ i ≤ n⇒
σi ∈ Var, Qi ∈ {∀,∃}, ϕ ∈ LbaseATLP (Agt,Π, T(Ωk−1
∪{σ1, . . . , σn}))) }.
Thus, plausibility terms on level k (i.e., Ωk) augment terms from the pre-
vious level (Ωk−1) with new terms Ωk that combine quantiﬁcation over strate-
gic variables σ1, . . . σn with formulae possibly containing these strategic variables.
Such terms are used to collect (or describe) speciﬁc strategy proﬁles (referred
to by variable σ1 which plays a distinctive role in comparisonwith the other
variables).
Deﬁnition 31 (LATLP ) The set of ATLP formulae with arbitrary ﬁnite nesting
of plausibility terms is deﬁned by
LATLP = L∞ATLP (Agt,Π,Var,Ω) = lim
k→∞
LkATLP (Agt,Π,Var,Ω).
Deﬁnition 32 (k-formula, k-term) Formula ϕ ∈ L∞ATLP (Agt,Π,Var,Ω) is
called an ATLP k-formula (or simply k-formula) if, and only if,
ϕ ∈ LkATLP (Agt,Π,Var,Ω). Analogously, a plausibility term occurring in a k-
formula is called a k-term.
Remark 17 We use the acronym ATLP to refer to both the full language L∞ATLP
and the basic sublanguage LbaseATLP .
Example 31 (Illustrating plausibility terms in LkATLP ) Belowwe present
some simple formulae illustrating the different levels of our logic.
LbaseATLP : (set-pl ωNE)Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ; group A can enforce γ if only Nash equilibria are
played (we assume that ωNE denotes exactly the set of Nash equilibria in the
model).
L0ATLP : (set-pl 〈ωNE, . . . , ωNE〉)Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ; plausibility terms can be combined.
Note the difference to the previous formula, agents are assumed to play a
strategy which is part of some NE. The resulting strategy proﬁle does not
have to be a Nash equilibrium, though.
8This correspondence will be given formally in Deﬁnition 33 (Section 5.4.5).
129 CHAPTER 5. TEMPORAL PROPERTIES OF RATIONAL PLAY
L1ATLP : ϕ ≡ (set-pl σ.∃σ1ϕ′(σ, σ1))Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ where ϕ′(σ, σ1) is a formula pos-
sibly containing operators (set-pl ω) with ω ∈ T(Ω ∪ {σ, σ1}); e.g. ϕ′ ≡
(set-pl 〈σ, . . . σ, σ1, ωNE〉)Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ′. We will have a closer look at the
(set-pl ·) operator in ϕ. The operator collects all strategies σ such that there
exists another strategy proﬁle σ1 for which Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ′ holds if all but the last
2 agents play according to σ, the second to last agent plays according to σ1,
and the last one according to a ﬁxed strategy out of ωNE.
L2ATLP : Consider the previous formula ϕ again, but this time ϕ′(σ, σ1) can also
contain quantiﬁcation; e.g. ϕ′ ≡ ((set-pl 〈σ, . . . , σ, σ1, ωNE〉)Pl 〈〈B〉〉γ′) →
((set-pl σ′.∃σ′1ϕ′′(σ′, σ′1))Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ)whereϕ′′(σ′, σ′1) is a base formulawith
plausibility terms taken from T(Ω ∪ {σ′, σ′1}).
In the next section we show how the denotation of complex terms is
constructed, and how it is plugged into the semantics of ATLP from Sec-
tion 5.4.2.
5.4.5 Semantics of LkATLP and L∞ATLP
LkATLP does not change the very structure of ATLP formulae, it only extends
LbaseATLP by more ornate plausibility terms. Therefore, it seems natural that
the plausibility mapping for theses terms is of particular interest; the deno-
tation reﬂects the construction of strategic combinations given in Deﬁni-
tion 29.
Deﬁnition 33 (Extended plausibilitymapping [̂[·]]) The extendedplau-
sibility mapping [̂[·]]M with respect to M ∈ CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω) is deﬁned as fol-
lows:
1. If ω ∈ Ω then [̂[ω]]qM = [[ω]]qM ;
2. If ω = ω′[A] then [̂[ω]]
q
M = {s ∈ Σ | ∃s′ ∈ [̂[ω′]]
q
M s|A = s′|A};
3. Ifω = 〈ω1, . . . ωk〉 then [̂[ω]]
q
M = {s ∈ Σ | ∃t1 ∈ [̂[ω1]]
q
M , . . . ,∃tk ∈ [̂[ωk]]
q
M∀i =
1, ..., k s|ai = ti|ai)};
4. If ω = σ1.(Q2σ2) . . . (Qnσn)ϕ then
[̂[ω]]
q
M = {s1 ∈ Σ | Q2s2 ∈ Σ, . . . , Qnsn ∈ Σ (Ms1,...,sn , q |= ϕ)},
whereMs1,...,sn is equal toM except thatwe ﬁxΥMs1,...,sn = Σ,ΩMs1,...,sn =
ΩM ∪ {σ1, . . . , σn}, [[σi]]qMs1,...,sn = {si}, and [[ω]]qMs1,...,sn = [[ω]]qM for all
ω = σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and q ∈ StM . That is, the denotation of σi inMs1,...,sn is
set to strategy proﬁle si.9
Consider, for instance, plausibility term σ1.∀σ2ϕ. The extended plausi-
bility mapping ̂[[σ1.∀σ2ϕ]]q collects all strategy proﬁles s1 ∈ Σ (referred to by
σ1) such that for all strategy proﬁles s2 ∈ Σ (referred to by σ2) ϕ is true in
modelMs1,s2 and state q ∈ St, i.e.Ms1,s2 , q |= ϕ for all s2 ∈ Σ.
9It should be emphasized that modelMs1,...,sn in which plausibility of proﬁle s1 is evalu-
ated does not presuppose any notion of plausibility, i.e.,ΥMs1,...,sn = Σ.
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Remark 18 Note that if the language includes a term ω that refers to all strat-
egy proﬁles, then x[A] can be expressed as 〈ω1, . . . , ωk〉, where ωa = xa for a ∈ A,
and ωa = ω otherwise. We also observe that in LkATLP , k > 0, ω can be ex-
pressed as σ..
In Deﬁnition 25 we deﬁned the semantics of the base language of ATLP.
Truth of LkATLP formulae is deﬁned in the same way, we only need to re-
place the previous (simple) plausibilitymapping by the extended one in the
semantics of plausibility updates.
Deﬁnition 34 (Semantics of LkATLP and L∞ATLP ) The semantics forLATLP
formulae is given as in Deﬁnition 25 with the extended plausibility mapping [̂[·]]M
used instead of [[·]]M . I.e., only the semantic clauses for (set-pl ω)ϕ and
(refn-pl ω)ϕ change as follows:
M, q |=B (set-pl ω)ϕ iffM ′, q |=B ϕ where the new modelM ′ is equal toM but
the new setΥM ′ of plausible strategy proﬁles is set to [̂[ω]]
q
M ;
M, q |=B (refn-pl ω)ϕ iff M ′, q |=B ϕ where the new model M ′ is equal to M
but the new setΥM ′ of plausible strategy proﬁles is set toΥM ∩ [̂[ω]]
q
M .
Remark 19 By a slight abuse of notation, we will refer to the extended plausibil-
ity mapping with the same symbol as to the simple plausibility mapping, i.e., with
[[·]].
We will discuss some important examples of LATLP formulae and terms
(together with their interpretation) in Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 where ATLP
characterizations of solution concepts are presented.
5.5 Properties of ATLP
This section contains our main conceptual results. We show:
1. That several logics can be embedded into ATLP by means of polyno-
mial translation of models and/or formulae (Section 5.5.1),
2. That several classical solution concepts for extensive games (Nash equi-
libria, subgameperfectNash equilibria, ParetoOptimality), canbe char-
acterized in ATLP already in the language L1ATLP (Section 5.5.2),
3. That these solution concepts can be also re-formulated in a qualita-
tive way, through appropriate formulae of ATLP parameterized by ATL
path formulae (Section 5.5.3).
5.5.1 Embedding Existing Logics into ATLP
In this section, we compare ATLP with several related logics and show their
formal relationships. To this end, we ﬁrst deﬁne notions that allow to com-
pare expressivity of logical systems. Embedding takes place on the level of
satisfaction relations (|=): Logic L1 embeds L2 if models and formulae of L2
can be simulated in L1 in a truth-preserving way. Subsumption refers to the
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level of valid sentences: L1 subsumesL2 if all the validities ofL2 are validities
of L1 as well.
Deﬁnition 35 (Embedding) LogicL1 embeds logicL2 iff there is a transla-
tion tr of L2 formulae into formulae of L1, and a transformationTR of L2 models
into models of L1, such thatM, q |=L2 ϕ iff TR(M), q |=L1 tr(ϕ) for every pointed
modelM, q and formula ϕ of L2.
Note that the translation of formulae and transformation of models are
supposed to be independent. This prevents translation schemes that trans-
form triples M, q |= ϕ in L2 to M ′, q |= , and triples M, q |= ϕ in L2 to
M ′, q |= ⊥ (with an arbitrary modelM ′), that would yield embeddings be-
tween any pair of logics.
It is important to point out that all the transformation and translation
schemes proposed in this section can be computed in polynomial time and
incur only polynomial increase in the size of models and the length of for-
mulae. Thus, we are in fact interested in polynomial embeddings of logics in
ATLP.
Deﬁnition 36 (Subsumption) LogicL1 subsumes logicL2 iff the set of va-
lidities of L1 subsumes validities of L2.
Proposition 48 ATLP embeds ATL.
Proof We use the identity translation of formulae: tr(ϕ) ≡ ϕ. As for models,
TR(M) = M ′ that extendsM with an arbitrary set of plausible strategy pro-
ﬁlesΥ. It is easy to see that the plausibility assumptionsΥ will never be used
in the evaluation of ϕ since ϕ includes no Pl operators. Thus, the result of
the evaluation will be the same as forM, q |= ϕ. 
The above reasoning implies also that ATL validities hold for all ATLP
models.
Corollary 5 ATLP subsumes ATL.
The relationship of ATLP to most other logics can be studied only in the
context of embedding, as they use differentmodal operators (and thus yield
incomparable sets of valid formulae). We begin with embedding “ATL with
Intentions” [85] in ATLP. Then, we show that “CTL with Plausibility”
from [25] can be embedded in ATLP for a limited (but very natural) class of
models. Finally, we propose an embedding of the two existing versions of
Game Logic with Preferences [137, 138] which allow to reason about what
can happen under particular game-theoretical rationality assumptions.
Proposition 49 ATLP embeds ATLI.
Proof sketch For an ATLI model M = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o, I,Str, [·]〉, we
construct the corresponding concurrent game structure with plausibility
TR(M) = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o,Υ,Ω, [[·]]〉 with the set of plausible proﬁles
Υ = {s ∈ Σ | s is consistent with I}, plausibility terms Ω = {ωσ | σ ∈ Str} ∪
{ω}, and their denotation [[ω]]q = Σ and [[ωσ]]q = {s ∈ Σ | s|a = [σ]} for
each σ ∈ Stra.
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For an ATLI formulaϕ, we construct its ATLP translation by transforming
strategic assumptions (about agents’ intentions) imposed by (stra σ) to plau-
sibility assumptions (about strategy proﬁles that can be plausibly played)
deﬁned by (set-pl ωσ) and applying them to the appropriate set of agents
(i.e., those for whom strategic assumptions have been deﬁned). Formally,
the translation is deﬁned as tr(ϕ) = Pl tr〈ω,...,ω〉(ϕ), where tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉 is
deﬁned as follows:
tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(p) = p,
tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(¬ϕ) = ¬tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(ϕ),
tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(ϕ1) ∧ tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(ϕ2),
tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(〈〈A〉〉 ϕ) = 〈〈A〉〉 tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉(ϕ),
(for 〈〈A〉〉ϕ and 〈〈A〉〉ϕ1 U ϕ2 analogously)
tr〈ω1,...,ωk〉((stra σ
′
a)ϕ) = (set-pl
−→ω )tr−→ω (ϕ),
where −→ω = 〈ω1, . . . , ωσ′a , . . . , ωk〉.
Note that, for “vanilla” ATLI, 〈〈A〉〉γ holds iff γ can be enforced against
every response strategy from Agt \ A. Thus, e.g.,M, q |=ATLI (stra σa)〈〈A〉〉p iff
TR(M), q |=ATLP Pl (set-pl 〈ω, . . . , ωσa , . . . , ω〉)〈〈A〉〉p, and analogously
for the other cases. 
CTLP, i.e., “CTLwith Plausibility” [25], is an extension of the branching-
time logic CTL with a similar notion of plausibility as the one we use here.
The main difference lies in the fact that CTLP formulae refer to plausible
paths rather than strategy proﬁles.
Proposition 50 ATLP embeds CTLP in the class of transition systems.
Proof sketch To transform models, we ﬁrst observe that every transition sys-
temM can be seen as a concurrent game structure that includes only a sin-
gle agent a1. Furthermore, we can transformM to a CGSP TR(M) by adding
Υ = Σ and Ω = ∅ (cf. Section 5.4.1). To translate CTLP formulae, we use the
scheme below:
tr(ϕ) = tr(set-pl σ.)(ϕ),
trω(p) = p,
trω(¬ϕ) = ¬trω(ϕ),
trω(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = trω(ϕ1) ∧ trω(ϕ2),
trω(Eγ) = 〈〈Agt〉〉trω(γ),
trω( ϕ) = trω(ϕ) (forϕ and ϕ1 U ϕ2 analogously);
trω(Plϕ) = (set-pl ω)Pl trω(ϕ),
trω(Phϕ) = Ph trω(ϕ),
trω((set-pl γ)ϕ) = trω′(ϕ),
where ω′ = σ.(set-pl σ)Pl 〈〈∅〉〉γ.
Now,M, q |=CTLP ϕ iffM, q |=ATLP tr(ϕ).
Note that we cannot use the above construction for arbitrary models of
CTLP, as not every set of (plausible) paths can be obtained by memoryless
strategy proﬁles. 
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Proposition 51 ATLP cannot be polynomially embedded in neither ATL, nor
ATLI, nor CTLP.
Proof Suppose that any of these logics polynomially embeds ATLP. Then,
the embedding provides a polynomial reduction of model checking from
ATLP to that logic. Since model checking of ATL, ATLI, and CTLP can be
done in polynomial deterministic time [8, 85, 25], we get that the problem
forATLP is inP, too. Butmodel checkingATLP isΔP3 -hard already forLbaseATLP
(see Section 5.6). 
There is not much work on logical descriptions of behaviour of agents
under rationality assumptions based on game-theoretical solution concepts.
In fact, we know only of one such logic for agents with perfect information,
which is GLP from [138]. There, agents can be assumed qualitative prefer-
ences (i.e., a propositional formula ϕ0 that they supposedly want to make
eventually true). Moreover, they are assumed to play rationally in the sense
that if theyhave some strategies that guaranteeϕ0, they canuse only those
strategies in their play. Interestingly enough, the preference criterion was
different in a preliminary version ofGLP [137], where it was based on the no-
tion of Nash equilibrium. Both versions of GLP can be embedded in ATLP.
One may embed game logics with other preference criteria in an analogous
way.
Proposition 52 GLP can be embedded in ATLP.
Proof sketch For the translation ofmodels, we transform game trees of GLP to
concurrent game structures using the construction from Section 5.3.3, and
transform the CGS to CGSP by taking Υ = Σ and Ω = ∅. Then, we use the
following translation of GLP formulae:
tr(ϕ) = Pl tr(set-pl σ.)(ϕ),
trω(p) = p, trω(¬ϕ) = ¬trω(ϕ), trω(ϕ ∨ ψ) = trω(ϕ) ∨ trω(ψ),
trω(ϕ0) = 〈〈∅〉〉ϕ0,
trω([a : ϕ0]ψ) = (set-pl ω′)trω′(ψ),
where ω′ = σ.Pl (set-pl ω)〈〈∅〉〉(plausible(σ) ∧ prefers(a, σ, ϕ0))
plausible(σ) ≡ (refn-pl σ)〈〈Agt〉〉 
prefers(a, σ, ϕ0) ≡ 〈〈a〉〉ϕ0 → (refn-pl σ[a])〈〈∅〉〉ϕ0.
That is, with each subsequent preference operator [a : ϕ0], only those from
the (currently) plausible strategy proﬁles are selected that are preferred by
a. The preference is based on the (subgame perfect) enforceability of the
outcomeϕ0 at the end of the game: ifϕ0 can be enforced at all, then a prefers
strategies that do enforce it.
Now, we have that Γ |=GLP ϕ iff TR(Γ), ∅ |=ATLP tr(ϕ).10 
Proposition 53 Preliminary GLP can be embedded in ATLP.
10Again, ∅ denotes the position with empty history, i.e., the initial state of the game.
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Proof Analogous to Proposition 52. The translation only differs in the char-
acterization of agents’ preferences. The agents are now assumed to stick to
their individual parts of Nash equilibria deﬁned by a zero-sum game where
awins iff ϕ0 is enforced:11
ω′ = σ.∃σ′Pl (set-pl ω)〈〈∅〉〉(
plausible(σ) ∧NE(σ′, a, ϕ0) ∧ coincides(σ, σ′, a)
)
plausible(σ) ≡ (refn-pl σ)〈〈Agt〉〉 
coincides(σ, σ′, a) ≡ (set-pl σ[a])(refn-pl σ′[a])〈〈Agt〉〉 
NE(σ, a, ϕ0) ≡
∧
i∈Agt
BRi(σ, a, ϕ0),
BRi(σ, a, ϕ0) ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
(refn-pl σ[Agt \ {i}])〈〈i〉〉ϕ0
→ (refn-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉ϕ0 for i = a
(refn-pl σ[Agt \ {i}])〈〈i〉〉¬ϕ0
→ (refn-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉¬ϕ0 i = a

A couple other logics were deﬁned for various solution concepts with re-
spect to incomplete information games [136, 135]. We do not study them
here, since our framework lacks the notions of knowledge and uncertainty –
but it seems a promising area of future research.
Remark 20 We have presented embeddings of several quite different logics into
ATLP, which suggests substantial gain in expressive power. Most of them (ATL,
ATLI, and CTLP) are embedded already in the lowest levels of the ATLP hierarchy
(i.e., LbaseATLP or L1ATLP with no quantiﬁers). GLP formulae with at most k prefer-
ence operators are embedded in LkATLP , which is inevitable given their semantics
that combines model update and irrevocable strategic quantiﬁcation (cf. the dis-
cussion and the complexity results in [2, 21]).
5.5.2 Classical Solution Concepts in L1ATLP
In Section 5.3.3 we showed how extensive games Γ (with a ﬁnite set of util-
ities) can be expressed by CGS’s: each Γ can be transformed in a CGSM(Γ)
such that they correspond (in the sense of Deﬁnition 15).
The following terms rewrite the speciﬁcation of best response proﬁles,
Nash equilibria, and the speciﬁcation of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
from Section 5.3.4. Note that the new speciﬁcations use only ATLP opera-
tors.
BRTa (σ) ≡ (set-pl σ[Agt \ {a}])Pl
∧
v∈U
(
(〈〈a〉〉Tpva) → (set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva
)
NET (σ) ≡
∧
a∈Agt
BRTa (σ)
SPNT (σ) ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉NET (σ)
11Note the similarity of the scheme below to the characterization of qualitative Nash equilib-
rium in Section 5.5.3.
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Recalling brieﬂy the ideas behind the above speciﬁcations,BRTa (σ)holds
iff σ[a] is the best response to σ[Agt \ {a}]. That is, after we ﬁx the Agt \ {a}’s
collective strategy to σ[Agt \ {a}], agent a cannot obtain a better tempo-
ral pattern of payoffs than by playing σ[a]. Then, σ is a Nash equilibrium if
each individual strategy s[a] is the best response to the opponent’s strategies
σ[Agt \ {a}] (cf. [111]). The formalization of a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium is straightforward: We require proﬁle σ to be a Nash equilibrium in all
reachable states (seen as initial positions of particular subgames).
The following propositions are simple adaptations of the results from
Section 5.3.4.
Proposition 54 Let Γ be an extensive game with a ﬁnite set of utilities. Then
the following holds:
1. s ∈ [[σ.NE(σ)]]∅M(Γ) iff s is a Nash equilibrium in Γ.
2. s ∈ [[σ.SPN(σ)]]∅M(Γ) iff s is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in Γ.
In Section 5.3.4 we deﬁned a quantitative version of Pareto optimality for-
mulated in ATLI. However, as we pointed out, the ATLI formula had expo-
nential length and some counterintuitive implications. Quantiﬁcation al-
lows to propose a more compact and intuitive speciﬁcation:
POT (σ) ≡ ∀σ′ Pl
( ∧
a∈Agt
∧
v∈U
(
(set-pl σ′)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva → (set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva
) ∨
∨
a∈Agt
∨
v∈U
(
(set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva ∧ ¬(set-pl σ′)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva
))
.
This deﬁnition of Pareto optimality is more intuitive than the one given
in Section 5.3.4 because it does not focus on temporal evolution of whole
payoff proﬁles, but rather on the interaction between temporal patterns of
individual patterns.
Proposition 55 Let Γ be an extensive game with a ﬁnite set of utilities. Then:
s ∈ [[σ.PO(σ)]]∅M(Γ) iff s is Pareto optimal in Γ.
Let 〈xA, yAgt\A〉 be a shorthand for the term 〈z1, . . . , zk〉 with za = x for
a ∈ A and za = y otherwise. The following speciﬁcation, formulated as
an L1ATLP formula, characterizes the set of strategy proﬁles that include un-
dominated strategies for agent a:
UNDOM T (σ) ≡ ∀σ1∀σ2∃σ3
Pl
( ∧
v∈U
(
(set-pl 〈σ{a}1 , σAgt\{a}2 〉)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva → (set-pl 〈σ{a}, σAgt\{a}2 〉)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva
)
∨
∨
v∈U
(
(set-pl 〈σ{a}, σAgt\{a}3 〉)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva ∧ ¬(set-pl 〈σ{a}1 , σAgt\{a}3 〉)〈〈∅〉〉Tpva
))
.
Proposition 56 Let Γ be an extensive game with a ﬁnite set of utilities. Then
s ∈ [[σ.UNDOM(σ)]]∅M(Γ) iff s|a is undominated in Γ.
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5.5.3 General Solution Concepts in L1ATLP
In this section, we return to the idea of general solution concepts from Sec-
tion 5.3.5 and show how qualitative versions of NE, SPN, PO and UNDOM
can be captured in ATLP. Like for temporalized solution concepts, it turns
out that their qualitative counterparts can be already speciﬁed in
L1ATLP (Agt,Π, ∅). That is, we need only one level of nested plausibility up-
dates (and no “hardwired” plausibility terms) to effectively capture classical
notions of rationality and extend them tomore general games that we study
in this paper.
Weonly consider one “winning condition”per agent to represent agents’
preferences, but this view can be naturally extended to full preference lists,
as in Section 3.5. In what follows, let −→η = 〈η1, . . . , ηk〉 be a vector of LATL
path formulae.
Deﬁnition 37 (Transforming a CGSP into a NFGame) Let M ∈
CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω) and q ∈ StM . The associated NF game S(M,−→η , q) with re-
spect to−→η is given as in Deﬁnition 18 withM interpreted as a pure CGS by remov-
ingΥ and [[·]] from it.
Our aim is to deﬁne analogues of classical solution concepts (Nash equi-
libria and such) that are based on explicit “winning conditions” ηi instead
of numerical payoffs. We can build on our results from the previous section;
we only need to replace temporal patterns of payoffs with the formulae ηi:
BR
−→η
a (σ) ≡ (set-pl σ[Agt\{a}])Pl
(〈〈a〉〉ηa → (set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉ηa)
NE
−→η (σ) ≡
∧
a∈Agt
BR
−→η
a (σ)
SPN
−→η (σ) ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉NE−→η (σ)
PO
−→η (σ) ≡ ∀σ′ Pl
( ∧
a∈Agt
((set-pl σ′)〈〈∅〉〉ηa → (set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉ηa) ∨
∨
a∈Agt
((set-pl σ)〈〈∅〉〉ηa ∧ ¬(set-pl σ′)〈〈∅〉〉ηa
)
.
UNDOM
−→η (σ) ≡ ∀σ1∀σ2∃σ3 Pl((
(set-pl 〈σ{a}1 , σAgt\{a}2 〉)〈〈∅〉〉ηa → (set-pl 〈σ{a}, σAgt\{a}2 〉)〈〈∅〉〉ηa
)
∨ ((set-pl 〈σ{a}, σAgt\{a}3 〉)〈〈∅〉〉ηa ∧ ¬(set-pl 〈σ{a}1 , σAgt\{a}3 〉)〈〈∅〉〉ηa)).
The intuitions behind these concepts are the same as in the quantitative
case. Note thatwedidnothave to include the big conjunctions/disjunctions
over all possible utility values in the case of Pareto optimal and undomi-
nated strategies. This is because the corresponding NF game can be seen as a
game with only two possible outcomes per agent.
The following proposition shows that NE
−→η , PO
−→η , and UNDOM
−→η in-
deed extend the classical notions of Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimal strat-
egy proﬁle, and undominated strategy.
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(B)
η1\η2 shh sht sth stt
shh 1,1 0, 0 0, 1 0, 1
sht 0, 0 0, 1 0, 1 0, 1
sth 0, 1 0, 1 1,1 0, 0
stt 0, 1 0, 1 0, 0 0, 1
Figure 5.7: “Extendedmatching pennies”: (A) CGSM3; again, action proﬁle
xy refers to action x played by player 1 and action y played by 2. (B) Strategies
and their outcomes for η1 ≡ (¬start → money1), η2 ≡ money2. Pareto op-
timal proﬁles are indicated with bold font, Nash equilibria with grey back-
ground.
Proposition 57
1. The set ofNash equilibrium strategies inS(M,−→η , q) is given by [[σ.NE−→η (σ)]]qM .
2. The set of Pareto optimal strategies in S(M,−→η , q) is given by [[σ.PO−→η (σ)]]qM .
3. The set of a’s undominated strategies in S(M,−→η , q) is given by(
[[σ.UNDOM
−→η (σ)]]qM
)|a.
Subgame perfect Nash equilibria cannot be directly related to normal
form games, but we can state the following.
Proposition 58 Let St′ be the set of states reachable from q in M . Then,
[[σ.SPNη(σ)]]qM =
⋂
q∈St′ [[σ.NE
η(σ)]]qM .
Example 32 (Extendedmatching pennies) In Figure 5.7 we consider a
slightly more complex version of the asymmetric matching pennies game pre-
sented in Figure 5.5. The new game consists of two phases (played ad inﬁnitum).
Firstly, player 1 wins some money if the sides of the pennies match, otherwise the
money goes to player 2. In the second phase, both win a prize if both show heads; if
they both show tails, only player 2wins. If they show different sides, nobody wins.
We denote particular strategies as sα1α2 , where α1 is the action played at state
q0, and α2 is the action played at states q1, q2 (it is not necessary to consider strate-
gies that specify different actions in q1 and q2, since the outgoing transitions in
q2 are exact copies of those in q1). Note that every combination of strategies (i.e.,
every strategy proﬁle) determines a single temporal path. For example, if agent 1
plays sht and agent 2 plays stt, then they both ensure the (inﬁnite) temporal path
q0q2q5q0q2q5 . . .
Let us additionally assume that the winning conditions are: η1 ≡ (¬start →
money1) for player 1 and η2 ≡ money2 for player 2. That is, agent 1 is only
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happy if she gets money all the time (whenever possible). Agent 2 is more mini-
malistic: it is sufﬁcient for him to win money once, sometime in the future. So,
for instance, the play that results from strategy proﬁle 〈sht, stt〉 satisﬁes the second
player, but not the ﬁrst one. This way, it is easy to construct a table of binary pay-
offs that indicates which strategy proﬁles are “winning” for whom, like the table in
Figure 5.7B. Now, we can for instance observe that proﬁle 〈sht, stt〉 is a Nash equi-
librium (player 1 cannotmake herself happy by unilaterally changing her strategy),
but it is not Pareto optimal (〈shh, shh〉 and 〈sth, sth〉 yield strictly better payoff pro-
ﬁles). As before, the CGS M3 in Figure 5.7A can be seen as a CGSP by adding
Υ = Σ and Ω = ∅. Now, we have that:
• [[σ.NEη1,η2(σ)]]q0M3 = {〈shh, shh〉, 〈shh, stt〉, 〈sht, sht〉, 〈sht, stt〉, 〈sth, sht〉,〈sth, sth〉, 〈stt, sht〉, 〈stt, stt〉}, and
• [[σ.POη1,η2(σ)]]q0M3 = {〈shh, shh〉, 〈sth, sth〉}.
Suppose that agent 1 wants money always, and 2 wants money eventually,
and only Pareto optimal Nash equilibria are played. Then, agent 1 is bound to
get money at the beginning of each round of the game. Formally:
M3, q0 |= (set-pl σ.NEη1,η2(σ))(refn-pl σ.POη1,η2(σ))Pl (start → 〈〈∅〉〉 money1).
In ATLP, we can also describe relationships between different solution
concepts in a CGS. For example, in the “extendedmatching pennies” game,
all Pareto optimal proﬁles happen to be inNash equilibrium,which is equiv-
alent to the following formula:
(set-pl σ.POη1,η2(σ))(refn-pl σ.¬NEη1,η2(σ))Pl¬〈〈Agt〉〉 ,
and the formula does indeed hold inM3, q0.
5.6 Model Checking ATLP
In this sectionwediscuss themodel checking complexity ofATLP. Themodel
checking problem refers to the question whether a given formula holds in a
given model and state. The size of the input is usually measured in the
number of transitions in the model (m) and the length of the formula (l).
Note that the problem of checking ATLPwith respect to the size of thewhole
CGSP (including the plausibility set Υ), is trivially linear in the size of the
model: The model size is exponential with respect to the number of states and
transitions. Hence, model checking CGSP’s does not make sense if the set
of plausible strategies is stored explicitly. The set should be stored implic-
itly; for instance, by means of some decision procedure. We will assume
throughout this section that the plausibility setΥ does not discriminate any
strategy proﬁles (i.e., all strategy proﬁles are initially plausible), and actual
plausibility assumptions must be speciﬁed in the object language through
(simple or complex) plausibility terms.
The same remark applies to the denotations of primitive (“hard-wired”)
plausibility terms. In this respect, we will consider two subclasses of CGSP’s
in which the representation of plausibility assumptions of plausibility as-
sumptions does not overwhelm the complexity of the rest of the input –
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namely, pure concurrent game structures and so called “well-behaved”
CGSP’s. In pure CGS’s, plausibility terms and their denotations are simply
absent. In well-behaved CGS’s, we put a limit on the complexity of the plau-
sibility check, i.e., the computational resources needed to determinewhether
a given strategy is plausible according to a given plausibility term and plau-
sibility mapping.
Deﬁnition 38 (CGS as CGSP) As before, we will take each CGS to be an im-
plicit representation of CGSP where all strategy proﬁles are initially plausible (Υ =
Σ) and there are no “hardwired” plausibility terms (Ω = ∅).
Deﬁnition 39 (Well-Behaved CGSP) ACGSPM is calledwell-behaved if,
and only if,
1. ΥM = Σ: all the strategy proﬁles are plausible inM ;
2. There is anNP-algorithm (with respect to l andm) which determineswhether
s ∈ [[ω]]qM for every state q ∈ StM , strategy proﬁle s ∈ Σ, and plausibility
term ω ∈ Ω.
Remark 21 We note that, if a list (or several alternative lists) of plausible strat-
egy proﬁles is given explicitly in the model (via the plausibility setΥ and/or the
denotations of abstract plausibility terms ω from Section 5.4), then the problem of
guessing an appropriate strategy from such a list is inNP (memoryless strategies
have polynomial size with respect tom). Consequently, we assume that, if such a
list is given explicitly, that it is stored outside the model.
Webegin our studywith the complexity ofmodel checking the basic lan-
guage LbaseATLP in Section 5.6.1. Then, we investigate the complexity for the
intermediate languageLATLPATLI (Section 5.6.2). It turns out that the prob-
lem is in both casesΔP3 -complete in general, which seems in line with ex-
isting results on the complexity of solving games. In particular, it is known
that if both players in a 2-player imperfect information game have imperfect
recall, and chance moves are allowed, then the problem of ﬁnding a max-
min pure strategy is ΣP2 -complete [89].12 That is, there are established re-
sults within game theory which show that reasoning about the outcome of
a game where the strategies of both parties are restricted cannot be easier
than ΣP2 (resp. ΔP3 when nesting of game speciﬁcations is allowed). In the
light of this, our complexity results are not as pessimistic as they seem, es-
pecially as ATLP allows speciﬁcation of muchmore diverse restrictions than
those imposed by imperfect information in 2-player turn-based games.13
Moreover, we show in Sections 5.6.1 and5.6.2 thatmodel checkingLbaseATLP
andLATLPATLI isΔP2 -complete if only theproponents’ strategies are restricted.
This, again, corresponds to some well-knownNP-hardness results for solv-
ing extensive games with imperfect information and recall [28, 48, 89].
Finally, in Section5.6.3we study themodel checking complexity ofLkATLP
and L∞ATLP . We summarize the results in Section 5.6.4.
12Note that strategic operators can be nested in an ATLP formula, thus specifying a sequence
of games, with the outcome of each game depending on the previous ones—and solving such
games requires adaptive calls to aΣP2 oracle.
13In particular, imperfect information strategies (sometimes called uniform strategies) can be
characterized in ATLP for a relevant subclass of models, cf. Section 5.6.1.
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functionmcheckATLP(M, q, ϕ);
Model checking ATLP: the main function.
 Returnmcheck(M, q, ϕ, ∅, ∅);
functionmcheck(M, q, ϕ,−→ω ,B);
Returns “true” iffϕ plausibly holds inM, q. The current plausibility assumptions are speciﬁed by a sequence
−→ω = [〈ω1, q1〉, . . . , 〈ωn, qn〉] of plausibility terms with interpretation points. The set of agents which are
assumed to play rational are denoted byB.
cases ϕ ≡ p, ϕ ≡ ¬ψ, ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 : proceed as usual;
case ϕ ≡ (set-pl ω′)ψ : return(mcheck(M, q, ψ, [〈ω′, q〉], B));
case ϕ ≡ (refn-pl ω′)ψ : return(mcheck(M, q, ψ,−→ω ⊕ 〈ω′, q〉, B));
case ϕ ≡ Pl Aψ : return(mcheck(M, q, ψ,−→ω ,A));
case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 ψ, where ψ includes some 〈〈B〉〉 : Label all q′ ∈ St, in which
mcheck(M, q, ψ,−→ω ,B) returns “true”, with a new proposition yes. Return
mcheck(M, q, 〈〈A〉〉 yes,−→ω ,B);
case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 ψ, where ψ includes no 〈〈C〉〉 : Remove all operators Pl , Ph ,
(set-pl ·) from ψ (they are irrelevant, as no cooperation modality comes fur-
ther), yielding ψ′. Return solve(M, q, 〈〈A〉〉 ψ′,−→ω ,B);
cases 〈〈A〉〉ψ and 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2 : analogously ;
end case
function solve(M, q, ϕ,−→ω ,B);
Returns “true” iff ϕ holds inM, q under plausibility assumptions speciﬁed by −→ω and applied to B. We as-
sume thatϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ, whereψ is a propositional formula, i.e., it includes no 〈〈B〉〉,Pl ,Ph , (set-pl ·).
 Label all q′ ∈ St, in which ψ holds, with a new proposition yes;
 Guess a strategy proﬁle s;
 if plausiblestrat(s,M,−→ω ,B)
then return( not beatable(s[A],M, q, 〈〈A〉〉yes,−→ω ,B));
else return( false);
Figure 5.8: Model checking ATLP
5.6.1 Model Checking LbaseATLP
In this section we show that model checking LbaseATLP isΔP3 -complete in gen-
eral, andΔP2 -complete when only the proponents’ strategies are restricted.
Moreover, model checking LbaseATLP over rectangular models and models with
bounded plausibility sets can be done in polynomial time.
Model Checking LbaseATLP : Upper Bounds
Well-behaved CGSP. A detailed algorithm for model checking LbaseATLP
formulae in well- behaved concurrent game structures with plausibility is
presented in Figure 5.8. Apart from modelM , state q, and formula ϕ to be
checked, the input includes a plausibility speciﬁcation vector −→ω and a set
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function beatable(sA,M, q, 〈〈A〉〉γ,−→ω ,B);
Returns “true” iff the opponents can beat sA so that it does not enforce γ inM, q under plausibility assump-
tions speciﬁed by−→ω and imposed on B. The path formula γ is of the form ψ,ψ,ψ U ψ′ with proposi-
tionalψ,ψ′.
 Guess a strategy proﬁle t;
 if plausiblestrat(t,M,−→ω ,B) and t|A = sA then
− M ′ := “trim”M , removing all transitions that cannot occur when t|B is
executed;
− return(mcheckCTL(M ′, q,¬Aγ));
else return( false);
function plausiblestrat(s,M,−→ω ,B);
Checks whetherB’s part of strategy proﬁle s is part of some proﬁle in
⋂
〈ω,q〉∈−→ω [[ω]]
q
M .
 return true if s|B ∈ ⋂〈ω,q〉∈−→ω [[ω]]qM |B ; and false otherwise.
Figure 5.9: Model checking ATLP, ctd.
B of agents which are assumed to play rationally. The plausibility vector−→ω = [〈ω1, q1〉, . . . , 〈ωn, qn〉] is a sequence of plausibility terms together with
states at which the terms are evaluated; this is because we need to keep track
of applications of the reﬁnement operators (refn-pl ·). The intuition is that
the vector represents the incremental plausibility updates. Moreover, by
[〈ω1, q1〉, . . . , 〈ωn, qn〉]⊕〈ω, q〉wedenote the vector [〈ω1, q1〉, . . . , 〈ωn, qn〉, 〈ω, q〉].
CTL model checking is linear in the number of transitions in the model
and the length of the formula [30], so as long as plausiblestrat(s,M, q, ω,B)
can be computed in polynomial time, we get thatmcheckATLP runs in time
ΔP3 , i.e., the algorithm can be implemented as a deterministic Turing Ma-
chinemaking adaptive calls to an oracle of rangeΣP2 = NP
NP. In fact, it suf-
ﬁces to require that plausiblestrat(s,M, q, ω,B) can be computed in nonde-
terministic polynomial time, as the witness for plausiblestrat can be guessed
together with the strategy proﬁle s in function solve, and with the strategy
proﬁle t in function beatable, respectively. The intersection of plausibility
terms can also be neglected as the vector of plausibility terms can contain
at most l terms (length of the formula). Schematically, we can describe the
main part of the algorithm by ∃s¬(∃t): s is guessed ﬁrst, then t is guessed
(and its answer is negated, so we have ∃s∀t). This schematic view will be
useful in Section 5.6.3 to give an intuition about the complexity of nested
formulae together with quantiﬁcation over strategic terms.
Proposition 59 Let M be a well-behaved CGSP, q a state in M , and ϕ a for-
mula of LbaseATLP (Agt,Π,Ω). ThenM, q |= ϕ iffmcheckATLP(M, q, ϕ). The algo-
rithm runs in timeΔP3 with respect to the number of transitions in the model and
the length of the formula.
Proof in Appendix 5.11.1.
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Note that the requirement that the set of plausible strategies is given by
Σ is not a real restriction. Speciﬁc plausibility speciﬁcation can always be set
using operator (set-pl ·), by adding a new plausibility term that denotes the
desired set of strategy proﬁles. The only restriction is that inclusion in the
set must be veriﬁable in nondeterministic polynomial time.
Finally, weobserve that the complexity canbe improved if only the strate-
gies of the proponents are restricted.
Proposition 60 Let γ be an LbaseATLP path formula without cooperation modal-
ities. Then the model checking problem for formulae of the form PlA〈〈A〉〉γ is in
ΔP2 (instead ofΔ
P
3 ).
Proof sketch We consider the case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 ψ, where ψ includes no 〈〈C〉〉.
In solve a plausible strategy sA for A is guessed (NP-call). Then, in function
beatable the model is directly trimmed according to sA (without guessing
another proﬁle t) and the CTL model checking algorithm is executed. In
this case, function beatable can be executed in polynomial time. 
Corollary 6 Let ϕ ∈ LbaseATLP . If for each cooperation modality 〈〈A〉〉 occurring
in ϕ it is speciﬁed that only agents A′ where A′ ⊆ A play plausibly then model
checking is inΔP2 .
PureCGS. This is a somewhat degenerate case because inLbaseATLP only prim-
itive plausibility terms can be used. With no such terms, (set-pl ·) and
(refn-pl ·) operators cannot be used, so all strategy proﬁles will be con-
sidered plausible in the evaluation of every subformula. In consequence,
modelLbaseATLP (Agt,Π, ∅) can be done in the sameway as for ATL. Sincemodel
checking ATL lies inP [8] we get the following result.
Proposition 61 Let M be a CGS, q a state in M , and ϕ ∈ LbaseATLP (Agt,Π, ∅).
Model checking ϕ in M, q is in P with respect to the number of transitions in the
model and the length of the formula.
Proof Remove all PlA operators from ϕ and check whether M ′q, |=ATL ϕ
whereM ′ is the CGS obtained fromM by leaving outΥ,Ω, and [[·]]. 
SpecialClassesofModels. Wewill nowconsider the special case inwhich
each plausibility term refers to at most polynomially many strategies.
Deﬁnition 40 (BoundedModelsMc) Given a ﬁxed constant c ∈ Nwe con-
sider the class Mc ⊆ CGSP (Agt,Π,Ω) of models such that for all M ∈ Mc,
ω ∈ ΩM , and q ∈ StM it holds that |[[ω]]qM | ≤ lc ·mc where l (resp. m) denotes the
length of the input formula (resp. number of transitions ofM ).
Proposition 62 Let c ∈ N be a constant. Model checkingLbaseATLP formulae with
respect to the class of well-behaved boundedmodelsMc can be done in polynomial
time with respect to the number of transitions in the model and the length of the
formula.
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Proof in Appendix 5.11.1.
Even with arbitrarily many strategies the complexity can be improved if
the set of plausible proﬁles has a speciﬁc structure, namely if the set can be
(and is) represented in a rectangular way. Intuitively, such a set of proﬁles
can be represented by behavioral constraints [132]. That is, we restrict the
actions that can be performed independently for each state and agent, and
then consider all strategy proﬁles generated from the constrained repertoire
of actions.
Deﬁnition 41 (Rectangularity,Mrect) Let Sa ⊆ Σa be a set of strategies of
agent a. We say thatSa is rectangular if it is represented by a function d′a : StM →
2Act such that for all states q ∈ StM it holds that d′a(q) ⊆ da(q); then, Sa is taken
to be the set {sa ∈ Σa | ∀q ∈ StM (sa(q) ∈ d′a(q))}.
A set of collective strategies (resp. strategy proﬁles) SA ⊆ ΣA is rectangular if it
represented as a collection of rectangular sets of individual strategies. Then, SA is
to the Cartesian product of the individual sets, i.e., SA =
∏
a∈A Sa.
A set of plausibility terms Ω is rectangular in a modelM if all terms in ω ∈ Ω
have rectangular denotations [[ω]]qM . Finally, we say that a CGSPM is rectangular
if the setΥM is rectangular and termsΩ are rectangular inM . We denote the class
of such models byMrect.
Note, for example, that each ΣA is rectangular.
Proposition 63 Model checkingLbaseATLP formulae in the classMrect can be done
in P with respect to the number of transitions in the model and the length of the
formula.
Proof The algorithm is very simple; wepresent theprocedure forϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ
being in the scope of (set-pl ω) andPlB. Other cases are analogous.
Firstly, we model-check (set-pl ω)PlBψ recursively and label the states
where the answerwas “true”with a newproposition yes. Then, we take [[ω]]qM
(recall that it is represented in a rectangular way, i.e., by function d′ : Agt ×
St→ 2Act), and replace function d inM by d′′ such that d′′(a, q) = d′(a, q) for
a ∈ B and d′′(a, q) = d(a, q) for a /∈ B. Finally, we use any ATLmodel checker
to model-check 〈〈A〉〉yes in the resultingmodel, and return the answer. 
We observe that strategic combinations of rectangular plausibility terms
are also rectangular. In consequence, the results extends toL0ATLP in a straight-
forward way, which will prove useful in Section 5.6.3.14
Lemma 11 If S ⊆ Σa (resp. S ⊆ ΣA) contains only a single strategy (resp. strat-
egy proﬁle) then it is rectangular.
Lemma 12 Let Ω be a rectangular set of plausibility terms, then τ(Ω) is rectan-
gular as well.
Corollary 7 Model checking L0ATLP formulae in the class Mrect can be done in
P with respect to the number of transitions in the model and the length of the for-
mula.
14Recall, that L0ATLP consists of all base formulae in which plausibility terms form τ(Ω) can
be used (instead of plain terms fromΩ only).
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Model Checking LbaseATLP : Hardness and Completeness
Well-behaved CGSP. We prove ΔP3 -hardness through a reduction
of SNSAT2 , a typicalΔP3 -complete variant of the Boolean satisﬁability prob-
lem. The reduction is done in two steps.
1. Firstly, we deﬁne a modiﬁcation of ATLir [121], in which all agents are
required to play only uniform strategies. We call it “uniform ATLir”
(ATLuir in short), and show that model checking ATL
u
ir isΔ
P
3 -complete
bymeans of a polynomial reduction of SNSAT2 to ATLuir model check-
ing.
2. Then,we point out that each formula andmodel of ATLuir can be equiv-
alently translated (in polynomial time) to a CGSP and a formula of
LbaseATLP , thus yielding apolynomial reductionof SNSAT2 tomodel check-
ing LbaseATLP .
Parts of our construction reuse techniques presented in [52, 81, 70, 82].
In “uniform ATLir” (ATLuir), where we assume that all the players have
limited information about the current state, and each agent can only use
uniform strategies (i.e., ones that assign same choices in indistinguishable
states). The syntax of ATLuir is the same as that of ATL, only cooperation
modalities are annotated with additional tags ir and u to indicate the im-
perfect information and recall, and uniformity of all agents’ strategies. The
semantics of ATLuir is deﬁned over concurrent epistemic game structures (CEGS),
i.e. CGS extended with epistemic relations that represent indistinguishabil-
ity of states for agents. Details of the semantics and more thorough presen-
tation canbe found inAppendix 5.9. The following proposition summarizes
the complexity results from Appendix 5.9.2.
Proposition 64 Model checking ATLuir isΔP3 -complete with respect to the num-
ber of transitions in the model and the length of the formula.
Remark 22 We have thus proven that checking strategic abilities when all play-
ers are required to play uniformly isΔP3 -complete (that is, harder than ability com-
pared with the worst line of events captured by ATLir formulae, which is “only”
ΔP2 -complete). We believe it is an interesting result with respect to veriﬁcation of
various kinds of agents’ abilities under incomplete information. We note that the
result from [89] for extensive games with incomplete information can be seen as a
speciﬁc case of our result, at least in the class of games with binary payoffs.
Nowwe showhowATLuirmodel checking can be reduced tomodel check-
ing of LbaseATLP . We are given a CEGSM , a state q inM , and an ATLuir formula
ϕ. Let Σu be the set of all uniform strategy proﬁles inM . We take CGSPM ′
asM (sans epistemic relations) extended with plausibility mapping [[·]] such
that [[ω]]q = Σu. Then:
M, q |=
ATLuir
〈〈A〉〉u
ir
ϕ iff M ′, q |=ATLP (set-pl ω)Pl 〈〈A〉〉ϕ,
which completes the reduction.
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Remark 23 We note in passing that, technically, the size of the resulting model
M ′ is not entirely polynomial. M ′ includes the plausibility set Υ, which is expo-
nential in the number of states inM (since it is equal to the the set of all uniform
strategy proﬁles inM ). This is of course the case when we want to store Υ explic-
itly. However, checking if a strategy proﬁle is uniform can be done in time linear wrt
the number of states in M , so an implicit representation of Υ (e.g., the checking
procedure itself) requires only linear space.
As a result of this and Proposition 59, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 20 Model checking LbaseATLP for well-behaved CGSP’s is ΔP3 -complete
with respect to the number of transitions in the model and the length of the for-
mula.
For the special case when only the proponents have to follow plausible
strategies, a reduction from model checking ATLir (instead of ATLuir) is suf-
ﬁcient. Since model checking ATLir is ΔP2 -complete [121, 82], we get the
following.
Theorem 21 Let L the subset of LbaseATLP in which every cooperation modality
〈〈A〉〉 occurs in the scope of PlB with B ⊆ A. Then, model checking L in the class
of well-behaved CGSP’s isΔP2 -complete.
Proof sketch The inclusion in ΔP2 has been already shown in Section 5.6.1.
We prove the lower bound by a reduction of model checking Schobbens’
ATLir [121] to model checking of our sublanguage L. LetM be a CEGS, q a
state inM , and ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉
ir
γ a formula of ATLir. Moreover, let ΣuA be the set
of all strategy proﬁles inM that are uniform for A. We take CGSPM ′ asM
(sans epistemic relations) extended with plausibility mapping [[·]] such that
[[ω]]q = ΣuA. Then:
M, q |=ATLir 〈〈A〉〉irγ iff M ′, q |=ATLP (set-pl ω)Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ,
which completes the reduction. 
PureCGSandSpecialClassesofModels. In order to show lower bounds
formodel checkingLbaseATLP for pure concurrent game structures, well-behaved
boundedmodels, and rectangularmodels, we observe that ATL is a subset of
LbaseATLP even if the latter does not use plausibility terms – and model check-
ing ATL isP-complete [8]. Thus, we conclude with the following.
Theorem 22 Let c ∈ N be a constant. Model checking LbaseATLP with respect to
well-behaved bounded models Mc, rectangular models Mrect, and pure CGS’s is
P-complete.
5.6.2 Model Checking LATLPATLI
Here, we show that model checking ATLP with plausibility terms based on
ATLI is alsoΔP3 -complete. Note that the only primitive terms occurring in
formulae of ATLPATLI are used to simulate strategic terms of ATLI (which
denote individual strategies of particular agents. Thus, the results in this
section refer to model checking with rectangular CGSP’s.
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Model Checking LATLPATLI : Upper Bound
The algorithm in Figure 5.8 uses abstract plausibility terms but it can also
be used for ATLI-based plausibility terms presented in Section 5.4.3. In [85]
it was shown that the model checking problem for ATLI is polynomial with
respect to the number of transitions and length of the formula. Thus, we get
another immediate corollary of Proposition 59.
Proposition 65 Model checking ATLP with ATLI-based plausibility terms in
rectangular well-behaved CGSP’s is in ΔP3 with respect to the number of transi-
tions in the model and the length of the formula.
In Section 5.4.4 we have used L1ATLP formulae to characterize game the-
oretic solution concepts. For this purpose it was not necessary to have hard-
wired plausibility terms in the language. Indeed, the absence of such terms
positively inﬂuences themodel checking complexity of higher levels of ATLP.
Model Checking LATLPATLI : Hardness and Completeness
Like in Section 5.6.1, we show the lower bound by a reduction from model
checking ATLuir. That is, we demonstrate how uniformity of strategy proﬁles
can be characterized by formulae of ATLI for a relevant class of concurrent
game structures. The actual reduction is quite technical and can be found
in Appendix 5.10. The following result is an immediate corollary of Propo-
sition 67, presented in Appendix 5.10.
Theorem 23 Model checkingLbaseATLP with ATLI-based plausibility terms isΔP3 -
complete with respect to the number of transitions in the model and the length of
the formula.
Moreover, if plausibility restrictions apply only to proponents, then the
complexity improves (the proof is analogous to Theorem 21).
Theorem 24 Let L the subset of LATLPATLI in which every cooperation modal-
ity 〈〈A〉〉 occurs in the scope of PlB with B ⊆ A. Then, model checking L in the
class of well-behaved rectangular CGSP’s isΔP2 -complete.
Proof sketch Weprove the lower bound (again) by a reductionofmodel check-
ing ATLir to model checking L. The reduction is very similar to the one
shown in Appendix 5.10 except that only the “veriﬁer” decides upon the
values of the propositions (cf. [81]). 
5.6.3 Model Checking LkATLP
In this section we present our results regarding the model checking com-
plexity of the full logic LATLP . The complexity depends on both the nest-
ing level of ATLP formulae and on the structure and alternations of strategic
quantiﬁers. Before we state our results we introduce some additional deﬁni-
tions needed to classify such complex formulae.
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Classifying LATLP Formulae: SomeDeﬁnitions
The complexity ofmodel checking formulae inLATLP does not only depend
on the actual nesting depth of plausibility terms but also on the structure of
strategic quantiﬁers used inside (set-pl ·) and (refn-pl ·) operators. The
latter structure is quite complex and cannot solely be described by the num-
ber of quantiﬁers. Often, a speciﬁc position of quantiﬁers can be used to
combine two “guessing” phases, improving complexity.
Firstly, not the number of quantiﬁers is important but rather the num-
ber of alternations. We introduce function ALT : {∃,∀}+ → {∃,∀}+ which
modiﬁes a word over {∃,∀} such that each quantiﬁer following a quantiﬁer
of the same type is removed; for example, ALT(∃∀∀∀∃∀) = ∃∀∃∀. Moreover,
existential quantiﬁers at the beginning and end of a quantiﬁer series can,
under some conditions, be ignored without changing the model checking
complexity. For example, let us assume that the ﬁrst quantiﬁer is existen-
tial. Then it follows a guess of the proponents (resp. opponents) strategy
and both guesses can be combined. Analogously, an existential quantiﬁer at
the end usually follows another existential guess. To take these issues into
account, we deﬁne function RALT : {∃,∀}+ → Z that counts the number of
the relevant alternations of quantiﬁers in a sequence:
RALT(
−→
Q) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
n if ALT(
−→
Q) = Q1 . . . Qn andQ1 = ∃ = Qn;
n− 1 if ALT(−→Q) = Q1 . . . Qn andQ1 = ∃ xorQn = ∃;
n− 2 if ALT(−→Q) = Q1 . . . Qn andQ1 = ∃ = Qn and n > 2;
−1 else.
Function RALT characterizes the “hardness” of the outermost level in a
given term. The next two functions take into account the recursive structure
of terms, due to possibly nested (set-pl ·) or (refn-pl ·) operators. Firstly,
UO(ϕ) returns the set of all the update operations (set-pl ω) and (refn-pl ω)
within formula ϕ. Secondly, ql takes a set of update operations and returns
the quantiﬁer level in these operations as follows:
ql(S) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
maxs∈S ql({s}) if |S| > 1
ql(UO(ϕ′)) if S = {(Op σ.ϕ′)}
RALT(Q1 . . . Qn) + ql(UO(ϕ′)) if S = {(Op σ.Q1σ1 . . . Qnσnϕ′)}
and (ϕ′ ∈ L0ATLP (Agt,Π,Var,
Var) orQn = ∀)
RALT(Q1 . . . Qn) + ql(UO(ϕ′)) + 1 if S = {(Op σ.Q1σ1 . . . Qnσnϕ′)}
and ϕ′ ∈ L0ATLP (Agt,Π,Var,
Var) andQn = ∃
0 otherwise
where (Op ·) is either (set-pl ·) or (refn-pl ·).
The intuition behind ql is that it determines themaximal sumof relevant
alternations in each sequence of nested update operators (set-pl ·) and/or
(refn-pl ·). Intuitively, the nested operators represent a tree. Given an
LkATLP formula we add arcs from the root of the tree to nodes representing
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update operators operators in the kth level. Then, from such anewnode rep-
resenting (set-pl ω) or (refn-pl ω), we add arcs to nodes representing up-
date operators insideω (i.e., on the k−1th level) and so on. Leaves of the tree
consist of nodes representing operators whose terms contain no further up-
date operators. Now, eachnode representedby e.g. (set-pl σ.Q1σ1 . . . Qnσnϕ′)
is labeled by RALT(Q1 . . . Qn). Function ql returns the maximal sum of such
numbers along all paths from the root to some leaf.
Given an operator (set-pl σ.Q1σ1 . . . Qnσnϕ′) on the second to last level
without hard-wired plausibility term (i.e., for ϕ′ ∈ L0ATLP (Agt,Π,Var,Var))
andwhich endswith an existential quantiﬁer ∃, the very operatorQn cannot
be ignored in the calculation of the characteristic number, as it is usually
done. The reason for that is that model chekcing ϕ′ can be done in P (cf.
Corollary 7) and this does not allow to combine the existential quantiﬁer of
the last strategic termwith another one. This is reﬂected in the third case of
the deﬁnition of ql.
Deﬁnition 42 (Level i Formula) We say that ϕ is a level i formula iff
ql(UO(ϕ)) = i.
Model Checking LkATLP : Upper Bounds
Plausibility terms are quite important for the base language LbaseATLP ; it does
not make much sense to consider the logic without them. In fact, when
LbaseATLP formulae are considered in the context of pureCGS’s, thewhole logic
degenerates to pure ATL. This observation does not apply to higher levels of
ATLP any more. Indeed, all characterizations of game theoretic solutions
concepts that we have presented are expressed as L1ATLP formulae without
hard-wired terms. Moreover – as we will see – not using hard-wired terms
yields an improvedmodel checking complexity.
Below we state the main results of this section. The intuition is the fol-
lowing. For each level i formula we have i quantiﬁer alternations; in addi-
tion to that, in each level there can be two more implicit quantiﬁers due to
the cooperation modalities (there is a plausible strategy of the proponents
such that for all plausible strategies of the opponents . . . ). It must also be en-
sured that the quantiﬁers of two nested levels are separated from each other,
otherwise they can be combined; the termmax{0, k−i−1} accounts for that.
Theorem 25 (Model Checking LkATLP in Pure CGS) For k ≥ 1, i ≥ 0 let
ϕ be a level-i formula ofLkATLP (Agt,Π, ∅). Moreover, letM be aCGS, and q a state
inM . Then,model checkingM, q |= ϕ can be done in timeΔPi+2k+1−max{0,k−i−1}.
Proof in Appendix 5.11.2.
Note, that the restriction topureCGS is essential because deﬁning a given
set of strategies Υ might require checking whether a strategy is plausible in
the ﬁnal nesting stage. And that case the advantage of not having hard-
wired plausibility terms would vanish and the complexity would increase.
So, if plausibility terms are available the last level of an ATLP formula can-
not be veriﬁed in polynomial time anymore (according to Corollary 7). The
complexity can increase as shown in the following result.
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Theorem 26 (Model Checking LkATLP inWell-Behaved CGSP) Letϕ be
a level-i formula of LkATLP (Agt,Π,Ω),M a well-behaved CGSP, and q a state in
M . Model checkingM, q |= ϕ can be done inΔPi+2(k+1)+1−max{0,k−i}.
Proof in Appendix 5.11.2.
Model Checking LkATLP : Hardness and Completeness
As it turns out, model checking LATLP , and even each LkATLP for k ≥ 1 is
in general PSPACE-complete. To show the lower bounds for LkATLP (with
arbitrary k ≥ 1) we show that L1ATLP is PSPACE-hard, implying that all
logics LkATLP (for k ≥ 1) are PSPACE-hard too. That the general model
checking problem for LATLP formulae is in PSPACE follows directly from
the algorithm shown in Figure 5.8.
The hardness proof, similar to the one for LATLPATLI is rather technical
and can be found in Appendix 5.11.2. As a corollary of Proposition 68, we
get the following.
Theorem 27 (LkATLP isPSPACE-complete) The model checking problems
for LATLP and for LkATLP (for each k ≥ 1) arePSPACE-complete.
Proof Easiness is immediate since the model checking algorithm presented
in Figure 5.8 can be executed in polynomial space with respect to the input
(cf. Theorem 25 and Proposition 61). Hardness is shown by the polynomial
space reduction fromQSAT (Proposition 68). 
Finally, we turn to classes inwhich thenumber of alternations is restricted
by a ﬁxedupper bound, andwe conjecture that themodel checking problem
for i-level formulae of LkATLP is in fact complete in its complexity classes de-
termined in Theorems 25 and 26.
Conjecture 1 Let ϕ be a level-i formula of LkATLP (Agt,Π, ∅), k ≥ 1, i ≥ 0.
Moreover, letM be a CGS, and q a state inM . Then, model checkingM, q |= ϕ is
ΔPi+2k+1−max{0,k−i−1}-complete.
Conjecture 2 Letϕ be a level-i formula ofLkATLP (Agt,Π,Ω),M awell-behaved
CGSP, and q a state inM . Model checkingM, q |= ϕ isΔPi+2(k+1)+1−max{0,k−i}-
complete.
5.6.4 Summary of Complexity Results
Throughout Section 5.6, we have analyzed the model checking complexity
of LATLP . The base language was shown to lie inΔP3 with both abstract and
ATLI-based plausibility terms. We also proved that model checking both
logics is complete regarding this class. The complexity of model checking
LkATLP formulae was shown to depend on three factors:
1. The nesting level k of plausibility terms;
2. the quantiﬁer level; and
3. whether abstract plausibility terms were present or not.
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0 1 . . . i . . . unbounded
LbasicATLP P - - - . . . -
L0ATLP P - . . . - . . . -
L1ATLP ΔP3 ΔP4 . . . ΔPi+3 . . . PSPACE
L2ATLP ΔP4 ΔP6 . . . ΔP5+i−max{0,1−i} . . . PSPACE
... . . .
...
LkATLP
i > k + 1
ΔPk+2 Δ
P
k+4 . . . Δ
P
i+2k+1−max{0,k−i−1} . . . PSPACE
Figure 5.10: Summary of the model checking results for pure concurrent
game structures (i.e., without hard-wired plausibility terms). AllP,ΔP3 , and
PSPACE results are completeness results.
0 1 . . . i . . . unbounded
LbasicATLP ΔP3 - . . . - . . . -
L0ATLP ΔP3 - . . . - . . . -
L1ATLP ΔP4 ΔP6 . . . ΔPi+5−max{0,1−i} . . . PSPACE
L2ATLP ΔP5 ΔP7 . . . ΔP7+i−max{0,2−i} . . . PSPACE
...
...
LkATLP
i > k
ΔPk+3 Δ
P
k+5 . . . Δ
P
i+2(k+1)+1−max{0,k−i} . . . PSPACE
Figure 5.11: Summary of themodel checking results inwell-behavedCGSP’s.
AllΔP3 andPSPACE results are completeness results.
The quantiﬁer level is inﬂuenced by the number of alternations andwith
which quantiﬁers – existential or universal – sequences start and end. In
general, an i-level LkATLP formula without plausibility terms was shown to
be in
ΔPi+2k+1−max{0,k−i−1}
where its counterpart with hard-wired terms was marginally more difﬁcult
to check:
ΔPi+2(k+1)+1−max{0,k−i}.
The results for formulae without (resp. with) primitive plausibility terms are
summarized in Figure 5.10 (resp. Figure 5.11).
Note that all our game theoretic characterizations could already be ex-
pressed by L1ATLP formulae without hard-wired terms.
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5.7 Conclusions
We proposed a logic in which one can study the outcome of rational play
in a logical framework, under various rationality criteria. Although solving
game-like scenarios with help of various solution concepts is arguably the
main application of game theory, to our knowledge, there has been very lit-
tle work on this issue. We are not discussing the merits of one rationality
criterion or the other, nor the pragmatics of using particular criteria to pre-
dict the actual behaviour of agents. Our aim was to propose a conceptual
tool in which the consequences of accepting one or another criterion can be
studied.
We believe that the logic we propose providesmuch ﬂexibility andmod-
eling power. The results presented in Sections 5.5 and 5.6 also suggest that
the expressive power of the language is quite high. Our main technical re-
sults are as follows:
ATLP: The very deﬁnition of the logic ATLP in Section 5.4 and the study of
its expressive power in Section 5.5.1.
Classical Solution Concepts: There are several classical solution concepts
for extensive games: Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium, undominated strategies, and Pareto optimality. We show, by re-
lating models of our logic (CGSP’s) to extensive form games, that these so-
lution concepts can be formulated as formulae inATLP (in fact, already
in L1ATLP ). This is shown in Section 5.5.2
General Solution Concepts: While the classical solution concepts for ga-
mes are formulatedusing payoffs (whichwas the reason to extendmod-
els by additional propositions), we propose to formulate generalized so-
lution concepts as formulae in our logic ATLP. More precisely, we pro-
pose to use LATL-path formulae ηi as winning conditions for agent i.
Thus, instead of computing payoffs in an extensive formgame,we con-
sider CGSP models plus a vector of LATL-path formulae ηi (represent-
ing the payoff for agent i). We demonstrate L1ATLP formulae that cor-
rectly express in ATLP our generalized solution concepts. This is elab-
orated in Section 5.3.5.
Model Checking in ATLP: Anextensive studyof themodel checking com-
plexity in several classes of models and variants of the language is pre-
sented in Section 5.6. On the way, we also deﬁne another interesting
variant of ATL (where both proponents and opponents are required to
use only uniform strategies) and we establish its model checking com-
plexity.
Our ultimate goal is to come up with a logic that would allow us to study
strategies, time, knowledge, and plausible/rational behaviour under both
perfect and imperfect information. However, putting so many dimensions
in one framework at once is usually not a good idea – even more so in this
case because the interaction between abilities and knowledge is non-trivial
(cf. [83, 75, 63]). In [25], wehave investigated time, knowledge and plausibility.
In this article, we studied strategies, time and rationality. We hope to integrate
both views into a single powerful framework in the future.
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Wewould like to thank two anonymous referees for pointing out several
issues that helped us to improve (and shorten) this article.
5.8 Appendix: BargainingwithDiscount
In Example 22 we presented bargaining with discount. After each round
the worth of the goods is reduced by δi. In round t the goods have a value of
r(δti). Becausewe use a rounding function r, there is aminimal round T such
that r(δT+1i ) = 0 for i = 1 or i = 2. We can treat this case as ﬁnite horizon
bargaining game [123, 101].
Now, consider the case that ai’s opponent, denoted by a−i, is the offerer
in T . It can offer 0 and ai should accept, because in the next round the goods
are worthless for ai.
On the other hand, if ai is offerer in T we have to distinguish two cases. If
r(δT+1−i ) = 0 then following the same reasoning as before ai can offer 0 to a−i.
In the other case, namely r(δT+1−i ) = 0, we consider the subsequent round
T + 1 in which a−i takes the role as offerer and can successfully offer 0 to i.
Now, it is possible to solve the game starting from the end. Solutions
for δ1 = δ2 can be found in the literature [101]. Here, we recall the idea for
different discount rates.
At ﬁrst, let a1 be the last offerer and r(δT+12 ) = 0. This implies, that T
is even (the initial round is 0). In T , a1 offers 〈1, 0〉 and a2 accepts. Knowing
this, in T−1 agent a2 can offer 〈δ1, 1−δ1〉, since in thenext round the value of
the good for a1 would become reduced by δ1. Following the same reasoning,
in T −2 a1 could successfully offer 〈1−δ2(1−δ1), δ2(1−δ1)〉. Finally, in round
t = 0 a1 can offer 〈ζ, 1− ζ〉where
ζ := (1− δ2)
T
2 −1∑
i=0
(δ1δ2)i + (δ1δ2)
T
2 = (1− δ2)1− (δ1δ2)
T
2
1− δ1δ2 + (δ1δ2)
T
2
Secondly, consider the case in which a2 is the last offerer in T and
r(δT+11 ) = 0. This time T is odd but the reasoning stays the same. In round 0
a1 can offer 〈ζ ′, 1− ζ ′〉where
ζ ′ := (1− δ2)1− (δ1δ2)
T+1
2
1− δ1δ2
5.9 Appendix: UniformATLir
In this section, we introduce and investigate the logic of “uniform ATLir”
(ATLuir). We use the logic only for technical reasons, namely it provides the
intermediate step in the completeness proof for the complexity of model
checking ATLP. Still, we believe that the logic can be interesting in itself.
Moreover, the technique we use for proving the completeness is interest-
ing too (and gives insight into the complexity as well as the relationship
between the problemwe study and known complexity from game theory).
The idea is based on Schobbens’s ATLir [121], i.e., ATL for agents with
imperfect information and imperfect recall. There, it was assumed that the
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coalitionA in formula 〈〈A〉〉
ir
ϕ canonlyuse strategies that assign same choices
in indistinguishable states (so called uniform strategies). Then, the outcome
of every strategy of A was evaluated in every possible behaviour of the re-
maining agentsAgt \A (with no additional assumption with respect to that
behaviour). In ATLuir, we assume that the opponents (Agt \ A) are also re-
quired to respond with a uniform memoryless strategy. The syntax of ATLuir is
the same as that of ATL, only cooperationmodalities are annotated with ad-
ditional tags ir and u to indicate the imperfect information and recall, and
uniformity of all agents’ strategies.
5.9.1 Semantics
The semantics of ATLuir can be deﬁned as follows. Firstly, we deﬁne models
as concurrent epistemic game structures (CEGS), i.e. CGS with epistemic rela-
tions ∼a⊆ St × St, one per agent. (The intended meaning of q ∼a q′ is that
agent a cannot distinguish between between states q and q′.) Secondly, we
require that agents have the same options in indistinguishable states, i.e.,
that q ∼a q′ implies da(q) = da(q′). A (memoryless) strategy sA is uniform if
q ∼a q′ implies saA(q) = saA(q′) for all q, q′ ∈ St, a ∈ A. To simplify the nota-
tion, we deﬁne [q]a = {q′ | q ∼a q′} to be the class of states indistinguishable
from q for a; [q]A =
⋃
a∈A[q]a collects all the states that are indistinguishable
from q for somemember of the groupA; ﬁnally, out(Q, sA) =
⋃
q∈Q out(q, sA)
collects all the execution paths of strategy sA from states in setQ.
Now, the semantics is given by the clauses below:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ π(q)
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q |= ϕ
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉u ϕ iff there is a uniform strategy sA such that, for every uni-
form counterstrategy tAgt\A, and λ ∈ out([q]A, 〈sA, tAgt\A〉),15 we have
M,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉uϕ iff there is a uniform strategy sA such that, for every
uniform counterstrategy tAgt\A, and λ ∈ out([q]A, 〈sA, tAgt\A〉), we have
M,λ[i] |= ϕ for all i = 0, 1, ...;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there is a uniform strategy sA such that, for every
uniform counterstrategy tAgt\A, and λ ∈ out([q]A, 〈sA, tAgt\A〉), there is
i ∈ N0 withM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i.
5.9.2 Model Checking Complexity
We show the lower bound by reduction of SNSAT2, a typical ΔP3 -complete
problem. We recall the deﬁnition of SNSATi after [96].
15Note that the deﬁnition of concurrent game structures, that we use after [8], implies that
CGS are deterministic, so there is in fact exactly one such path λ.
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Figure 5.12: CEGSM2 forϕ1 ≡ ((x1∧x2)∨¬y1)∧(¬x1∨y1),ϕ2 ≡ z1∧(¬z1∨y2).
Deﬁnition 43 (SNSATi )
Input: p sets of propositional variablesXjr = {xj1,r, ..., xjk,r} for each j = 1, . . . , i;
p propositional variables zr, and p Boolean formulae ϕr in positive normal form
(i.e., negation is allowed only on the level of literals). Each ϕr involves only vari-
ables in
⋃i
j=1 X
j
r ∪ {z1, ..., zr−1}, with the following requirement:
zr ≡ ∃X1r∀X2r∃X3r . . . QXir.ϕr(z1, ..., zr−1, X1r , . . . , Xir), where Q = ∀ (resp. Q =
∃) if i is even (resp. odd).
Output: The value of zp.
In this section we focus on SNSAT2 where we set X1r = Xr = {x1,r, ..., xk,r}
andX2r = Yr = {y1,r, ..., yk,r}.
Our reduction of SNSAT2 is an extension of the reduction of SNSAT pre-
sented in [81, 82]. That is, we construct the CEGS Mr corresponding to zr
with two players: veriﬁer v and refuter r. The CEGS is turn-based, that is,
every state is “governed” by a single player who determines the next transi-
tion. Each subformula χi1...il of ϕr has a corresponding state qi1...il inMr. If
the outermost logical connective of ϕr is ∧, the refuter decides at q0 which
subformulaχi ofϕr is to be satisﬁed, byproceeding to the “subformula” state
qi corresponding to χi. If the outermost connective is ∨, the veriﬁer decides
which subformulaχi ofϕr will be attempted at q0. This procedure is repeated
until all subformulae are single literals. The states corresponding to literals
are called “proposition” states.
The difference from the construction from [81, 82] is that formulae are
in positive normal form (rather than CNF) and that we have two kinds of
“proposition” states now: qi1...il refers to a literal consisting of some x ∈ Xr
and is governed by v; q¯i1...il refers to some y ∈ Yr and will be governed by r.
Now, the values of the underlying propositional variables x, y are declared at
the “proposition” states, and the outcome is computed. That is, ifv executes
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 for a positive literal, i.e. χi1...il = x, (or ⊥ for χi1...il = ¬x) at qi1...il , then
the systemproceeds to the “winning” state q; otherwise, the systemgoes to
the “sink” state q⊥. For states q¯i1...il the procedure is analogous. Models cor-
responding to subsequent zr are nested like in Figure 5.12.16 “Proposition”
states referring to the same variable x are indistinguishable for v (so that he
has to declare the same value of x in all of them), and the states referring
to the same y are indistinguishable for r. A sole ATLuir proposition yes holds
only in the “winning” state q. As in [81, 82], we have the following result
which concludes the reduction.
Proposition 66 The above construction shows a polynomial reduction of SNSAT2
to model checking ATLuir in the following sense. Let
Φ1 ≡ 〈〈v〉〉uir (¬neg)U yes, and
Φr ≡ 〈〈v〉〉uir (¬neg)U (yes ∨ (neg ∧ 〈〈∅〉〉uir ¬Φr−1)) for r = 2, . . . , p.
Then, we have zp iffMp, q
p
0 |=ATLuir Φp.
As for the upper bound, we note that there is a straightforward ΔP3 al-
gorithm that model-checks formulae of ATLuir: when checking 〈〈A〉〉uir Tϕ in
M, q, it ﬁrst recursively checks ϕ (bottom-up), and labels the states where ϕ
held with a special proposition yes. Then, the algorithm guesses a uniform
strategy sA and calls an oracle that guesses a uniform counterstrategy tAgt\A.
Finally, it trimsM according to 〈sA, tAgt\A〉, and calls a CTL model checker
to check formula AT yes in state q of the resulting model. This gives us the
following result.
Theorem 28 Model checkingATLuir isΔP3 -complete with respect to the number
of transitions in the model and the length of the formula. It isΔP3 -complete even
for turn-based CEGS with at most two agents.
5.10 Appendix: FromATLuir toATLPwithATLI-
Based Plausibility Terms
The reduction of ATLuir model checking to model checking ofATLP
ATLI in
“pure” CGS is rather sophisticated. We do not present a reduction for full
model checking of ATLuir; it is enough to show the reduction for the kind
of models that we get in Appendix 5.9.2 (i.e., turn-based models with two
agents, two “ﬁnal” states q, q⊥, no cycles except for the loops at the ﬁnal
states, and uncertainty appearing only in states one step before the end of
the game, cf. Figure 5.12).
Firstly, we reconstruct the concurrent epistemic game structureMp from
Section 5.9.2 so that the last action proﬁle is always “remembered” in the ﬁ-
nal states. Then, we show how uniformity of strategies can be characterized
with a formula of ATLI extendedwith epistemic operators. Thirdly, we show
how the model and the formula can be transformed to get rid of epistemic
links and operators (yielding a “pure” CGS and a formula of “pure” ATLI).
16All states in themodel for zr are additionally indexed by r.
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Figure 5.13: Memorizing the last action proﬁle in a simple 2-agent system
Finally, we show how the resulting characterization of uniformity can be
“plugged” into an ATLP formula to require that only uniform strategy pro-
ﬁles are taken into account.
Adding More Final States to the Model. To recall, the input of ATLuir
model checking consists in our case of a concurrent epistemic game struc-
tureMp (like the one in Figure 5.12) and an ATLuir formula Φp (cf. Proposi-
tion 66). We begin the reduction by reconstructingMp toM ′p in which the
last action proﬁle is “remembered” in the ﬁnal states. The idea is based on
the construction from [52, Proposition 16] where it is applied to all states of
the system, cf. Figure 5.13.
In our case, we ﬁrst create copies of states q, q⊥, one per incoming transi-
tion. That is, the construction yields states of the form 〈q, α1, . . . , αk〉, where
q ∈ {q, q⊥} is a ﬁnal state of the original modelMp, and 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 is the
action proﬁle executed just before the system proceeded to q. Each copy has
the same valuation of propositions as the original state q, i.e.,
π′(〈q, α1, . . . , αk〉) = π(q). Then, for each action α ∈ Act and agent i ∈ Agt,
we add a new proposition i : α. Moreover, we ﬁx the valuation of i : α inM ′p
so that it holds exactly in the ﬁnal states that can be achieved by an action
proﬁle in which i executes α (i.e., states 〈q, α1, ..., αi, ..., αk〉). Note that the
number of both states and transitions in M ′p is linear in the transitions of
Mp. The transformation produces model M ′p which is equivalent to Mp in
the following sense. Letϕ be a formula of ATLuir that does not involve special
propositions i : α. Then, for all q ∈ St:Mp, q |=ATLuir ϕ iffM
′
p, q |=ATLuir ϕ.
InM ′p, agents can “recall” their actions executed at states that involved
some uncertainty (i.e., states in which the image of some indistinguishabil-
ity relation ∼i was not a singleton). Now we can use ATLI (with additional
help of knowledge operators, see below) to characterize uniformity of strate-
gies.
Characterizing Uniformity in ATLI+K. We will now show that uni-
formity of a strategy can be characterized in ATLI extended with epistemic op-
erators Ka (that we call ATLI+K. Kaϕ reads as “agent a knows that ϕ”. The
semantics of ATLI+K extends that of ATLI by adding the standard semantic
clause from epistemic logic:
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M, q |= Kaϕ iffM, q′ |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
We note that ATLI+K can be also seen as ATEL [133] extended with inten-
tions.
Let us now consider the following formula of ATLI +Knowledge:
uniform(σ) ≡ (str σ)〈〈∅〉〉
∧
i∈Agt
∨
α∈d(i,q)
Ki〈〈∅〉〉 i : α.
The readingof uniform(σ) is: suppose that proﬁleσ is played (str σ); then, for
all reachable states (〈〈∅〉〉), every agent has a single action (∧i∈Agt∨α∈d(i,q))
that is determined for execution (〈〈∅〉〉 i : α) in every state indistinguishable
from the current state (Ki). Thus, formula uniform(σ) characterizes the uni-
formity of strategy proﬁle σ. Formally, for every concurrent epistemic game
structure M , we have that M, q |=ATLI+K uniform(σ) iff [σ[a]] is uniform for
each agent a ∈ Agt (for all states reachable from q). Of course, only reach-
able statesmatter whenwe look for strategies that should enforce a temporal
goal.
Note that the epistemic operator Ka refers to incomplete information,
but σ is now an arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily uniform) strategy proﬁle. We
observe that the length of the formula is linear in the number of agents and
actions in themodel.
Translating Knowledge to Ability. To get rid of the epistemic opera-
tors from formula uniform(σ) and epistemic relations frommodelM ′p, we use
the construction from [70] (which reﬁnes that from [52, Section 4.4]). The
construction yields a concurrent game structure tr(M ′p) and anATLI formula
tr(uniform(σ)) with the following characteristics. The idea can be sketched
as follows. The set of agents becomes extended with epistemic agents ei (one
per ai ∈ Agt), yielding Agt′′ = Agt ∪ Agte. Similarly, the set of states is aug-
mentedwith epistemic states qe for every q ∈ St′ and e ∈ Agte; the states “gov-
erned” by the epistemic agent ea are labeled with a special proposition ea.
The “real” states q from the originalmodel are called “action” states, and are
labeled with another special proposition act. Epistemic agent ea can enforce
transitions to states that are indistinguishable for agent a (see Figure 5.14 for
an example).17 Then, “a knows ϕ” can be rephrased as “ea can only effect
transitions to epistemic states where ϕ holds”. With some additional tricks
to ensure the right interplay between actions of epistemic agents, we get the
following translation of formulae:
tr(p) = p, for p ∈ Π
tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
tr(ϕ ∨ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∨ tr(ψ)
tr(〈〈A〉〉 ϕ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉 (act ∧ tr(ϕ))
tr(〈〈A〉〉ϕ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉(act ∧ tr(ϕ))
tr(〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉(act ∧ tr(ϕ))U (act ∧ tr(ψ))
tr(Kiϕ) = ¬〈〈e1, ..., ei〉〉 
(
ei ∧ 〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 (act ∧ ¬tr(ϕ))
)
.
17The interested reader is referred to [70] for the technical details of the construction.
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Figure 5.14: Getting rid of knowledge and epistemic links
Note that the length of tr(ϕ) is linear in the length of ϕ and the number
of agents k. Two important facts follow from [70, Theorem 8]:
Lemma 13 For every CEGSM and a formula of ATLuir that does not include the
special propositions act, e1, . . . , ek, we have M, q |=ATLuir ϕ iff tr(M), q |=ATLuir
tr(ϕ).
Lemma 14 For every CEGS M , we have M, q |=ATLI+K uniform(σ) iff
tr(M), q |=ATLI+K tr(uniform(σ)).
Putting the Pieces Together: theReduction. Weobserve thatATLuir
can be seen as ATL where only uniform strategy proﬁles are allowed. An
ATLI formula that characterizes uniformity has been deﬁned in the previ-
ous paragraphs. It can be now plugged into our “ATL with Plausibility” to
restrict agents’ behaviour in the way the semantics of ATLuir does. This way,
we obtain a reduction of SNSAT2 to model checking ofATLPATLI .
Proposition 67
zp iff tr(M ′p), q
p
0 |=ATLPATLI (set-pl σ.tr(uniform(σ)))Pl tr(Φp).
Proof We have zp iff M ′p, q
p
0 |=ATLuir Φp iff tr(M
′
p), q
p
0 |=ATLuir tr(Φp)
iff tr(M ′p), q
p
0 |=ATLPATLI (set-pl σ.tr(uniform(σ)))Pl tr(Φp). 
5.11 Appendix: Some Model Checking Com-
plexity Proofs
5.11.1 Results in Section 5.6.1
Proposition 59: Let M be a well-behaved CGSP, q a state in M , and ϕ a
formula of LbaseATLP (Agt,Π,Ω). ThenM, q |= ϕ iff mcheckATLP(M, q, ϕ). The
algorithm runs in timeΔP3 with respect to the number of transitions in the
model and the length of the formula.
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Proof Function mcheck is called recursively, at most l times. All cases apart
from ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 ψ where ψ includes no 〈〈C〉〉 (analogously for the other
temporal operators) can be performed in polynomial time. Now, there is a
nondeterministic Turing machine AB which implements function beatable:
Firstly, it guesses a strategy t possibly together with another witness neces-
sary for plausiblestrat (by assumption the latter is in NP) and veriﬁes if t is
plausible, the veriﬁcation can be done in polynomial time (by the same as-
sumption). Finally, if t is plausible AB has to perform CTL model checking
which lies inP.
It remains to show that there is a nondeterministic oracle Turing ma-
chine AS with oracle AB implementing solve. (Formally, the machine re-
quires two oracles, one answering the question whether s is plausible, and
the other is given byAB. However, the former is computationally less expen-
sive then the latter and can be ignored since we are interested in the oracle
with the highest complexity.) AS works as follows: Firstly, it guesses a proﬁle
s (again possibly together with a witness for plausiblestrat); secondly, it ver-
iﬁes whether s is plausible and then calls oracle AB and inverts its answer.
Altogether, there are polynomial many calls tomachineAABS ∈ NPNP. This
renders the algorithm to be inΔP3 . 
Proposition 62: Let c ∈ N be a constant. Model checking LbaseATLP formulae
with respect to the class of well-behaved bounded models Mc can be done
in polynomial time with respect to the number of transitions in the model
and the length of the formula.
Proof sketch We modify the original ATL model checking procedure as fol-
lows. Consider the formula ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ where γ is a pure ATL path formula.
Let B be the set of agents assumed to play plausibly and let Υ = Σ be the
current set of plausible strategies described by some term and state. For each
sB ∈ Υ|B we remove fromM all transitions which cannot occur according
to sB, yieldingmodelMsB , and check whetherMsB , q |=ATL 〈〈A〉〉γ. We pro-
ceed like this for all s ∈ Υ|B (there are only polynomiallymany). This proce-
dure is incorporated into our ATLP model checking algorithm and applied
bottom up. 
5.11.2 Results in Section 5.6.3
Upper Bounds
First, we recall a basic complexity result that will be used in the rest of this
section. Then,wepresent proofs of upper bounds formodel checkingLkATLP
for pure CGS’s and well-behaved CGSP’s.
Remark 24 A relation R ⊆ ×k+1i=1 Σ∗ (k ≥ 1) is called polynomial decidable
whenever there is a deterministic Turingmachine (DTM)which decides {(x, y1 . . . , yk) :
(x, y1 . . . , yk) ∈ R} in polynomial time; furthermore,R is called polynomial bal-
anced if there is a k ∈ N such that for all (x, y1 . . . , yk) ∈ R: |yi| ≤ |x|k for all
i = 1, . . . k.
For a language L and k ≥ 1 the following holds: L ∈ ΣPk if, and only if, there
is a polynomial decidable and balanced (k + 1)-ary relation R such that L = {x |
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∃y1∀y2∃y3 . . . Qyk ((x, y1 . . . , yk) ∈ R)} where Q = ∀ (resp. Q = ∃) if k is odd
(resp. k even) [112, Corollary 2 of Theorem 17.8].
Theorem 25: Let ϕ be a level-i formula of LkATLP (Agt,Π, ∅), k ≥ 1, i ≥ 0.
Moreover, letM be a CGS, and q a state inM . Then, model checkingM, q |=
ϕ can be done in timeΔPi+2k+1−max{0,k−i−1}.
Proof By induction over k. In the followingwe restrict ourselves to (set-pl ·)
without loss of generality.
Case k = 1. Let ϕ be a level-i L1ATLP formula, (set-pl ω) an operator occur-
ring in ϕ such that l({(set-pl ω)}) = i and ω = σ.Q1σ1Q2σ2 . . . Qnσnϕ′
where
ϕ′ ∈ LbaseATLP (Agt,Π, {σ, σ1, . . . , σn}).
Note thatMs,s1,...,sn , q |= ϕ′ can be checked in polynomial time since
all constructible plausibility terms are rectangular and the representa-
tion is directly given (see Corollary 7). Moreover, let q′ denote the state
in which ω is evaluated. W.l.o.g. we can assume that ϕ has the follow-
ing structure:
ϕ ≡ (set-pl ω)Pl 〈〈A〉〉yes
Now,ϕ is true inM and q if andonly if there is a plausible strategy sA for
A and noplausible strategy twith t|A = s such thatM ′, q |=C TL¬Ayes
where M ′ is the trimmed model of M wrt t. In the following we ne-
glect the complexity needed to verify whether sA is plausible since the
method beatable also veriﬁes this property and its complexity is as least
as high (cf. proof of Proposition 59). Thus, ϕ is true if, and only if:
∃sA¬
(∃t (t ∈ [̂[ω]]q′ andR|=(M, q, sA, t,yes))) iff
∃sA¬
(∃tQ1s1Q2s2 . . . Qnsn (M t,s1,...,sn , q′ |= ϕ′ andR|=(M, q, sA, t,yes)))
iff ∃sA∀tQ¯1s1Q¯2s2 . . . Q¯nsn (M t,s1,...,sn , q′ |= ϕ′ or ¬R|=(M, q, sA, t,yes))
whereR|=(M, q, sA, t,yes) = true iff t|A = sA andM ′, q |=C TL¬Ayes
whereM ′ is the “trimmed” model ofM wrt t, and Q¯ is the dual opera-
tor toQ.
Now, the latter conditions can be veriﬁed in polynomial time. We
consider the number of quantiﬁer alternations. Subsequent strategies
which are quantiﬁed by quantiﬁers of the same type can be guessed
together. The same holds if the sequence starts with existential quan-
tiﬁers. These strategies can be guessed togetherwith strategy t. A quan-
tiﬁer level of l({(set-pl ω)}) = i denotes that it is sufﬁcient to alternat-
ingly guess iwitnesses. We obtain the following structure:
∃sA∀xt∃x1∀x2 . . . Qxi
where Q = ∃ (resp. Q = ∀) if i is even (resp. odd). Where xi denotes a
witness for a strategy or several strategies if guessing can be combined.
Thus, according to Remark 24 checking whether ϕ is satisﬁed can be
determined in time Σi+2 and the complete model checking algorithm
for level-i L1ATLP formula can be performed in timeΔPi+3 (there can be
polynomial many such constructs).
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Induction step: k  → k + 1 (k > 1). Let ϕ be a level-i Lk+1ATLP formula and
letω be a term in ϕ of the form ω = σ1.Q1σ1Q2σ2 . . . Qnσnϕ′ such that
l((set-pl ω)) = i. Furthermore, let RALT(Q1 . . . Qn) = j; then, lϕ′ :=
ql(UO(ϕ′)) = i − j and ϕ′ is an LkATLP formula. Thus, by induction
hypothesis we have that ϕ′ can bemodel checked in time
ΔPr+1 where r := lϕ′ + 2k −max{0, k − lϕ′ − 1}.
Again, w.l.o.g. we can assume that ϕ has the following structure:
ϕ ≡ (set-pl ω)Pl 〈〈A〉〉yes.
We proceed as in case k = 1. Firstly, a proﬁle s is guessed, then a proﬁle
t and it is checked whether t is plausible and coincides with s wrt A
and whether the trimmed model (wrt t) satisﬁes ¬Ayes. We obtain
the following structure:
∃sA¬
(
∃t (t ∈ [̂[ω]]q
′
andR|=(M, q, sA, t,yes))
)
iff
∃sA¬
⎛⎜⎜⎝∃tQ1s1Q2s2 . . . Qnsn (M t,s1,...,sn , q′ |= ϕ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ΔPr+1
and R|=(M, q, sA, t,yes)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈P
)
⎞⎟⎟⎠
SinceM t,s1,...,sn , q′ |= ϕ′ is invoked by a nondeterministic polynomial
Turing machine we can assume that its model checking problem can
be solved in ΣPr instead of ΔPr+1; the polynomial effort of the deter-
ministic machine can also be done by the invoking nondeterministic
machine. Hence to verifyM t,s1,...,sn , q′ |= ϕ′ witnesses according to
∃x1∀x2∃x3 . . . Qrxr
have to be guessed; then, the question whether ϕ is satisﬁed with re-
spect to the witnesses x1, . . . , xr can be solved in polynomial time.
Because RALT(Q1Q2 . . . Qn) = j it sufﬁces to guess witnesses according
to the following structure:
∀x′1∃x′2∀x′3 . . .∀x′j .
If Q1Q2 . . . Qn would start (resp. end) with existential quantiﬁers the
corresponding witnesses could be guessed together with the one for
proﬁle t (resp. witness x1). Putting things together the following wit-
nesses have to be guessed:
() ∃sA∀xt ∃x′1∀x′2∃x′3 . . .∃x′j ∀x1∃x2∀x3 . . . Q¯rxr
It remains to show that the number of alternations in () does never
exceed i + 2(k + 1)−max{0, (k + 1)− i− 1}
We distinguish two cases (k + 1)− i− 1 ≤ 0 and (k + 1)− i− 1 > 0.
Case: k + 1− i− 1 ≤ 0. That is, k ≤ i. We are going to determine the
maximal possible number of alternations in ().
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Firstly, assume that j ≥ 1. That is the number of alternation is
given by 2 + j + r = i + 2(k + 1) − max{0, k − i + j − 1}. This
expression ismaximal whenever k− i+ j− 1 ≤ 0. Because of k ≤ i
this is always the case for j = 1. In this case the formula has at
most
i + 2(k + 1)−max{k + 1− i− 1} alternations.
For j = 0 there is at least one alternation less, since the witness xt
can be guessed together with x1.
Case: k + 1− i− 1 > 0. That is, k > i. Firstly, we consider the case
j ≥ 1. There are atmost i+2(k+1)−max{0, k−i+j−1} alternations,
where the number becomes maximal for j = 1; i.e. we have at
most
i + 2(k + 1)−max{k + 1− i− 1} alternations.
Now, we consider the case j = 0. In this case there are at most
i+2(k+1)−1−max{0, k− i−1} alternations. Because of k > i, we
have that k− i−1 ≥ 0 and, hence i+2(k+1)−1−max{0, k− i−1}
is equivalent to i + 2(k + 1)−max{0, (k + 1)− i− 1}.
Thus, i+2(k+1)−max{k+1− i− 1} alternations denotes themaxi-
mal possible number of alternationswhich proofs our claim themodel
checking algorithm for level-i Lk+1ATLP can be performed in time
PΣ
P
i+2(k+1)−max{k+1−i−1} = ΔPi+2(k+1)+1−max{k+1−i−1}.

Theorem26: Letϕbe a level-i formula ofLkATLP (Agt,Π,Ω),M awell-behaved
CGSP, and q a state inM . Model checkingM, q |= ϕ is inΔPi+2(k+1)+1−max{0,k−i}.
Proof The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 25. In comparison to
the claim of Theorem 25, 2k has changed to 2(k + 1) and max{0, k − i − 1}
to max{0, k − i}. The reason for this is that the ﬁnal nesting (i.e. formu-
lae in LbaseATLP ) might contain hard-wired terms and it can not be veriﬁed
in polynomial time anymore. This causes the change from k to k + 1 (it
requires to guess sA and verify it against all responses t). However, now
the complexity might be increased too much since the ﬁnal strategy sA of
A could be guessed together with the next to last strategy t′ of the oppo-
nents (∃s′A¬(∃t′∃sA¬(∃t))) if there is no further alternation between t′ and
sA, caused by a plausibility term. Such an “interfering” alternation is only
possible if the given formula is at least an level-k formula; this is reﬂected by
max{0, k − i}. 
PSPACE-completeness of LkATLP Model Checking
We use quantiﬁed satisﬁability (QSAT) to show PSPACE-completeness of
model checking LkATLP and LATLP .
Deﬁnition 44 (QSAT [112])
Input: A boolean formula ϕ in conjunctive normal with i variables x1, . . . , xi.
Output: True if ∃x1∀x2 . . . Qixi ϕ is satisﬁable, false otherwise (where Q = ∀ if
i is even, andQ = ∃ if i is odd).
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Figure 5.15: Construction of the intermediate model M ′ϕ for ϕ ≡
∃x1∀x2∃x3((x1 ∧ x2) ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ x3).
Given an instance ϕ of QSAT we construct an L1ATLP formula θϕ and a
CGSPMϕ (both are constructible in polynomial space regarding the length
of ϕ) such that ϕ is satisﬁable if, and only if,Mϕ, q0 |= θϕ. In the following
we sketch the constructions which are based on the reduction of SNSAT2 to
model checking ATLuir proposed in Appendix 5.9.2, and the translation of
ATLuir to LATLPATLI proposed in Appendix 5.10.
Let ϕ ≡ ∃x1∀x2 . . . Qnxn ψ be an instance of QSAT. Firstly, we sketch the
construction of the CEGSM ′ϕ which will then be transformed into a CGSP
Mϕ. In comparison to the construction in Appendix 5.9.2, we consider n
agents one for each quantiﬁer (in fact, we consider max{2, n} agents; how-
ever, for the rest of this section we assume that n ≥ 2). The agent belong-
ing to quantiﬁer i is named ai. Except for the proposition states the proce-
dure is completely analogous to the construction given in Appendix 5.9.2
where agent a2 is considered as refuter and a1 as veriﬁer. (Alternatively, two
additional agents could be added.) The procedure at the proposition states
changes as follows: In such a state, say q, referring to a literal l, say l = xi,
agent ai can decide on the value of xi. Note again that the agent is required
to make the same choice in indistinguishable states. In Figure 5.15 the con-
struction is shown for the formulaϕ ≡ ∃x1∀x2∃x3((x1∧x2)∨¬x3)∧(¬x1∨x3).
Finally, the model Mϕ is obtained fromM ′ϕ by following the same steps as
described in Appendix 5.9.2.
Secondly, we construct formula θϕ from ϕ as follows:
θϕ ≡ (set-pl σ1.∀σ2∃σ3 . . . Qnσnχ)Pl 〈〈Agt〉〉 
where
χ ≡
⎛⎝ ∧
i=1,...,n
uniformiATLP (σi)
⎞⎠ ∧ (set-pl 〈σ1[1], . . . , σn[n]〉)Pl 〈〈∅〉〉yes.
Next, we will give the intuition behind θϕ. Firstly, it is easy to see that
Pl 〈〈Agt〉〉  is truewhenever the set of plausible strategyproﬁles isnot empty.
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Hence, the actual set of strategies described by the preceding (set-pl ·) oper-
ator is not particularly important, rather if some strategy is plausible or not.
Secondly, note that (set-pl 〈σ1[1], . . . , σn[n]〉) in χ describes a single strat-
egyproﬁle and that all individual strategies canbe considered independently
(the set is rectangular, cf. Deﬁnition 41 and Lemma 11). Furthermore, an in-
dividual strategy is mainly used to assign  or ⊥ to propositional variables
in the proposition states. (Except for agents a1 and a2 which also take on the
refuter and veriﬁer role; they can also perform actions in non-proposition
states.) Hence, a given strategy proﬁle can be seen as a valuation of the
propositional variables.
Thirdly, we analyze χwith respect to a given proﬁle σ := 〈σ1[1], . . . , σn[n]〉
taking into account the previous points. By formula uniformiATLP (σi) it is
ensured that agent i assigns the same valuation to propositions in indistin-
guishable states. Now, χ is true if the “winning state” q is reached by fol-
lowing the strategy described by σ (it describes a unique path in themodel).
In other words, χ is true if, and only if, the valuation described by σ satisﬁes
ϕ.
Finally, due to the previous observations, if ̂[[σ1.∀σ2∃σ3 . . . Qnσnχ]] is non-
empty it can be interpreted as follows: There is a valuation of x1 such that
for all valuations of x2 there is a valuation of x3, and so forth such that ϕ is
satisﬁed.
The following proposition states that the construction is correct.
Proposition 68 Let ϕ be a QSAT instance. Then it holds that ϕ is satisﬁable if,
and only if,Mϕ, q0 |= θϕ whereMϕ and θϕ are effectively constructible from ϕ in
polynomial space with respect to the length of the formula ϕ.
Proof sketch Let ϕ be a QSAT instance. We use the construction above to
obtainM ′ϕ and θϕ where uniform
i
ATLP (σ) is obtained as follows: Firstly, we
take the ATLI +K formula uniform(σ|i) (where σ|i refers to agent i’s startegy
in σ) as described in Appendix 5.10; then, we use the polynomial translation
to change knowledge to ability, yielding a pure ATLI formula. Finally, we
use the polynomial translation from ATLI to ATLP given in Section 5.5.1
(Proof of Proposition 49) to obtain a pure ATLP formula uniformiATLP (σ).
Hence, the latter formula is true if agent i’s strategy contained in the com-
plete proﬁle σ is a uniform strategy. This shows that θϕ can be constructed
in polynomial space.
Model Mϕ is obtained from M ′ϕ by the same scheme. Firstly, the con-
struction from [70] referred to in Appendix 5.10 is applied. Secondly, the
resulting CGS with intentions is transformed to a CGSP using the construc-
tion from Section 5.5.1 (Proposition 49) again. The constructed modelMϕ
is also polynomial with respect to ϕ.
We get that ϕ is satisﬁable if, and only if,Mϕ, q0 |= θϕ. 
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Chapter 6
Model Checking Abilities
of Agents: A Closer Look
(jointworkwith Ju¨rgen
Dix)
Abstract. Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) is a logic for rea-
soning about open computational systems andmulti-agent systems.
It is well known that ATL model checking is linear in the size of the
model. We point out, however, that the size of an ATL model is
usually exponential in the number of agents. When the size of mod-
els is deﬁned in terms of states and agents rather than transitions, it
turns out that the problem is (1)ΔP3 -complete for concurrent game
structures, and (2) ΔP2 -complete for alternating transition systems.
Moreover, for “Positive ATL” that allows for negation only on the
level of propositions, model checking is (1) ΣP2 -complete for con-
current game structures, and (2) NP-complete for alternating tran-
sition systems. We show a nondeterministic polynomial reduction
from checking arbitrary alternating transition systems to checking
turn-based transition systems, We also discuss the determinism as-
sumption in alternating transition systems, and show that it can be
easily removed.
In the second part of the paper, we study the model checking com-
plexity for formulae of ATL with imperfect information (ATLir). We
show that the problem is ΔP2 -complete in the number of transi-
tions and the length of the formula (thereby closing a gap in pre-
vious work of Schobbens [121]). Then, we take a closer look and
use the same ﬁne structure complexity measure as we did for ATL
with perfect information. We get the surprising result that checking
formulae of ATLir is alsoΔP3 -complete in the general case, and ΣP2 -
complete for “Positive ATLir”. Thus, model checking agents’ abili-
ties for both perfect and imperfect information systems belongs to
the same complexity class when a ﬁner-grained analysis is used.
Keywords: multi-agent systems, model checking, computational
complexity.
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6.1 Introduction
Alternating-time temporal logic [6, 7, 8] is one of themost interesting frame-
works that emerged recently for reasoning about computational systems.
One of the most appreciated features of ATL is its model checking complex-
ity: linear in the size of the model (more precisely, in the number of transitions
in themodel) and the size of the formula. Thus, the complexity is the same as
for computation tree logic CTL (despite ATL being strictly more expressive
thanCTL).While the result is certainly attractive, it guarantees less thanone
could expect. We point out that, unlike in CTL, the number of transitions
outgoing from a single global state in an ATL model is usually exponential
in the number of agents. While it is well-known that the number of states
in a model can be exponential in the size of a higher-level description of
the system, it also turns out that the size of an explicit ATL model is usually
exponential in the number of agents, even when no higher level description is
considered.
Following this observation, we study the precise ATL model checking
complexity for explicit models when the size of models is deﬁned in terms of
states rather than transitions, and the number of agents is considered a param-
eter of the problem. In fact, we show that the model checking problem is
intractable in such a setting of input parameters. Firstly, it turns out that
the problem isΣP2 -complete for the language of “Positive ATL” (where nega-
tion is allowed only on the level of propositions) and the semantics based
on concurrent game structures (CGS). Secondly, model checking “Positive
ATL” is “only” NP-complete when an earlier semantics, based on alternat-
ing transition systems (ATS), is used. Using our ideas, Laroussinie et al. [95]
have proved that model checking formulae of the full ATL isΔP3 -complete
for CGS, andΔP2 -complete for ATS; we cite their results, too.1
Additionally, we point out that ATL model checking over the broader
class of nondeterministic alternating transition systems is stillΔP2 -complete
for the full language, and NP-complete for the “positive” sublanguage—
which suggests that using themore general class of ATSmaybe a good choice
in practice.
The results mentioned above apply to general, arbitrary models (be it
CGS or ATS). On the other hand,model checking ATL for turn-basedmodels
(i.e., those in which only one agent/process at a time is executing an action)
can still be done in deterministic polynomial time. We show how, for an
arbitrary alternating transition system M , a turn-based system M ′ can be
constructed, so that a combination of choices inM corresponds to a combi-
nationof strategies in a fragment ofM ′. We thenpropose a translationofATL
formulae into ATL+ formulae, such that the original formula holds inM, q
iff the translated formula holds inM ′, q. Finally, we point out that the latter
can bemodel-checked in timeΔP2 (respectivelyNP for “Positive ATL”), and
1A note of explanation. ΔP2 = P
NP is the class of problems that can be solved by a deter-
ministic Turingmachine in polynomial timewith adaptive calls to anNP oracle.ΣP2 = NP
NP
is the class of problems that can be solved by a nondeterministic Turing machine in polynomial
time with calls to anNP oracle. ΔP3 = P
ΣP2 is the class of problems that can be solved by a
deterministic Turingmachine in polynomial time with adaptive calls to aΣP2 oracle [112, 13].
Contrary to what the index suggests,ΔPi+1 belongs still to the i-th level of the polynomial
hierarchy.
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thus provide another (slightlymore general) proof that the original problem
is inΔP3 (resp. ΣP2 for “Positive ATL”). The translation of models is indepen-
dent from the translation of formulae in our construction, which allows for
“pre-compiling” models when one wants to check various properties of a
particular multi-agent system.
The last part of the paper is concernedwithATLwith imperfect information
(ATLir), introduced by Schobbens in [121]. Since no satisfying semantics
based on alternating transition systems for strategic abilities under imper-
fect information has been proposed so far, we present our results for an epis-
temic extension of concurrent game structures only. First, we close a gap in
Schobbens’s results, and show that model checking ATLir formulae isΔP2 -
complete with respect to the number of transitions in the model and the
lengthof the formula (thus conﬁrming the initial intuitionof Schobbens [121]).
We also show that the problem isNP-complete for “Positive ATLir”. Next,
we demonstrate thatmodel checking ATLir isΔP3 -complete when the size of
models is deﬁned in terms of states and agents rather than transitions (and
ΣP2 -complete for “Positive ATLir” in the same setting). We point out that the
result is somewhat surprising: checking abilities of agents acting under imperfect
information falls into the same complexity class as checking abilities of agents in
perfect information scenarioswhen a ﬁner-grained analysis is used.
This article is organised as follows. In Section 6.2 we introduce ATL and
its semantics. Several variants of this logic are considered and the notions
of perfect and imperfect information in these systems are precisely deﬁned.
Section 6.3 presents known and new results on the complexity of model
checking ATL with concurrent game structures. In Section 6.4 we consider
model checking ATLwith alternating transition systems. We also show that
the usual singleton requirement in ATS can be relaxed without affecting the
complexity. In Section 6.5 we relate general ATS and turn-based systems.
Section 6.6 contains our main results with respect to agents with imperfect
information. They suggest, rather surprisingly, that there is nomajor differ-
ence in the model checking complexity between games of perfect and im-
perfect information. We conclude with Section 6.7.
6.1.1 History of the Results
This article is based onpreliminary results presented in a series of conference
papers [78, 79, 80]. In [78] we consideredmodel checking of ATL, observing
(correctly) that the “perceived” size of ATL models is very sensitive to the
measure one applies (much more so than CTL models). We concluded that
the model checking problem was ΣP2 -complete for CGS, andNP-complete
for ATS. Unfortunately, these claims were incorrect, as Laroussinie, Markey
andOreiby pointed out in [95]. The error was related to the way we handled
negation inourmodel checking algorithms. Laroussinie and colleagues used
our ideas to obtain the correct results, namely to prove that ATLmodel check-
ing is ΔP3 -complete for concurrent game structures, and ΔP2 -complete for
alternating transition systems [95]. Still, they observed that our algorithms
were correct for “PositiveATL” – i.e., ATLwithoutnegated cooperationmodal-
ities. We summarize all the relevant results in Section 6.3 of this paper, to get
the complete picture.
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Another paper [79], wherewe reported complexity results onmodel check-
ing ATLir, suffered from the error mentioned above. Again, our claims were
correct for “PositiveATLir”, but incorrect formodel checkingof the full logic.
In Section6.6.2, wepresent an entirelynew result, proving thatmodel check-
ing of full ATLir is ΔP2 -hard (and hence, by Schobbens’s result [121], also
ΔP2 -complete) with respect to the number of transitions in themodel. Then
we use the results, obtained by Laroussinie et al. for ATL [95], to establish
the precise model checking complexity of ATLir with respect to the number
of states and agents.
6.2 ATL: A Logic of Strategic Ability
The logic of ATL [6, 7, 8] was originally invented to capture properties of
open computer systems (such as computer networks), where different compo-
nents can act autonomously, and computations in such systems result from
their combined actions. Alternatively, ATL can be seen as a logic for systems
involving multiple agents, that allows one to reason about what agents can
achieve in game-like scenarios. ATL can be also understood as a generalisa-
tion of the well-known branching time logic CTL [39, 38], in which path
quantiﬁers E (“there is a path”) and A (“for each path”) are replaced by co-
operation modalities 〈〈A〉〉 that express strategic abilities of agents and their
teams.
Formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ expresses that agents A have a collective strategy to en-
forceϕ. ATL formulae include temporal operators: “ ” (“in thenext state”),
 (“always fromnowon”) and U (“until”). An additional operator (“some-
time from now on”) can be deﬁned asϕ ≡ U ϕ. Like in CTL, every occur-
rence of a temporal operator is preceded by exactly one cooperation modal-
ity (this variant of the language is sometimes called “vanilla”ATL). Thebroa-
der language of ATL∗, in which no such restriction is imposed, is discussed
brieﬂy in Section 6.2.3.
Formally, the recursive deﬁnition of ATL formulae is:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ.
“Positive ATL” is the subset of ATL in which the use of negation is lim-
ited to propositional formulae. Formally, it can be deﬁned by the following
grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ.
Anumber of different semantics andmodel classes have been deﬁned for
ATL, most of them equivalent (cf. [51, 52]). Among these, concurrent game
structures [8] are probably themost natural and easiest to comeupwithwhen
modeling concrete problem domains. Moreover, they are the easiest to ex-
tend to the imperfect information case, because actions have global identity
in concurrent game structures (cf. [66]). However, it seems that alternating
transition systems, introduced in the more preliminary papers [6, 7] may of-
fer some advantage in terms of model checking complexity (see the results
in Sections 6.3 and 6.4).
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Inwhat follows,webeginwith a brief presentationof the twomost promi-
nent semantics, based on concurrent game structures and alternating tran-
sition systems. In Section 6.2.4, we are extending the scope of ATL with the
possibility that some agents have imperfect information about the current
state of the world. Research on this subject is far from being complete, yet
a number of ATL extensions have already been proposed to cope with such
systems: from the logics of ATEL [133, 134] and “ATL with incomplete infor-
mation” [8] to more sophisticated approaches like ATOL and ATEL-R∗ [83],
ATLir and ATLiR [121], ETSL [135], and CSL [73]. Among these, ATLir seems
to stand out for its simplicity and conceptual clarity; also (unlike for logics of
agents with perfect recall, e.g. ATEL-R∗ and ATLiR), its model checking pro-
cedure is decidable. We believe that ATLir, while probably not the deﬁnitive
ATL extension for games with imperfect information,2 includes constructs
that are indispensable when addressing such games. Thus, we treat ATLir
as a kind of “core” ATL-based language for strategic ability under imperfect
information, and present its syntax and semantics in Section 6.2.4.
6.2.1 StrategicAbilitieswithConcurrentGameStruc-
tures
Concurrent game structures (CGS) [8], can be deﬁned as tuples
M = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o〉,
where:
• Agt = {a1, ..., ak} is a ﬁnite nonempty set of all agents,
• St is a nonempty set of states,
• Π is a set of atomic propositions,
• π : Π → 2St is a valuation of propositions,
• Act is a ﬁnite nonempty set of (atomic) actions;
• function d : Agt × St → 2Act deﬁnes actions available to an agent in a
state, and
• o is a (deterministic) transition function that assigns outcome states
q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to states and tuples of actions.
Remark 25 Firstly, this variant of concurrent game structures differs slightly
from the original CGS [8]: we represent agents and their actions with symbolic
labels, whereas in [8] they are represented with natural numbers.
Secondly, determinism is not a crucial issue here, as systems with nondeter-
ministic outcome of agents’ actions can be modeled easily by introducing a new,
ﬁctional agent, “nature”, which settles all nondeterministic transitions.
2ATOL, for example, is strictly more expressive with the samemodel checking complexity.
6.2. ATL: A LOGIC OF STRATEGIC ABILITY 174
A strategy of agent a is a conditional plan that speciﬁes what a is going to
do in each possible state. Thus, a strategy can be representedwith a function
sa : St → Act, such that sa(q) ∈ da(q). A collective strategy for a group of
agents A = {a1, ..., ar} is simply a tuple of strategies SA = 〈sa1 , ..., sar 〉, one
per agent fromA.
Remark 26 This is an important deviation from the original semantics of ATL [6,
7, 8], where strategies assign agents’ choices to sequences of states, which suggests
that agents can recall the whole history of each game. In this article, however, we
employ “memoryless” strategies. While the choice of one or another notion of strat-
egy affects the semantics of the full ATL∗, and most ATL extensions (e.g. for games
with imperfect information), it should be pointed out that both types of strategies
yield equivalent semantics for “pure” ATL [121].
A path in M is an inﬁnite sequence of states that can result from sub-
sequent transitions, and refers to a possible course of action (or a possible
computation). Function out(q, SA) returns the set of all paths that may oc-
cur when agentsA execute strategy SA from state q onward:3
out(q, SA) = {λ = q0q1q2... | q0 = q and for each i = 1, 2, ... there exists a tuple
of agents’ decisions 〈αi−1a1 , ..., αi−1ak 〉 st. αi−1a ∈ da(qi−1) for every a ∈ Agt,
and αi−1a ∈ SA(a)(qi−1) for every a ∈ A, and o(qi−1, αi−1a1 , ..., αi−1ak ) = qi}.
Let λ[i] denote the ith position in computation λ (starting from i = 0).
The semantics of ATL is deﬁned via the clauses below. Informally speaking,
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉Φ iff there exists a collective strategy SA such that Φ holds for all
computations from out(q, SA).
M, q |= p iff q ∈ π(p) (where p ∈ Π);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q |= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∨ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ orM, q |= ψ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ iff there is a collective strategySA such that, for eachpath
λ ∈ out(SA, q), we haveM,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for each λ ∈ out(SA, q), we
haveM,λ[i] |= ϕ for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there exists SA such that, for each λ ∈ out(SA, q),
there is i ≥ 0 for whichM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for each 0 ≤ j < i.
Example 33 Consider amodiﬁed version of the Simple RocketDomain from [18].
There is a rocket that can bemoved between London (roL) and Paris (roP), and piece
of cargo that can lie in London (caL), Paris (caP), or inside the rocket (caR). Three
agents are involved: 1who can load the cargo, unload it, or move the rocket; 2who
can unload the cargo or move the rocket, and 3who can load the cargo or supply the
rocket with fuel. Each agent can also stay idle at a particular moment (the nop –
“no-operation” actions). The “moving” action has the highest priority. “Loading”
3The notation SA(a) stands for the strategy sa of agent a in the tuple SA = 〈sa1 , ..., sar 〉.
175 CHAPTER 6. MODEL CHECKING ABILITIES OF AGENTS
nofuel
roL
caR
fuelOK nofuel fuelOK
nofuel fuelOK nofuel fuelOK
nofuel fuelOK nofuel fuelOK
1
5 6
2
3 4
87
9 10 1211
roL roP
roL roL
roLroL
roP
roP roP
roP
roP
caL caL caLcaL
caR caR caR
caP caP caP caP
< >load ,nop ,fuel1 2
< >unload ,unload ,fuel1 2
< >nop ,nop ,nop1 2 3
< >load ,unload ,nop1 2 3
< >nop ,unload ,load1 2 3
< >unload ,unload ,nop1 2 3
< >unload ,nop ,nop1 2 3
< >unload ,nop ,fuel1 2
< >load ,unload ,fuel1 2
< >nop ,nop ,fuel1 2
< >nop ,unload ,fuel1 2
< >nop ,nop ,load1 2 3
< >load ,nop ,load1 2 3
< >load ,unload ,load1 2 3
< >load ,nop ,nop1 2 3
Figure 6.1: A CGS for Simple Rocket Domain
is executed when the rocket does not move and more agents try to load than to un-
load; “unloading”works in a similar way (in a sense, the agents “vote” whether the
cargo should be loaded or unloaded). Finally, “fueling” can be accomplished only
when the rocket tank is empty (alone or in parallel with loading or unloading). The
rocket can move only if it has some fuel (fuelOK), and the fuel must be reﬁlled after
each ﬂight. The concurrent game structure for the domain is shown in Figure 6.1
(we will refer to this model asM1). All the transitions for state 1 (the cargo and the
rocket are in London, no fuel in the rocket) are labeled; output of agents’ choices for
other states is analogous.
Example ATL formulae that hold inM1, 1 are: ¬〈〈1〉〉caP (agent 1 cannot de-
liver the cargo to Paris on his own), 〈〈1, 3〉〉caP (1 and 3 can deliver the cargo if
they cooperate), and 〈〈2, 3〉〉(roL ∧ 〈〈2, 3〉〉roP) (2 and 3 can keep the rocket in
London forever, and at the same time retain the ability to change their strategy and
move the rocket to Paris).
It is worth pointing out that the CTL path quantiﬁers A and E can be
embedded in ATL in the following way: Aϕ ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉ϕ and Eϕ ≡ 〈〈Agt〉〉ϕ.
Note that the determinism of the transition function is essential for the lat-
ter property. In a deterministic system, a collective strategy for the “grand
coalition” of agents Agt determines a single path in the model. In contrast,
this is usually not the case in non-deterministic systems. Thus, itmay be the
case that there is a single path for which property ϕ holds (i.e., we have Eϕ),
and yet the agents are not able to enforce it, so 〈〈Agt〉〉ϕ does not hold.
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On the other hand, Aϕ is equivalent to 〈〈∅〉〉ϕ even when we abandon
the determinism assumption (to see this, it is sufﬁcient to check what the
semantic clauses for 〈〈∅〉〉 ϕ, 〈〈∅〉〉ϕ and 〈〈∅〉〉ϕU ψ look like). This allows
us to deﬁne E ϕ as ¬〈〈∅〉〉 ¬ϕ, Eϕ as ¬〈〈∅〉〉¬ϕ, and Eϕ as ¬〈〈∅〉〉¬ϕ.
Still, as demonstrated in [94], EϕU ψ cannot be expressed with any combi-
nation of the above operators.4
6.2.2 Semantics of ATL Based onATS
Previous versions of ATLwere deﬁned over alternating transition systems [6,
7]. An alternating transition system (ATS) is a tuple
M = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, δ〉,
where:
• Agt is a non-empty ﬁnite set of agents, St is a non-empty set of states,
Π is a set of (atomic) propositions, and π : St → 2Π is a valuation of
propositions;
• δ : St × Agt → 22St is a function that maps pairs 〈state, agent〉 to non-
empty families of choices with respect to possible next states. The idea
is that, at state q, agent a chooses a set Qa ∈ δ(q, a) thus forcing the
outcome state to be from Qa. The resulting transition leads to a state
which is in the intersection of all Qa for a ∈ Agt and so it reﬂects the
will of all agents. Since the system is required to be deterministic (given
the state and the agents’ decisions), Qa1 ∩ ... ∩ Qak must always be a
singleton.
In anATS, the type of a strategy function is slightly different since choices
are sets of states now, and a strategy is represented as amapping sa : St→ 2St,
such that sa(q) ∈ δ(q, a). The rest of the semantics looks exactly the same as
for concurrent game structures. In particular, the semantic clauses are ex-
actly the same as the ones in Section 6.2.1.
Example 34 Consider ATS M2 from Figure 6.2. We use symbols α1, α2 and
β1, β2 as shorthands for the choices, to make the example easier to read. The fol-
lowing ATL formulae hold inM2, q0: ¬〈〈a〉〉p2 (a cannot enforce that p2 is even-
tually true), 〈〈a, b〉〉p1 (a and b can cooperate to guarantee that p1 always holds),
and 〈〈a〉〉 (p1 ∨ p2) (a can achieve p1 ∨ p2 in the next step).
Note that M2 is not “tight” in the sense that some choices include states that
cannot be reached via these choices. It can be tightened by removing q1 from the
choices in δ(q1, a), δ(q2, b) and δ(q3, b), which yields an equivalent tight ATS. We
discuss the notion of tightness in Section 6.4.1 more formally.
It is worth pointing out that alternating transition systems are usually
less natural andmore difﬁcult to come upwith than concurrent game struc-
tures; they are also larger in most cases (cf. [67], Section 2.7.4). More pre-
cisely: for each ATS there exists an isomorphic CGS, but the reverse does not
hold. Moreover, alternating transition systems do not allow easily for exten-
sions (e.g. with the possibility that agentsmayhave imperfect information).
This subject is discussed inmore detail in [66, 52, 67].
4See also Remark 28, and the expressivity results from [95].
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Π = {p1, p2}
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δ(q0, a) = {{q0, q1},{q2, q3}}
β1 β2
δ(q0, b) = {{q0, q2},{q1, q3}}
δ(q1, b) = δ(q2, a) = δ(q3, a) = {{q0}}
δ(q1, a) = δ(q2, b) = δ(q3, b) = {{q0, q1}}
Figure 6.2: Alternating transition system M2: two agents, each has two
choices at state q0
Remark 27 Note that the determinism assumption is signiﬁcant in the case of
ATS. Unlike for CGS, adding an auxiliary player (“nature”) to an existing alternat-
ing transition system is neither easy nor straightforward. The problem is to extend
the existing choice function δ so that it still satisﬁes the rigid formal requirement
that all the intersections of choices are singletons. Designing a completely newATS
from scratch is probably an easier solution.
We note here that model checking of ATL formulae has been proved to
be linear in the size of the model and the length of the formula for both
concurrent game structures [8] and alternating transition systems [7], which
coincides with themodel checking complexity for CTL [30]. Wewill discuss
this issue inmore detail in Section 6.3.1.
6.2.3 BeyondATL: ATL+ andATL∗
The full language of ATL∗ [7, 8] is usually presented as consisting of
1. state formulae 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, expressing strategic abilities of agents to enforce
speciﬁc paths of computation, and
2. path formulae ϕ and ϕU ψ, expressing temporal properties of paths.
Both state and path formulae can be combined using Boolean operators.
State formulae are interpreted in states, withM, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕmeaning “there
is SA such that, for each path λ ∈ out(q, SA), we haveM,λ |= ϕ”. Path for-
mulae are interpreted in paths, withM,λ |= ϕ andM,λ |= ϕU ψ deﬁned
in the obvious way.
ATL∗ is more costly in computational terms. Model checking ATL∗ with
memoryless strategies (i.e., the variant that we are interested in here) is
PSPACE-complete [121]. Model checking ATL∗ with perfect recall is even
more expensive: it is 2EXPTIME-complete in the number of transitions in
themodel and the length of the formula [8].
In this article, we are only interested in its subset ATL+ [121], in which
each temporal operator is preceded by a single cooperation modality, mod-
ulo Boolean operators. That is, 〈〈A〉〉 is followed by a Boolean combination
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of path formulae ϕ, ϕU ψ, in which ϕ,ψ are state formulae again. As an
example, the following is an ATL+ formula: 〈〈a〉〉((p1 ∨ p2) ∧ p1). It states
that a has a strategy to visit state q0 at least once, while staying in states q0, q1
all the time (note, by the way, that the formula holds inM2, q0 from Exam-
ple 34).
ATL+ can be seen as a generalisation of CTL+ [40]. Model checking of
ATL+ has been proved Δ3-complete in the number of transitions and the
lengthof the formula (for bothmemoryless andperfect recall strategies) [121],
while CTL+ model checking is Δ2-complete [96]. However, the ATL+ and
CTL+ formulae that we use in this article can be model checked in nonde-
terministic polynomial time (cf. Section 6.5.2).
6.2.4 StrategicAbilitiesunder Imperfect Information
ATL and its models include no way of addressing uncertainty that an agent
or a process may have about the current situation; moreover, strategies in
ATL can deﬁne different choices for any pair of different states, hence im-
plying that an agent can recognise each (global) state of the system, and act
accordingly. Thus, it can be argued that the logic is tailored for describing
and analyzing systems in which every agent/process has complete and accu-
rate knowledge about the current state of the system. This is usually not the
case for most application domains, where a process can access its local state,
but the state of the environment and the (local) states of other agents can be
observed only partially.
One of the main challenges, when a logic of strategic abilities under im-
perfect information is addressed, is the question of how agents’ knowledge
should interferewith the agents’ available strategies. When reasoning about
what an agent can enforce, it seems more appropriate to require the agent
to know his winning strategy rather than to know only that such a strat-
egy exists [66, 83, 86]. This problem is closely related to the distinction be-
tween knowledge de re and knowledge de dicto, well known in the philos-
ophy of language [117], as well as in research on the interaction between
knowledge and action [105, 106, 143]. Several variations on “ATL with im-
perfect information” have been proposed [83, 121, 86, 135, 73], yet none
of them has been commonly accepted. In this article, we treat Schobbens’
ATLir and ATLiR [121] as “core”, minimal ATL-based languages for strategic
ability under imperfect information. The ﬁrst logic enables reasoning about
agents that have no implicit memory of the game (i.e., they use “memory-
less” strategies), while the latter is guided by the assumption that agents can
always memorise the whole game. As agents seldom have unlimited mem-
ory, and logics of strategic ability with imperfect information and perfect
recall are believed to have undecidable model checking, we use ATLir as the
logic of strategic ability under uncertainty here.
ATLir includes the same formulae as ATL, only the cooperation modali-
ties are presentedwith a subscript: 〈〈A〉〉
ir
to indicate that they address agents
with imperfect information and imperfect recall. Like for ATL, “Positive ATLir”
is the subset of ATLir inwhich the use of negation is limited to propositional
formulae. Models of ATLir, imperfect information concurrent game structures
(i-CGS), can be presented as concurrent game structures augmented with a
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Figure 6.3: Gambling Robots game
family of indistinguishability relations ∼a⊆ St × St, one per agent a ∈ Agt.
The relations describe agents’ uncertainty: q ∼a q′ means that, while the
system is in state q, agent a considers it possible that it is in q′ now. Each
∼a is assumed to be an equivalence. It is required that agents have the same
choices in indistinguishable states: if q ∼a q′ then d(a, q) = d(a, q′).
Again, a strategy of an agent a is a conditional plan that speciﬁes what a is
going to do in each possible state. An executable (deterministic) plan must
prescribe the same choices for indistinguishable states. Therefore ATLir re-
stricts the strategies that can be used by agents to the set of so called uniform
strategies. A uniform strategy of an agent a is deﬁned as a function sa : St →
Act, such that: (1) sa(q) ∈ d(a, q), and (2) if q ∼a q′ then sa(q) = sa(q′).
A collective strategy for a group of agents A = {a1, ..., ar} is a tuple of strate-
gies SA = 〈sa1 , ..., sar 〉, one per each agent from A. A collective strategy is
uniform if it contains only uniform individual strategies. Again, function
out(q, SA) returns the set of all paths thatmay result fromagentsA executing
strategy SA from state q onward. The semantics of cooperationmodalities in
ATLir is deﬁned as follows:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
ir
ϕ iff there is a uniform collective strategy SA such that,
for each a ∈ A, q′ such that q ∼a q′, and path λ ∈ out(SA, q′), we have
M,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
ir
ϕ iff there exists a uniform SA such that, for each a ∈ A,
q′ such that q ∼a q′, and λ ∈ out(SA, q′), we haveM,λ[i] |= ϕ for each
i ≥ 0;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
ir
ϕU ψ iff there exist a uniform strategy SA such that, for each
a ∈ A, q′ such that q ∼a q′, and λ ∈ out(SA, q′), there is i ≥ 0 for which
M,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for each 0 ≤ j < i.
That is, 〈〈A〉〉irϕ if agents A have a uniform strategy, such that for each
path that can possibly result from execution of the strategy according to at least
one agent fromA, ϕ is the case.
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Example 35 (Gambling robots) Two robots (a and b) play a simple card
game. The deck consists of Ace, King andQueen (A,K,Q). Normally, it is assumed
that A is the best card, K the second best, and Q the worst. Therefore A beats K
and Q, K beats Q, and Q beats no card. At the beginning of the game, the “envi-
ronment” agent deals a random card to both robots (face down), so that each player
can see his own hand, but he does not know the card of the other player. Then robot
a can exchange his card for the one remaining in the deck (action exch), or he can
keep the current one (keep). At the same time, robot b can change the priorities of
the cards, so thatQ becomes better thanA (action chg) or he can do nothing (nop),
i.e. leave the priorities unchanged. If a has a better card than b after that, then a
win is scored, otherwise the game ends in a “losing” state. A CGSM1 for the game
is shown in Figure 6.3.
It is easy to see that M1, q0 |= ¬〈〈a〉〉irwin, because, for each a’s (uniform)
strategy, if it guarantees a win in e.g. state qAK then it fails in qAQ (and simi-
larly for other pairs of indistinguishable states). Let us also observe thatM1, q0 |=
¬〈〈a, b〉〉irwin: in order to win, amust exchange his card in state qQK , so he must
exchange his card in qQA too (by uniformity), and playing exch in qQA leads to
the losing state. On the other hand,M1, qAQ |= 〈〈a, b〉〉ir win (a winning strategy:
sa(qAK) = sa(qAQ) = sa(qKQ) = keep, sb(qAQ) = sb(qKQ) = sb(qAK) = nop;
qAK , qAQ, qKQ are the states that must be considered by a and b in qAQ). Still,
M1, qAK |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉ir win.
Schobbens [121] proved that ATLir model checking isNP-hard andΔP2 -
easy. He also conjectured that the problem might be ΔP2 -complete. We
discuss the issue in more detail, and formally conﬁrm his intuition in Sec-
tion 6.6.
Remark 28 The CTL universal path quantiﬁer A can be expressed in ATLir in
the following way: Aϕ ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉
ir
ϕ. The existential path quantiﬁer E, however, is
not fully expressible when cooperation modalities quantify over uniform strategies
only. Like for non-deterministic models, it may be the case that there is a single
path for which property ϕ holds (i.e., we have Eϕ), and yet even the “grand coali-
tion” of agentsAgt is not able to enforce it (becauseAgt can now use only uniform
strategies), so 〈〈Agt〉〉
ir
ϕ does not hold. Moreover, EϕU ψ cannot be expressed as
a combination of AϕU ψ, Eϕ, Eϕ, Aϕ, E ϕ, and A ϕ (cf. [94], and the
remark at the end of Section 6.2.1).
6.3 Complexity of ATL Model Checking Re-
visited
Themodel checkingproblemasks, givenmodelM , state q inM , and formula
ϕ, whether ϕ holds in M, q. Model checking of temporal logics is usually
computationally cheaper than satisﬁability checking or theorem proving,
while often being at least as useful because the designer or user of a system
can come up with a precise model of the system behaviour (e.g. a graph
with all the actions that may be executed) in many cases. For ATL, model
checking has been proved linear in the size of the models and formulae. This
seems to be a very good property, but unfortunately it guarantees less than
one could expect.
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functionmcheck1(M,ϕ).
Returns the set of states in modelM = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, o〉 for which formula ϕ
holds.
case ϕ ∈ Π : return π(p)
case ϕ = ¬ψ : return St \mcheck1(M,ψ)
case ϕ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2 : returnmcheck1(M,ψ1) ∪mcheck1(M,ψ2)
case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉 ψ : return pre1(M,A,mcheck1(M,ψ))
case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ :
Q1 := St; Q2 := mcheck1(M,ψ); Q3 := Q2;
whileQ1 ⊆ Q2
do Q1 := Q2; Q2 := pre1(M,A,Q1) ∩Q3 od;
returnQ1
case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2 :
Q1 := ∅; Q2 := mcheck1(M,ψ1);
Q3 := mcheck1(M,ψ2);
whileQ3 ⊆ Q1
do Q1 := Q1 ∪Q3; Q3 := pre1(M,A,Q1) ∩Q2 od;
returnQ1
end case
function pre1(M,A,Q).
Auxiliary function; returns the exact set of states Q′ such that, when the
system is in a state q ∈ Q′, agentsA can cooperate and enforce the next state
to be inQ.
return {q | ∃αA∀αAgt\A o(q, αA, αAgt\A) ∈ Q}
Figure 6.4: The ATLmodel checking algorithm from [8]
6.3.1 Model Checking ATL: Easy or Hard?
It has been known for a long time that formulae of CTL can be checked in
time linear with respect to the size of the model and the length of the for-
mula [30]. One of the main results concerning ATL states that its formulae
can also be model-checked in deterministic linear time.
Proposition 69 ([7, 8]) The ATLmodel checking problem is PTIME-complete,
and can be done in timeO(ml), wherem is the number of transitions in the model
and l is the length of the formula.
The ATL model checking algorithm from [7, 8] is presented in Figure 6.4.
While the result is certainly attractive, it should be kept inmind that it is
only relative to the size of models and formulae, and these can be very large
for most application domains. Indeed, it is well known that the number
of states in a model is usually exponential in the size of a higher-level de-
scription of the problem domain for both CTL and ATL models. Consider,
for example, a system whose state space is deﬁned by r Boolean variables
(binary attributes). Obviously, the number of global states in the system is
n = 2r. A more general approach is presented in [92], where the “higher
level description” is deﬁned in terms of so called concurrent programs, that
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can be used for simulating Boolean variables, but also processes or agents
acting in parallel. Each concurrent program C = 〈C1, ..., Ck〉 implicitly gen-
erates a system of global states which is deﬁned as the product automaton
of C. The main result concerning model checking is that checking CTL for-
mulae isPSPACE-complete in the size of the concurrent program (and the
length of the formula) [92].5
Thus, there are basically two kinds of results regarding model checking
CTL and ATL. On the one hand, the problem is computationally easy with
respect to CTL/ATL models one uses when deﬁning semantics (sometimes
called global state graphs [30] or explicit models [102]). On the other hand,
the problem is very hard with respect tomore compact representations (e.g.
concurrent programs), mainly because these representations unravel into
exponentially large explicitmodels. As a concurrent programmaybe seen as
a system involving k agents, this already shows that having multiple agents
can make models (and model checking) explode with respect to a high level
description. What we point out in this article is that the complexity ofO(ml)
includes potential intractability even on the level of explicit models if the size of
models is deﬁned in terms of states rather than transitions, and the number
of agents is a parameter of the problem rather than a ﬁxed value. We state
the observation formally as follows.
Remark 29 Let n be the number of states in an explicit ATL model M . It was
already observed in [8] that the number of transitions inM is not bounded by n2,
because transitions are labeled with tuples of agents’ choices. Here, we make the
observation more precise.
Let k denote the number of agents, and d the maximal number of available
decisions per agent per state. Then,m = O(ndk). In consequence, the ATL model
checking algorithms from [7, 8] run in timeO(ndkl), and hence their complexity is
exponential if the number of agents is a parameter of the problem.
Example 33 is quite illustrative in this respect. The state space refers to
valuations of only three attributes (twobinary, andone ternary), whichyields
12 states. And the number of transitions is already 216, despite the fact that
the system includes only three agents, and each agent has only two or three
actions available at each state.
Remark 30 Note that, for turn-based models, only one agent is playing at a
time, so the number of transitions isO(nd), and hence model checking can be done
in timeO(ndl).
Throughout the rest of Section 6.3, we report results on the complex-
ity of model checking ATL formulae over concurrent game structures, with
n, k, d, l as input parameters. We show that the problem is ΣP2 -complete for
“Positive ATL”, and we cite [95], where model checking of full ATL is proved
to be ΔP3 -complete. The results seem natural as soon as we re-formulate
M, q |= 〈〈a1, ..., ar〉〉 ϕ as ∃(α1, ..., αr)∀(αr+1, ..., αk) M,o(q, α1, ..., αk) |= ϕ
which bears close resemblance to the problem of QSAT2. Before we discuss
them formally, however, wemust make onemore important remark.
5We also note in passing that, for some high-level system descriptions, even the computa-
tion of 〈〈A〉〉 may requirePSPACE, or evenNEXPTIME [34, 35], but these results are not
relevant for our discussion here.
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Remark 31 Note that the transition function omust be kept external to themodel
checking algorithm, or represented in a somehow “compressed” way. Otherwise
the algorithm requires exponential amount of memory to store the function, and in
consequence the problem is not even in PSPACE.
One way to achieve this is to assume that the transition function is imple-
mented as an external procedure (more precisely: deterministic Turing machine)
that, given state q and actions α1, ..., αk, returns the value of o(q, α1, ..., αk) in
polynomial time.
Another way is to represent transitions in amore compact way. Laroussinie and
colleagues (after an idea that we developed in [78]) propose the notion of an im-
plicit concurrent game structure. An implicit CGS [95] is a CGS where, in each
state q, the transition is deﬁned by a ﬁnite sequence ((ϕ1, q1), ..., (ϕn, qn)). In the
sequence, each qi is a state, and each ϕi is a boolean combination of propositions
αˆa, where α ∈ d(a, q); αˆa stands for “agent a chooses action α”. The transition
function is now deﬁned as follows:
o(q, α1, ..., αk) = qi iff i is the lowest index such that {αˆ11, ..., αˆkk} |= ϕi.
It is required that ϕn ≡ , so that no agent can enforce a deadlock. Every CGS can
be encoded as an implicit CGS, with each ϕi being of polynomial size with respect
to the number of states and actions [95].
6.3.2 “PositiveATL”ModelCheckingforCGS isΣP2 -hard
Firstly, we show that model checking of “positive” ATL formulae over con-
current game structures is ΣP2 -hard. We show this through a polynomial
reduction of QSAT2 to the model checking problem.
Deﬁnition 45 (QSATi) The satisﬁability of quantiﬁed Boolean formulae with
i alternations of quantiﬁers is deﬁned as follows.
Input: k propositional variables p1, ..., pk (partitioned into i sets P1, ..., Pi), and
a Boolean formula θ that includes no other variables.
Problem: QSATi asks if ∃P1∀P2∃P3 . . .ΔPi θ (whereΔ = ∀ if i is even, and ∃ if
i is odd), i.e. whether there is a valuation of propositions in P1 such that, for
all valuations of propositions in P2, there exists a valuation of propositions
in P3 etc., such that θ is satisﬁed.
We use θ as a symbol for the Boolean formula that appears in QSATi, to dis-
tinguish it from the ATL formula in the model checking problem which we
usually denote by ϕ. QSATi is known to beΣPi -complete [112]. Obviously, in
QSAT2, we have only two sets of variables: P1 and P2.
To obtain the reduction, we construct a concurrent game structure M
with 3 states: St = {q0, q, q⊥}, and k agents: Agt = {a1, ..., ak} that “de-
cide” at q0 upon valuations of propositions p1, ..., pk ∈ P1 ∪ P2, respectively.
Thus, agent ai can “declare” proposition pi true (action ) or false (action
⊥). Every tuple of actions from Agt corresponds to a valuation v1, ..., vk of
the propositions, and vice versa. Now, the transitions from q0 are deﬁned in
the following way:
o(q0, v1, ..., vk) =
{
q if v1, ..., vk |= θ
q⊥ else
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Transitions from q and q⊥ do not matter. Note that v1, ..., vk |= θ can be
veriﬁed in time and space linear in |θ|, so o has a polynomial representation
with respect to the size of the original problem.6 Finally, we deﬁne proposi-
tion sat to hold only in state q. Note that the agents “controlling” propo-
sitions from P1 can enforce the next state to be q if, and only if, they can
declare such a valuation of “their” propositions that θ is satisﬁed regardless
of the opponents’ choices:
Lemma 15 Let A be the group of agents “responsible” for propositions P1, i.e.
ai ∈ A iff pi ∈ P1. Then, ∃P1∀P2 θ iffM, q0 |= 〈〈A〉〉 sat.
Proposition 70 Model checking formulae of “Positive ATL” over concurrent game
structures isΣP2 -hard.
6.3.3 “Positive ATL”Model Checking for CGS is inΣP2
In order to demonstratemembership inΣP2 of themodel checking problem,
we show an algorithm that computes the set of states in which formula ϕ
holds, and lies inNPNP. A careful analysis of the algorithms proposed in [7,
8] reveals that the intractability is due to the pre-image operator pre, which
is called at most n times for each subformula of ϕ.7 Indeed, as we saw in the
previous section, checkingwhat a coalition can enforce in a single step (e.g.,
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 sat) lies very close to the standard ΣP2 -complete problem of
QSAT2.
We show that checking a more sophisticated “positive” formula of ATL
is nomore complex than this. Themain idea of the algorithm is as follows.
1. We guess nondeterministically all the choices that will be needed for
any call to function Pre (that is, for each coalition A that occurs in ϕ,
and for each state q ∈ St). The choices are then stored in the array
choice.
2. We employ the standard model checking algorithm from Figure 6.4
with one important modiﬁcation: every time function pre2(M,A,Q1)
is called, it assumes the subsequent A’s choices from the array, and
checks whether q ∈ pre2(M,A,Q1) by calling an NP oracle (is there a
response from the opposition in q that leads to a state outside Q1?) and in-
verting its answer.
The detailed algorithm is shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. As the number of
iterations, as well as the number of calls to pre, in the algorithm from Fig-
ure 6.4 isO(nl), we get a nondeterministic polynomial algorithm thatmakes
calls to anNP oracle.
Lemma 16 Function mcheck2 deﬁnes a nondeterministic Turing machine that
runs in time O(nkl), making calls to an NP oracle. The size of the witness is
O(nkl). The oracle is a nondeterministic Turing machine that runs in timeO(n +
k).
6Note that, in fact, this is a simple example of an implicit CGS.
7We recall that n is the number of states inM .
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functionmcheck2(M,ϕ);
Returns the set of states inM , in which formula ϕ holds.
 assign cooperationmodalities in ϕwith subsequent numbers 1, ..., c;
// note that c ≤ l; by c(ϕ), we denote the number of coop. modalities in ϕ
// we will denote the coalition from the ith cooperation modality in ϕ as
ϕ[i]
 for each i = 1, ..., c, assign the agents in ϕ[i]with numbers 1, ..., kc;
// note that kc ≤ k and kc ≤ l
// we will denote the jth agent in A with A[j]
 guess an array choice such that, for each i = 1, ..., c, q ∈ St, and j =
1, ..., kc, we have that choice[i][q][j] ∈ dϕ[i][j](q);
// at this point, the optimal choices for all coalitions in ϕ are guessed
// note that the size of choice is O(nkl)
// by choice|i, we will denote the array choice with rows 1, ..., i− 1 removed
 return eval2(M,ϕ, choice);
function eval2(M,ϕ, choice);
Returns the states in which ϕ holds, given choices for all the coalitions from
ϕ.
case ϕ ∈ Π : return {q | ϕ ∈ π(q)};
case ϕ = ¬ψ : returnQ \ eval2(M,ψ, choice);
case ϕ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2 : return eval2(M,ψ1, choice) ∪ eval2(M,ψ2, choice|c(ψ1)+1);
case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉 ψ : return pre2(M,A, eval2(M,ψ, choice|2), choice[1]);
case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ : Q1 := St; Q2 := Q3 := eval2(M,ψ, choice|2);
while Q1 ⊆ Q2 do Q1 := Q1 ∩ Q2; Q2 := pre2(M,A,Q1, choice[1]) ∩ Q3
od;
returnQ1;
case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2 : Q1 := ∅; Q2 := eval2(M,ψ1, choice|2);
Q3 := eval2(M,ψ2, choice|c(ψ1)+2);
while Q3 ⊆ Q1 do Q1 := Q1 ∪ Q3; Q3 := pre2(M,A,Q1, choice[1]) ∩ Q2
od;
returnQ1;
end case
Figure 6.5: Nondeterministic algorithm for model checking formulae of
“Positive ATL”; part I.
Proposition 71 Model checking formulae of “Positive ATL” over concurrent game
structures is inΣP2 .
The following theorem is an immediate corollary:
Theorem 29 Model checking “Positive ATL” formulae over CGS isΣP2 -complete
with respect to the number of (global) states, actions and agents, and the length of
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function pre2(M,A,Q1, thischoice);
Returns the set of states, for which the A’s choices from thischoice enforce
that the next state is inQ1, regardless of what agents from Agt \A do.
 Q2 := ∅;
 for each q ∈ St: if oracle2(M,A,Q1, thischoice, q) = yes then Q2 :=
Q2 ∪ {q}ﬁ;
 returnQ2;
function oracle2(M,A,Q1, thischoice, q);
Returns yes if, and only if, the A’s choices from thischoice in q enforce that
the next state is inQ1, regardless of what agents from Agt \A do.
 guess an array resp such that, for each a ∈ Agt \ A, we have resp[a] ∈
da(q);
// at this point, the most dangerous response from the opposition is guessed
// note that the size of resp is O(k)
 if o(q, thischoice[q], resp) ∈ Q1 then return yes else return noﬁ;
Figure 6.6: Nondeterministic algorithm for model checking formulae of
“Positive ATL”: part II.
the formula. It isΣP2 -complete even for formulae that include only one cooperation
modality, and only the “nexttime” temporal operator .
6.3.4 Full ATL
As pointed out by Laroussinie, Markey and Oreiby, the algorithm in Fig-
ures 6.5 and 6.6 can be easily adapted to handle arbitrary ATL formulae in
timeΔP3 . In that case, strategies are guessed for each cooperation modality
separately (and it is not necessary to guess them in advance).
Proposition 72 Model checking formulae of ATL over concurrent game struc-
tures is inΔP3 .
Laroussinie et al. have also proved that the bound is tight.
Theorem 30 ([95]) Model checking ATL over CGS isΔP3 -complete in the num-
ber of states, actions and agents in the model, and the length of the formula.
6.4 Model Checking with Alternating Tran-
sition Systems
Model checking ATL over CGS isΔP3 -complete (and ΣP2 -complete for “pos-
itive” formulae) when the size of models is deﬁned in terms of the number
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of states, and the number of agents is a parameter of the problem. However,
the transition function in a CGS refers to choices that are abstract, while
in alternating transition systems the function already encodes some infor-
mation about possible outcomes of actions. One obvious advantage is that,
in an ATS, the transition function is already represented in a compact way:
for n states, k agents and at most d decisions per agent and state, the size
of function δ is O(n2kd), while an explicit transition table in a CGS may re-
quire O(ndk) memory cells in general. In this section, we show that using
ATS results in some advantages in terms of model checking complexity: it
still sits in the nondeterministic polynomial hierarchy, but one level lower.
Firstly, we demonstrate that the model checking of “Positive ATL” is inNP
in Section 6.4.1. Secondly, in Sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3, we deﬁne a variant of
the Boolean satisﬁability problem that we call “single false clause SAT” (Sfc-
SAT), prove that it isNP-complete, and present a reduction of Sfc-SAT to the
model checking problem. In Section 6.4.4, we cite [95] again, where correct
complexity results for full ATL were presented.
Modeling systems via ATS is usually troublesome in practice, mostly due
to the “singleton” requirement. In Section 6.4.5 we point out that, if we
relax the requirement and allow for nondeterministic ATS’s, we obtain the
samemodel checking complexity for a strictly larger class of models.
6.4.1 ModelChecking“PositiveATL”overATS is inNP
Unlike in concurrent game structures, choices in alternating transition sys-
tems already contain some information about which states can possibly be
achieved through them. More precisely, α includes all the states that can be
achieved throughα. Had it contained only such states, checking if it enforces
ϕ would have been easy (it would have been sufﬁcient to check whether ϕ
holds in all q′ ∈ α). However, the latter condition is not true in general.
[51] introduces the notion of a tight ATS: all states q′ to which no transition
exists from q are removed from agents’ choices at q (i.e. from the elements
of δ(q, a) for all a ∈ Agt). Still, this is not enough for our purposes, because
α ∈ δ(q, a)may include states that are reachable from q in general, but not by
executing α. In this section, we propose a stronger notion of tightness, and
show anondeterministic algorithm tomodel check “Positive ATL” formulae
over such ATS’s. We also present a nondeterministic algorithm to “tighten”
an ATS, and point out how these algorithms can be combined to obtain a
procedure that model checks “Positive ATL” formulae over arbitrary ATS’s
in nondeterministic polynomial time. In the following, we assume without
loss of generality thatA = {a1, ..., ar} for some r ≤ k.
Deﬁnition 46 Let αA = 〈α1, ..., αr〉 be a collective choice of A at q, i.e. αi ∈
δ(q, ai). State q′ is αA-reachable from q if there is a combination of responses from
the rest of agents: αr+1, ..., αk, αi ∈ δ(q, ai) such that q′ ∈ α1 ∩ ... ∩ αk.
Deﬁnition 47 ATS M is strongly tight if, for each q ∈ St, a ∈ Agt, we have
that for each q′ ∈ αa ∈ δ(q, a), q′ is αa-reachable from q.
Lemma 17 Let M be strongly tight, α1, ..., αr be choices of a1, ..., ar at q, and
q′ ∈ α1 ∩ ... ∩ αr. Then q′ is 〈α1, ..., αr〉-reachable from q.
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function tighten(M);
For each ai ∈ Agt, q ∈ St, αi ∈ δ(q, ai), and q′ ∈ αi:
 guess the “opposition” responses α1, ..., αi−1, αi+1, ..., αk;
 if q′ /∈ α1 ∩ ... ∩ αk then remove q′ from αi;
Figure 6.7: Algorithm for “tightening” alternating transition systems
function pre3(M,A,Q1);
 pre := ∅;
 for each q ∈ St:
− guess αa ∈ δ(q, a) for each a ∈ A;
− if⋂a∈A αa ⊆ Q1 then pre := pre ∪ {q};
 return pre;
Figure 6.8: Newpre-image function formodel checkingATLover alternating
transition systems
Every ATS can be made strongly tight via the procedure in Figure 6.7.
Moreover, “PositiveATL” formulae canbemodel-checkedover strongly tight
ATS’s via the original ATL model checking algorithm from Figure 6.4, with
function pre(A,Q) implemented as in Figure 6.8. We observe that – if we as-
sign numbers 1, ..., |δ(q, a)| to choices from δ(q, a) for all q, a at the beginning,
so that the choices are further identiﬁed by abstract labels rather than their
content – all the “guessing” operations are independent from each other
when we evaluate a “positive” formula. Thus, we can apply the same trick
as in Section 6.3.3, and guess all the necessary information beforehand. The
size of the witness is O(n2k2d + nkl), hence we obtain anNP algorithm for
the model checking.
Proposition 73 Model checking formulae of “Positive ATL” over alternating
transition systems is inNP.
6.4.2 Single False Clause SAT
To prove NP-hardness of model checking “Positive ATL” over alternating
transition systems, we deﬁne the following variant of the SAT problem.
Deﬁnition 48 (Sfc-SAT: single false clause SAT) Input: (1) n clauses:
C1, ..., Cn, in k propositions: p1, ..., pk such that for each valuation of p1, ..., pk,
exactly one clause is false;
(2) numbersm ≤ n, r ≤ k.
Problem: Is there a valuation of p1, ..., pr such that all clauses C1|r, ..., Cm|r
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are satisﬁed? Clause C|r is obtained from clause C by deleting all literals
that refer to propositions pr+1, ..., pk (we keep only the literals up to r).
Remark 32 Obviously, Sfc-SAT is inNP (it is sufﬁcient to guess a valuation and
check whether it is a good one).
In order to show that Sfc-SAT is NP-hard, we show that 3-SAT can be
reduced to it. In 3-SAT, we are given m clauses C1, ..., Cm over r proposi-
tions p1, ..., pr such that each clause Ci contains at most three literals: Ci =
li,1 ∨ li,2 ∨ li,3 (li,j are pl or ¬pl, 1 ≤ i ≤ m). This special instance of the sat-
isﬁability problem is alsoNP-complete [112]. Note that them and the r are
the respective numbers occurring as inputs in Deﬁnition 48. To show that
3-SAT can be reduced to Sfc-SAT, we demonstrate that there are propositions
pr+1, . . . , pk, and clauses C ′1, ..., C ′n, with m ≤ n, Ci ⊆ C ′i and C ′i|r = Ci for
i ≤ m, such that for each valuation of p1, . . . , pk, exactly one of C ′i is false.
What does the last condition mean for a set of clauses C ′1, ..., C ′n? Basi-
cally, it means that these clauses represent all 2k possibilities of choosing
truth values for p1, . . . , pk. So, the problem in the reduction is to extend the
given clauses by new variables and to add new clauses. This has to be done so
that the length of the new problem is still polynomial in the length of the
given 3-SAT instance.
We assume without loss of generality that none of C ′1, ..., C ′m contains a
complementary pair of literals (otherwise the clause would be satisﬁable un-
der all valuations and could be safely discarded as it does not matter for the
overall satisﬁability problem). In order to extend clauses C1, ..., Cm in an ap-
propriate way, we use auxiliary formulae αi and β, deﬁned in the following
way:
αi: Weconstruct formulaeαi stating that a selected clause number is i ≤ m. To
be more precise, we introduce t := !logm" new variables y1, . . . , yt and
deﬁne conjunctions αi (i = 1, . . . ,m) over these variables as follows
(this idea is due to Thomas Eiter [37]). We write each number 1, . . . ,m
in binary and represent each (of the t) digits by the new variables (a 1 is
represented by the variable itself, a 0 by the negation of the variable).
The i’th digit is then represented by yi if it is 1 and by¬yi if it is 0. Thus,
for each valuation of the new variables, only one conjunction αi can
be true, namely the one representing the number coded in the binary
representation.
Note thatwe can also represent numbers greater thanm (up to thenext
power of 2, namely 2t). These conjunctions do not correspond to the
m original clauses from the 3-SAT problem. In our reduction, we have
to distinguish between them. Therefore we introduce a formula β in
the next step.
β: We construct a formula β stating that the selected clause number is less
than or equal tom. Thus, β satisﬁes the following equivalences: β ⇔∨m
i=1 αi ⇔
∧2	log m

i=m+1 ¬αi.
We therefore deﬁne a set of clauses β, which describe all valuations
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corresponding to numbers strictly greater thanm. Thus we have:
β ⇔
m∧
i=1
¬αi.
Realising β as a set of clauses is simple: we just take αm and check that
they coincide on an initial segment and then a negated variable occurs
(where in αm a positive variable is located).
β can also be written as a set of clauses
β ⇔
2	log m
∧
i=m+1
¬αi.
Note that the last formula is a set clauses (because all ¬αi are clauses),
and hence we need at most 2logm − m many clauses to represent β
(which is never more thanm). We denote these clauses by Cβ1 , . . . , C
β
m.
Each clause Cβj states, that the selected clause has not the numberm + j.
In the followingwe sometimes useβ to represent the (atmost)m clauses
Cβ1 , . . . , C
β
m.
Extending the clauses: For each Ci = li,1 ∨ li,2 ∨ li,3 we construct the
remaining 7 clauses (all parities of the 3 variables) and add ¬αi. So, for each
Ci we get 8 clauses C ′i,0, . . . C
′
i,7, where C
′
i,0 = Ci ∨ ¬αi and (C ′i,0 ∧ . . . ∧
C ′i,7) ⇔ ¬αi. Note, again, that ¬αi is always a clause. We observe also that
them clauses C1, ..., Cm, which we originally started with (as an instance of
3-SAT), are, by construction, exactly C ′1,0|r, C ′2,0|r, . . . , C ′m,0|r.
Reduction: The (at most) s := m + m× 8 clauses:
Cβ1 , . . . , C
β
m, and C ′i,j (1 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤ j ≤ 7),
over k = r + !logm" variables, represent an instance of Sfc-SAT, such that if
we choosem ≤ n and r ≤ k, then we get the 3-SAT problemwe started with.
Why are the clauses above an instance of Sfc-SAT? The fact that we get
back the 3-SAT problem has already been shown. It is also obvious that the
constructed instance is polynomial in the size of the instance we started
with. So it remains to show that for each valuation of all the variables, ex-
actly one clause is false. Let a valuation be given. Wemust consider two cases:
1. Exactly one of the α1, . . . , αm is true, say αi0 (this is decided by the
newly introduced variables). Then all clauses C ′i,j with i = i0 are true
(because ¬αi is true and it occurs as a disjunct in all these clauses).
Of the 8 clauses C ′i0,j (0 ≤ j ≤ 7), exactly one is false, namely the
one contradicting the valuation of the three old variables occurring in
the original Ci (note that all possibilities are covered with the 8 cases).
Clearly, β (i.e all clauses Cβj ) is true as well.
2. None of the α1, . . . , αm is true. But then all clauses C ′i,j are true and
only β is false, i.e. exactly one of the clauses Cβj .
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These are all the cases, becauseαi (resp.C
β
j ) are pairwise inconsistent by con-
struction: any two different conjunctions αi, αj (resp. C
β
i , C
β
j ) with i = j
contain at least one pair of complementary literals. This gives us the follow-
ing result:
Proposition 74 Sfc-SAT isNP-complete.
6.4.3 Reduction of Sfc-SAT to “Positive ATL”Model
Checking over ATS
To obtain the reduction, we construct an ATSM with St = {q0, C1, ..., Cn},
i.e. one state per clause plus an initial state. Next, we “simulate” proposi-
tions p1, ..., pk with agents a1, ..., ak. Each agent “declares” his proposition
true or false in the initial state q0. Thus, agent ai has two available choices at
q0: to declare pi true or to declare pi false; a choice of ai is represented with
the set of clauses that are notmade true by setting the value of pi in this par-
ticular way. For example, for clauses C1 = p1 ∨ ¬p2, C2 = p2, a1’s choices are
represented as {C2}, {C1, C2}: if p1 is set to true, onlyC2 can be false, but if p1
is set to false, both C1, C2 can remain unsatisﬁed. Choices and transitions at
states C1, ..., Cm do not really matter. There is only one atomic proposition,
therest, with π(therest) = {Cm+1, ..., Cn}.
Note that each combination of choices from a1, ..., ak at q0 corresponds to
a single valuation of p1, ..., pk, and vice versa. Moreover, a clause is not satis-
ﬁedby a valuation iff noproposition “makes” it true. Thus, the set of clauses,
unsatisﬁed by a valuation, is equal to the intersection of sets of clauses that
are not “made” true by each single proposition. By deﬁnition of Sfc-SAT,
such an intersection is always a singleton, which proves thatM is indeed an
ATS.
Lemma 18 There is a valuation of p1, ..., pr such that all clauses C1|r, ..., Cm|r
are satisﬁed iff M, q0 |= 〈〈a1, ..., ar〉〉 therest.
Proof [⇒] Suppose that there is such a valuation of p1, ..., pr. Thus, regard-
less of the actual valuation of pr+1, ..., pk, clauses C1, ..., Ct must be true, and
hence for each valuation of pr+1, ..., pk, the single unsatisﬁed clause must be
among Ct+1, ..., Cn. Re-writing it in terms of the ATS M : there is a collec-
tive choice of a1, ..., ar such that, for each tuple of choices from the other
agents, the resulting next statemust be amongCt+1, ..., Cn. In consequence,
M, q0 |= 〈〈a1, ..., ar〉〉 P.
[⇐] Let M, q0 |= 〈〈a1, ..., ar〉〉 P. Thus, there is a collective choice
S{a1,...,ar} such that, for each tuple of choices from the other agents, the
resulting next state is always among Ct+1, ..., Cn. We take the valuation of
p1, ..., pr that corresponds to this S{a1,...,ar}. By the shape of the construc-
tion, each Ci ∈ {C1, ..., Ct}must be true for each valuation of pr+1, ..., pk. In
particular, Ci is true for the valuation pr+1 = ⊥, ..., pk = ⊥. Thus, Ci|r is also
true. 
Note that the reduction can be done in time polynomial in n, k. Com-
puting the agents’ choice sets is the hardest point here, and it can be done
in time O(k2n). The resulting model includes n + 1 states, k agents, and
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d = 2 choices per agent per state – and the length of the resulting formula is
l = r+2 ≤ k+2, which concludes the reduction, and proves that themodel
checking problem isNP-hard. Thus, we have the following.
Theorem 31 Model checking “Positive ATL” formulae over ATS isNP-complete
with respect to the number of (global) states, actions and agents, and the length of
the formula. It isNP-complete even for formulae that include only one cooperation
modality, and only the “nexttime” temporal operator .
6.4.4 Full ATL
Like in the case of CGS, the algorithm presented in Section 6.4.1 can be
easily adapted to model-check arbitrary ATL formulae in time ΔP2 . Again,
strategies are guessed for each cooperationmodality separately (and it is not
necessary to guess them in advance).
Proposition 75 Model checking formulae of ATL over alternating transition sys-
tems is inΔP2 .
Laroussinie, Markey and Oreiby have proved that the bound is tight.
Theorem 32 ([95]) Model checking ATL over ATS isΔP2 -complete in the num-
ber of states, actions and agents in the model, and the length of the formula.
6.4.5 Model Checking with Nondeterministic Transi-
tion Systems
Alternating transition systems were proposed as models for open computa-
tional systems, and the way in which the transition function is constructed
reﬂects this intention. The problem with ATS’s is that they are not mod-
ular, partly due to the “singleton intersection” requirement: legality of a
choice cannot be deﬁned in isolation from the rest of the choices in a given
state. Adding another process to the system usually requires thorough re-
construction of the model: in particular, new states must be added, and
agents’ choices extended so that each intersection is again a singleton. We
suggest that the requirement can be relaxed, yielding a more general (and
more ﬂexible) class of models with the same ATL model checking complex-
ity. To show this, we deﬁne non-deterministic alternating transition systems
(NATS) in the same way as ATS, except that no requirement on function δ
is imposed.8 Obviously, model checking ATL formulae over NATS is ΔP2 -
hard (andNP-hard for “positive” formulae), because ATS are special cases of
NATS. Moreover, the model checking algorithm, depicted in Section 6.4.1,
can be applied to NATS as well.
Theorem 33 Model checking ATL formulae over NATS is ΔP2 -complete for the
full language, andNP-complete for the “positive” sublanguage.
8Traditionally, the transition relation is required to be serial in models of temporal logic, in
order tomake sure that the time “ﬂows forever”. This can be ensured by requiring that, for each
tuple of choices αi ∈ δ(q, ai), the intersection α1 ∩ ...∩αk is non-empty. Our argument in this
section is valid for such a variant of NATS, too.
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This suggests that using the more general class of NATS may be beneﬁ-
cial for most purposes: we can get rid of the rigid and highly inconvenient
“singleton” requirement without any computational cost! But, as we al-
ready pointed out in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, the existential path quanti-
ﬁer E from CTL cannot be fully embedded in ATL, when the latter has its
semantics deﬁned over NATS. This looks as a serious shortcoming in terms
of expressivity at ﬁrst glance. However, we observe that we can deal with
this problem by adding another temporal operator to the language of ATL.
The operator we propose to add is the “weak until” operator W , known in
temporal logic for a long time [99], although not as popular as the “strong
until” U . Formula ϕW ψ means that, if ψ becomes eventually true, then ϕ
holds until the ﬁrst occurrence of ψ, otherwise ϕ holds for ever.9 The formal
semantics of “weak until” can be deﬁned as follows:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕW ψ iff there exists SA such that, for each λ ∈ out(SA, q): (1)
there is i ≥ 0 for whichM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for each 0 ≤ j < i,
or (2)M,λ[j] |= ϕ for each j ≥ 0.
In Figure 6.9, we present a simple extension of the model checking algo-
rithm from Figure 6.4 that deals with “weak until” formulae in a way anal-
ogous to model checking 〈〈A〉〉ϕ and 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ. The model checking algo-
rithm from Section 6.4.1 can be augmented in the same way. It is easy to see
that the complexity of the algorithms stays the same as before. Moreover,
we show that adding 〈〈A〉〉ϕW ψ to ATL allows to express the full power of
CTL (andmore), through the following translation:
A ϕ ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉 ϕ
AϕU ψ ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉ϕU ψ
AϕW ψ ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉ϕW ψ
E ϕ ≡ ¬A ¬ϕ
EϕU ψ ≡ ¬A(¬ψ)W (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
EϕW ψ ≡ ¬A(¬ψ)U (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
ϕ ≡ U ϕ
ϕ ≡ ϕW⊥
Note that formulae 〈〈A〉〉ϕ do not have to be included in the deﬁnition
of ATL explicitly anymore, since the operator can be derived from W .
Theorem 34 ATLwith “weak until” covers the full expressive power of CTL even
when nondeterministic alternating transition systems are used as models. More-
over, model checking ATL with “weak until” over nondeterministic ATS is:
1. P-complete (linear time) with respect to the number of transitions in the
model and the length of the formula;
9We note that “weak until” is not expressible even in ATL with deterministic transitions,
cf. [95].
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case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ1W ψ2 :
Q1 := mcheck(M,ψ1) ∪mcheck(M,ψ2);
Q2 := St;
Q3 := mcheck(M,ψ2);
whileQ2 = Q1
do Q2 := Q1; Q1 := Q2 \
(
(St \ pre(M,A,Q2)) \Q3
)
od;
returnQ1
Figure 6.9: Subroutine for model checking “weak until”
2. NP-complete for the “positive” sublanguage with respect to the number of
states, agents and decisions in the model and the length of the formula;
3. ΔP2 -complete for the full languagewith respect to the number of states, agents
and decisions in the model and the length of the formula.
Finally, we observe that ATS have already been used in the work on im-
plementing symbolic model checking for ATL [87], probably because of the
compact representation of the transition function.10 We proved in this sec-
tion that using ATS offers also some computational advantage over CGS.
Theorem 34 suggests that designing ATS does not have to be such a painstak-
ing process.
6.5 TurningGameModels Turn-Based
In this section, we demonstrate how strategic ability in arbitrary ATS’s can
be translated into strategic ability in turn-based systems. More precisely, we
show how, for an arbitrary alternating transition system M , a turn-based
system M ′ can be constructed, so that a combination of choices in M cor-
responds to a combination of strategies in a fragment of M ′. We then pro-
pose a translation of ATL formulae into ATL+ formulae, such that the orig-
inal formula holds in M, q if, and only if, the translated formula holds in
M ′, q. Finally, we point out that the latter can be model-checked in nonde-
terministic polynomial time (ΔP2 for full ATL, and NP for “Positive ATL”),
and provide another (slightly more general) proof of the upper bounds for
both variants of the language.
The translation of models is independent from the translation of formu-
lae in our construction, which allows for “pre-compiling”models when one
wants to check various properties of a particular multi-agent system.
10The authors of [87] deﬁne the semantics of ATL in terms of concurrent game structures,
but the model checking algorithm they present uses postconditions to specify the possible out-
comes of a choice. A postcondition is taken to be simply a set of states, and choices by different
agents executed in parallel lead to the state from the intersection of the postconditions (it is
even assumed that the intersectionmust be a singleton).
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Figure 6.10: A fragment ofM ′1: simulation of outgoing transitions from q0
6.5.1 Translation ofModels
Let M = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, δ〉 be an ATS. We construct a turn-based ATS M ′ =
〈Agt′, St′,Π′, π′, δ′〉 as follows:
• Agt′ = Agt ∪ {v}: we add an additional agent v (“veriﬁer”) to the orig-
inal set of players. Veriﬁer helps to ﬁnd out the right outcome state,
given the choices from all agents (i.e. the sole state which belongs to
the intersection of their choices);
• St′ = St ∪⋃a∈Agt(dec(a) ∪ exec(a) ∪ outcome(a)), where:
– dec(a) = {qa | q ∈ St} are the “dummy states” from which agent
a’s decisions are simulated; by xρ, we will denote a copy of item x,
labeled with superscript ρ.
– exec(a) = {qa,S | q ∈ St, S ∈ δ(q, a)} simulate the situations between
a’s decisionmaking and the execution of a decision.
– outcome(a) = {qa,q′ | q ∈ St, q′ ∈ ⋃S∈δ(q,a) S} are thedummy states
that simulate possible outcomes of a’s decisions.
• Π′ = {q | q ∈ St} ∪ {real, choice, out}. Proposition real marks the origi-
nal, “real” states fromM ; choice labels the dummy states that simulate
situations before and after a choice, outmarks the ﬁnal outcome states
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before the next “real” state is reached, and qi mark “outcome” dummy
states that refer to a transition ending up in state qi. Thus:
– π′(real) = St, π′(choice) =
⋃
a∈Agt(dec(a) ∪ exec(a)),
– π′(out) = outcome(ak),
– π′(qi) = {qa,qi | qa,qi ∈ outcome(a), a ∈ Agt}.
• The “decision” states are “owned” by the decisionmaking players; the
rest of the states is owned by veriﬁer:
– δ(q,v) = {St′} for q ∈ dec(a), a ∈ Agt,
– δ(q, a) = {St′} for q /∈ dec(a).
• Choices of the original agents remain the same as inM , but they are
split between “choice” states. Veriﬁer makes substantial choice only at
the “execution”dummy states. Transitions from the “outcome”dummy
states are automatic, and lead to the decision node of the next player.
Choices executed by agents at decision nodes lead to their correspond-
ing execution states, and veriﬁer’s actions at execution nodes lead to
their corresponding outcome nodes.
– δ(qa, a) = {{qa,Q1}, ..., {qa,Qi}} for qa ∈ dec(a), δ(q, a) = {Q1, ..., Qi};
– δ(qa,S ,v) = {{qa,q1}, ..., {qa,qi}} for qa,S ∈ exec(a) andS = {q1, ..., qi}.
– δ(qai,qj ,v) = {{qai+1}} for i < k, and δ(qak,qj ,v) = {{qak}}.
Example 36 Consider a fragment of the alternating transition system M2, de-
picted in Figure 6.2. The fragment of the resulting ATSM ′2, that refers to the transi-
tions starting from q0, is shown in Figure 6.10. (Remember, we use symbols α1, α2
and β1, β2 as shorthand for the choices to make the example easier to read, but
in fact these are sets of states and not abstract labels.) The collective strategy of
{a, b}, that corresponds to the combination of choices 〈α1, β2〉 in the original ATS,
is marked with bold arrows. The only veriﬁer’s response, that yields a path with
exactly one qi proposition holding along it, is also indicated.
Note that, for each state q inM , the transformation of the outgoing tran-
sitions requires that we process all the choices from δ(q, a) once; we must
also process the “contents” of each choice (i.e. all the states included in the
choice) – but only once, too. Moreover, the resulting substructure includes
at mostO(kdn) outgoing transitions per node.
Proposition 76 The translation of M can be done in time O(n2kd), and M ′
includesm′ = O(n2kd) states.
6.5.2 Translation of Formulae
Let ϕ,ψ be ATL formulae, whose interpretations in M are [[ϕ]], [[ψ]] respec-
tively.11 We deﬁne the translation of complex formulae in the following
way:
11We will abuse the notation slightly by using [[ϕ]] to denote also
∨
qi∈[[ϕ]] qi, a formula that
holds exactly in the states from [[ϕ]].
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trM (¬ϕ) = ¬[[ϕ]]
trM (ϕ ∧ ψ) = [[ϕ]] ∧ [[ψ]]
nextM (ϕ) = ¬
∨
qi /∈[[ϕ]]
(qi ∨ real ∨ choice)U out
trM (〈〈A〉〉 ϕ) = 〈〈A〉〉nextM (ϕ)
trM (〈〈A〉〉ϕ) = [[ϕ]] ∧ 〈〈A〉〉(real → 〈〈∅〉〉nextM (ϕ))
trM (〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ) = [[ψ]] ∨ ([[ϕ]] ∧ 〈〈A〉〉(real → 〈〈∅〉〉nextM (ϕ))U [[ψ]]).
The idea is as follows: the paths that matter are the ones where only a
single proposition qi occurs in each subpath between two subsequent “real”
states – they correspond to intersections of the agents’ choices that can be
found along the subpath. For 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ, we want to make sure that A have
a strategy to enforce that all such subpaths until the next “real” node refer
to states from [[ϕ]]. In other words, Amust have a strategy such that no ini-
tial subpath occurs that refers to some qi /∈ [[ϕ]]. For 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, the same must
hold for subpaths after each “real” node etc. Note that trM (Φ) is a formula of
ATL+, since it includes Boolean combinations of temporal formulae.12 The
following proposition states that the translation is correct.
Proposition 77 Let ϕ be an ATL formula that does not include special proposi-
tions real, out, choice and qi. LetM be an ATS, and q a state inM . Then:
M, q |= Φ iff M ′, q |= trM (Φ).
Proof We prove the proposition for the case Φ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ. The other cases
follow from respective ﬁxpoint characterisations of 〈〈A〉〉ϕ and 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ.
[⇒] Let M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ, A = {a1, ..., ar}. Suppose that M ′, q
|= 〈〈A〉〉¬∨qi /∈[[ϕ]](qi ∨ real ∨ choice)U out. Note that out holds for the ﬁrst
time exactly after 3k transitions from q in M ′. Thus, for each strategy S′A
inM ′ there is a path λ ∈ out(q, S′A), and a state qi /∈ [[ϕ]], such thatM,λ[j] |=
(qi ∨ real ∨ choice) for all j = 0, ..., 3k − 1. We take any strategy SA inM , ﬁnd
the corresponding S′A with s
′
a(q
a) = sa(q) for a ∈ A, and then we take the
above λ and qi. We set the choices of the opponents in M, q to saj (q) = σ
such that λ[3j − 2] = qaj ,σ, aj /∈ A. By construction, qi ∈ sa1(q) ∩ ... ∩ sak(q),
which gives a contradiction.
[⇐] Similarly: we take the “winning” strategy inM ′, construct the cor-
responding strategy in M (or rather its relevant part for state q), and show
that no combinationof responses from ar+1, ..., ak can lead to a state q′ /∈ [[ϕ]].

Example 37 ConsidermodelsM2 andM ′2 again. Formula 〈〈a〉〉 (p1∨p2) holds
in M2, q0, and indeed M ′2, q
a
0 |= 〈〈a〉〉¬
(
(q2 ∨ real ∨ choice)U out ∨ (q3 ∨ real ∨
choice)U out). On the other hand,M ′2, q0 |= 〈〈a〉〉 p1, andM ′2, qa0 |= 〈〈a〉〉¬((q1 ∨
real ∨ choice)U out ∨ (q2 ∨ real ∨ choice)U out ∨ (q3 ∨ real ∨ choice)U out
)
.
12We assume that this is the “memoryless” version of ATL+, with strategies represented as
functions from states to choices.
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Proposition 78 The length of trM (ϕ) is l′ = O(n + l), where l is the length of
ϕ, and n is the number of states inM .
The following nondeterministic algorithm can be used to model check
formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ of the “memoryless” ATL∗ in modelM ′:
1. Recursively compute the interpretations of the state subformulae of ϕ
inM ′ (e.g., for ϕ ≡ ψ, compute the set of states that satisfy ψ);
2. Guess the collective strategy SA. Note that the size of SA isO(nkd);
3. “Trim”modelM ′, removing allA’s choices that donot appear inSA. As
M ′ is turn-based, the operation requires only O(nkd) steps, and yields
a turn-based ATSM ′′ with nomore states and transitions thanM ′;
4. Model-check CTL∗ formula Aϕ inM ′′.
Note that A nextM (ϕ) ⇔ ¬E
∨
qi /∈[[ϕ]](qi∨ real∨ choice)U out ⇔ ¬
∨
qi /∈[[ϕ]] E(qi∨
real ∨ choice)U out, which is a formula of “vanilla” CTL, and can be model-
checked indeterministic polynomial time.13 Note also that an array of strate-
gies for all the cooperationmodalities occurring in a complex “positive” for-
mula can be guessed before the translation of the formula (as strategy sa(q) =
α inM transformed to an equivalent strategy s′a(qa) = {{qa,α}} inM ′). The
size of the witness is stillO(nkdl), which gives us the following.
Corollary 8 Model checking of an ATL formula ϕ in an ATS M is in ΔP2 with
respect to n, k, d, l. Model checking “Positive ATL” is even inNP.
Thus, we obtained a proof of membership inΔP2 (resp. NP), alternative
to the one in Section 6.4. We want to emphasize that the above algorithm
is somewhat more general than the one in Section 6.4.1, because it does not
employ “tightening” of the model. In principle, an equivalent tight model
exists for each ATS if we consider alternating transition systems in isolation.
However, the same does not have to holdwhenwe extend ATL and ATSwith
additional modalities. For instance, for an ATL extension that handles im-
perfect information, we may want to require that a single strategy speciﬁes
identical choices in indistinguishable states (cf. [134]), which means that a
choice must include all the states that are considered as possible outcomes
by an agent in a given situation, and not only the ones that can physically
occur [129]. In consequence, such a kind of alternating epistemic transition
systems cannot be tight in most cases. The above algorithm is valid for all
ATS, even for those which cannot be tightened in a given context.
6.6 Model Checking Strategic Abilities of
Agents under Incomplete Information
In this section, we consider model checking of ATL with imperfect (or incom-
plete) information. Since no satisfying semantics based on alternating tran-
sition systems has been proposed so far for strategic abilities under imper-
fect information, we present our results for an extension of concurrent game
structures only.
13We thank an anonymous reviewer of MFCS’05 for pointing this out.
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Schobbens [121] proved that ATLir model checking is intractable: more
precisely, it is NP-hard andΔP2 -easy (i.e., can be solved through a polyno-
mial number of calls to an oracle for some problem inNP) when the size of
the model is deﬁned in terms of the number of transitions. He also conjec-
tured that the problemmight beΔP2 -complete.
This section contains several new results. Firstly, we close the gap and
prove thatmodel checkingATLir isΔP2 -hard, andhence indeedΔP2 -complete
with respect to the number of transitions in themodel and the length of the
formula. The proof proceeds by a reduction of theSNSAT problem to ATLir
model checking, presented in Section 6.6.3. NP and ΔP2 are quite close,
both belonging to the ﬁrst level of the polynomial hierarchy, so our result
might seem a minor one – although, technically, it was not that trivial to
prove it. On the other hand, its importance goes well beyond model check-
ing of ATLir. In fact, Theorem 38 yields immediate corollaries with ΔP2 -
completeness of other logics like ATOL [83], “Feasible ATEL” [86], CSL [73]
etc., andΔP2 -hardness of ETSL [135].
We also point out that the problem is NP-complete for the “positive”
sublanguage of ATLir.
Secondly, we show that the problem is ΔP3 -complete in the number of
states, agents and decisions in the model, and the length of the formula
(and it is “only”ΣP2 -complete for “Positive ATLir”). Therefore, the problem
sits in the same complexity class asmodel checking strategic abilities for per-
fect information games with respect to these parameters. We believe this is
good news, as far as complexity is concerned, for agent logics dealing with
imperfect information.
Finally, we point out that the difference between the perfect and im-
perfect information case lies in the modularity of strategies with respect to
the property that the agents may want to enforce. For perfect information
games, potential successfulness of sub-strategies is more independent and
they can be computed (or guessed) incrementally, while imperfect informa-
tion strategies refuse incremental analysis.
6.6.1 Existing Results
Model checking ATLir has been proved to be NP-hard andΔP2 -easy in the
number of transitions and the length of the formula [121]. Membership in
ΔP2 was demonstrated through the following observation. If the formula to
be model checked is of the form 〈〈A〉〉irϕ (ϕ being ψ, ψ or ψ1 U ψ2), where
ϕ contains no more cooperation modalities, then it is sufﬁcient to guess a
strategy for A, “trim” the model by removing all transitions that will never
be executed (according to this strategy), and model check CTL formula Aϕ
in the resulting model. Thus, model checking an arbitrary ATLir formula
can be done by checking the subformulae iteratively, which requires a poly-
nomial number of calls to anNP algorithm.14
NP-hardness follows from a reduction of the well known SAT problem.
Here, wepresent a reductionwhich is somewhat different from theone in [121].
Wewill adapt it in Section 6.6.3 to proveΔP2 -hardness. InSAT, we are given
14The algorithm from [79] can be also used to demonstrate the upper bounds for the com-
plexity of this problem.
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a CNF formula ϕ ≡ C1 ∧ · · · ∧Cn involving k propositional variables from set
X = {x1, ..., xk}. Each clauseCi can bewritten asCi ≡ xsi,11 ∨· · ·∨xsi,kk , where
si,j ∈ {+,−, 0}; x+j denotes a positive occurrence of xj in Ci, x−j denotes an
occurrence of ¬xj in Ci, and x0j indicates that xj does not occur in Ci. The
problem asks if ∃X.ϕ, that is, if there is a valuation of x1, ..., xk such that ϕ
holds.
We construct the corresponding i-CGSMϕ as follows. There are twoplay-
ers: veriﬁer v and refuter r. The refuter decides at the beginning of the game
which clause Ci will have to be satisﬁed: it is done by proceeding from the
initial state q0 to a “clause” state qi. At qi, veriﬁer decides (by proceeding
to a “proposition” state qi,j) which of the literals x
si,j
j from Ci will be at-
tempted. Finally, at qi,j , veriﬁer attempts to prove Ci by declaring the un-
derlying propositional variable xj true (action ) or false (action ⊥). If she
succeeds (i.e., if she executes  for x+j , or executes ⊥ for x−j ), then the sys-
tem proceeds to the “winning” state q. Otherwise, the system stays in qi,j .
Additionally, “proposition” states referring to the same variable are indistin-
guishable for veriﬁer, so that she has to declare the same value of xj in all of
them within a uniform strategy. A sole ATLir proposition yes holds only in
the “winning” state q. Obviously, states corresponding to literals x0j can be
omitted from themodel.
Speakingmore formally,Mϕ = 〈Agt, St,Π, π, Act, d, o,∼1, ...,∼k〉, where:
• Agt = {v, r},
• St = {q0} ∪ Stcl ∪ Stprop ∪ {q}, where Stcl = {q1, . . . , qn}, and Stprop =
{q1,1, . . . , q1,k, . . . , qn,1, . . . , qn,k};
• Π = {yes}, π(yes) = {q},
• Act = {1, ...,max(k, n),,⊥},
• d(v, q0) = d(v, q) = {1}, d(v, qi) = {1, ..., k},
d(v, qi,j) = {,⊥},
d(r, q) = {1, ..., n} for q = q0, and d(r, q) = {1} otherwise;
• o(q0, 1, i) = qi, o(qi, j, 1) = qi,j ,
o(qi,j ,, 1) = q if si,j = +, and qi,j otherwise,
o(qi,j ,⊥, 1) = q if si,j = −, and qi,j otherwise;
• q0 ∼v q iff q = q0, qi ∼v q iff q = qi, qi,j ∼v q iff q = qi′,j .
As an example, modelMϕ for ϕ ≡ (x1 ∨¬x3)∧ (¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3) is presented in
Figure 6.11.
Theorem 35 ϕ is satisﬁable iff Mϕ, q0 |= 〈〈v〉〉iryes.
Proof
(⇒) Firstly, if there is a valuation that makes ϕ true, then for each clause
Ci one can choose a literal out of Ci that is made true by the valuation. The
choice, together with the valuation, corresponds to a uniform strategy for v
such that, for all possible executions, q is achieved at the end.
(⇐) Conversely, if Mϕ, q0 |= 〈〈v〉〉iryes, then there is a strategy sv such
that q is achieved for all paths from out(q0, sv). But then the valuation,
which assigns propositions x1, ..., xk with the same values as sv, satisﬁes ϕ. 
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Figure 6.11: An i-CGS for checking satisﬁability of ϕ ≡ (x1 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x1 ∨
x2 ∨ x3)
Both the number of states and transitions inMϕ are linear in the length
of ϕ, and the construction ofM requires linear time too. Thus, the model
checking problem for ATLir is NP-hard. Note that it is NP-hard even for
formulae with a single cooperation modality, and turn-based models with
at most two agents.15
6.6.2 NP-completeness for “Positive ATL”
We already investigated the complexity of ATLir model checking in [79],
concluding that the problem was NP-complete. Unfortunately, our claim
was incorrect: the error occurred in the way we handled negation in our
model checking algorithm (cf. [95]). Still, the algorithm from [79] was cor-
rect for “positive” formulae of ATLir: in this case, we can do the same trick as
in Section 6.3.3, and guess all the relevant strategies beforehand. The size of
the witness is still polynomial in this case: more precisely, it isO(ml), where
m is the number of transitions, and l is the length of the formula. Thus, the
following holds.
Theorem 36 Model checking of “Positive ATLir” isNP-complete with respect to
the number of transitions in the model and the length of the formula.
Proof A nondeterministic algorithm that checks formula ϕ in model M is
presented in Figure 6.12. Calls to mcheck
CTL
refer to any established CTL
model-checker (e.g. [30]). As for the time necessary to carry out the proce-
dure: guessing the strategies can be done in time O(ml), while “trimming”
the model, checking CTL formulae, and getting rid of the states in which
agents may not know that the strategy is successful, can all be done in time
O(m) (recursively for subformulae). Thus, the algorithm terminates in time
15In fact, it isNP-hard even for models with a single agent, although the construction must
be a little different to demonstrate this.
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functionmcheck4(M,ϕ);
Returns the set of states inM , in which formula ϕ holds.
 assign cooperationmodalities in ϕwith subsequent numbers 1, ..., c;
// note that c ≤ l
// we will denote the coalition from the ith cooperation modality in ϕ as
ϕ[i]
 for each i = 1, ..., c, assign the agents in ϕ[i]with numbers 1, ..., kc;
// note that kc ≤ k and kc ≤ l
// we will denote the jth agent in A with A[j]
 guess an array choice such that, for each i = 1, ..., c, q ∈ St, and j =
1, ..., kc, we have that choice[i][q][j] ∈ dϕ[i][j](q), and for each q′ ∈ St
such that q ∼ϕ[i][j] q′ we have choice[i][q][j] = choice[i][q′][j];
// at this point, the optimal choices for all coalitions in ϕ are guessed
// note that the size of choice is O(ml)
// by choice|i, we will denote the array choice with rows 1, ..., i− 1 removed
 return eval4(M,ϕ, choice);
function eval4(M,ϕ, choice);
Returns the states in which ϕ holds, given choices for all the coalitions from
ϕ.
case ϕ ∈ Π : return {q | ϕ ∈ π(q)};
case ϕ = ¬ψ : returnQ \ eval4(M,ψ, choice);
case ϕ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2 : return eval4(M,ψ1, choice) ∪ eval4(M,ψ2, choice);
case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉Tψ, where T = or :
Q1 := eval4(M,ψ, choice|2); M ′ := trim(M, choice[1]);
add toM ′ new proposition pwith π(p) = Q1;
Q2 := mcheckCTL(M
′,AT p);
return {q ∈ St | ∀a, q′ . a ∈ A ∧ q ∼a q′ ⇒ q′ ∈ Q2};
case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2 :
c′ := the number of cooperationmodalities in ψ1;
Q1 := eval4(M,ψ1, choice|2); Q2 := eval4(M,ψ2, choice|c′+2);
M ′ := trim(M, choice[1]);
add toM ′ new propositions p1, p2 with π(p1) = Q1, π(p2) = Q2;
Q3 := mcheckCTL(M
′,Ap1 U p2);
return {q ∈ St | ∀a, q′ . a ∈ A ∧ q ∼a q′ ⇒ q′ ∈ Q3};
end case
Figure 6.12: Nondeterministic algorithm for model checking “Positive
ATLir”.
O(ml). Combining it with theNP-hardness result from [121], we obtain the
theorem. 
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function trim(M, thischoice);
Returns the CTL model, which includes exactly the transitions that can
occur
whenA execute choices from thischoice.
 R := ∅; // the CTL transition relation (contains pairs of states)
 for each q ∈ St and tuple resp of choices from Agt \ A, such that
resp[a] ∈ d(a, q):
− q′ := o(q, thischoice[q], resp);
− R := R∪ {〈q, q′〉};
 return 〈St,R,Π, π〉;
Figure 6.13: Nondeterministic algorithm for “Positive ATLir”, ctd.
Note that the exhaustive deterministic algorithm that checks all possible
strategies runs in timeO(ndknl) = O(n(m/n)nl), even for “Positive ATLir”.
ΔP2 -hardness for full ATLir is proved in the next section.
6.6.3 Model Checking ATLir Is IndeedΔP2 -complete
Let us ﬁrst recall (after [95]) the deﬁnition of SNSAT, a typical ΔP2 -hard
problem.
Deﬁnition 49 (SNSAT)
Input: p sets of propositional variablesXr = {x1,r, ..., xk,r}, p propositional vari-
ables zr, and p Boolean formulae ϕr in CNF, with each ϕr involving only variables
inXr ∪ {z1, ..., zr−1}, with the following requirement:
zr ≡ there exists an assignment of variables inXr such that ϕr is true.
We will also write, by abuse of notation, zr ≡ ∃Xr ϕr(z1, ..., zr−1, Xr).
Output: The truth-value of zp (i.e., or⊥).
Let n be the maximal number of clauses in any ϕ1, ..., ϕp from the given
input. Now, each ϕr can be written as:
ϕr ≡ Cr1 ∧ · · · ∧ Crn, and Cri ≡ x
sri,1
1,r ∨ · · · ∨ x
sri,k
k,r ∨ z
sri,k+1
1 ∨ . . . z
sri,k+r−1
r−1 .
Again, sri,j ∈ {+,−, 0}; x+ denotes a positive occurrence of x, x− denotes
an occurrence of ¬x, and x0 indicates that x does not occur in the clause.
Similarly, sri,k+j deﬁnes the “sign” of zj in clause C
r
i . Given such an in-
stance of SNSAT, we construct a sequence of concurrent game structures
Mr for r = 1, ..., p in a similar way to the construction in Section 6.6.1. That
is, clauses and variables xi,r are handled in exactly the same way as before.
Moreover, if zi occurs as a positive literal in ϕr, we embedMi inMr, and add
a transition to the initial state qi0 ofMi. If ¬zi occurs in ϕr, we do almost the
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same: the only difference is that we split the transition into two steps, with
a state negri (labeled with an ATLir proposition neg) added in between.
More formally,Mr = 〈Agt, Str,Π, πr, Actr, dr, or,∼r1, ...,∼rk〉, where:
• Agt = {v, r},
• Str = {qr0, qr1, . . . , qrn, qr1,1, . . . , qrn,k, negr1, . . . , negrr−1, q} ∪ Str−1,
• Π = {yes, neg}, πr(yes) = {q}, πr(neg) = {negji | i, j = 1, ..., r},
• Actr = {1, ...,max(k + r − 1, n),,⊥},
• dr(v, qr0) = dr(v, negri ) = dr(v, q) = {1}, dr(v, qri ) = {1, ..., k + r − 1},
dr(v, qri,j) = {,⊥},
dr(r, q) = {1, ..., n} for q = qr0 and {1} for the other q ∈ Str.
For q ∈ Str−1, we simply include the function from Mr−1: dr(a, q) =
dr−1(a, q);
• or(qr0, 1, i) = qri , or(qri , j, 1) = qri,j for j ≤ k,
or(qri , k + j, 1) = q
j
0 if s
r
i,k+j = +, and o
r(qri , k + j, 1) = neg
r
j if s
r
i,k+j = −,
or(negrj , 1, 1) = q
j
0,
or(qri,j ,, 1) = q if sri,j = +, and qri,j otherwise,
or(qri,j ,⊥, 1) = q if sri,j = −, and qri,j otherwise.
For q ∈ Str−1, we include the transitions fromMr−1: or(q, α) = or−1(q, α);
• qr0 ∼v q iff q = qr0, qri ∼v q iff q = qri , qri,j ∼v q iff q = qri′,j .
For q, q′ ∈ Str−1, we include the tuples fromMr−1: q ∼rv q′ iff q ∼r−1v q′.
As an example, modelM3 for ϕ3 ≡ (x3 ∨ ¬z2) ∧ (¬x3 ∨ ¬z1), ϕ2 ≡ z1 ∧ ¬z1,
ϕ1 ≡ (x1 ∨ x2) ∧ ¬x1, is presented in Figure 6.14.
Theorem 37 Let
Φ1 ≡ 〈〈v〉〉ir (¬neg)U yes,
Φi ≡ 〈〈v〉〉ir (¬neg)U (yes ∨ (neg ∧ A ¬Φi−1)).
Now, for all r: zr is true iffMr, qr0 |= Φr.
Before we prove the theorem, we state an important lemma. Lemma 19
says that “overlong” formulae Φi do not introduce new properties of model
Mr. More precisely, a formula Φi that includes more “nestings” than model
Mr can be as well reduced to Φi−1 whenmodel checked inMr, qr0.
Lemma 19 For i ≥ r:Mr, qr0 |= Φi iffMr, qr0 |= Φi+1.
Proof (induction on r)
1. For r = 1:M1, q10 |= Φi iffM1, q10 |= 〈〈v〉〉iryes iffM1, q10 |= Φi+1, because
M1 does not include states that satisfy neg.
2. For r > 1: Mr, qr0 |= Φi+1 ≡ 〈〈v〉〉ir (¬neg)U (yes ∨ (neg ∧ A ¬Φi)) iff
∃sv∀λ ∈ out(qr0, sv)∃u∀w ≤ u.
(
(Mr, λ[u] |= yes or Mr, λ[u] |= neg ∧
A ¬Φi) and (Mr, λ[w] |= ¬neg)
)
. [*]
However, each state satisfying neg has exactly one outgoing transition,
soMr, λ[u] |= neg∧A ¬Φi is equivalent toMr, λ[u] |= neg andMr, λ[u+
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Figure 6.14: An i-CGS for the reduction of SNSAT. The superscripts in state
labels are omitted since they canbededuced from the sub-machine inwhich
the state resides.
1] |= ¬Φi. Thus, [*] iff ∃sv∀λ ∈ out(qr0, sv)∃u∀w ≤ u.
(
(Mr, λ[u] |=
yes or Mr, λ[u] |= neg and Mr, λ[u + 1] |= ¬Φi) and (Mr, λ[w] |= ¬neg)
)
[**].
Note that, by the construction ofMr, λ[u + 1]must refer to the initial
state qj0 of some “submodel”Mj , j < r ≤ i. Thus,Mr, λ[u+1] |= ¬Φi iff
Mj , q
j
0 |= ¬Φi iff (by induction) Mj , qj0 |= ¬Φi−1 iff Mj , λ[u+1] |=
¬Φi−1.
So, [**] iff ∃sv∀λ ∈ out(qr0, sv)∃u∀w ≤ u.
(
(Mr, λ[u] |= yes orMr, λ[u] |=
neg and Mr, λ[u + 1] |= ¬Φi−1) and (Mr, λ[w] |= ¬neg)
)
iff Mr, qr0 |=
〈〈v〉〉ir (¬neg)U (yes ∨ (neg ∧ A ¬Φi−1)) ≡ Φi.

Proof of Theorem 37 Induction on r:
1. For r = 1: we use the proof of Theorem 35.
2. For r > 1:
For the implication from left to right (⇒): let zr be true: then,
there is a valuation ofXr such that ϕr holds. We construct sv as in the
proof of Theorem 35. In case that some xsi has been “chosen” in clause
Cri , we are done. In case that some z
−
j has been “chosen” in clause C
r
i
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(note: j must be smaller than i), we have (by induction) thatMj , q
j
0 |=
¬Φj . By Lemma 19, also Mj , qj0 |= ¬Φr, and hence Mr, qj0 |= ¬Φr. So
we can make the same choice (i.e., z−j ) in sv, and this will lead to state
negrj , in which it holds that neg ∧ A ¬Φr.
In case that some z+j has been “chosen” in clause C
r
i , we have (by in-
duction) thatMj , q
j
0 |= Φj , and hence, by Lemma 19,Mj , qj0 |= Φr. That
is, there is a strategy s′v inMj such that (¬neg)U (yes∨(neg∧A ¬Φr−1))
holds for all paths from out(qj0, s
′
v). As the states in Mj have no epis-
temic links to states outside of it, we canmerge s′v into sv.
For the other direction (⇐): letMr, qr0 |= Φr ≡ 〈〈v〉〉ir (¬neg)U (yes ∨
(neg∧A ¬Φr−1)). We take the strategy sv that enforces (¬neg)U (yes∨
(neg∧A ¬Φr−1)). Weﬁrst consider the clauseCri forwhich a “proposi-
tional” state is chosen by sv. The strategy deﬁnes a uniform valuation
for Xr that satisﬁes these clauses. For the other clauses, we have two
possibilities:
• sv chooses qj0 in the state corresponding to Cri . Neither yes nor
neg have been encountered on this path yet, so we can take sv
to demonstrate that Mr, q
j
0 |= Φr, and hence Mj , qj0 |= Φr. By
Lemma 19, alsoMj , q
j
0 |= Φj . By induction, zj must be true, and
hence clause Cri is satisﬁed.
• sv chooses negrj in the state corresponding to Cri . Then, it must
be that Mr, negrj |= A ¬Φr−1, and hence Mj , qj0 |= ¬Φr−1. By
Lemma 19, alsoMj , q
j
0 |= ¬Φj . By induction, zj must be false, and
hence clause Cri (containing ¬zj) is also satisﬁed.

Thus, in order to determine the value of zp, it is sufﬁcient tomodel check
Φp inMp, q
p
0 . Note that modelMp consists ofO(|ϕ|p) states andO(|ϕ|p) tran-
sitions, where |ϕ| is themaximal length of formulaeϕ1, ..., ϕp. Moreover, the
length of formulaΦp is linear in p, and the construction ofMp andΦp can be
also done in time O(|ϕ|p) and O(p), respectively. In consequence, we obtain
a polynomial reduction of SNSAT to ATLir model checking.
Theorem 38 Model checking ATLir isΔP2 -complete with respect to the number
of transitions in the model, and the length of the formula. The problem is ΔP2 -
complete even for turn-based models with at most two agents.
6.6.4 The Complexity Reﬁned
One of the problems withmodel checking formulae of ATL is that the num-
ber of transitionsm in a model is not bounded by n2, and can be very large:
more precisely, m = O(ndk) where n is the number of states, k the num-
ber of agents, and d the maximal number of decisions per agent per state.
Thus,m is exponential in k unless themodel is turn-based or the number of
agents is ﬁxed. In consequence, ATLmodel checking becomesΔP3 -complete
when n, k, d, l are the parameters of the problem, andmodel checking “Posi-
tive ATL” becomesΣP2 -complete. In this section, we show that ATLir model
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checking is also ΔP3 -complete (resp. ΣP2 -complete “Positive ATLir”) in the
same setting. To prove the lower bounds, it sufﬁces to point out that:
Lemma 20 ATL is semantically subsumed by ATLir. “Positive ATL” is semanti-
cally subsumed by “Positive ATLir”.
Proof In order to transform a concurrent game structureM to a correspond-
ing imperfect information concurrent game structureM ′, we ﬁx the indis-
tinguishability relations as the minimal total reﬂexive relations, (i.e. ∼a=
{〈q, q〉 | q ∈ St} for all a ∈ Agt), whichmeans that the agents can distinguish
between any two states. Letϕ be a formula of ATL, andϕ′ the result of adding
subscript ir in each cooperationmodality inϕ. Then,M, q |= ϕ iffM ′, q |= ϕ′.
Thus, ATL (resp. “Positive ATL”)model checking can be seen as a special case
of ATLir (resp. “Positive ATLir”) model checking. 
To show that the problem is ΣP2 -easy for “Positive ATLir”, we present a
reﬁnement of the algorithm from Section 6.6.2 in Figures 6.15 and 6.16.
Proposition 79 Functionmcheck5 deﬁnes a nondeterministic Turing machine
that runs in time O(n2kl), making calls to an NP oracle. The oracle itself is a
nondeterministic Turingmachine that runs in timeO(n+k). The size of witnesses
is never more thanO(nkl).
Proof The main idea is as follows. Firstly, we guess nondeterministically all
the strategies for the cooperation modalities that occur in formula ϕ (we do
it beforehand, as in Section 6.6.2). The strategies must be uniform, so set-
ting sa(q) ﬁxes automatically sa(q′) for all q ∼a q′. Then we model check ϕ
recursively: for each subformula 〈〈A〉〉irψ, we assume the respective strategy
and check the formula 〈〈∅〉〉irψ. To do so, we take ATL formula 〈〈A〉〉ψ as input,
and employ the standard ATL model checking algorithm from [8] with one
important modiﬁcation: each time function pre(A,Q1) is called, it assumes
the respective A’s choices, and checks whether q ∈ pre(A,Q1) by calling an
NP oracle (“is there a response from the opposition in q that leads to a state out-
sideQ1?”) and reversing its answer. Note that the latter amounts to checking
M ′, q |= 〈〈∅〉〉 Q1, whereM ′ is modelM withA’s actions ﬁxed accordingly,
and Q1 is a new proposition that holds exactly in states Q1. Finally, we get
rid of the states that have indistinguishable counterparts for which the as-
sumed strategy is not successful. Note that, in the middle part of the algo-
rithm, we use an adaptation of the ATL model checking procedure, which
iterates over states of the system. This kind of iterative solution is possible
because 〈〈∅〉〉
irψ ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉ψ (although, of course, the analogous property does
not hold for 〈〈A〉〉
ir
in general).
The detailed algorithm is shown in Figures 6.15 and 6.16. The procedure
is very similar to the “Positive ATL” model checking algorithm from Sec-
tion 6.3.3. Analogous complexity analysis applies: ﬁrst, the number of iter-
ations within one single call of function eval, as well as the number of calls
to pre, is O(n); next, function pre runs in O(n) steps, including calls to the
oracle; removing the states for which a member of the coalition can have
any doubts can be done in time O(n2k); ﬁnally, eval is called at most O(l)
times. In consequence, we get a nondeterministic polynomial algorithm
that makes calls to anNP oracle. 
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functionmcheck5(M,ϕ);
Returns the set of states inM , in which formula ϕ holds.
 assign cooperationmodalities in ϕwith subsequent numbers 1, ..., c;
// note that c ≤ l
// we will denote the coalition from the ith cooperation modality in ϕ as
ϕ[i]
 for each i = 1, ..., c, assign the agents in ϕ[i]with numbers 1, ..., kc;
// note that kc ≤ k and kc ≤ l
// we will denote the jth agent in A with A[j]
 guess an array choice such that, for each i = 1, ..., c, q ∈ St, and j =
1, ..., kc, we have that choice[i][q][j] ∈ dϕ[i][j](q), and for each q′ ∈ St
such that q ∼ϕ[i][j] q′ we have choice[i][q][j] = choice[i][q′][j];
// at this point, the optimal choices for all coalitions in ϕ are guessed
// note that the size of choice is O(nkl)
// by choice|i, we will denote the array choice with rows 1, ..., i− 1 removed
 return eval5(M,ϕ, choice);
function eval5(M,ϕ, choice);
Returns the states in which ϕ holds, given choices for all the coalitions from
ϕ.
case ϕ ∈ Π : return {q | ϕ ∈ π(q)};
case ϕ = ¬ψ : returnQ \ eval5(M,ψ, choice);
case ϕ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2 : return eval5(M,ψ1, choice) ∪ eval5(M,ψ2, choice);
case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉 ψ :
Q1 := pre5(A, eval5(M,ψ, choice|2),M, choice[1]);
return {q ∈ St | ∀a, q′ . a ∈ A ∧ q ∼a q′ ⇒ q′ ∈ Q1};
case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ : Q1 := St; Q2 := Q3 := eval5(M,ψ, choice|2);
while Q1 ⊆ Q2 do Q1 := Q1 ∩ Q2; Q2 := pre5(A,Q1,M, choice[1]) ∩ Q3
od;
return {q ∈ St | ∀a, q′ . a ∈ A ∧ q ∼a q′ ⇒ q′ ∈ Q1};
case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2 : c′ := the number of cooperationmodalities in ψ1;
Q1 := ∅; Q2 := eval5(M,ψ1, choice|2); Q3 := eval5(M,ψ2, choice|c′+2);
while Q3 ⊆ Q1 do Q1 := Q1 ∪ Q3; Q3 := pre5(A,Q1,M, choice[1]) ∩ Q2
od;
return {q ∈ St | ∀a, q′ . a ∈ A ∧ q ∼a q′ ⇒ q′ ∈ Q1};
end case
Figure 6.15: Themodel checking algorithm reﬁned (main part).
Like forATL, the algorithmcanbe easily adapted tohandle arbitraryATLir
formulae in time ΔP3 (strategies are guessed for each 〈〈A〉〉ir separately, and
not in advance). Thus, we get the following.
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function pre5(A,Q1,M, thischoice);
Returns the set of states, for which the A’s choices from thischoice enforce
that the next state is inQ1, regardless of what agents from Agt \A do.
 Q2 := ∅;
 for each q ∈ St: if oracle5(A,Q1,M, thischoice, q) = yes then Q2 :=
Q2 ∪ {q}ﬁ;
 returnQ2;
function oracle5(A,Q1,M, thischoice, q);
Returns yes if, and only if, the A’s choices from thischoice in q enforce that
the next state is inQ1, regardless of what agents from Agt \A do.
 guess an array resp such that, for each a ∈ Agt \ A, we have resp[a] ∈
d(a, q);
// at this point, the most dangerous response from the opposition is guessed
// note that the size of resp is O(k)
 if o(q, thischoice[q], resp) ∈ Q1 then return yes else return noﬁ;
Figure 6.16: Themodel checking algorithm reﬁned: pre-image and oracle.
Theorem 39 Model checking ATLir formulae over i-CGS is ΔP3 -complete with
respect to the number of states, decisions and agents, and the length of formulae.
Model checking “Positive ATLir” isΣP2 -complete.
6.6.5 Discussion
The result has been somewhat surprising to us, since it turns out that a ﬁne
grained analysis puts checking strategic abilities of agents under imperfect
information in the same complexity class as for perfect information games.
It is surprising because the ﬁrst case appears to be strictly harder than the
latter when we approach it from amore “distant” perspective (i.e. when the
input parameters are less detailed).
Let us recall from Section 6.3 that the hardness of model checking ATL
is due to simultaneous actions of agents, and can be demonstrated even for
scenarios that consist of a single step. It turns out that restricting agents’
strategies to uniform strategies only does not increasemodel checking com-
plexity enough to shift it to a higher complexity class. Even the size of wit-
nesses is the same in both cases.
What is different then, that makes model checking of ATLir harder than ATL
in relation to the number of transitions?
Deﬁnitely not the number of transitions itself, because CGS can be seen
as a special case of i-CGS. Comparison of model checking complexity for
turn-based structures16 can give us a hint in this respect. Note that, for such
16I.e., structures in which at each state there is a single agent who decides upon the next
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structures,m = O(nd) and we can use the model checking algorithms from
Section 6.6.2 and from [8] to model-check formulae of ATLir and ATL, re-
spectively.
Proposition 80 Model checking ATLir over turn-based i-CGS is ΔP2 -complete
(NP-complete for “Positive ATLir”), while model checking ATL over turn-based
CGS can be done deterministically in time O(ndl). Since d ≤ n for turn-based
structures, the latter bound can be replaced byO(n2l).
The result canbe generalised to systems inwhichonly aﬁxed (or bounded)
number of agents is acting in each state; we propose to call such systems
semi-turn-based concurrent game structures. Note that systems with a ﬁxed
(or bounded) number of agents are a special case of semi-turn-based CGS.
Proposition 81 Model checking ATLir over semi-turn-based i-CGS isΔP2 -com-
plete (NP-complete for “Positive ATLir”), while model checking ATL over semi-
turn-based CGS can be done deterministically in timeO(n2l).
Moreover, the exhaustive model checking of ATL formulae can be done
in timeO(ndkl), while, for ATLir formulae, it can be done inO(ndknl) steps.
This is due to the fact that 〈〈A〉〉ϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 〈〈A〉〉ϕ and 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ ≡
ψ ∨ ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ in ATL, whereas analogous ﬁxpoint characterisa-
tions do not hold for ATLir modalities. Thus, successful ATL strategies can
be computed incrementally, state by state. By contrast, uniform strategies
must be considered as a whole, which requires much more backtracking if
we check the possibilities exhaustively.
Nevertheless, webelieve that the results in this section indicate that agent
logics with imperfect information might not be unfeasible. If ATL formu-
lae can be feasibly model-checked then agents with imperfect information
are not that far away. And there already exist running model-checkers for
ATL [9, 4], based on OBDD (Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams). Also, new
model checking techniques, based on the idea ofUnboundedModel Checking,
are under development [87].
6.7 Conclusions
In this article, we discussed model checking complexity for several variants
of alternating-time temporal logicATL.Weanalyzed the complexity ofmodel
checking for explicit models when the size of models is deﬁned in terms of
states rather than transitions, and the number of agents is considered a pa-
rameter of the problem. Most importantly, we proved that the problem is
intractable for all studied variants of the logic. First of all, we showed that
model checking “Positive ATL” (i.e., ATL where the use of negation is re-
stricted to literals) over concurrent game structures is ΣP2 -complete. More-
over, for the previous semantics based on alternating transition systems, the
problem is “only”NP-complete. Using our results, Laroussinie, Markey and
Oreiby proved subsequently in [95] that model checking of full ATL isΔP3 -
complete for CGS and ΔP2 -complete for ATS. All these results suggest that
transition; this can bemodeled by requiring that d(a, q) is a singleton for all but one agent.
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m, l n, k, l nlocal, k, l
CTL P [30] P [30] PSPACE [92]
P-ATL
ATS P [7] NP (Sect. 6.4)
NATS P (Sect. 6.4.5) NP (Sect. 6.4.5)
EXPTIME [131]CGS P [8] ΣP2 (Sect. 6.3)
ATL
ATS P [7] ΔP2 [95]
NATS P (Sect. 6.4.5) ΔP2 (Sect. 6.4.5)
CGS P [8] ΔP3 [95]
P-ATLir NP ([121] & Sec. 6.6.2) ΣP2 (Sect. 6.6.4) ?ATLir ΔP2 ([121] & Sec. 6.6.3) ΔP3 (Sect. 6.6.4)
Figure 6.17: Model checking complexity: completeness results for various
settings of input parameters. Symbols n, k,m stand for the number od states,
agents and transitions in the explicit model, l is the length of the formula,
and nlocal is the number of local states in a concurrent program. P-ATL
stands for “Positive ATL”, and P-ATLir for “Positive ATLir”.
using ATS may have some advantage over CGS. Secondly, we showed that
ATL model checking over the broader class of nondeterministic alternating
transition systems is stillNP-complete for the “positive” formulae (andΔP2 -
complete in the general case), and hence the ATS-based semantics might
perhaps be used in amore convenient way than until now.
Finally, we proved that:
1. Model checking ATLir (i.e., ATL with imperfect information) is ΔP2 -
complete in the number of transitions and the length of the formula
(therefore closing a gap in existing research);
2. Model checking “PositiveATLir” isNP-complete in thenumber of tran-
sitions and the length of the formula;
3. Model checking ATLir isΔP3 -complete when the size of models is de-
ﬁned in terms of states rather than transitions;
4. Model checking “Positive ATLir” isΣP2 -complete in the same setting.
Thus, checking strategic ability under imperfect information falls in the same
complexity class as checking strategic ability for perfect information agents,
when a more reﬁned analysis is conducted – which we consider somewhat
surprising. We summarise the existing results onmodel checkingATL-related
logics in Figure 6.7.
Additionally, we presented a truth-preserving translation of ATL mod-
els and formulae. The resulting models are always turn-based, which usually
means an exponential decrease in the number of transitions. As turn-based
alternating transition systems are very close to CTLmodels, as well as exten-
sive form games with perfect information, one may hope that some inter-
esting techniques can be transferred fromCTLmodel checking and/or game
theory this way. Moreover, our translation of models is independent from
the translation of formulae, which allows for “pre-compiling”models when
one wants to check various properties of a particular multi-agent system.
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Chapter 7
Modular Interpreted
Systems (jointworkwith
Thomas A˚gotnes)
Abstract. We propose a new class of representations that can
be used for modeling (and model checking) temporal, strategic and
epistemic properties of agents and their teams. Our representations
borrow the main ideas from interpreted systems of Halpern, Fagin et
al.; however, they are also modular and compact in the way concur-
rent programs are. We also mention preliminary results on model
checking alternating-time temporal logic for this natural class of
models.
Keywords: open computational systems, temporal and strategic
logics, modelingmethodology, model checking
7.1 Introduction
The logical foundations of multi-agent systems have received much atten-
tion in recent years. Logic has been used to represent and reason about, e.g.,
knowledge [42], time [39], cooperation and strategic ability [8]. Lately, an
increasing amount of research has focused on higher level representation
languages for models of such logics, motivatedmainly by the need for com-
pact representations, and for representations that correspond more closely
to the actual systems which are modeled. Multi-agent systems are open sys-
tems, in the sense that agents interact with an environment only partially
known in advance. Thus, we need representations of models of multi-agent
systemswhich aremodular, in the sense that a component, such as an agent,
can be replaced, removed, or added, withoutmajor changes to the represen-
tation of the whole model. However, as we argue in this paper, few existing
representation languages are both modular, compact and computationally
grounded on the one hand, and allow for representing properties of both
knowledge and strategic ability, on the other.
In this paperwe present a new class of representations formodels of open
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multi-agent systems, which are modular, compact and come with an im-
plicit methodology for modeling and designing actual systems.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, in Section 7.2, we present
the background of our work – that is, logics that combine time, knowledge,
and strategies. More precisely: modal logics that combine branching time,
knowledge, and strategies under incomplete information. We start with
computation tree logic CTL, then we add knowledge (CTLK), and then we
discuss two variants of alternating-time temporal logic (ATL): one for the
perfect, and one for the imperfect information case. The semantics of log-
ics like the ones presented in Section 7.2 are usually deﬁned over explicit
models (Kripke structures) that enumerate all possible (global) states of the
system. However, enumerating these states is one of the things one mostly
wants to avoid, because there are toomany of them even for simple systems.
Thus, we usually need representations that are more compact. Another rea-
son for using a more specialized class of models is that general Kripke struc-
tures do not always give enough help in terms of methodology, both at the
stage of design, nor at implementation. This calls for a semantics which is
more grounded, in the sense that the correspondence between elements of
the model, and the entities that are modeled, is more immediate. In Sec-
tion 7.3, we present an overview of representations that have been used for
modeling and model checking systems in which time, action (and possibly
knowledge) are important; we mention especially representations used for
theoretical analysis. We point out that the compact and/or grounded rep-
resentations of temporal models do not play their role in a satisfactory way
when agents’ strategies are considered. Finally, in Section 7.4, we present our
framework ofmodular interpreted systems (MIS), and show where it ﬁts in the
picture. We conclude with a somewhat surprising hypothesis, that model
checking ability under imperfect information for MIS can be computation-
ally cheaper than model checking perfect information. Until now, almost
all complexity results were distinctly in favor of perfect information strate-
gies (and the others were indifferent).
7.2 LogicsofTime,Knowledge, andStrategic
Ability
First, we present the logics CTL, CTLK, ATL and ATLir that are the starting
point of our study.
7.2.1 Branching Time: CTL
Computation tree logic CTL [39] includes operators for temporal properties
of systems: i.e., path quantiﬁer E (“there is a path”), together with temporal
operators: (“in the next state”),  (“always from now on”) and U (“un-
til”).1 Every occurrence of a temporal operator is immediately preceded by
exactly one path quantiﬁer (this variant of the language is sometimes called
“vanilla” CTL).
1Additional operators A (“for every path”) and  (“sometime in the future”) are deﬁned in
the usual way.
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Let Π be a set of atomic propositions with a typical element p. CTL for-
mulae ϕ are deﬁned as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | E ϕ | Eϕ | EϕU ϕ.
The semantics of CTL is based on Kripke modelsM = 〈St,R, π〉, which
include a nonempty set of states St, a state transition relationR ⊆ St × St,
and a valuation of propositions π : Π → 2St. A path λ inM refers to a pos-
sible behavior (or computation) of systemM , and can be represented as an
inﬁnite sequence of states q0q1q2... such that qiRqi+1 for every i = 0, 1, 2, ....
We denote the ith state in λ by λ[i]. A q-path is a path that starts in q. Inter-
pretation of a formula in a state q in modelM is deﬁned as follows:
M, q |= p iff q ∈ π(p);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q |= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ;
M, q |= E ϕ iff there is a q-path λ such thatM,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= Eϕ iff there is a q-path λ such thatM,λ[i] |= ϕ for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |= EϕU ψ iff there is a q-path λ and i ≥ 0 such thatM,λ[i] |= ψ and
M,λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
7.2.2 Adding Knowledge: CTLK
CTLK [115] is a straightforward combination of CTL and standard epistemic
logic [55, 42]. Let Agt = {1, ..., k} be a set of agents with a typical element
a. Epistemic logic uses operators for representing agents’ knowledge: Kaϕ is
read as “agent a knows that ϕ”. Models of CTLK extendmodels of CTL with
epistemic indistinguishability relations ∼a⊆ St × St (one per agent). We
assume that all∼a are equivalences. The semantics of epistemic operators is
deﬁned as follows:
M, q |= Kaϕ iffM, q |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
Note that, when talking about agents’ knowledge, we implicitly assume
that agents may have imperfect information about the actual current state
of theworld (otherwise the notion of knowledgewould be trivial). This does
not have inﬂuence on the way we model evolution of a system as a single
unit, but it will become important when particular agents and their strate-
gies come to the fore.
7.2.3 Agents and Their Strategies: ATL
Alternating-time temporal logic ATL [8] is a logic for reasoning about tempo-
ral and strategic properties of open computational systems (multi-agent sys-
tems in particular). The language of ATL consists of the following formulae:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ.
where A ⊆ Agt. Informally, 〈〈A〉〉ϕ says that agents A have a collective strat-
egy to enforce ϕ. It should be noted that the CTL path quantiﬁers A,E can
be expressed with 〈〈∅〉〉, 〈〈Agt〉〉 respectively.
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The semantics of ATL is deﬁned in so called concurrent game structures
(CGS s). A CGS is a tuple
M = 〈Agt, St, Act, d, o,Π, π〉,
consisting of: a set Agt = {1, . . . , k} of agents; set St of states; valuation of
propositions π : Π → 2St; set Act of atomic actions. Function d : Agt × St →
2Act indicates the actions available to agent a ∈ Agt in state q ∈ St. Finally, o
is a deterministic transition functionwhichmaps a state q ∈ St and an action
proﬁle 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ Actk, αi ∈ d(i, q), to another state q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk).
Deﬁnition 50 A (memoryless) strategy of agent a is a function sa : St →
Act such that sa(q) ∈ d(a, q).2 A collective strategy SA for a teamA ⊆ Agt spec-
iﬁes an individual strategy for each agent a ∈ A. Finally, the outcome of strategy
SA in state q is deﬁned as the set of all computations thatmay result from executing
SA from q on:
out(q, SA) = {λ = q0q1q2... | q0 = q and for each i = 1, 2, ... there is 〈αi−11 , ..., αi−1k 〉
such that αi−1a = SA(a)(qi−1) for each a ∈ A, αi−1a ∈ d(a, qi−1) for each
a /∈ A, and o(qi−1, αi−11 , ..., αi−1k ) = qi}.
The semantics of cooperationmodalities is as follows:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ iff there is a collective strategy SA such that, for every
λ ∈ out(q, SA), we haveM,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ out(q, SA), we
haveM,λ[i] for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there existsSA such that for everyλ ∈ out(q, SA) there
is a i ≥ 0, for whichM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
7.2.4 Agentswith Imperfect Information: ATLir
As ATL does not include incomplete information in its scope, it can be seen
as a logic for reasoning about agents who always have complete knowledge
about the current state of the whole system. ATLir [121] includes the same
formulae as ATL, except that the cooperation modalities are presented with
a subscript: 〈〈A〉〉
ir indicates that they address agents with imperfect informa-
tion and imperfect recall. Formally, the recursive deﬁnition of ATLir formu-
lae is:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉
ir
ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉
ir
ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉
ir
ϕU ϕ
Models of ATLir, concurrent epistemic game structures (CEGS), can be de-
ﬁned as tuples M = 〈Agt, St, Act, d, o,∼1, ...,∼k,Π, π〉, where
〈Agt, St, Act, d, o,Π, π〉 is a CGS, and∼1, ...,∼k are epistemic (equivalence) re-
lations. It is required that agents have the same choices in indistinguishable
states: q ∼a q′ implies d(a, q) = d(a, q′). ATLir restricts the strategies that can
2This is a deviation from the original semantics of ATL [8], where strategies assign agents’
choices to sequences of states, which suggests that agents can by deﬁnition recall the whole
history of each game. While the choice of one or another notion of strategy affects the seman-
tics of the full ATL∗, and most ATL extensions (e.g. for games with imperfect information), it
should be pointed out that both types of strategies yield equivalent semantics for “pure” ATL
(cf. [121]).
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be used by agents to uniform strategies, i.e. functions sa : St→ Act, such that:
(1) sa(q) ∈ d(a, q), and (2) if q ∼a q′ then sa(q) = sa(q′). A collective strategy
is uniform if it contains only uniform individual strategies. Again, the func-
tion out(q, SA) returns the set of all paths that may result from agents A ex-
ecuting collective strategy SA from state q. The semantics of ATLir formulae
can be deﬁned as follows:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ir ϕ iff there is a uniform collective strategy SA such that,
for every a ∈ A, q′ such that q ∼a q′, and λ ∈ out(SA, q′), we have
M,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
irϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every a ∈ A, q′ such that
q ∼a q′, and λ ∈ out(SA, q′), we haveM,λ[i] for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
ir
ϕU ψ iff there exist SA such that, for every a ∈ A, q′ such that
q ∼a q′, and λ ∈ out(SA, q′), there is i ≥ 0 for whichM,λ[i] |= ψ, and
M,λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
That is, 〈〈A〉〉
ir
ϕ holds iff A have a uniform collective strategy, such that for
every path that can possibly result from execution of the strategy according
to at least one agent fromA, ϕ is the case.
7.3 Models andModel Checking
In this section, we present and discuss various (existing) representations of
systems that can be used formodeling andmodel checking. We believe that
the two most important points of reference are in this case: (1) the mod-
eling formalism (i.e., the logic and the semantics we use), and (2) the phe-
nomenon, or more generally, the domain we are going to model (to which
we will often refer as the “real world”). Our aim is a representation which is
reasonably close to the realworld (i.e., it is sufﬁciently compact andgrounded),
and still not too far away from the formalism (so that it e.g. easily allows for
theoretical analysis of computational problems). We begin with discussing
the merits of “explicit” models – in our case, these are transition systems,
concurrent game structures and CEGS s, presented in the previous section.
7.3.1 Explicit Models
Obviously, an advantage of explicit models is that they are very close to
the semantics of our logics (simply because they are the semantics). On the
other hand, they are in many ways difﬁcult to use to describe an actual sys-
tem:
• Exponential size: temporal models usually have an exponential num-
ber of states with respect to any higher-level description (e.g. Boolean
variables, n-ary attributes etc.). Also, their size is exponential in the
number of processes (or agents) if the evolution of a system results
from joint (synchronous or asynchronous) actions of several active en-
tities [92]. For CGS s the situation is even worse: here, also the num-
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ber of transitions is exponential, even if we ﬁx the number of states.3
In practice, this means that such representations are very seldom scal-
able.
• Explicitmodels includenomodularity. States in amodel refer to global
states of the system; transitions in themodel correspond to global tran-
sitions as well, i.e., they represent (in an atomic way) everything that
mayhappen in one single step, regardless ofwhohas done it, towhom,
and in what way.
• Logics like ATL are often advertised as frameworks for modeling and
reasoning about open computational systems. Ideally, one would like
the elements of such a system to have as little interdependencies as
possible, so that they can be “plugged” in and out without much has-
sle, for instance when we want to test various designs or implementa-
tions of the active component. In the case of a multi-agent system the
need is perhaps even more obvious. We do not only need to “re-plug”
various designs of a single agent in the overall architecture; we usu-
ally also need to change (e.g., increase) the number of agents acting in
a given environment without necessarily changing the design of the
whole system. Unfortunately, ATL models are anything but open in
this sense.
Theoretical complexity results for explicit models are as follows. Model
checkingCTL andCTLK is P-complete, and canbedone in timeO(ml), where
m is the number of transitions in the model, and l is the length of the for-
mula [30]. Alternatively, it can be done in time O(n2l), where n is the num-
ber of states. Model checking ATL is P-complete wrt. m, l andΔP3 -complete
wrt. n, k, l (k being the number of agents) [8, 78, 95]. Model checking ATLir
isΔP2 -complete wrt. m, l andΔP3 -complete wrt. n, k, l [121, 82].
7.3.2 Compressed Representations
Explicit representation of all states and transitions is inefﬁcient in many
ways. An alternative is to represent the state/transition space in a symbolic
way [102, 103].
Such models offer some hope for feasible model checking properties of
open/multi-agent systems, although it is well known that they are compact
only in a fraction of all cases.4 For us, however, they are insufﬁcient for
another reason: they are merely optimized representations of explicit models.
Thus, they are neither more open nor better grounded: they were meant to
optimize implementation rather than facilitate designormodelingmethod-
ology.
3Another class of ATL models, alternating transition systems [7] represent transitions in a
more succinct way. While we still have exponentially many states in an ATS, the number of
transitions is simply quadratic wrt. to states (like for CTLmodels). Unfortunately, ATS are even
less modular and harder to design than concurrent game structures, and they cannot be easily
extended to handle incomplete information (cf. [52]).
4Representation R of an explicit model M is compact if the size of R is logarithmic with
respect to the size ofM .
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7.3.3 Interpreted Systems
Interpreted systems [58, 42] are held by many as a prime example of com-
putationally grounded models of distributed systems. An interpreted system
can be deﬁned as a tuple IS = 〈St1, ..., Stk, Stenv,R, π〉. St1, ..., Stk are local
state spaces of agents 1, ..., k, and Stenv is the set of states of the environ-
ment. The set of global states is deﬁned as St = St1 × ... × Stk × Stenv;
R ⊆ St × St is a transition relation, and π : Π → 2St. While the transi-
tion relation encapsulates the (possible) evolution of the system over time,
the epistemic dimension is deﬁned by the local components of each global
state: 〈q1, ..., qk, qenv〉 ∼i 〈q′1, ..., q′k, qenv〉 iff qi = q′i.
It is easy to see that such a representation is modular and compact as far
as we are concerned with states. Moreover, it gives a natural (“grounded”)
approach to knowledge, and suggests an intuitive methodology for mod-
eling epistemic states. Unfortunately, the way transitions are represented
in interpreted systems is neither compact, nor modular, nor grounded: the
temporal aspect of the system is given by a joint transition function, exactly
like in explicit models. This is not without a reason: if we separate activities
of the agents too much, we cannot model interaction in the framework any
more, and interaction is the most interesting thing here. But the bottom
line is that the temporal dimension of an interpreted system has exponen-
tial representation. And it is almost as difﬁcult to “plug” components in and
out of an interpreted system, as for an ordinary CTL or ATLmodel, since the
“local” activity of an agent is completely merged with his interaction with
the rest of the system.
7.3.4 Concurrent Programs
The idea of concurrent programs has been long known in the literature on dis-
tributed systems. Here, we use the formulation from [92]. A concurrent pro-
gram P is composed of k concurrent processes, each described by a labeled
transition systemPi = 〈Sti, Acti,Ri,Πi, πi〉, whereSti is the set of local states
of process i,Acti is the set of local actions,Ri ⊆ Sti×Acti×Sti is a transition
relation, andΠi, πi are the set of local propositions and their valuation. The
behavior of program P is given by the product automaton of P1, ..., Pk under
the assumption that processeswork asynchronously, actions are interleaved,
and synchronization is obtained through common action names.
Concurrent programs have several advantages. First of all, they are mod-
ular and compact. They allow for “local” modeling of components – much
more so than interpreted systems (not only states, but also actions are local
here). Moreover, they allow for representing explicit interaction between
local transitions of reactive processes, like willful communication, and syn-
chronization. On the other hand, they do not allow for representing im-
plicit, “incidental”, or not entirely benevolent interactionbetweenprocesses.
For example, ifwewant to represent the act of pushing somebody, the pushed
object must explicitly execute an action of “being pushed”, which seems
somewhat ridiculous. Side effects of actions are also not easy tomodel. Still,
this is a minor complaint in the context of CTL, because for temporal log-
ics we are only interested in the ﬂow of transitions, and not in the underly-
ing actions. For temporal reasoning about k asynchronous processes with no
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implicit interaction, concurrent programs seem just about perfect.
The situation is different when we talk about autonomous, pro-active
components (like agents), acting together (cooperatively or adversely) in a
common environment – and we want to address their strategies and abili-
ties. Now, particular actions are no less important than the resulting tran-
sitions. Actions may inﬂuence other agents’ local states without their con-
sent, they may have side effects on other agents’ states etc. Passing mes-
sages and/or calling procedures is by no means the only way of interaction
between agents. Moreover, the availability of actions (to an agent) should
not depend on the actions that will be executed by other agents at the same
time – these are the outcome states thatmay depend on these actions! Finally,
we would often like to assume that agents act synchronously. In particular,
all agents play simultaneously in concurrent game structures. But, assum-
ing synchrony and autonomy of actions, synchronization can no longer be a
means of coordination.
To sum up, we need a representation which is very much like concur-
rent programs, but allows formodeling agents that play synchronously, and
which enablesmodelingmore sophisticated interaction between agents’ ac-
tions. The ﬁrst postulate is easy to satisfy, as we show in the following sec-
tion. The second will be addressed in Section 7.4.
Wenote thatmodel checkingCTL against concurrent programs is PSPACE-
complete in the number of local states and the length of the formula [92].
7.3.5 Synchronous CP and Simple ReactiveModules
The semantics of ATL is based on synchronous models where availability
of actions does not depend on the actions currently executed by the other
players. A slightly different variant of concurrent programs can be deﬁned
via synchronous product of programs, so that all agents play simultane-
ously.5 Unfortunately, under such interpretation, no direct interaction be-
tween agents’ actions can bemodeled at all.
Deﬁnition 51 A synchronous concurrent program consists of k concurrent
processesPi = 〈Sti, Acti,Ri,Πi, πi〉with the following unfolding to aCGS: Agt =
{1, ..., k}, St =∏ki=1 Sti, Act = ⋃ki=1 Acti, d(i, 〈q1, ..., qk〉) = {αi | 〈qi, αi, q′i〉 ∈
Ri for some q′i ∈ Sti}, o(〈q1, ..., qk〉, α1, ..., αk) = 〈q′1, ..., q′k〉 such that 〈qi, αi, q′i〉 ∈
Ri for every i; Π =
⋃k
i=1 Πi, and π(p) = πi(p) for p ∈ Πi.
Wenote that the simple reactive modules (SRML) from [131] can be seen as
a particular implementation of synchronous concurrent programs.
Deﬁnition 52 ASRML system is a tuple 〈Σ,Π,m1, . . . ,mk〉, whereΣ = {1, . . . , k}
is a set of modules (or agents),Π is a set of Boolean variables, and, for each i ∈ Σ,
we havemi = 〈ctri, initi, updatei〉, where ctri ⊆ Π. Sets initi and updatei consist
of guarded commands of the form φ  v′1 := ψ1; . . . ; v′k := ψk, where every
vj ∈ ctri, and φ, ψ1, . . . , ψk are propositional formulae over Π. It is required that
ctr1, . . . ctrk partitionsΠ.
5The concept is not new, of course, and has already existed in folk knowledge, although we
failed to ﬁnd an explicit deﬁnition in the literature.
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The idea is that agent i controls the variables ctri. The init guarded com-
mands are used to initialize the controlled variables, while theupdate guarded
commands can change their values in each round. A guarded command
is enabled if the guard φ is true in the current state of the system. In each
round an enabled update guarded command is executed: each ψj is evalu-
ated against the current state of the system, and its logical value is assigned
to vj . Several guarded commands being enabled at the same time model
non-deterministic choice. Model checking ATL for SRML has been proved
EXPTIME-complete in the size of themodel and the lengthof the formula [131].
7.3.6 Concurrent Epistemic Programs
Concurrent programs (both asynchronous and synchronous) can be used
to encode epistemic relations too – exactly in the same way as interpreted
systems do [118]. That is, when unfolding a concurrent program to a model
of CTLK or ATLir, we deﬁne that 〈q1, ..., qk〉 ∼i 〈q′1, ..., q′k〉 iff qi = q′i. Model
checkingCTLK for concurrent epistemic programs is PSPACE-complete [118].
SRML can be also interpreted in the same way; then, we would assume that
every agent can see only the variables he controls.
Concurrent epistemic programs are modular and have a “grounded” se-
mantics. They are usually compact (albeit not always: for example, an agent
with perfect information will always blow up the size of such a program).
Still, they inherit all the problems of concurrent programs with perfect in-
formation, discussed in Section 7.3.4: limited interaction between compo-
nents, availability of local actions depending on the actual transition etc.
The problems were already important for agents with perfect information,
but they become even more crucial when agents have only limited knowl-
edge of the current situation. One of the most important applications of
logics that combine strategic and epistemic properties is veriﬁcation of com-
munication protocols (e.g., in the context of security). Now, we may want
to, e.g., check agents’ ability to pass an information between them, without
letting anybody else intercept the message. The point is that the action of
intercepting is by deﬁnition enabled; we just look for a protocol in which
the transition of “successful interception” is never carried out. So, availabil-
ity of actionsmust be independent of the actions chosen by the other agents
under incomplete information. On the other hand, interaction is arguably
the most interesting feature of multi-agent systems, and it is really hard to
imagine models of strategic-epistemic logics, in which it is not possible to
represent communication.
7.3.7 ReactiveModules
Reactive modules [5] can be seen as a reﬁnement of concurrent epistemic
programs (primarily used by the MOCHA model checker [9]), but they are
muchmorepowerful, expressive andgrounded. Wehave alreadymentioned
a very limited variant of RML (i.e., SRML). The vocabulary of RML is very
close to implementations (in terms of general computational systems): the
modules are essentially collections of variables, states are just valuations of
variables; events/actions are variable updates. However, the sets of variables
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controlled by different agents can overlap, they can change over time etc.
Moreover, reactive modules support incomplete information (through ob-
servability of variables), although it is not themain focus of RML. Again, the
relationship between sets of observable variables (and to sets of controlled
variables) is mostly left up to the designer of a system. Agents can act syn-
chronously as well as asynchronously.
To sum up, RML deﬁne a powerful framework for modeling distributed
systems with various kinds of synchrony and asynchrony. However, we be-
lieve that there is still a need for a simpler and slightly more abstract class of
representations. First, the framework of RML is technically complicated, in-
volving a number auxiliary concepts and their deﬁnitions. Second, it is not
always convenient to represent all that is going on in a multi-agent system
as reading and/or writing from/to program variables. This view of a multi-
agent system is arguably close to its computer implementation, but usually
rather distant from the real world domain – hence the need for a more ab-
stract, and more conceptually ﬂexible framework. Third, the separation of
the “local” complexity, and the complexity of interaction is not straight-
forward. Our new proposal, more in the spirit of interpreted systems, takes
these observations as the starting point. The proposed framework is pre-
sented in Section 7.4.
7.4 Modular Interpreted Systems
The idea behind distributed systems (multi-agent systems even more so) is
that we deal with several loosely coupled components, where most of the
processing goes on inside components (i.e., locally), and only a small frac-
tion of the processing occurs between the components. Interaction is cru-
cial (which makes concurrent programs an insufﬁcient modeling tool), but
it usually consumes much less of the agent’s resources than local compu-
tations (which makes the explicit transition tables of CGS, CEGS, and in-
terpreted systems an overkill). Modular interpreted systems, proposed here,
extrapolate the modeling idea behind interpreted systems in a way that al-
lows for a tight control of the interaction complexity.
Deﬁnition 53 Amodular interpreted system (MIS) is deﬁned as a tuple
S = 〈Agt, env,Act, In〉,
where Agt = {a1, ..., ak} is a set of agents, env is the environment, Act is a set of
actions, and In is a set of symbols called interaction alphabet. Each agent has
the following internal structure:
ai = 〈Sti, di, outi, ini, oi,Πi, πi〉, where:
• Sti is a set of local states,
• di : Sti → 2Act deﬁnes local availability of actions; for convenience of
the notation, we additionally deﬁne the set of situated actions as Di =
{〈qi, α〉 | qi ∈ Sti, α ∈ di(qi)},
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• outi, ini are interaction functions; outi : Di → In refers to the inﬂuence
that a given situated action (of agent ai) may possibly have on the external
world, and ini : Sti × Ink → In translates external manifestations of the
other agents (and the environment) into the “impression” that they make on
ai’s transition function depending on the local state of ai,
• oi : Di × In→ Sti is a (deterministic) local transition function,
• Πi is a set of local propositions of agent ai where we require that Πi and Πj
are disjunct when i = j, and
• πi : Πi → 2Sti is a valuation of these propositions.
The environment env = 〈Stenv, outenv, inenv, oenv,Πenv, πenv〉has the same struc-
ture as an agent except that it does not perform actions, and that thus outenv :
Stenv → In and oenv : Stenv × In→ Stenv.
Within our framework, we assume that every action is executed by an ac-
tor, that is, an agent. As a consequence, every actor is explicitly represented
in a MIS as an agent, just like in the case of CGS and CEGS. The environ-
ment, on the other hand, represents the (passive) context of agents’ actions.
In practice, it serves to capture the aspects of the global state that are not
observable by any of the agents.
The input functions ini seem to be the fragile spots here: when given ex-
plicitly as tables, they have size exponential wrt. the number of agents (and
linear wrt. the size of In). However, we can use, e.g., a construction similar
to the one from [95] to represent interaction functions more compactly.
Deﬁnition 54 Implicit input function for state q ∈ Sti is given by a sequence
〈〈ϕ1, η1〉, ..., 〈ϕn, ηn〉〉, where each ηj ∈ In is an interaction symbol, and each ϕj is
a boolean combination of propositions ηˆi, with η ∈ In; ηˆi stands for “η is the sym-
bol currently generated by agent i”. The input function is now deﬁned as follows:
ini(q, 1, ..., k, env) = ηj iff j is the lowest index such that {ˆ11, ..., ˆkk, ˆenvenv} |= ϕj .
It is required that ϕn ≡ , so that the mapping is effective.
Remark 33 Every ini can be encoded as an implicit input function, with each
ϕj being of polynomial size with respect to the number of interaction symbols
(cf. [95]).
Note that, for some domains, theMIS representation of a system requires
exponentially many symbols in the interaction alphabet In. In such a case,
the problem is inherent to the domain, and ini will have size exponential
wrt the number of agents.
7.4.1 Representing Agent SystemswithMIS
Let Stg = (
∏k
i=1 Sti) × Stenv be the set of all possible global states generated
by amodular interpreted system S.
Deﬁnition 55 The unfolding of a MIS S for initial states Q ⊆ Stg to a CEGS
cegs(S,Q) = 〈Agt′, St′,Π′, π′, Act′, d′, o′,∼′1, ...,∼′k〉 is deﬁned as follows:
• Agt′ = {1, ..., k} andAct′ = Act,
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• St′ is the set of global states from Stg which are reachable from some state in
Q via the transition relation deﬁned by o′ (below),
• Π′ = ⋃ki=1 Πi ∪Πenv,
• For each q = 〈q1, . . . , qk, qenv〉 ∈ St′ and i = 1, ..., k, env, we deﬁne q ∈ π′(p)
iff p ∈ Πi and qi ∈ πi(p),
• d′(i, q) = di(qi) for global state q = 〈q1, ..., qk, qenv〉,
• The transition function is constructed as follows. Let q = 〈q1, ..., qk, qenv〉 ∈
St′, and α = 〈α1, ..., αk〉 be an action proﬁle s.t. αi ∈ d′(i, q). We deﬁne
inputi(q, α) = ini
(
qi, out1(q1, α1), . . . , outi−1(qi−1, αi−1), outi+1(qi+1, αi+1),
. . . , outk(qk, αk), outenv(qenv)
)
for each agent i = 1, . . . , k, and
inputenv(q, α) = inenv
(
qenv, out1(q1, α1), . . . , outk(qk, αk)
)
.
Then, o′(q, α) = 〈o1(〈q1, α1〉, input1(q, α)), . . . , ok(〈qk, αk〉, inputk(q, α)),
oenv(qenv, inputenv(q, α))〉;
• For each i = 1, ..., k: 〈q1, ..., qk, qenv〉 ∼′i 〈q′1, ..., q′k, q′env〉 iff qi = q′i.6
Remark 34 Note that MIS s can be used as representations of CGS s too. In that
case, epistemic relations ∼′i are simply omitted in the unfolding. We denote the
unfolding of a MIS S for initial statesQ into a CGS by cgs(S,Q).
Propositions 82 and 83 state that modular interpreted systems can be
used as representations for explicit models of multi-agent systems. On the
other hand, these representations are not always compact, as demonstrated
by Propositions 84 and 85.
Proposition 82 For every CEGSM , there is a MIS SM and a set of global states
Q of SM such that cegs(SM , Q) is isomorphic toM .7
Proof LetM = 〈{1, . . . , k}, St, Act, d, o,Π, π,∼1, . . . ,∼k〉 be a concurrent epis-
temic game structure. We construct a MIS SM = 〈{a1, . . . , ak}, env,Act, In〉
with agents ai = 〈Sti, di, outi, ini, oi,Πi, πi〉 and environment
env = 〈Stenv, outenv, inenv, oenv,Πenv, πenv〉, plus a setQ ⊆ Stg of global states,
as follows.
• In = Act ∪ St ∪ (Actk−1 × St),
• Sti = {[q]∼i | q ∈ St} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k (i.e., Sti is the set of i’s indistin-
guishability classes inM ),
• Stenv = St,
• di([q]∼i) = d(i, q) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k (this is well-deﬁned since d(i, q) = d(i, q′)
whenever q ∼i q′),
• outi([q]∼i , αi) = αi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k; outenv(q) = q,
• ini([q]∼i , α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αk, qenv) = 〈α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αk, qenv〉
for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}; inenv(q, α1 . . . , αk) = 〈α1, . . . , αk〉;
ini(x) and inenv(x) are arbitrary for other arguments x,
6This shows another difference between the environment and the agents: the environment
does not possess knowledge.
7We say that two CEGS are isomorphic if they only differ in the names of states and/or ac-
tions.
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• oi(〈[q]∼i , αi〉, 〈α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αk, qenv〉) = [o(qenv, α1, . . . , αk)]∼i for
1 ≤ i ≤ k and αi ∈ di([q]∼i);
oenv(q, 〈α1, . . . , αk〉) = o(q, α1, . . . , αk);
oi and oenv are arbitrary for other arguments,
• Πi = ∅ for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, andΠenv = Π,
• πenv(p) = π(p)
• Q = {〈[q]∼1 , . . . , [q]∼k , q〉 : q ∈ St}
Let M ′ = cegs(SM , Q) = 〈Agt′, St′, Act′, d′, o′,Π′, π′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′k〉. We argue
thatM andM ′ are isomorphic by establishing a one-to-one correspondence
between the respective sets of states, and showing that the other parts of the
structures agree on corresponding states.
First we show that, for any qˆ′ = 〈[q′]∼1 , . . . , [q′]∼k , q′〉 ∈ Q and any α =
〈α1, . . . , αk〉 such that αi ∈ d′(i, qˆ′), we have
o′(qˆ′, α) = 〈[q]∼1 , . . . , [q]∼k , q〉where q = o(q′, α) (7.1)
Let qˆ = o′(qˆ′, α). Now, for any i: inputi(qˆ′, α) = ini([q′]∼i , out1([q
′]∼1 , α1), ...,
outi−1([q′]∼i−1 , αi−1), outi+1([q
′]∼i+1 , αi+1), . . . , outk([q
′]∼k , αk), outenv(q
′)) =
ini([q′]∼i , α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αk, q
′) = 〈α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αk, q′〉. Sim-
ilarly, we get that inputenv(qˆ′, α) = 〈α1, . . . , αk〉. Thus we get that o′(qˆ′, α) =
〈o1(〈[q′]∼1 , α1〉, input1(qˆ′, α)), . . . , ok(〈[q′]∼k , αk〉, inputk(qˆ′, α)), oenv(q′,
inputenv(qˆ′, α))〉 = 〈[o(q′, α1, . . . , αk)]∼1 , . . . ,[o(q′, α1, . . . , αk)]∼k , o(q′, α1, . . . , αk)〉.
Thus, qˆ = 〈[q]∼1 , . . . , [q]∼k , q〉 for q = o(q′, α1, . . . , αk), which completes the
proof of (7.1).
We now argue that St′ = Q. Clearly, Q ⊆ St′. Let qˆ ∈ St′; we must show
that qˆ ∈ Q. The argument is on induction on the length of the least o′ path
from Q to qˆ. The base case, qˆ ∈ Q, is immediate. For the inductive step,
qˆ = o′(qˆ′, α) for some qˆ′ ∈ Q, and then we have that qˆ ∈ Q by (7.1). Thus,
St′ = Q.
Now we have a one-to-one correspondence between St and St′: r ∈ St
corresponds to 〈[r]∼1 , . . . , [r]∼k , r〉 ∈ St′. It remains to be shown that the
other parts of the structuresM andM ′ agree on corresponding states:
• Agt′ = Agt,
• Act′ = Act,
• Π′ = ⋃ki=1 Πi ∪Πenv = Π,
• For p ∈ Π′ = Π: 〈[q′]∼1 , . . . , [q′]∼k , q′〉 ∈ π′(p) iff q′ ∈ πenv(p) iff q′ ∈ π(p)
(same valuations at corresponding states),
• d′(i, 〈[q′]∼1 , . . . , [q′]∼k , q′〉) = di([q′]∼i) = d(i, q),
• It follows immediately from (7.1) and the fact that Q = St′ that
o′(〈[q′]∼1 , . . . , [q′]∼k , q′〉, α) = 〈[r′]∼1 , . . . , [r′]∼k , r′〉 iff o(q′, α) = r′ (tran-
sitions on the same joint action in corresponding states lead to corre-
sponding states),
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• 〈[q′]∼1 , . . . , [q′]∼k , q′〉 ∼′i 〈[r′]∼1 , . . . , [r′]∼k , r′〉 iff [q′]∼i = [r′]∼i iff q′ ∼i
r′ (the accessibility relations relate corresponding states), which com-
pletes the proof.

Corollary 9 For every CEGSM , there is an ATL ir-equivalent MIS S with initial
states Q, that is, for every state q in M there is a state q′ in cegs(S,Q) satisfying
exactly the same ATL ir formulae, and vice versa.
Proposition 83 For every CGSM , there is a MIS SM and a set of global states
Q of SM such that cgs(SM , Q) is isomorphic toM .
Proof Let M = 〈Agt, St, Act, d, o,Π, π〉 be given. Now, let
Mˆ = 〈Agt, St, Act, d, o,Π, π,∼1, . . . ,∼k〉 for some arbitrary accessibility rela-
tions ∼i over St. By Proposition 82, there exists a MIS SMˆ with global states
Q such that Mˆ ′ = cegs(SMˆ , Q) is isomorphic to Mˆ . LetM ′ be the CGS ob-
tained by removing the accessibility relations from Mˆ ′. Clearly, M ′ is iso-
morphic toM . 
Corollary 10 For every CGS M , there is an ATL-equivalent MIS S with initial
states Q. That is, for every state q inM there is a state q′ in cgs(S,Q) satisfying
exactly the same ATL formulae, and vice versa.
Proposition 84 The local state spaces in a MIS are not always compact with
respect to the underlying concurrent epistemic game structure.
Proof Take a CEGSM in which agent i has always perfect information about
the current global state of the system. When constructing a modular inter-
preted system S such thatM = cegs(S,Q), we have that Sti must be isomor-
phic with St. 
The above property is a part of the interpreted systemsheritage. The next
proposition stems from the fact that explicit models (and interpreted sys-
tems) allow for intensive interaction between agents.
Proposition 85 The size of In in S is, in general, exponential with respect to
the number of local states and local actions. This is the case even when epistemic
relations are not relevant (i.e., when S is taken as a representation of an ordinary
CGS).
Proof Consider a CGS M with agents Agt = {1, ..., k}, global states St =∏k
i=1{qi0, ..., qii}, and actions Act = {0, 1}, all enabled everywhere. The tran-
sition function is deﬁned as o(〈q1j1 , ..., qkjk〉, α1, ..., αk) = 〈q1l1 , ..., qklk〉, where
li = (ji + α1 + ... + αk) mod i. Note thatM can be represented as a modu-
lar interpreted system with succinct local state spaces Sti = {qi0, ..., qii}. Still,
the current actions of all agents are relevant to determine the resulting local
transition of agent i. 
Wewill call items In, outi, ini the interaction layer of amodular interpreted
system S; the other elements of S constitute the local layer of the MIS. In
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this paper we are ultimately interested in model checking complexity with
respect to the size of the local layer. To this end, we will assume that the size
of interaction layer is polynomial in the number of local states and actions.
Note that, by Propositions 84 and 85, not every explicit model submits to
compact representation with a MIS. Still, as we declared at the beginning of
Section 7.4, we aremainly interested in amodeling framework for systems of
loosely coupled components, where interaction is essential, but most pro-
cessing is done locally anyway. More importantly, the framework of MIS
allows for separating the interaction of agents from their local structure to a
larger extent. Moreover, we can control andmeasure the complexity of each
layer in a ﬁner way than before. First, we can try to abstract from the com-
plexity of a layer (e.g. like in this paper, by assuming that the other layer is
kept within certain complexity bounds). Second, we can also measure sepa-
rately the interaction complexity of different agents.
7.4.2 Modular Interpreted Systems vs. Simple Reac-
tiveModules
In this section we show that simple reactive modules are (as we already sug-
gested) a speciﬁc (and somewhat limited) implementation ofmodular inter-
preted systems. First, we deﬁne our (quite strong) notion of equivalence of
representations.
Deﬁnition 56 Two representations are equivalent if they unfold to isomorphic
concurrent epistemic game structures. They are CGS-equivalent if they unfold to
the same CGS.
Proposition 86 For any SRML there is a CGS-equivalent MIS.
Proof Consider an SRML R with k modules and n variables. We construct
S = 〈Agt, Act, In〉 with Agt = {a1, ..., ak}, Act = {1, ...,n,⊥1, ...,⊥n}, and
In = ⋃ki=1 Sti × Sti (the local state spaces Sti will be deﬁned in a moment).
Let us assume without loss of generality that ctri = {x1, ..., xr}. Also, we
consider all guarded commands of i to be of type γi,ψ : ψ  xi := , or
γ⊥i,ψ : ψ  xi := ⊥. Now, agent ai in S has the following components:
Sti = 2ctri (i.e., local states of ai are valuations of variables controlled by i);
di(qi) = {1, ...,r,⊥1, ...,⊥r}; outi(qi, α) = 〈qi, qi〉; ini(qi, 〈q1, q1〉, ..., 〈qi−1, qi−1〉,
〈qi+1, qi+1〉, ..., 〈qk, qk〉) = 〈{xi ∈ ctri | 〈q1, ..., qk〉 |=
∨
γi,ψ
ψ},
{xi ∈ ctri | 〈q1, ..., qk〉 |=
∨
γ⊥i,ψ
ψ}〉. To deﬁne local transitions, we consider
three cases. If t = f = ∅ (no update is enabled), then oi(qi, α, 〈t, f〉) =
qi for every action α. If t = ∅, we take any arbitrary xˆ ∈ t, and deﬁne
oi(qi,j , 〈t, f〉) = qi ∪ {xj} if xj ∈ t, and qi ∪ {xˆ} otherwise; oi(qi,⊥j , 〈t, f〉) =
qi \ {xj} if xj ∈ f , and qi ∪{xˆ} otherwise. Moreover, if t = ∅ = f , we take any
arbitrary xˆ ∈ f , and deﬁne oi(qi,j , 〈t, f〉) = qi ∪ {xj} if xj ∈ t, and qi \ {xˆ}
otherwise; oi(qi,⊥j , 〈t, f〉) = qi \{xj} if xj ∈ f , and qi \{xˆ} otherwise. Finally,
Πi = ctri, and qi ∈ πi(xj) iff xj ∈ qi. 
The above construction shows that SRML have more compact represen-
tation of states than MIS: ri local variables of agent i give rise to 2ri local
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states. In a way, reactive modules (both simple and “full”) are two-level rep-
resentations: ﬁrst, the system is represented as a product of modules; next,
each module can be seen as a product of its variables (together with their
update operations). Note, however, that speciﬁcation of updates with re-
spect to a single variable in an SRMLmay require guarded commands of total
lengthO(2
∑k
i=1 ri). Thus, the representation of transitions in SRML is (in the
worst case) nomore compact than inMIS, despite the two-level structure of
SRML. We observe ﬁnally that MIS are more general, because in SRML the
current actions of other agents have no inﬂuence on the outcome of agent
i’s current action (although the outcome can be inﬂuenced by other agents’
current local states).
7.4.3 Model CheckingModular Interpreted Systems
One of ourmain aimswas to study the complexity of symbolicmodel check-
ing ATLir in a meaningful way. Following the reviewers’ remarks, we state
our complexity results only as conjectures. Preliminary proofs can be found
in [74].
Conjecture 3 Model checkingATL formodular interpreted systems is EXPTIME-
complete.
Conjecture 4 Model checking ATLir for the class ofmodular interpreted systems
is PSPACE-complete.
A summaryof complexity results formodel checking temporal and strate-
gic logics (with and without epistemic component) is given in the table be-
low. The table presents completeness results for variousmodels and settings
of input parameters. Symbols n, k,m stand for the number of states, agents
and transitions in an explicitmodel; l is the length of the formula, and nlocal
is the number of local states in a concurrent programormodular interpreted
system. The new results, conjectured in this paper, are printed in italics.
Note that the result for model checking ATL against modular interpreted
systems is an extension of the result from [131].
m, l n, k, l nlocal, k, l
CTL P [30] P [30] PSPACE [92]
CTLK P [30, 45] P [30, 45] PSPACE [118]
ATL P [8] ΔP3 [78, 95] EXPTIME
ATLir ΔP2 [121, 82] ΔP3 [82] PSPACE
If we are right, then the results for ATL and ATLir form an intriguing pat-
tern. When we compare model checking agents with perfect vs. imperfect
information, the ﬁrst problem appears to be much easier against explicit
models measured with the number of transitions; next, we get the same
complexity class against explicitmodelsmeasuredwith thenumber of states
and agents; ﬁnally, model checking imperfect information turns out to be
easier thanmodel checking perfect information formodular interpreted sys-
tems. Why can it be so?
First, a MIS unfolds into CEGS and CGS in a different way. In the ﬁrst
case, theMIS is assumed to encode the epistemic relations explicitly (which
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makes it explode when we model agents with perfect, or almost perfect in-
formation). In the latter case, the epistemic aspect is ignored, which gives
some extra room for encoding the transition relation more efﬁciently. An-
other crucial factor is the number of available strategies (relative to the size
of input parameters). Thenumber of all strategies is exponential in thenum-
ber of global states; for uniform strategies, there are usually much less of
them but still exponentially many in general. Thus, the fact that perfect
information strategies can be synthesized incrementally has a substantial
impact on the complexity of the problem. However, measured in terms of
local states and agents, the number of all strategies is doubly exponential, while
there are “only” exponentially many uniform strategies – which settles the
results in favor of imperfect information.
7.5 Conclusions
We have presented a new class of representations for open multi-agent sys-
tems. Our representations, called modular interpreted systems, are: mod-
ular, in the sense that components can be changed, replaced, removed or
added, with as little changes to the whole representation as possible; more
compact than traditional explicit representations; and grounded, in the sense
that the correspondences between the primitives of the model and the en-
tities beingmodeled are more immediate, giving a methodology for design-
ing and implementing systems. We also conjecture that the complexity of
model checking strategic ability for our representations is higher if we as-
sume perfect information than if we assume imperfect information.
The solutions, proposed in this paper, are not necessarily perfect (for ex-
ample, the “impression” functions ini seem to be the main source of non-
modularity in MIS, and can be perhaps improved), but we believe them to
be a step in the right direction. We also do notmean to claim that our repre-
sentations should replace more elaborate modeling languages like Promela
or reactive modules. We only suggest that there is a need for compact, mod-
ular and reasonably groundedmodels that aremore expressive than concur-
rent (epistemic) programs, and still allow for easier theoretical analysis than
reactivemodules. We also suggest thatMISmight be better suited formodel-
ing simplemulti-agent domains, especially for human-oriented (as opposed
to computer-oriented) design.
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Chapter 8
A Temporal Logic for
Markov Chains
Abstract. Most models of agents and multi-agent systems in-
clude information about possible states of the system (that deﬁnes
relations between states and their external characteristics), and in-
formation about relationships between states. Qualitativemodels of
this kind assign no numerical measures to these relationships. At
the same time, quantitative models assume that the relationships are
measurable, and provide numerical information about the degrees
of relations. In this paper, we explore the analogies between some
qualitative and quantitative models of agents/processes, especially
those between transition systems andMarkovianmodels.
Typical analysis of Markovian models of processes refers only to the
expected utility that can be obtained by the process. On the other
hand, modal logic offers a systematic method of describing phe-
nomena by combining various modal operators. Here, we try to
exploit linguistic features, offered by propositional modal logic, for
analysis of Markov chains and Markov decision processes. To this
end, we proposeMarkov temporal logic – a multi-valued logic that ex-
tends the branching time logic CTL*.
Keywords: Temporal logic, Markov chains, Markov decision pro-
cesses
8.1 Introduction
There are many different models of agents and multi-agent systems; how-
ever, most of them follow a similar pattern. First of all, they include infor-
mation about possible situations (states of the system) that deﬁnes relations
between states and their external characteristics (essentially, “facts of life”
that are true in these states). Second, they provide information about rela-
tionships between states (e.g, possible transitions between states).
Models that share this structure can be, roughly speaking, divided into
two classes. Qualitative models provide no numerical measures for these re-
lationships. They arewidely used as basicmodels of computational systems,
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in semantics of programming languages (including agent-oriented languages),
and in speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of systems. Qualitative models seem
especially suited for domains in which quantitative information cannot be
reliably obtained nor assumed. They are also used to model situations in
which the goal of an agent (or the whole system) is not to maximize a mea-
surable output, but rather to achieve a state that matches certain character-
istics (speciﬁed e.g. by a logical formula).
Quantitative models assume that relationships are measurable, and pro-
vide numerical information about the degrees of relations. For the relations
between states, the degrees are usually given as probabilities. For the “quali-
ties” of particular states, one often talks about rewards or utilities. Quantita-
tive representations are used in stochastic modeling (Markov chains), deci-
sion theory and reinforcement learning (Markov decision processes), game
theory (strategic and extensive game forms) etc. In this paper, we explore
analogies between transition systems andMarkovianmodels in order to pro-
vide a more expressive language for reasoning about, and speciﬁcation of
agents in stochastic environments.
Analysis of quantitative process models is usually based on the notion
of expected reward. Still, other features of Markov chains and Markov deci-
sion processes can be also interesting. We propose to use the methodology
of propositionalmodal logic in order to study quantitative properties of sys-
tems and processes. Markov temporal logic for Markov chains, introduced in
Section 8.4, is our ﬁrst step in this direction. We also brieﬂy consider two ex-
tensions of the logic: for Markov decision processes (where a single decision
maker is present) and for multi-agent Markov decision processes (in which
many agents can play simultaneously).
8.1.1 RelatedWork
Related work includes research on multi-valued logics, especially fuzzy log-
ics [145, 54], probabilistic logics [110, 119], andmulti-valuedmodal logics [50,
36]. Of the latter, [90] is particularly relevant, as it deﬁnes a multi-valued
version of CTL*, with propositions and accessibility relations taking values
from a ﬁnite quasi-Boolean algebra. Still, the approach of [90] is too abstract
to give an account of quantitative analysis of processes (e.g., by operators
that compute the expected and/or average truth value along a given path).
Logics of probability [56] are also related to the phenomena we study
here. Important examples of such logics are two probabilistic variants of
CTL: PCTL [59] for real time, and pCTL* [10] for discrete time; both allow to
express probability bounds for a speciﬁed behavior. However, logics of prob-
ability do not use the machinery of multi-valued logics. More importantly,
like probabilistic logics, they focus on the probabilities of events (e.g., be-
haviors), and it is often hard to attribute an intuitive meaning to combina-
tions (or patterns) of different probability values. In contrast, we will argue
in Section 8.2.3 that combining utilities has a very natural commonsense
interpretation.
Our work comes very close to [33], where the “Discounted CTL” (DCTL)
is proposed. In fact, our Markov temporal logic directly extends the ideas
behind DCTL; a more detailed comparison is presented in Section 8.6. The
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Figure 8.1: (A) Markov chain. (B) Unlabeled transition system
variant ofmulti-valuedCTL from [97], where the domain of truth values can
be any c-semiring (rather than simply the interval [0, 1] of real numbers), is
also relevant. While it does not address quantitative analysis of processes
directly, the choice of c-semirings makes such analysis possible (at least in
principle). It may be interesting to consider a similar generalization of our
framework in the future.
8.2 Looking for Analogies
We begin with drawing some analogies between the quantitative and quali-
tative approaches to computational systems. In particular, we are interested
in similarities between Markovian models of processes and transition sys-
tems.
8.2.1 Quantitative vs. QualitativeModels
The simplestMarkovianmodels areMarkov chains [100, 88, 53], discrete-time
stochastic processes in which the next state of the system depends only on
the current state and possibly the current action(s), but it does not directly
depend on the past states of the system. A formal deﬁnition is given in Sec-
tion 8.3.2. An exampleMarkov chain is depicted in Figure 8.1, together with
an unlabeled transition system. It is easy to see the similarities. First, states
in theMarkov chain are assigned real reward valuesR, and states in the tran-
sition system are assigned valuations of atomic propositions p, q, . . . . More-
over, both kinds of structures include a set of states and a (single) binary
transition relation on states; however, in theMarkov chain, tuples of the re-
lation are annotated with transition probabilities.
Markov decision processes [16, 15] can be seen as an extension of Markov
chains, where several actions are available in each state. We observe that
Markov decision processes are very much like labeled transition systems. In
both cases, the action-transition structure can be modeled by a number of
binary relations on states (one relationper action), although the elements of
relations inMarkov decisionprocesses are annotatedwith probability values
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Figure 8.2: (A) Markov decision process. (B) Labeled transition system
(cf. Figure 8.2). We also observe the similarity between multi-agent Markov
decision processes from [20] and concurrent game structures from [8].
8.2.2 Quantitative vs. Qualitative Descriptions
The tradition of decision theory and reinforcement learning puts forward
the quantitative notion of expected utility which represents the average of
“what we can get” for all possible executions of the process. At the same
time, logical approaches are usually concerned with “limit properties” like
the existence of an execution that displays a speciﬁc temporal pattern. Log-
ical frameworks are not very well suited to coping with models that involve
probabilities: the existence of a particular kind of execution may be of little
interest if this kind of execution is unlikely to happen. It does not mean,
however, that these “limit properties” are irrelevant: in some cases we do
want to e.g. make sure that there is no path violating an important security
property. The point we are trying to make in this paper is that both kinds of
properties are interesting and worth using to describe processes.
One of the nicer features of temporal logics – especially branching-time
logics like CTL and CTL* – is that they offer a systematic approach in which
properties of particular paths (executions) are distinguished from the prop-
erties of sets of paths (e.g., the set of all executions of a process). The ﬁrst
kind of properties is facilitated by temporal operators like “always” (), “even-
tually” (), “next” ( ) etc. The second kind is based on path quantiﬁers like
“for all paths” (A) and “there is a path” (E). Both kinds of operators can be
combined: e.g., Esafe says “there is a path such that the system is always in
a safe state”. The same approach can be employed within the quantitative
framework. For instance, besides the expected value of cumulative future
reward, we can ask of the maximal (or minimal) cumulative reward. Or, we
might be concerned with the expected value of minimal guaranteed reward
etc. We propose a precise semantics for such combinations (and a semantics
of interplay between qualitative and quantitative properties) in Section 8.4.
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8.2.3 Logical operators as Minimizers and Maximiz-
ers
Note that – when truth values represent utility of an agent – temporal oper-
ators “sometime” and “always” have a very natural interpretation. “Some-
time p” (p) can be rephrased as “p is achievable in the future”. Thus, under
the assumption that agents want to obtain as much utility as possible, it is
natural to view the operator as maximizing the utility value along a given
temporal path. Similarly, “always p” (p) can be rephrased as “p is guaran-
teed from now on”. In other words, p asks for the minimal value of p on
the path. On a more general level, every universal quantiﬁer is essentially a
minimizer of truth values, while existential quantiﬁers can be seen as maxi-
mizers. Thus,Aγ (“for all paths γ”)minimizes the utility speciﬁed by γ across
all paths that can occur, etc. Also, conjunction and disjunction can be seen
as aminimizer and amaximizer: ϕ∨ψ reads easily as “the utility that can be
achieved through ϕ or ψ”, while ϕ∧ψ reads as “utility guaranteed by both ϕ
and ψ”.
Of course, the idea of deﬁning semantics of conjunction and disjunction
through functionsmin andmax, respectively, is not new: the same semantic
approach is used e.g. in fuzzy logic [145, 54]. Also, interpreting quantiﬁers as
outcome maximization/minimization operators, can be traced back to the
game semantics of classical logic [64, 98].
8.3 BasicModels: MarkovChainsandMarkov
Decision Processes
Markov chains have been proposed to represent and study properties of pro-
cesses inwhich transitions canbedescribed in termsof probabilities. Markov
chains are often used for generation of semi-random sequences of words,
symbols or events (algorithms generating spam messages are a good exam-
ple here). For these applications, states of a system (chain) playmostly tech-
nical role, aswe aremainly after the events being generated. However,Markov
chains can be also used to model and analyze existing processes (especially
as parts ofMarkov decision processes, perhaps the most popular models of re-
inforcement learning). In that case, we are usually interested in properties of
the states: either qualitative (i.e., some facts being true or false in different
states of the process) or quantitative (representing utilities or rewards that
the process is expected to yield in particular states). Evenmore importantly,
we are interested in how these (qualitative or quantitative) properties accu-
mulate as the system progresses in time.
8.3.1 Domain
A domainD = 〈U,,⊥, u〉 consists of: (1) a set U ⊆ R of utility values (or sim-
ply utilities); (2) special values,⊥ standing for the logical truth and falsity,
respectively; Uˆ = U ∪ {,⊥} will be called the extended utility set; and, ﬁ-
nally, (3) a complement function u : Uˆ → Uˆ . A domain should satisfy the
following conditions:
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1. U ⊆ R;
2. The operations of addition andmultiplication have their typical prop-
erties on Uˆ , and Uˆ is closed under averaging, i.e., for every probability
distribution P over Uˆ (discrete or continuous),
∑
u∈Uˆ u P (u) ∈ Uˆ ;
3. U is closed under complement: if u ∈ U then u ∈ U ;
4. Complement reverts the classical truth values:  = ⊥ and⊥ = ;
5.  ≥ 0;
6. ⊥ ≤ u and ≥ u for all u ∈ Uˆ ;1
7. The complement is quasi-booleanwrtmax,min, i.e., for everyu1, u2, u ∈
Uˆ : max(u1, u2) = min(u1, u2), min(u1, u2) = max(u1, u2), u1 ≤ u2 iff
u2 ≤ u1, and u = u.
In the rest of the paper, we will assume that U = [0, 1], = 1,⊥ = 0, u =
1 − u. This closely resembles the setting in [33]. Admittedly, using 0 and 1
to represent “false” and “true” has a long tradition in logic; there is also a
tradition of using values between 0 and 1 in multi-valued logics.
8.3.2 Markov Chains
Typically, aMarkov chain is a directed graphwith probabilistic transition re-
lation. In our deﬁnition, we include also a device for assigning states with
utilities and/or propositional values. This is done throughutility ﬂuentswhich
generalize atomic propositions frommodal logic, in the sense that they can
also take real numbers as their values.
Deﬁnition 57 (Markov chain) A Markov chain over domain
D = 〈U,,⊥, u〉, and a set of utility ﬂuentsΠ is a tupleM = 〈St, τ, π〉, where:
• St is a set of states (we will assume that the set is ﬁnite and nonempty
throughout the rest of the paper);
• τ : St × St → [0, 1] is a stochastic transition relation that assigns each
pair of states q1, q2 with a probability τ(q1, q2) that, if the system is in q1, it
will change its state to q2 in the next moment. For every q1 ∈ St, τ(q1, ·) is
assumed to be a probability distribution, i.e.
∑
q∈St τ(q1, q) = 1.
By abuse of notation, we will sometimes write τ(q) to denote the set of states
accessible in one step from q, i.e. {q′ | τ(q, q′) > 0}.
• π : Π× St→ Uˆ is a valuation of utility ﬂuents.
Example 38 (Genemodel) Consider the following extension of the “genemo-
del” from [53]. A trait in animals of a particular species is governed by a pair of
genes, each of whom may be of type G or g. Very often the GG and Gg types are
indistinguishable in appearance; we say that type G dominates type g. Thus, an
individual can have the dominant combination GG, recessive combination gg,
or hybrid combinationGg (which is genetically the same as gG).
1Note that this implies that max(u,) = , min(u,) = u, min(u,⊥) = ⊥, and
max(u,⊥) = u for all u ∈ Uˆ .
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Figure 8.3: Markov chain for the genemodel
Mating of two animals produces an offspring that inherits one gene of the pair
from each parent, and the basic assumption of genetics is that these genes are se-
lected at random, independently of each other. Suppose that we breed animals by
starting with an individual of known genetic character and mate it with a hybrid.
We assume that there is at least one offspring. Then, at each round, a random
offspring is chosen and mated with a hybrid, and so on. Suppose also that a sta-
tistical study of survival produced the following ﬁtness function for individuals of
the species (in relation to genotype): f(GG) = 0.5, f(Gg) = 0.3, and f(gg) = 0.9
– i.e., the individuals with recessive genes are the ﬁttest, and hybrids are the least
ﬁt of all. Furthermore, utility ﬂuent f is used to represent ﬁtness values. A Markov
chain that models the process is shown in Figure 8.3.
A run in Markov chain M is an inﬁnite sequence of states q0q1 . . . such
that each qi+1 can follow qi with a non-zero probability, i.e., for every i =
0, 1, . . . we have τ(qi, qi+1) > 0. We denote the set of all runs inM by RM .
The set of runs starting from state q is denoted byRM (q).2 Let λ = q0q1... be a
run and i ∈ N0. Then: λ[i] = qi denotes the ith position in λ; λ[i..j] = qi . . . qj
denotes the subpathofλ fromposition i to j; andλ[i..∞] = qiqi+1 . . . denotes
the inﬁnite subpath of λ from position i on.
Finite preﬁxes of runs are called histories. HM = {h | h = λ[0..i] for some
λ ∈ RM , i} denotes the set of all histories inM . HM (q) is the set of histories
starting from q; HkM (q) restricts the set further to the histories of length k.
Note that each history h can be uniquely identiﬁed with the set of runs that
“complete” it. By a slight abuse of notation, we will also use h to denote
the set, and HM (q) to denote all such subsets of RM (q). Finally, by λ(h) we
denote an arbitrary inﬁnite continuation of h (e.g., the run from hwhich is
minimal wrt to alphabetical ordering of runs).
8.3.3 MarkovDecision Processes
Markov decision processes extend Markov chains with an explicit action
structure: transitions are now connected to actions that generate them.
Deﬁnition 58 (Markov decision process) AMarkovdecisionprocess over
domainD = 〈U,,⊥, u〉, and a set of utility ﬂuentsΠ is a tupleM = 〈St,Act, τ, π〉,
where: St, π are like in aMarkov chain,Act is a nonempty ﬁnite set of actions, and
τ : St×Act×St→ [0, 1] is a stochastic transition relation; τ(q1, α, q2) deﬁnes the
probability that, if the system is in q1 and the agent executes α, the next state will
2If the model is clear from the context, the subscripts will be omitted.
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Figure 8.4: Markov decision process that allows for various mating policies
be q2. For every q ∈ St, α ∈ Act, we assume that either (1) τ(q, α, q′) = 0 for all q′
(i.e., α is not enabled in q), or (2) τ(q, α, ·) is a probability distribution.
Additionally, we deﬁne act(q) = {α ∈ Act | ∃q′.τ(q, α, q′) > 0} as the set of
enabled actions in q.
Apolicy is a conditional plan that speciﬁes future actions of the decision-
making agent. Policies can be stochastic as well, thus allowing for random-
ness in the agent’s play.
Deﬁnition 59 A policy (or strategy) in a Markov decision process
M = 〈St,Act, τ, π〉 is a function s : States × Act → [0, 1] that assigns each
state q with a probability distribution over the enabled actions act(q). That is,
s(q, α) ∈ [0, 1] for all q ∈ St, α ∈ act(q), and∑α∈act(q) s(q, α) = 1. Values of
s(q, α) for α /∈ act(q) are irrelevant.
Policy s is pure iff for each state q it speciﬁes a single action α (i.e., s(q, α) = 1,
and s(q, α′) = 0 for all the other α′). By abuse of notation, we will sometimes write
s(q) = α instead of s(q, α) = 1 for pure policies.
The set of all policies inM is denoted by ΣM . The set of all pure policies inM
is denoted by σM .
Note that, if the agent’s policy is ﬁxed, aMarkov decision process reduces
to aMarkov chain.
Deﬁnition 60 Policy s : States × Act → [0, 1] instantiates
MDPM = 〈St,Act, τ, π〉 to a Markov chainM † s = 〈St′, τ ′, π′〉 with St′ = St,
π′ = π, and τ ′(q, q′) =
∑
α∈act(q) s(q, α) τ(q, α, q
′).
Example 39 (Genemodel ctd.) An extension of the “gene model” Markov
chain from Example 38 is shown in Figure 8.4. Now, it is possible to mate the
offspring with an animal that has dominant genes (action d), recessive genes (ac-
tion r), or hybrid genes (action h). Note that the pure policy s(GG) = s(Gg) =
s(gg) = h instantiates the MDP to the Markov chain from Figure 8.3.
8.4 MTL0: A Logic ofMarkov Chains
In this section we present our ﬁrst take on Markov Temporal Logic (MTL), a
logic that allows for ﬂexible reasoning about outcomes of agents acting in
stochastic environments. The core of the logic is calledMTL0, and addresses
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outcomes of Markov chains. Intuitively, MTL0 is a quantitative analogue of
the branching-time logic CTL* [38]; we will formalize (and prove) this claim
later, in Section 8.4.4.
Operators ofMTL0 include path quantiﬁersE,A,M for themaximal,min-
imal, and average outcome of a set of temporal paths, respectively, and tem-
poral operators,,m for themaximal,minimal, and average outcomealong
a given path.3 Propositional operators follow the same pattern. Besides ∨,∧
for maximization and minimization of outcomes obtained from different
utility channels or related todifferent goals, weuse (after [33]) the “weighted
average” operator⊕whichwill prove usefulwhenwe formulate e.g. ﬁxpoint
properties of temporal operators with discount. Additionally, we introduce
a “defuzziﬁcation” operator ; ϕ1  ϕ2 yields “true” if the outcome of ϕ1 is
less or equal to ϕ2, and “false” otherwise. This provides a neat two-valued
interface to the logic. Among other advantages, it allows to deﬁne the clas-
sical computational problems of validity, satisﬁability and model checking
for MTL.
8.4.1 Syntax ofMTL0
The syntax of MTL0 (parameterized by a set of utility ﬂuentsΠ) is deﬁned as
follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ⊕c ϕ | ϕ  ϕ | Eγ | Mγ,
γ ::= ϕ | ¬γ | γ ∧ γ | c γ | cγ | γ Uc γ | mcγ.
where p ∈ Π is a utility ﬂuent, and c ∈ (0, 1] is a discount factor. We will use
the symbol Lstate(Π) to denote the set of “state formulae” ϕ, and Lpath(Π)
to denote the set of “path formulae” γ.
Additionally, we deﬁne the Boolean constants T,F (standing for “true”
and “false”), disjunction, and the “sometime” temporal operator  as be-
low. Except forT, all of them are just standard deﬁnitions that can be found
in any textbook on temporal logic. We will show in Section 8.4.2 that their
semantics corresponds to our intuition also in this setting.
• T ≡ p  p,
• F ≡ ¬T,
• ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2),
• Aγ ≡ ¬E¬γ,
• γ1 ∨ γ2 ≡ ¬(¬γ1 ∧ ¬γ2),
• cγ ≡ TUc γ,
• ϕ1 ∼= ϕ2 ≡ (ϕ1  ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2  ϕ1).
We may also use the following shorthands for discount-free versions of
temporal operators: ≡ 1 , ≡ 1, ≡ 1, U ≡ U1 .
3The temporal operators will allow to discount future outcomes with a discount factor c.
Also, we will introduce the “until” operator U , which is more general than.
241 CHAPTER 8. A TEMPORAL LOGIC FORMARKOVCHAINS
Example 40 The following MTL0 formulae deﬁne some interesting character-
istics of the breeding process from Example 38: Mm0.9f (expected average ﬁtness
with time discount 0.9),Am0.9f (guaranteed average ﬁtness with the same discount
factor),Mf (expected minimal undiscounted ﬁtness), andAf (guaranteedmax-
imal ﬁtness).
8.4.2 Semantics ofMTL0
Themain idea behindMTL0 is to treat formulae in a sufﬁciently general way,
so that they can represent both quantitative utilities and qualitative truth
values referring to something which is completely true or false, like a task
that has been completely achieved. Besides advantages in terms of model-
ing, this allows to freely mix qualitative and quantitative properties, which
(hopefully) makes the resulting semantics elegant and powerful. Thus, we
are going to treat complex formulae as ﬂuents, just like the atomic utility
ﬂuents fromΠ, through a valuation function that assigns formulae with ex-
tended utility values from Uˆ .
LetM = 〈St, τ, π〉 be a Markov chain over domainD = 〈U,,⊥, u〉 and a
set of utility ﬂuentsΠ. The truth value of formulae inM is determinedby the
valuation function [·] : (St×Lstate(Π))∪(R×Lpath(Π)) → Uˆ , deﬁned below.
We will omitM in [·]M,q, [·]M,λ when themodel is clear from the context.
• [p]q = π(p, q), for p ∈ Π;
• [¬ϕ]q = [ϕ]q;
• [ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2]q = min([ϕ1]q, [ϕ2]q);
• [ϕ1 ⊕c ϕ2]q = (1− c) · [ϕ1]q + c · [ϕ2]q;
• [ϕ1  ϕ2]q =  if [ϕ1]q ≤ [ϕ2]q and⊥ otherwise;
• [ϕ]M,λ = [ϕ]M,λ[0].
• [¬γ]λ = [γ]λ;
• [γ1 ∧ γ2]λ = min([γ1]λ, [γ2]λ);
• [ c γ]λ = c · [γ]λ[1..∞];
• [cγ]M,λ = infi=0,1,...{ci[γ]M,λ[i..∞]};
• [γ1 Uc γ2]λ =
supi=0,1,...
{
min( min0≤j<i{cj [γ1]λ[j..∞]}, ci[γ2]λ[i..∞])
}
;
• TheMarkovian temporal operatormc produces the average discounted
reward along the given run:
[mcγ]λ =
{
(1− c)∑∞i=0 ci[γ]λ[i...∞] if c < 1
limi→∞ 1i+1
∑i
j=0[γ]λ[i...∞] if c = 1
• [Eγ]q = sup{[γ]λ | λ ∈ R(q)};
• The Markovian path quantiﬁerMγ produces the expected truth value
γ across all the possible runs (fromnow on). GivenM, q, we ﬁrst deﬁne
the probability space 〈R(q),H(q), pr〉 induced by the next-state transi-
tion probabilities τ (cf. also [33, 88]). In this space, elementary out-
comes are runs from R(q), events are sets of runs that share the same
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ﬁnite preﬁx (i.e., ones from H(q)), and the probability measure pr :
H(q) → [0, 1] is deﬁned as pr(q0 . . . q1) = τ(q0, q1) · . . . · τ(qi−1, qi). Then,
we use the valuation of γ as the randomvariable; the truth value ofMγ
is deﬁned as its expected value:
[Mγ]q = lim
k→∞
∑
h∈Hk(q)
[γ]λ(h)τ(h[0], h[1]) · . . . · τ(h[k − 1], h[k]).
Example 41 The valuations of the MTL0 formulae from Example 40 for the
breeding process fromFigure 8.3 are as follows. [Mm0.9f]GG = 0.484, [Mm0.9f]Gg =
0.480, and [Mm0.9f]gg = 0.554; i.e., the expected average ﬁtness with time discount
0.9 is 0.484, 0.480, 0.554 if we start with dominant, hybrid, and recessive genes, re-
spectively. Moreover, [Am0.9f]GG = 0.32, [Am0.9f]Gg = 0.3, and [Am0.9f]gg = 0.36:
the guaranteed average ﬁtness (with discount) is 0.32, 0.3, and 0.36, respectively.
Finally, the expected minimal undiscounted ﬁtness [Mf]q = 0.3 for all states q,
and the guaranteed maximal ﬁtness [Af]q = 0.3 for all states q.
Proposition 87 Wenote that the derived operators have the following semantic
characteristics:4
1. [T]M,q =  for everyM, q;
2. [F]M,q = ⊥ for everyM, q;
3. [ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]M,q = max([ϕ1]M,q, [ϕ2]M,q);
4. [γ1 ∨ γ2]M,λ = max([γ1]M,λ, [γ2]M,λ);
5. [Aγ]M,q = inf{[γ]M,λ | λ ∈ R(q)};
6. [cγ]M,λ = supi=0,1,...{ci[γ]M,λ[i..∞]};
7. [ϕ1 ∼= ϕ2]M,q =  if [ϕ1]M,q = [ϕ2]M,q, and⊥ otherwise.
The undiscounted versions of temporal operators “always” and “some-
time” have the usual relationship, but it does not transfer to the discounted
case. Moreover, discounted “always” is trivial for many domains.
Proposition 88 1. [γ]M,λ = [¬¬γ]M,λ,
2. [cγ]M,λ = 0 if c < 1 and Uˆ ⊆ R+ ∪ {0}.
8.4.3 Levels of Truth
Since every domainmust include adistinguished value for the classical (com-
plete) truth, validity of formulae can be deﬁned in a straightforward way.
Deﬁnition 61 (Levels of validity) LetM be aMarkov chain, q a state inM ,
and ϕ a formula of MTL0. Then:
• ϕ is true inM, q (writtenM, q |= ϕ) iff [ϕ]M,q = .
• ϕ is valid inM (writtenM |= ϕ) iff it is true in every state ofM .
4Proofs of propositions (omitted here due to lack of space) can be found in the technical
report [69].
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• ϕ is valid for Markov chains (written |= ϕ) iff it is valid in every Markov
chainM .
Example 42 Let M be the Markov chain from Figure 8.3 with additional util-
ity ﬂuents 0.3, 0.32 and 0.36 such that π(0.3, q) = 0.3, π(0.32, q) = 0.32, and
π(0.36, q) = 0.36 for all q ∈ St. Then, we have that M,GG |= Am0.9f ∼= 0.32,
M,Gg |= Am0.9f ∼= 0.3, and M, gg |= Am0.9f ∼= 0.36. Moreover, the following
formula is valid inM :M |= 0.3  Am0.9f ∧ Am0.9f  0.36.
Note that T is valid for Markov chains, while F is true in noM, q. Other
examples of validities are: Aγ ∼= A¬¬γ, Eγ ∼= E¬¬γ etc. (cf. Proposi-
tion 88.1).
Deﬁnition 61 enables the traditional view of MTL0 that identiﬁes “the
logic” with the set of valid formulae of that logic. Moreover, it allows to
deﬁne the typical decision problems for MTL0 in a natural way:
• Given a formula ϕ, the validity problem asks if |= ϕ;
• Given a formula ϕ, the satisﬁability problem asks if there areM, q such
thatM, q |= ϕ;
• Given a model M , state q and formula ϕ, the model checking problem
asks ifM, q |= ϕ. Alternatively, the output of model checking can be
deﬁned as the value of [ϕ]M,q.
An important corollary of Proposition 87.7 is that the notion of equiv-
alence deﬁned by ∼= is strong enough to make equivalent formulae inter-
changeable on all levels of validity.
Corollary 11 IfM, q |= ϕ1 ∼= ϕ2, and ψ′ is obtained from ψ through replacing
an occurrence of ϕ1 by ϕ2, thenM, q |= ψ iffM, q |= ψ′.
8.4.4 TransitionSystemsasMarkovChains. Correspon-
dence betweenMTL0 and CTL*
Markov chains can be seen as generalizations of transition systems, where
quantitative information is added via non-classical values of atomic state-
ments and probabilities of transitions. As action labels are absent inMarkov
chains, these in fact generalize unlabeled transition systems (UTS). In this
section, we redeﬁne UTS as a proper subclass of Markov chains, in which all
the ﬂuents can assume only classical truth values.
Deﬁnition 62 LetM be a Markov chain. Formula ϕ is propositional inM iff
it can take only the values of,⊥, i.e., [ϕ]M,q ∈ {,⊥} for all q ∈ St.
Propositions have a simple characterization for Markov chains.
Proposition 89 LetM be a Markov chain and ϕ a formula of MTL0. Then ϕ is
propositional inM iff formula (ϕ ∼= F) ∨ (ϕ ∼= T) is valid inM .
An unlabeled transition system can be deﬁned as aMarkov chainwith only
propositional ﬂuents. This way, we obtain the class of models that are used
for qualitative branching-time logics, i.e. CTL and CTL*. Of course, when
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interpreting formulae of CTL*, one must also ignore the probabilities that
are present in Markov chains. The next two propositions show that MTL0
strictly generalizes CTL*.
Proposition 90 LetM be a transition system, and ϕ a formula of CTL*. Then,
M, q |=MTL0 ϕ iffM, q |=CTL* ϕ.
Proposition 91 There is a transition system M with states q, q′ which cannot
be distinguished by any CTL* formula, and can be distinguished by a formula of
MTL0.
8.4.5 State-BasedMTL0
“CTLwithout star” (or “vanilla CTL”) is themost often used variant of com-
putation tree logic,mainly due to the complexity of itsmodel checkingprob-
lem and the fact that its semantics can be deﬁned entirely in relation to
states. “Vanilla” CTL can be seen as a syntactic restriction of CTL*, in which
every temporal modality is preceded by exactly one path quantiﬁer. In this
section, we consider a similar syntactic restriction on MTL0; we call it state-
basedMTL0.
Deﬁnition 63 State-based MTL0 (sMTL0 in short) is given by the following
grammar (where p ∈ Π stands for utility ﬂuents, and c ∈ (0, 1] for discount fac-
tors):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ⊕c ϕ | ϕ  ϕ | Eγ | Aγ | Mγ,
γ ::= c ϕ | cϕ | ϕUc ϕ | mcϕ.
Lemma 21 shows thatM c ϕ implements the discounted expected value
ofϕ in the nextmoment. Proposition 92 presents ﬁxpoint characterizations
for most modalities of sMTL0. The results from [33] suggest that Mc and
MUc do not have ﬁxpoint characterizations, but this remains to be formally
proven.
Lemma 21 Letϕ be a formula of sMTL0. Then, [M c ϕ]q = c
∑
q′∈τ(q)[ϕ]q′τ(q, q
′).
Proposition 92 The following formulae of sMTL0 are valid:
• Eϕ1 Uc ϕ2 ∼= ϕ2 ∨ ϕ1 ∧ E c Eϕ1 Uc ϕ2;
• Aϕ1 Uc ϕ2 ∼= ϕ2 ∨ ϕ1 ∧ A c Aϕ1 Uc ϕ2;
• Ecϕ ∼= ϕ ∧ E c Ecϕ;
• Acϕ ∼= ϕ ∧ A c Acϕ;
• Emcϕ ∼= ϕ⊕c E Emcϕ;
• Amcϕ ∼= ϕ⊕c A Amcϕ;
• Mmcϕ ∼= ϕ⊕c M Mmcϕ.
The above characterizations enable computing the truth values of most
sMTL0 formulae by solving sets of simple equations.
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Example 43 The valuations of formulaAm0.9f for statesGG,Gg, gg of the “gene
model” Markov chain can be derived from the following equations:
[Am0.9f]GG = 0.1 · 0.5 + 0.9min([Am0.9f]GG, [Am0.9f]Gg),
[Am0.9f]Gg = 0.1 · 0.3 + 0.9min([Am0.9f]GG, [Am0.9f]Gg,
[Am0.9f]gg),
[Am0.9f]gg = 0.1 · 0.9 + 0.9min([Am0.9f]Gg, [Am0.9f]gg).
8.5 MTL1: A Logic of Markov Decision Pro-
cesses
The main aim of this paper is to offer a systematic study of temporal oper-
ators for Markov chains; the study was presented in the previous section.
This section brieﬂy shows how MTL0 can be extended to strategic reason-
ing about Markov decision processes. We propose to use an explicit strate-
gic quantiﬁer 〈〈a〉〉, similar to the cooperation modality from alternating-time
temporal logic ATL. The intuitive meaning of 〈〈a〉〉ϕ is “themost that the de-
cision maker can make out of ϕ”. Note that there is always only one agent
behind anMDP, so putting his name (e.g., “a”) inside the operator is super-
ﬂuous – but it will make the framework easier to extend to the multi-agent
case in the future.
8.5.1 Syntax and Semantics ofMTL1
The syntax of MTL1 is given by the following grammar:
ϑ ::= p | ¬ϑ | ϑ ∧ ϑ | ϑ⊕c ϑ | ϑ  ϑ | 〈〈a〉〉ϕ,
ϕ ::= ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ⊕c ϕ | Eγ | Mγ,
γ ::= ϑ | ¬γ | γ ∧ γ | c γ | cγ | γ Uc γ | mcγ.
Note that a is just a ﬁxed symbol and not a parameter of the strategic opera-
tor.
LetM = 〈St,Act, τ, π〉 be a Markov decision process over domain D =
〈U,,⊥, u〉 and a set of utility ﬂuents Π. The truth value of formulae inM is
determined by the valuation function [·] that extends the valuation ofMTL0
formulae from Section 8.4.2 as follows:
• [p]M,q = π(p, q), for p ∈ Π;
• [¬ϑ]M,q = [ϑ]M,q;
• [ϑ1 ∧ ϑ2]M,q = min([ϑ1]q, [ϑ2]M,q);
• [ϑ1 ⊕c ϑ2]M,q = (1− c) · [ϑ1]M,q + c · [ϑ2]M,q;
• [ϑ1  ϑ2]M,q =  if [ϑ1]M,q ≤ [ϑ2]M,q and⊥ otherwise;
• [〈〈a〉〉ϕ]M,q = sup{[ϕ]M†s,q | s ∈ ΣM};
• [ϑ]M†s,λ = [ϑ]M,λ[0].
We use the same deﬁnitions of derived Boolean and temporal operators
as in Section 8.4.1. Additionally, we deﬁne ϑ1 ∼= ϑ2 ≡ ϑ1  ϑ2 ∧ ϑ2  ϑ1, and
[[a]]ϕ ≡ ¬〈〈a〉〉¬ϕ. The following proposition shows that [[a]]ϕ implements the
outcome of the worst possible policy with respect to ϕ.
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Proposition 93 [[[a]]ϕ]M,q = infs∈ΣM{[ϕ]M†s,q}.
Example 44 LetM be the “gene model” MDP from Figure 8.4. Then, we have
e.g. [〈〈a〉〉Mm0.9f]GG = 0.762, [〈〈a〉〉Mm0.9f]Gg = 0.791, and [〈〈a〉〉Mm0.9f]gg = 0.9.
Indeed, using only individuals with recessive genes for mating is the best policy
when we want to maximize the expected average ﬁtness discounted with 0.9.
On the other hand, mating with hybrids proves best if we want tominimize the
expected average ﬁtness (with discount 0.9) from stateGG on; for statesGg and gg,
mating with dominant genes gives the worst expectancy: [[[a]]Mm0.9f]GG = 0.484,
[[[a]]Mm0.9f]Gg = 0.464, and [[[a]]Mm0.9f]gg = 0.507.
We observe that various levels of satisfaction and validity of MTL1 for-
mulae (and thus also the typical computational problems) can be deﬁned
analogously to Section 8.4.3.
The semantic deﬁnition od 〈〈a〉〉 refers to the set of all stochastic policies
Σ, which suggests that looking for the best policy can be quite a complex
task. Is it possible to restrict the search to pure policies only? Unfortunately,
it turns out that it is not the case in general. However, we conjecture that an
analogous property should hold for the “state-based” fragment of MTL1.
Proposition 94 Let ϑ ≡ 〈〈a〉〉ϕ be a formula of MTL1. Then, the equation
[〈〈a〉〉ϕ]M,q = sups∈σM{[ϕ]M†s,q} does not hold. It does not even hold for labeled
transition systems, i.e., Markov decision processes where all the utility ﬂuents
take only classical truth values,⊥.
Conjecture 5 Let ϑ ≡ 〈〈a〉〉ϕ be a formula of MTL1 in which every temporal op-
erator is immediately preceded by exactly one path quantiﬁer, and every path quan-
tiﬁer is immediately preceded by exactly one strategic operator. Then: [〈〈a〉〉ϕ]M,q =
sups∈σM{[ϕ]M†s,q}.
8.5.2 BeyondMDP: theMulti-Agent Case
In the more general case, a system can include multiple agents/processes,
interacting with each other. Here, we only brieﬂy discuss howMarkov tem-
poral logic can be extended to handle such interaction.
On the language level, we propose to extend the strategic operator 〈〈a〉〉
to a family of operators 〈〈A〉〉, parameterized with groups of agents A. Intu-
itively 〈〈A〉〉ϕ refers to howmuch agents A can “make out of” ϕ by following
their best joint policy. Thiswould yield a language similar to the alternating-
time temporal logic ATL* from [8], albeit with strategic operators separated
from path quantiﬁers.
On the semantic level,multi-agentMarkov decisionprocesses [20] can be
used as models. The semantics 〈〈A〉〉ϕ should be of course based on themax-
imal value of ϕwith respect toA’s joint strategies. However, it is not entirely
clear how the other agents’ actions should be ﬁxed in order to instantiate the
MMDP to aMarkov chain. One option is to assume that the opponents play
a strategy that minimizes ϕ best. This way, operator 〈〈A〉〉 would correspond
to themaxminof the two-player gamewhereA is the (collective)maximizer,
and the rest of agents ﬁlls in the role of the (collective)minimizer. Still, such
a semantics would entail a very strong assumption, namely that the oppo-
nents ofAmust also play onlymemoryless strategies.
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8.6 Comparison to DCTL
Markov temporal logic (MTL), proposed in this paper, is in many respects
similar to the “Discounted CTL” (DCTL) by de Alfaro and colleagues [33].
This section lists some differences between both logics.
1. InDCTL, the set of truth values is [0, 1]. We keep the choicemore open:
it can be any continuous subset of R ∪ {−∞,+∞}.
2. MTL has more general syntax than DCTL: MTL0 extends CTL* and
MTL1 extends the single-agent fragment of ATL*, while de Alfaro et
al.’s DCTL extends only the “vanilla” CTL.
3. E,A are true path quantiﬁers in our framework, in the sense that they
refer to “limit properties” of paths. For aggregation of utilities via ex-
pected value, we propose a separate path operatorM. In contrast, [33]
propose a semantics in which both E,A are based on the expected re-
ward. In consequence, neither universal nor existential quantiﬁcation
on paths is expressible in DCTL for models with quantitative transi-
tion relations. One peculiar consequence of such approach is that the
DCTL’s Eγ yields the same truth value as Aγ for all Markov chains,
which is not the case in our framework. Another consequence is that
the semantics of path quantiﬁers in [33] is different for qualitative and
quantitative models, which is not the case in our semantics.
4. MTL includes the operator , which can serve both as a kind of crisp
material implication on fuzzy operands, and as a “defuzziﬁcation” op-
erator thatmaps quantitative characteristics to qualitative descriptions.
5. The last feature allows us to deﬁne the notions of satisfaction and va-
lidity. Thus, standard problems like satisﬁability and validity are prop-
erly deﬁned in our framework.
6. MTL includes the full “until” operator U , while DCTL includes only
“sometime” ().
7. We propose only the “path semantics” for MTL. We believe it is more
appropriate to introduce ﬁxpoint operators rather than to deﬁne two
different semantics of the same formulae.
8. In contrast to [33], we do not try to capture strategic properties of the
decision-making agent with temporal path quantiﬁers. Instead, we
propose to use an explicit strategic quantiﬁer 〈〈a〉〉.
In essence: we attempt at a more systematic exploration of linguistic fea-
tures that are offered by propositionalmodal logic for analysis ofMarkovian
models of agents.
8.7 Conclusions
Two kinds ofmodels are used inmulti-agent systems to represent and reason
about behavior of agents/processes: quantitative and qualitative ones. In
this paper, we suggest that both traditions are complementary rather than
competitive. In fact, we believe that an integration of both approaches may
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bring a really powerful framework for dealing with multi-agent systems. To
this, end, we propose Markov temporal logic MTL which can be seen as an
extension of “Discounted CTL” from [33]. We show that the simplest ver-
sion of MTL (for Markov chains) strictly extends the branching-time logic
CTL*, and we discuss some ﬁxpoint properties for a “state-based” subset of
the logic. Finally, we discuss how the basic logic can be extended to address
strategic abilities of agents in Markov decision processes, in a way similar to
ATL*.
Chapter 9
A Temporal Logic for
StochasticMulti-Agent
Systems
Abstract. Typical analysis of Markovianmodels of processes refers
only to the expected utility that can be obtained by the process. On
the other hand,modal logic offers a systematicmethod of character-
izing processes by combining various modal operators. A multival-
ued temporal logic forMarkov chains andMarkov decision processes
has been recently proposed in [71]. Here, we discuss how it can be ex-
tended to themulti-agent case. We relate the resulting logic to exist-
ing (two-valued) logics of strategic ability, and present ﬁxpoint char-
acterizations for some natural combinations of strategic and tempo-
ral operators.
Keywords: temporal logic, multi-agent system, Markov decision
process.
9.1 Introduction
There are many different models of agents and multi-agent systems; how-
ever,most of them follow a similar pattern. First of all, they include informa-
tion about possible situations (states of the system) that deﬁnes relations be-
tween states and their external characteristics (essentially, “facts of life” that
are true in these states). Second, they provide information about relation-
ships between states (e.g., possible transitions between states). Models that
share this structure can be, roughly speaking, divided into two classes. Qual-
itative models provide no numerical measures for these relationships. Quan-
titativemodels assume that relationships aremeasurable, andprovidenumer-
ical information about the degrees of relations. In [71], we explored analo-
gies between transition systems and Markovian models in order to provide
a more expressive language for reasoning about, and speciﬁcation of agents
in stochastic environments. In [72], we tentatively extended the framework
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to the multi-agent case. Here, we present some formal results on the multi-
agent version of the language.
Analysis of quantitative process models is usually based on the notion of
expected reward. On the other hand, logical approaches aremost often con-
cerned with “limit properties” like the existence of an execution path that
displays a speciﬁc temporal pattern. We believe that both kinds of prop-
erties are interesting and worth using to describe processes. For instance,
besides the expected value of cumulative future reward, we can ask of the
maximal (or minimal) cumulative reward. Or, we might be concerned with
the expected value of minimal guaranteed reward etc. A typical analysis
of multi-agent Markov decision processes is even more constrained, as we
assume that all the agents in the system cooperate to achieve a common
goal (i.e., maximize their common expected cumulative reward). Our ex-
tension allows to study the outcomes that can be obtained by various groups
of agents.
The roots of our proposal can be traced back to multivalued logics on
one hand (e.g., fuzzy logics [145] and probabilistic logics [110, 119]), and
(crisp) modal logics of probability [59, 10, 56] on the other. A closer inspira-
tion comes from multi-valued modal logics [50, 36, 90, 33, 97]. Of the lat-
ter, [90, 33, 97] are particularly relevant, as they deﬁnemulti-valued versions
of temporal logic. Still, the version ofMarkov Temporal Logic proposed here
is (to our best knowledge) the ﬁrst multivalued logic for reasoning about
strategic abilities of agents in stochastic multi-agent systems.
We begin by recalling the basic idea of Markov Temporal Logic (MTL)
from [71] (Section 9.2). The remaining sections present the original contri-
bution of the paper: the syntax and semantics of the multi-agent MTL was
only presented at a workshop with informal proceedings [72], and the theo-
retical results (relationship to ATL*, ﬁxpoint properties) are entirely new.
9.2 Markov Temporal Logic
In this section we recall the idea ofMarkov Temporal Logic (MTL) from [71].
The logic allows for ﬂexible reasoning about outcomes of agents acting in
stochastic environments. The core of the logic is calledMTL0, and addresses
outcomes of Markov chains. Intuitively, MTL0 can be seen as a quantitative
analogue of the branching-time logic CTL* [38].
9.2.1 BasicModels: Markov Chains
Typically, a Markov chain [100, 88] is a directed graph with probabilistic
transition relation. In our deﬁnition, we include also a device for assigning
states with utilities and/or propositional values. This is done through util-
ity ﬂuents which generalize atomic propositions in modal logic in the sense
that they can take both numerical and qualitative truth values.
Deﬁnition 64 (Domain of truth values) AdomainD = 〈U,,⊥, u〉 con-
sists of: (1) a set U ⊆ R of utility values (or simply utilities); (2) special val-
ues ,⊥ standing for the logical truth and falsity, respectively; Uˆ = U ∪ {,⊥}
will be called the extended utility set; and, ﬁnally, (3) a complement function
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u : Uˆ → Uˆ . A domain should satisfy the conditions speciﬁed in [71], omitted here
for lack of space.
Deﬁnition 65 (Markov chain) AMarkov chain over domainD = 〈U,,⊥, u〉,
and a set of utility ﬂuentsΠ is a tupleM = 〈St, τ, π〉, where:
• St is a set of states (we will assume that the set is ﬁnite and nonempty
throughout the rest of the paper);
• τ : St × St → [0, 1] is a stochastic transition relation that assigns each
pair of states q1, q2 with a probability τ(q1, q2) that, if the system is in q1, it
will change its state to q2 in the next moment. For every q1 ∈ St, τ(q1, ·) is
assumed to be a probability distribution, i.e.
∑
q∈St τ(q1, q) = 1.
By abuse of notation, we will sometimes write τ(q) to denote the set of states
accessible in one step from q, i.e. {q′ | τ(q, q′) > 0}.
• π : Π× St→ Uˆ is a valuation of utility ﬂuents.
A run in Markov chain M is an inﬁnite sequence of states q0q1 . . . such
that each qi+1 can follow qiwith a non-zero probability. The set of runs start-
ing from state q is denoted by RM (q).1 Let λ = q0q1... be a run and i ∈ N0.
Then: λ[i] = qi denotes the ith position in λ, and λ[i..∞] = qiqi+1 . . . denotes
the inﬁnite subpath of λ from position i on.
9.2.2 Logical Operators as Minimizers and Maximiz-
ers
Note that – when truth values represent utility of an agent – temporal oper-
ators “sometime” and “always” have a very natural interpretation. “Some-
time p” (p) can be rephrased as “p is achievable in the future”. Thus, under
the assumption that agents want to obtain as much utility as possible, it is
natural to view the operator as maximizing the utility value along a given
temporal path. Similarly, “always p” (p) can be rephrased as “p is guaran-
teed fromnowon”. In otherwords,p asks for theminimal value of pon the
path. On amore general level, every universal quantiﬁer is essentially amin-
imizer of truth values, while existential quantiﬁers can be seen as maximiz-
ers. Thus, Eγ (“there is a path such that γ”) maximizes the utility speciﬁed
by γ across all paths that can occur; likewise,Aγ (“for all paths γ”)minimizes
the value of γ across paths. Also, disjunction and conjunction can be seen
as amaximizer and aminimizer: ϕ∨ψ reads easily as “the utility that can be
achieved through ϕ or ψ”, while ϕ∧ψ reads as “utility guaranteed by both ϕ
and ψ”.
9.2.3 MTL0: A Logic ofMarkov Chains
Operators of MTL0 include path quantiﬁers E,A,M for the maximal, mini-
mal, and average outcome of a set of temporal paths, respectively, and tem-
poral operators,,m for themaximal,minimal, and average outcomealong
1If the model is clear from the context, the subscripts will be omitted.
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a given path.2 Propositional operators follow the same pattern: ∨,∧,⊕ re-
fer to maximization, minimization, and weighted average of outcomes ob-
tained from different utility channels or related to different goals. Finally,
we have the “defuzziﬁcation” operator , which provides a two-valued in-
terface to the logic. ϕ1  ϕ2 yields “true” if the outcome of ϕ1 is less or equal
toϕ2, and “false” otherwise. Amongother advantages, it allows to deﬁne the
classical computational problems of validity, satisﬁability andmodel check-
ing for MTL.
Let Bool(ω) = ¬ω | ω ∧ ω | ω ⊕c ω | ω  ω denote quasi-Boolean com-
binations of formulae of type ω. The syntax of MTL0 can be deﬁned by the
following production rules:
ϕ ::= p | Bool(ϕ) | Eγ | Mγ,
γ ::= ϕ | Bool(γ) | c γ | cγ | γ Uc γ | mcγ,
where p ∈ Π is a utility ﬂuent, and c is a discount factor such that 0 < c ≤ 1.
Additionally, we deﬁne ϕ1 ∼= ϕ2 ≡ (ϕ1  ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2  ϕ1). Boolean con-
stants T,F (“true”, “false”), disjunction, and the “sometime” temporal op-
erator are deﬁned in the standard way. The following shorthands are used
for discount-free versions of temporal operators:  ≡ 1 , ≡ 1, ≡
1, U ≡ U1 .
Example 45 Let r be a utility ﬂuent that represents the immediate reward at
each state. The following MTL0 formulae deﬁne some interesting characteristics
of a process: Mm0.9r (expected average reward with time discount 0.9), Am0.9r
(guaranteed average reward with the same discount factor), Mr (expected min-
imal undiscounted reward), and Ar (guaranteed maximal reward).
The main idea behind MTL0 is that formulae can refer to both quanti-
tative utilities and qualitative truth values. Thus, we treat complex formu-
lae as ﬂuents, just like the atomic utility ﬂuents from Π, through a valua-
tion function that assigns formulae with extended utility values from Uˆ . Let
M = 〈St, τ, π〉 be a Markov chain over domain D = 〈U,,⊥, u〉 and a set of
utility ﬂuentsΠ. The valuation function [·] is deﬁned below.
• [p]M,q = π(p, q), for p ∈ Π;
• [¬ϕ]M,q = [ϕ]M,q;
• [ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2]M,q = min([ϕ1]M,q, [ϕ2]M,q);
• [ϕ1 ⊕c ϕ2]M,q = (1− c) · [ϕ1]M,q + c · [ϕ2]M,q;
• [ϕ1  ϕ2]M,q =  if [ϕ1]M,q ≤ [ϕ2]M,q and⊥ else;
• [Eγ]M,q = sup{[γ]M,λ | λ ∈ R(q)};
• The Markovian path quantiﬁerMγ produces the expected truth value
γ across all the possible runs, cf. [88] for the formal construction;
• [ϕ]M,λ = [ϕ]M,λ[0];
• [¬γ]M,λ, [γ1 ∧ γ2]M,λ, [γ1 ⊕c γ2]M,λ, [γ1  γ2]M,λ: analogous to Boolean
combinations of “state formulae” ϕ;
2We allow to discount future outcomes with a discount factor c. Also, we introduce the “un-
til” operator U , which is more general than.
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• [ c γ]M,λ = c · [γ]M,λ[1..∞];
• [cγ]M,λ = infi=0,1,...{ci[γ]M,λ[i..∞]};
• [γ1 Uc γ2]M,λ = supi=0,1,...
{
min( min0≤j<i{cj [γ1]M,λ[j..∞]}, ci[γ2]M,λ[i..∞])
}
;
• TheMarkovian temporal operatormc produces the average discounted
reward along the given run:
[mcγ]M,λ =⎧⎨⎩ (1− c)
∑∞
i=0 c
i[γ]M,λ[i...∞] if c < 1
lim supi→∞
1
i+1
∑ i
j=0[γ]M,λ[j...∞]+lim infi→∞
1
i+1
∑ i
j=0[γ]M,λ[j...∞]
2 if c = 1
9.3 Reasoning about StochasticMulti-Agent
Processes
Strategic abilities were already considered in MTL1, the version of Markov
Temporal Logic for reasoning about Markov decision processes [71]. In con-
sequence, MTL1 can be seen as a quantitative analogue of the single-agent
fragment of ATL* [8] withmemoryless strategies. In themore general case, a
system can include multiple agents/processes, interacting with each other.
To address their properties, a family of operators 〈〈A〉〉 can be used, parame-
terizedwith groups of agentsA. Intuitively, 〈〈A〉〉ϕ refers to howmuch agents
A can “make out of” ϕ by following their best joint policy. This yields a lan-
guage similar to the alternating-time temporal logic ATL* from [8], albeit
with strategic operators separated from path quantiﬁers.
Markov decision processes [16, 15] extend Markov chains with an ex-
plicit action structure: transitions are generated by actions of an (implicit)
decision maker. Multi-agent Markov decision processes (MMDP) [20] extend
Markov decision processes to themulti-agent setting: transitions are now la-
beled by combinations of agents’ actions. Weobserve the similarity between
MMDP’s and concurrent game structures which are the models of ATL* (cf.
Figure 9.1).
As models for our multi-agent MTL, we will use a reﬁnement of MMDP’s
similar to the version of Markov chains presented in Section 9.2.1. The se-
mantics of 〈〈A〉〉ϕ is based on maximization of the value of ϕ with respect
to A’s joint strategies. We assume that the opponents play a strategy that
minimizes ϕ most. This way, operator 〈〈A〉〉 corresponds to the maxmin of
the two-player game where A is the (collective) maximizer, and the rest of
agents ﬁlls in the role of the (collective) minimizer. Note that such a se-
mantics entails that the opponents ofAmust also play onlymemoryless (i.e.,
Markovian) strategies.
9.3.1 MTL2: Syntax
LetAgt be the set of all agents. MTL2 adds toMTL0 a family of operators 〈〈A〉〉,
one for each group of agentsA ⊆ Agt. Formally, the syntax of MTL2 is given
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q1
q2
q3
 :0.5
 :0.5
 :1.0
 :0.2
 :0.1
 :0.7
 :1.0
 :0.3
 :0.7R=0.2
R=0
R=1
 :1.0
 :0.1
 :0.9
q1
q2
q3












p=	
q=	
p=	
q=
	
p=
q=	
	
Figure 9.1: (A) Simple MMDP with two agents; (B) Simple concurrent
game structure
by the following grammar:
ϑ ::= p | Bool(ϑ) | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ,
ϕ ::= ϑ | Bool(ϕ) | Eγ | Mγ,
γ ::= ϕ | Bool(γ) | c γ | cγ | γ Uc γ | mcγ.
An example formula ofMTL2 is 〈〈1, 2〉〉Amrwhichmakes agents 1 and 2maxi-
mize the guaranteed average reward rwith respect to their available policies.
9.3.2 MTL2: Semantics
The semantics of MTL2 is deﬁned for a version of multi-agent Markov de-
cision processes that incorporates qualitative as well as quantitative atomic
properties of states.
Deﬁnition 66 (MMDP) Amulti-agentMarkovdecisionprocess over domain
D = 〈U,,⊥, u〉 and utility ﬂuents Π is a tupleM = 〈Agt, St, {Acti}i∈Agt, τ, π〉,
where: St, π are like in aMarkov chain,Agt = {1, . . . , k} is the set of agents,Acti
is the set of individual actions of agent i, and Act =
∏
i∈Agt Acti is the space
of joint actions (action proﬁles). τ : St × Act × St → [0, 1] is a stochastic
transition relation; τ(q1, α, q2) deﬁnes the probability that, if the system is in q1
and the agents execute α, the next state will be q2. For every q ∈ St, α ∈ Act, we
assume that either (1) τ(q, α, q′) = 0 for all q′ (i.e., α is not enabled in q), or (2)
τ(q, α, ·) is a probability distribution. Additionally, we deﬁne act(q) = {α ∈ Act |
∃q′.τ(q, α, q′) > 0} as the set of enabled action proﬁles in q.
For a joint action α, we deﬁne αi to denote agent i’s individual part in
α, and we extend the notation to sets of joint actions and agents. Also, let
A be a set of action proﬁles, and α a collective action of agents A. Then,
A|α = {β ∈ A | βA = α} is the set of action proﬁles that include α.
A policy is a conditional plan that speciﬁes future actions of an agent.
Policies canbe stochastic aswell, thus allowing for randomness in the agent’s
play.
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Deﬁnition 67 An individual strategy (policy) of agent i is a function si :
St × Acti → [0, 1] that assigns each state q with a probability distribution over
i’s enabled actions act(q)i. That is, s(q, αi) ∈ [0, 1] for all q ∈ St, αi ∈ act(q)i,
and
∑
αi∈act(q)i s(q, αi) = 1. Values of s(q, αi) for αi /∈ act(q)i are irrelevant. The
set of all i′s strategies is denoted byΣi. A collective strategy sA for teamA ⊆ Agt
is simply a tuple of individual strategies, one per agent from A. The set of all A’s
collective strategies is given byΣA =
∏
i∈A Σi. The set of all strategy proﬁles in a
model is given by Σ = ΣAgt.
For a collective strategy s, we deﬁne si as the i’s individual part in s. We
also extend the notation to sets of agents.
Deﬁnition 68 Policy s ∈ ΣA instantiates multi-agent Markov decision pro-
cess M = 〈Agt, St, {Acti}i∈Agt, τ, π〉 to a simpler multi-agent MDP M † s =
〈Agt \A,St, {Acti}i∈Agt\A, τ ′, π〉with
τ ′(q, α, q′) =
∑
α′∈(act(q)|α)
(
∏
i∈A
si(q, α′)) τ(q, α′, q′).
IfA = Agt, then s instantiatesM to a Markov chain.
The semantics of MTL2 extends that of MTL0 with the following clauses:
• [p]M,q = π(p, q), for p ∈ Π;
• [¬ϑ]M,q, [ϑ1 ∧ ϑ2]M,q, [ϑ1 ⊕c ϑ2]M,q, [ϑ1  ϑ2]M,q: analogous as for “state
formulae” ϕ;
• [〈〈A〉〉ϕ]M,q = sups∈ΣA inft∈ΣAgt\A{[ϕ]M†〈s,t〉,q};
In order to keep consistent with qualitative logics of strategic ability, we as-
sume that instantiation of an MMDP by a policy s is “soft” in the sense
that nested strategic operators discard previous instantiations and instan-
tiate the original model again: [〈〈A〉〉ϕ]M†s,q = [〈〈A〉〉ϕ]M,q.
Example 46 Consider themulti-agentMarkov decision process fromFigure 9.1A,
consisting of two agents (1 and 2). If the agents cooperate, they can maximize
the expected achievable reward quite successfully, as [〈〈1, 2〉〉MR]q1 = 0.9 (best
policy: both agents play β in q1 with probability 1; the choices at other states
are irrelevant). If agent 1 is to maximize the expected achievable reward on his
own, against adversary behavior of agent 2, then he is bound to be less successful:
[〈〈1〉〉MR]q1 = 0.6. Also, in this case agent 1 should employ a different policy,
namely play α in q1 with probability 1.
9.4 Formal Results
The semantics ofMTL, presented in the previous section, portrays it as a lan-
guage of arithmetic expressions that can be used to deﬁne numerical char-
acteristics of Markov processes. However, MTL can be also seen as a logic,
i.e. a set of sentences that are true in some contexts, and false (at least to a
degree) in others. This view allows us to use the conceptual apparatus of
mathematical logic to study e.g. the expressivity of the language. Also, we
can state interesting properties of the domain (multi-agent stochastic pro-
cesses) through formulae of MTL. To this end, we ﬁrst deﬁne what it means
for a formula to be valid and/or satisﬁable.
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9.4.1 Levels of Truth
Since every domainmust include adistinguished value for the classical (com-
plete) truth, validity of formulae can be deﬁned in a straightforward way.
Deﬁnition 69 (Levels of validity) LetM be amulti-agentMarkov decision
process, q a state inM, and ϑ a formula of MTL2. Then:
• ϑ is true inM, q (writtenM, q |= ϑ) iff [ϑ]M,q = .
• ϑ is valid inM (writtenM |= ϑ) iff it is true in every state ofM.
• ϑ is valid for multi-agent Markov decision processes (written |= ϑ) iff it
is valid in every MMDPM.
• Additionally, for path formulae γ, we can say that γ holds on run λ inMMDP
M (writtenM, λ |= γ) iff [γ]M,λ = .
The notion of validity helps to express general properties of stochastic
multi-agent systems in a neat logical way. Moreover, Deﬁnition 69 allows to
deﬁne the typical decision problems for MTL2 in a natural way:
• Given a formula ϑ, the validity problem asks if |= ϑ;
• Given a formula ϑ, the satisﬁability problem asks if there areM, q such
thatM, q |= ϑ;
• Given a modelM, state q and formula ϑ, the model checking problem
asks ifM, q |= ϑ.
For example, we can search for a model in which agent a can guarantee
the average reward r to be at least 0.6 in the long run by solving the satisﬁa-
bility problem for formula 0.6  〈〈a〉〉Amr.
We consider model checking the most important of the three problems,
since in the analysis of a stochastic system the domain speciﬁcation is usu-
ally given by a procedural representation (rather than axiomatic theory).
Some work on model checking multi-valued temporal logics has been re-
ported in [90, 33]. Perhaps evenmore importantly, computing approximate
“solutions” ofMDP’s is one of the central issues studied by theMarkov com-
munity. Integration of the two approaches seems a very promising (and ex-
citing) path for future research.
9.4.2 Concurrent Game Structures asMMDP’s. Corre-
spondence betweenMTL2 andATL*
Multi-agentMarkovdecisionprocesses canbe seen as generalizations of con-
current game structures [8], in which quantitative information is added
through non-classical values of atomic statements and probabilities of tran-
sitions. Conversely, concurrent game structures can be seen as a subclass of
MMDP’s with all ﬂuents assuming only classical truth values.
Deﬁnition 70 LetM be anMMDP. Formulaϕ is propositional inM iff it can
take only the values of ,⊥, i.e., [ϕ]M,q ∈ {,⊥} for all q ∈ St. A concurrent
game structure is an MMDP with only propositional ﬂuents.
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This way, we obtain the class ofmodels that are used for qualitative alter-
nating-time logics, i.e. ATL and ATL*. Of course, when interpreting formu-
lae of qualitative ATL/ATL*, one must as well ignore the probabilities that
are present inMarkov decision processes. Note also that the semantics of the
original ATL/ATL* uses the “history-based” notion of a strategy (i.e., strate-
gies assign choices to histories rather than single states), while our MTL2 is
underpinned by a much weaker notion ofmemoryless (or positional) strate-
gies. This makes the two logics formally incomparable. However, we can
show that MTL2 strictly generalizes the memoryless version of ATL*. The
latter was studied in [121] under the acronym of ATLIr* (ATL with Perfect
Information and imperfect recall), and we will use the name here.
Proposition 95 LetM be a transition system, andϕ a formula of ATLIr*. More-
over, let ϕ′ be the result of replacing every occurrence of 〈〈A〉〉 with 〈〈A〉〉A in ϕ for
allA ⊆ Agt. Then,M, q |=MTL2 ϕ′ iffM, q |=ATLIR* ϕ.
Proof sketch Let σA denote the set of deterministic memoryless strategies of
group A.3 The proof follows by induction on the structure of ϕ; here, we
only sketch the induction step for the most important case, namely ϕ ≡
〈〈A〉〉
Ir
γ. We recall from [121] the semantics of 〈〈A〉〉
Ir
: let outM(q, s) be the set
of paths inM that can result from execution of strategy s from state q on;
then,M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
Ir
γ iff there is s ∈ σA such that for every λ ∈ outM(q, s)we
haveM, λ |= γ.
“MTL2 ⇒ATLIr*”: LetM, q |=MTL2 〈〈A〉〉Aγ. Then, [〈〈A〉〉Aγ]M,q = , and
so sups∈ΣA inft∈ΣAgt\A infλ∈RM†〈s,t〉(q)[γ]M†〈s,t〉,λ = ; let s∗ be a strategy that
maximizes the above expression. Note that all the state subformulae of γ
will be in fact evaluated in the original MMDP M, so we get that
inft∈ΣAgt\A infλ∈RM†〈s∗,t〉(q)[γ]M,λ = . Thus, ∀t∈ΣAgt\A∀λ∈RM†〈s∗,t〉(q)[γ]M,λ =
, and by induction we obtain that ∀t∈ΣAgt\A∀λ∈RM†〈s∗,t〉(q)M, λ |=ATLIR* γ.
Now we observe that if s ∈ ΣA is a randomized strategy and $s% ∈ σA is
any determinization of s then RM†〈s,t〉(q) ⊆ RM†〈s,t〉(q), so also for $s∗%
we have that ∀t∈ΣAgt\A∀λ∈RM†〈s∗,t〉(q)M, λ |=ATLIR* γ. Finally, we take t to be
the uniform randomized strategy of Agt \ A since it does not remove any
paths from themodel:RM†〈s∗,uniform〉(q) = outM(q, $s∗%). In consequence,
∀λ∈outM(q,s∗)M, λ |=ATLIR* γ, which concludes this part of the proof.
“ATLIr*⇐MTL2”: Let M, q |=ATLIR* 〈〈A〉〉Irγ. Then, ∃s∈σA∀λ∈outM(q,s)M, λ |=ATLIR* γ. We take such s. By induction, ∀λ∈outM(q,s)M, λ |=MTL2 γ. Take
any t ∈ ΣAgt\A, then RM†〈s,t〉(q) ⊆ outM(q, s), and hence also ∀λ∈RM†〈s,t〉(q)
M, λ |=MTL2 γ. As σA ⊆ ΣA, we ﬁnally get that∃s∈ΣA∀t∈ΣAgt\A∀λ∈RM†〈s,t〉(q)M, λ |=MTL2 γ. In consequence, sups∈ΣA inft∈ΣAgt\A
infλ∈RM†〈s,t〉(q)[γ]M†〈s,t〉,λ = , which concludes the proof. 
Proposition 96 There is a transition systemM with states q, q′ which cannot
be distinguished by any formula of ATL* nor ATLIr*, and can be distinguished by
a formula of MTL2.
Proof Consider the transition system in Figure 9.2, which can be seen as
a concurrent game structure with a single agent (Agt = {1}) and a single
3Recall thatΣA is the set of all (possibly randomized) memoryless strategies ofA.
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Figure 9.2: MTL2 vs. ATL*: probabilities matter!
action that can be executed (Act = {α}). Note that states q1, q2 are bisimilar
under CTL* bisimulation, so the same CTL* properties hold in both states
(cf. e.g. [104]). Since the agent cannotmake any real choices, both ATL* and
ATLIr* have nomore distinguishing power for thismodel as CTL*, andhence
the same properties of ATL* (resp. ATLIr*) hold in q1, q2 as well.
On the other hand, we have that [〈〈1〉〉Mmp]q1 = 0.5 = [〈〈1〉〉Em0.5p]q1 ,
and [〈〈1〉〉Mmp]q2 = 0.1 = 0.5 = [〈〈1〉〉Em0.5p]q2 . Thus, for ϕ ≡ (〈〈1〉〉Mmp ∼=
〈〈1〉〉Em0.5p), we have q1 |= ϕ and q2 |= ϕ (and even q2 |= ¬ϕ). 
The above example shows that a proper notionof bisimulation forMarkov
decision processes must take into account transition probabilities.
9.4.3 State-Based Formulae and Bellman Equations
“ATL without star” (or “vanilla ATL”) is themost often used variant of alter-
nating-time temporal logic,mainly due to the complexity of itsmodel check-
ing problem and the fact that its semantics can be deﬁned entirely in rela-
tion to states. “Vanilla” ATL can be seen as a syntactic restriction of ATL*, in
which every temporal modality is preceded by exactly one path quantiﬁer.
In this section, we consider a similar syntactic restriction onMTL2; we call it
state-basedMTL2.
Deﬁnition 71 State-basedMTL2 (sMTL2 in short) is given as follows:
ϑ ::= p | Bool(ϑ) | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ,
ϕ ::= Eγ | Mγ,
γ ::= c ϑ | cϑ | ϑUc ϑ | mcϑ.
Proposition 97 presents ﬁxpoint characterizations formostmodalities of
sMTL2. Note that the last validity from the list is in fact amodal formulation
of Bellman equation, which is the basic law used in analysis of Markov deci-
sion processes. The other formulae can be seen as variants of the equation
for non-standard analysis based on minimal/maximal rather than average
rewards. The results from [33] suggest that 〈〈A〉〉Mc and 〈〈A〉〉MUc do not
have ﬁxpoint characterizations, but this remains to be formally proven.
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Proposition 97 The following formulae of sMTL2 are valid:
• 〈〈A〉〉Ecϕ ∼= ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉E c 〈〈A〉〉Ecϕ;
• 〈〈A〉〉Acϕ ∼= ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉A c 〈〈A〉〉Acϕ;
• 〈〈A〉〉Eϕ1 Uc ϕ2 ∼= ϕ2 ∨ ϕ1 ∧ 〈〈A〉〉E c 〈〈A〉〉Eϕ1 Uc ϕ2;
• 〈〈A〉〉Aϕ1 Uc ϕ2 ∼= ϕ2 ∨ ϕ1 ∧ 〈〈A〉〉A c 〈〈A〉〉Aϕ1 Uc ϕ2;
• 〈〈A〉〉Emcϕ ∼= ϕ⊕c 〈〈A〉〉E 〈〈A〉〉Emcϕ;
• 〈〈A〉〉Amcϕ ∼= ϕ⊕c 〈〈A〉〉A 〈〈A〉〉Amcϕ;
• 〈〈A〉〉Mmcϕ ∼= ϕ⊕c 〈〈A〉〉M 〈〈A〉〉Mmcϕ.
Proof sketch We will sketch the proof of the ﬁrst validity; the others can be
proved in an analogous way.
Let L = [〈〈A〉〉Ecϕ]M,q andR = [ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉E c 〈〈A〉〉Ecϕ]M,q. Then:
R = min([ϕ]M,q,
c · sups∈ΣA inft∈ΣAgt\A supq′∈τM†〈s,t〉(q) sups′∈ΣA inft′∈ΣAgt\A{[Ecϕ]M†〈s′,t′〉,q′}).
Moreover, by [71, Proposition 8], we get that
L = min([ϕ]M,q, c · sups∈ΣA inft∈ΣAgt\A supq′∈τM†〈s,t〉(q){[Ecϕ]M†〈s,t〉,q′}).
Thus, in order to prove L = R, it is sufﬁcient to prove that
sups∈ΣA inft∈ΣAgt\A supq′∈τM†〈s,t〉(q){[Ecϕ]M†〈s,t〉,q′}
= sups∈ΣA inft∈ΣAgt\A supq′∈τM†〈s,t〉(q) sups′∈ΣA inft′∈ΣAgt\A{[Ecϕ]M†〈s′,t′〉,q′}.
The difference between the sides of the equation is that in the left hand
side optimal strategies s, t are chosen once (at state q), while in the right
hand side strategies are re-evaluated after each step. Let s∗ be a strategy of
A that optimizes L, and let us take s and s′ in R to be the same as s∗ in L.
We observe that inft∈ΣAgt\A supq′∈τM†〈s∗,t〉(q){[Ecϕ]M†〈s∗,t〉,q′} is indeed equal
to inft∈ΣAgt\A supq′∈τM†〈s∗,t〉(q) inft′∈ΣAgt\A{[Ecϕ]M†〈s∗,t′〉,q′}. Thus, we obtain
thatA have at least as good options inR as in L, and hence L ≤ R.
For the other direction, note that s, t inR are only relevantwrt the agents’
actions in state q (later s′, t′ will be used). By unfolding R, we obtain an in-
ﬁnite sequence of collective action proﬁles sn(qn), tn(qn) which maximize
(over A’s actions) and minimize (over Agt \ A’s actions) the value of Ecϕ
in the next step. Now we observe that, when the system returns to state q,
the same strategies s, t will be again optimal for the respective parties since
the same expression will be maximized/minimized. Thus, the sequence of
action proﬁles can be combined into a single pair of memoryless strategies
s∗, t∗, whichmaximizes/minimizes Ecϕ as good as the original sequence of
strategies. In consequence, alsoR ≤ L. 
9.5 Conclusions
We extend the Markov Temporal Logic MTL from [71] to handle Markovian
models with multiple agents acting in parallel. In terms of formal results,
we show that the resulting logic strictly embeds ATLIr*, i.e., alternating-time
temporal logic withmemoryless strategies. We also present ﬁxpoint charac-
terizations for some natural combinations of strategic, path, and temporal
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operators, that can be seen as analogues of Bellman equation. The charac-
terizations enable computing the truth values of many MTL2 formulae by
solving sets of simple equations.
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